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The fa ta l disturbances o f 1906-8 have to 1m ««m  aralnet 
the social* econoaio sad p o lit ica l frssevcrk o f the colony* end 
a distinction  has to be A tm  between the paet hie to 17 o f Sulu- 
land and that o f fata l itse lf*
la  both arena however lead and labour p o licies  and eon- 
aid arable African poverty were the uaderlylaa eaaee o f unrest 
and the 190$ f e l l  feat has to be linked to th is, the breakdown 
in ccm ini cation betveeea blank end white wee aeaif acted la a 
spate o f h ostile  rumours aaongst both eroape about the inteatlone 
o f the other* ratal headline o f opposition to the Pell fan and 
the declaration o f Martial leer a fter a relatively minor incident 
acted as a precipitant o f further violence*
Darina the dieturtaanoeet reepaaaee varied from ohiefdoa to 
ohiefdom and even within ch ief dome* frequently Mile wae related 
to the worklnge o f traditional p o litie s . Ac sign ificant ae why 
certain people rebelled le  why others did not* In this the peat 
history o f the group mm highly relevant*
Despite a widespread b e lie f that Dlnasalu was behind the 
rebellion  end the unrest la Mainland in 1907» this is  9not proven9
v
although hie none wae used by the rebels ee an essential central- 
lain# device*
Allegations that the 'Ethiopian1 Cburohee vara saaponaihla 
fo r  tha outbreak and that Ohrletiaa Afriaaaa had played a pro- 
niaeat part ia  tha raballioa vara exaggerated, although Ohrlatiaa- 
iaapirad a llle a la l b e lie f a aoatribatad to tha f  aaaaat *a fa ta l.
Ia tha loa* term, although tha raballioa vaa a atrihiag 
daaoaatratioa o f tha neat af anud reefataaee, i t  aoatribatad 
to tha groviag aeaaa o f tha aaad fa r p o litla a l ualtp aaaqgat 
both bleak and ahita ia  South ifrlea*
a r ii
In the spelling o f 2*1* ***** I have tried to uee the 
Dost recent orthography abtra this is  known, though occasionally 
this has produced name which art unfaalllars thus fcibhebhu 
rather thus Hsibehu or Slbepu, 2s * auaber of ess so h om tr 
It has proTsd lnpoeelfcie to determine the correct orthography.
The same •THoako1 for enmple also oaeurs frequently aa Tllonkve 
and Tilongo. Where applicable, is  these instances 2 here fol~ 
low * th.  *Mfl« in J«MB sto u t* . & & *£*% ..£?■.S4y 
When this has failed, T hem used the met frequently found rerelcn 
in the primary eouroes.
In the ease o f plurals, in general both the 2nlu prefix  
and the Bagllsh su ffix  here been oadtted* thus Zulu end ln&una 
rather then ^  Indunas or lslnduna. Certain hdu prefixes
hare hcverer been retained where this has been leee eluneyt e .g . 
Bantu (rather than Htu) and abanuaaana rather than aanaane.
Tha follovlag athraviitleia hare been used la the foot- 
aotee ead tssti
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AihwAii|1ti| help given la  the pssdastlaa o f a theaie 
le  an invidious tasks ae aaoqr people eontrlbute, both direetly 
end ind irectly . l i n t  md fereaost, X aaat thank ay super- 
▼ie©re, Professors John Fage and Roland O liver, aad ay aaUaagaaa 
at the Saheal e f Orleatal aad Afrlaaa Studies, aat euly fa r la* 
aadiata advise, ehlah aaa generously given, bat eleo fo r  eaebllag 
ae to aea South AfrAesa history la the eoateat af Afbiaaa history.
A speelal intallaataal debt la  oved also to Professor George 
Shsppsreea, whoso Inde&oadoat Afrloaa fira t  aat a t thlaklag ahaat 
colonial rabaUloaa in general and tha Ratal diaturbanoee la  
partlealar, aad uheae aftvlaa la  tha vary aarly stages af thia work 
vaa both aaafa l  aad at lanl a tlag*
Stay Xbrarlea and Ubrarlaaa bar a aada agr tank eeaior. 
Particular grnUtuda la  fa it  fo r  tha aeaataat kindneaa, ladaad 
indulgence, o f tha llbaarlaaa aad tha ever surprising raaaaraaa 
o f tha llhravy o f tha Royal Oonaonwoalth oeletyj fa r tha h a lf- 
falaeaa af the Fatal arch ivist, Sr. ~«rsrtea, aad hia seals taste, 
tha lata £1111# Cdnpbell o f Durban aad tha librarleaa at tha In­
stitu te  o f Coxaoawealth Studlec aad 1ha School o f Orleatal end 
Afriaaa Studies, Deaden, aad Shades Souse, Oxford. A ward of 
thanks ia  also da# to Xrr. bade vho helped type the fir a t  draft 
o f thia thesis, and to Mrs. I ,  Fuller she took ea aaaa than aha 
had bargained far when aha agreed to type tha fin a l aaauaaript.
Tha Central Research Fuad o f tha university o f London provided 
a grant fo r  tha traaalatlea o f lanteglaa ataaloaary aaterlal, ifelah 
vaa both found and vary kindly translated fo r  no by tha Rev, X. X. 
Xedae o f tha Xorvagiaa Xiaaionary Xaaiaty, Ira . Dope Fngal vary 
generously helped with the translation o f Sanaa aieaioa reports.
Finally this thesis m at ba dedicated to ay husband, without 
vhaaa prodding i t  would net hare been written, and to Lam aad 
S afi, ia  aplte a f uhea i t  baa baas written.
Content*
AIM treat «• ♦♦ »• «« #• •« m  ••
Zulu orthography •* •• •« •« •• ••
Abbreviation a M «• •• ♦♦ »* •• ••
AoknovladgssontB •« •# *« »• • * • »
IstlOh&OtiOn •• »• • « mm •« •• mm
Chapter X -The Joloa iil Irstowoik •• M
Chapter XX A L'lgreaaloa lata 2uln E i*tory,,
Chapter XIX - The Colonial f r aaeeorfc: I*t*rd<p**4~
aaaa »• •• •• *• »• «•
Chapter It h a sv n  eat 1*4 Berria*e » . » .
Chapter f  The l U l t t p  Teeter M •« »»
Chapter TI - Traditional P eiltlee  in a Oelealal
Sattla* mm mm mm mm mm
Chapter YXX 2otlu BaaXet . .  •« «» «*
Chapter YXXX The Xolva Coanunity •• •« . .
Chapter XX Xpllega# • • •« •• «« ••
3*1 eat Bibliography •• •• »« •* «* M
pare
1
3
4
7
9
53
92
143
211
271
370
429
506
560
613.
iMi£S^&SiSbt
Cm the 6th February, 1906 Colonial O ffice o ffic ia ls  
in London were startled aad M eauysrt to s c cd rc  a telegraph free 
the Ccvcmcr o f Metal that two shite police o ffice rs  had heea 
•hot in an attcapt to arrcat a areap of Afrioea trlbceeen ea 
the fare frewirrle* near the Tillage o f hrrcEtanau the eolonlata 
thcasclTcc ware an startled, i f  rather lean surprised* The la - 
poeltloa o f a f e l l  Tax at the end e f 1905 ea a ll admit aalaa in 
the aaltiracia l ooloay lad te wideepread oppoaitioa froa the 
Afrioaa majority. Through the long, bet anaaar aoatba vuaour 
ran r io t aad whea Afrieaan started k illin g  white aaiaala sad 
destroying laplsasats e f tureyeen aawifbetars, i t  was given tha 
nost s ia istsr interpretation. Magistrates attempting te so il sot 
ths Pell Tea at the bsgtnwlnc o f 1906 were act tor angry ifrlesae 
bread!sMa* wsspone and with ths k illin g  of two poleanea aost 
whites thonfht caasral rebellion 1 sal newt sad Inert table* The 
ataoaphers was ftrtln r  Infl Mad shea it  was learnt that tha an—ft 
a— were a—be— o f — lfrieea  independent church, aid the following 
day Partial V— waa declared throughout tha colony*
The M ilitia  waa alerted aad tha fata l Plaid Posse wader 
S ir Duncan MeKernels despatched to the Midlands sad South la ta l, 
both to hunt oat ths Trswirais •aurdere— * sad te deter reportedly 
hostile chiefs froa —tire  rebellion* la  e l l ,  between 10th February
and 50th larch aiaa ahlafa vara flnad lasga nuahara c f ahaap 
•ad oattla , aropa aeaflaaatod aU fcrcala h n t »  la h a  hallaf 
that paopla vara doataxlac thaaaalma for aur aad prcparlnc to 
f l 4frt rathor thaa par tha ‘tea* Oa Vahmai? 15th, trc o f tha 
African paartlalpaata ia tha Trcrvl«d.a affray vara aaptarad aad 
■hot hr ttrumhaad Court la r t ia l. aad* aftar a laatlhp Oaart har t laT 
hald at Klehaoad. a furthar tvalm  « f  tha partlalpaBta vara ahat 
fo r  tha oaaa offaaaa on 2nd A pril, daapita aa abortlm  attaapt 
aa tha part a f tha Colonial Off lee to dalagr tha rcaw tloaa.
On tha 13th Tateuarj, a battalion af tha vuaan*a Oa 
Ei*hl«ad*ara vara atntimad at Fiatanarttsbum  at U w aaiM t of 
Ratal alnlatara, aad hattlaahlp M.I«8«Iarndi:6hoie doahad at Barhaa 
a waak bafora atfhadala. Zt vaa fa it  la Ratal thaaa aotlaaa veuld 
hara a profound moral affaat an tha ifrlaaan. Za London, thagr 
a l l i l  to the fooling of gemersl oftfrsortt n d  xtspeudM Iity fe lt  
about e ffe ise  ia Betel*
Cm the lith  febxuary e aeeond eoluaa# the TJhvoti Mounted 
K iflee under Col* George Lemobers, m i despatched to the Tapaaulo 
divisoa, where •punitive1 notion was taken egei&et a miaber of 
eh lefs, the moat Important being dgoblmcmbe* Hceenl and Svalaane, 
whose people had been •defiant9 over tha taxa Within a month this 
aolmam had bean disbanded.
So fa r  there bed bee* no overt reeiete&ee to the eatlvltiee 
o f the troeps* %  the ead o f Kerch this f ir s t  ead pesalve phase
o f the disturbances oeae te an end* The Intel gove— c t  fe lt  
eoafideet that 1ha *—b e lli— * as n whole waa over* Three days 
la ter, they were Paged with open resistance for the f ir s t  tins, 
in a completely different pert o f the ooloay.
On ths 3rd A pril, a petty ehlef, tehatha, who lad 
been deposed by the government, esptared the regent appointed in 
his steed* Ths following day he fired on ths magistrate seat to 
investigate the sltuftlon aad oa the 5th April —boshed a police 
rescue force at dents1# D rift, b illin g  three e f its  scabs—* Than, 
aoeoapaaled by a section o f bin tribe end by b is newly appointed 
lieutenant, Csfcijana, who el si aad to be the ewiessiy o f Plan sale, 
eon o f the la st Main king, he nede bis way as—as the Tegola to 
the —gged ferected mountains o f Hcandln*
Ty the 16th April he bad wee ever the oldest and. nest 
venerable ehlef e f tha ten d  la , Hgmadm Gate, end hie aid aad 
the —pert that Dixmmln wee behind the rebellion attracted sa 
aray o f follovere* Though few ether chiefs la  tha He—die Jdhed 
bln, seetleae e f the eaxronndlng ehlcfdeae broke away to Join him, 
while t e  —at fled  to t e  see—at eaglet—ay or eaeeapaent fo r  
p—tee ties*
la  t e  neighbouring Kreatskep division t e  attitudes 
o f t e  In tel ch iefs, Onyede —d fflswgnhcse gave rise  to saw ea—, 
and n e f (hgre&e'e people joined tk* rebel a. There m e
also sin ister reports froa Equtu, vhara Xehloknaalu w t  reported 
to t i  la  tkt toto waiting: m a to , A lla  Enin'a psepl* aoroea 
A s  Tugola In tJnalnga a m  nine reported disaffected.
On to* 3rd Rap tot M flitr tta  of RahXnbatla l , I .  X. 
Statatonk, m * n B im l«  though kla arm ana not up la  a m , and 
this aaaeod oonaldamhla anxiety, aapecially as tha m rdarsra 
sonld not ha traoed. Dirlalcaa o f tha Ratal am ad foreaa aara 
despatched to aarlooa points la  tot disturbed arm  on tha borders 
a f Ratal aad aalnlmd, and offara af had* floadad lata Ratal tram 
a ll  asm SoaA «faian.
tha aowataiaaus tsrraia o f tha Xkmdla division aada 
a llltaxp  o y m tta u  against A s  ratals emaodlaglp d t ff lm lt , though 
a aarim a f drives tp tha dlffarant oaluana sating froa dlffsront 
dlreetloas« uadsr A s  ganerml a wa and af RoEmsis , a u U  d  A s 
troops A  la f l ls t  A s  f ir s t  ssal disaster m  RmhaAa's fsrom  
an A s  5A a f Map* Oa A at toft Aay am* Aafmtsd at A s hnttla 
o f Aha tU | «i a Asfmt ahleh throw oonsldarahla dauht m  BmhaAa'a 
saaartlon A at t o r a f t  A s  am ef a apadal dhara ha had rssaiasd 
froa  Siaamla A s  ratal form s amid A  iapcrrleua A  A s A lt s  san'a 
hn llsA  ahleh asnld tarn A  m tor. At A la  point A m * A P*ara A  
hast horn m m  dlaagrseemt A  A sm  Slgmandn aad BatohaAa, who 
a ttrlA tsd  A s d lsm A r A  A s  A ra sr 's  had gm am lA lp sad rods 
o f f  with Cahljana aad his inaadlats foUovsro A  Rssala* A  A s
17th Rap, tha Zoluland Plaid Force, ooamrgad on the area around 
Catahvapo'a g r m  aad in filotod  a oarer# dafaat oa the rebel* under 
Sigaaaada'a eon,. At tha aaaa tlaa, Cekljane, Baabatha aad Rangstl 
aada thair wap to Oiauaalu'o headquarters, to find out chat aupport 
thapaaald oxpaot froa hla.
•hilo RaKaaala was 'harassing' tha rahala la  tha lhaadla. 
aad attesting then at Tata Oorgs* Xoa* aad Maoalpaatana, Colonel 
Leuahars, heading tha Ratal Plaid Force*, «aa operating la tha Buffalo 
H ear fa lle n  there ha dealt ulth tha aaatloa o f b l d a  tribe, under 
the 1—  I  te l a, and with Kahlokaaulu aad fa ta . uho had rlaaa, 
hut had not pat llakad up with either BsUbath,  or Sigananda. Oa 
tha RSth lap ha defeated thaa at Puklapsal, uhareupoa tha aurvleam, 
Including tha leader,, aada their uap to Raahatha at Raoala. the 
f ir s t  weak la  June aa* a anabsr o f hash drives Up oonv»r,rlng ooluaaa 
la tha Rkaadla foraata, though until tha 9th RaKaaala did not know 
ahara laahatha aad tha aala hadp o f hla fellovaro wars.
Oa that dap ha dlaoororad that the/ had hlddao theaaalraa 
la  tha fedaal foraata aoaaahat to tha aaat of tha rahala under Siga- 
aaada, aad that the t*o saatloaa ware planning to Jsla up again at 
S oil Qox^tt i htf t  Si^maadt tad tikm  fdttgi# A rw tar of soIqmmi 
lr c e d lo te ly  aorahed on tha Ooxgn froa  dlffurant directions, and warn 
thus ahla to pravaat tha rohal andas froa s ta tin g . Oa thla occasion, 
laahatha and Rahlohaaalu dlaplapad aa aatraordlaaxp look o f  aXaaaatary
p recant ion* One e f the major reasons for that turned rat te he 
a rent waa their deeislca not te eatar tha stronghold on t e  
night cf t e  9th, hat to osmp at Ita mouth whare they —  easily 
trapped* la  t e  battle o f t e  10th June, 1—baths, lehloka—la ,
I  tale end Yoadubela —  k illed  aid their a—y grated* On t e  
13th June Slgsa—da aad hie fo lio —  tmrreadered uaoonditionally* 
Tluqr vara triad by court martial at 8hp—dleai later in t e  south, 
where Sigaaaada himself died shortly after*
The battle e f leas Gorge waa believed to hare ended t e  
rebellion* Once again t e  troops we— a m » l  la  'sopping up' 
operations before demobilisation when a fa r t e r  outbreak o f re ­
bellion  occurred, this tine across t e  Tugela in la ta l, In t e  
densely populated Kepu—lo-Lover Tugela divisions. In this third 
phase t e  l ead—  —  lee—1 e f t e  Qwabe, Katshvili o f the K tetlaa  
and lilevu  kn Tiauni of the dalm doyal House*
phase of the disturbances opened ea the 10th June 
when a rebel iapl —hushed n troop ooxrroy end attaeked a Bhrope— 
ea—I ate— — Thring'a fe e t, K illing a trooper —d t e  lorvegl— 
oto—aan, and — ding a stock inspector* After a number of a—H er 
sklralehee, — le t July a postal o f f ic ia l , 0 , S* Teal, a—posted 
e f being a spy, —a found murdered —d —tlla ted  for medicinal 
purposes by 1 — en l'a  iap l, — event which outraged t e  white 
colonists*
The f ir s t  day* of July as* a series o f sad or defeats 
fo r  Iks vefeelot is  the Moodaberg d is tr ic t , six  hundred rebels 
vers k illed  by Colossi Barkers1* Transvaal Rousted a i f  lea j en 
the 2nd and 3rd, converging eoluans k illed  four hundred o f Bessel*a 
sen, while cm the 8th, fiv e  hundred sad forty-seven sesbeare of 
Matshvlll9* arsy sere killed* On the 12th July, Bessni sad Bdlovs 
ks Tissual, who had fled  to ~ululaad, were handed over at Behove*
This phase o f the disturbance* had sot lasted long* Al­
though the rebel assies outnumbered their European adversaries, 
they had very ovaaiderately, i f  aoseshet inexyUsably, salted 
until the eoloalal forces had dealt vith Basbatha aad the Brandis 
rebels f ir s t  aad were t e e  free to deal with theau Moreover, they 
the as turn! advantages which Bsabstha* a &csjr had enpleited 
In tha Xksadle* the irsal stones was now over* i l l  that masiaed was 
fo r  ike troops to pursue the regaining fugitives is  different parte 
e f the eoloay, and aevarel aoaeshat ablguoualy texsed * sweeping 
sovesents* were serried out* through July end August a large number 
o f rebels sere tried by Courts Martial and given etnteneee o f vary- 
lag severity* A number e f death sentences were so sauted to l i fe  
imprisonment by the Governor* n th  the passing o f m  le t  e f T w d ifty  
on the 2nd September Martini lav eventually sane to an and fo r  the 
tine being* Bone three to four thousand Afrioans had been k illed  
and, a t this tine, thare ware about seven thousand prisoners* la
June 1907 twaety-fivw o f the ch ief ringleaders were deported 
to 3t* Bel cue with the n v n a e it  of the B rltlflt government*
Despite the ending of Martial Lev end the appointment 
cf e Coamission o f Ha$iiry into African grlereneee m the Batal 
Xative A ffairs Cenmlsaion# 1906-7 -  the government eon tim ed to 
trade down rebel refugees in 4elmland» this added to the unrest 
already censed by the poverty aid bitterness following on the up­
heaval o f 1906. In 1907 a few chiefs who had fought cm the Governs*at 
eld* ware murdered, end other •loyalists' feared fo r  their lives* 
Many Hatallans, both bl eak: and ifeite, were certain that Dina rain# 
ax-Paramount Chief and the eon and heir o f Cetahweyo, wee behind 
these murders and the unrest in Finland.
At th* beginning of Deoenber, 1907# rrrtia l Lav vaa de­
clared ones acre over fttluland# end the Vorthem d istricts  o f la ta l, 
end a large fores under S ir Dunoon Ke&enile node its  way to Bongoaa 
fo r  the purpose of enrooting h ie. Although there wae no resistance 
to the emed foroea, and Dlnuxulu gave himself up without a struggle, 
Martial lav vaa retained until August, 1908 while troops gathered 
guns ead magistrates gathered wldence against Dinusulu*
Tor nave than sight son the, Dimsalu feeed a preparatory 
examination before a colonial naglatrate* Be was fin a lly  brought 
to tr ia l before a specially constituted court presided over by the 
Tran w eal  Chief Justice# Sir William Smith, In Bovomber 1908#
V* ? , Schreiner warn Senior Defense Counsel. la  February» 1909, 
Dimusulu waa found guilty — two and a half o f tha twcnty-th see 
charges originally laid  by tha lata l government and waa sentenced 
to four yea— imprisonment mod £LCQ fin e , shortly after senteaoe 
had ha— passed on Dlnusulu, his ohief advise—, Kgwaqo end 
laakolumaaa we— also tried and found guilty on three counts of 
high treason end —  sentenced to fifteen  and nine months Im­
prisonment respectively.
This then In barest outline was tha la ta l —hellion o f 
1906, "the last tribal —volt on -outh African so il"  and t e  moat 
severe artels faeed by self-governing latal in  her abort history, 
le t  surprisingly so traumatic — grant wee widely Interpreted ty 
contemporaries. To t e  Governor of batal there waa l it t le  doubt 
that the "lelwa ee Kolwa* was responsible, and that t e  rebellion
it 1had as its  mainspring t e  cry Africa, fo r  t e  Africans*. This 
view was ste e d  by John Buchan some four yea— later la  hie hovel, 
Prsatar John, which /as based on the events o f 1906 but curioaaiy 
bo— aleeer —eeablenoe to the Cbileabve uprising in hy—alsad yet 
to oeeor.*
^Dee below, Chapter HXfc p« S oy -sor
2See 0. A. Dheppe—on end T. Priest Indepaadsnt African (Sdinbuzgh, 
» » ) .  TO. 3-4.
Captain James Stuart, who published a se a i-ox 'lc la l 
Hl»*ou  at th* aOa JfrjuUAfla ia  1913, «**••4 that &• part 
played by Christian Africans waa a laxgs aad proainsnt one, 
but fe lt  the outbreak waa rather more the "inevitable" result 
o f the "attempt aado to lapose the European character and c iv ili­
sation on the native races*1 -  a view well in seeord with the 
Social Darwinism of his day.
K ill tax? non ia Ratal had long prophesied a Sal* prisin g*
To then the disturbanees represented a "golden opportunity" o f in - 
flio t ia g  the most severe punishment on Africans, who had boon 
"inaolint" and "out of hand" slnoe the «ad of the Boer *ar.2 While 
however the Ratal government sod gray were conrloeed that the 
fira t outbreak o f vlolcaee had to be dealt with as sw iftly as possible
and that la  doing so they wears earing South Africa froa "the Baseless
«
barbarities which the savage Bind alone osn conceive", other ob­
servers were lees sure* froa the c range free State, ca-Fresldeat 
Stcyn talked o f Ratal9e /hyeterioaT handling o f eventg, whilst Saats, 
Botha and Kerviaat n il cotpresstd oonoem lent the methods taken to
1J* Stuart, £*R| > pp* 4 ^ -1 , 913*
*8ee below. Chapter T, p, 25?<?.
5Sir D« ItsKenale ia  hie introdsetica to Cspt* V* Boonsr i the Ratal
(London, 1307), p .v .
suppress rebellion spur I t  on, Harriotts Coleneo, Church of
Hu l^and missionary in A ttili aad m y  4«
Britain, vent § m  further in suggesting that tha ^frloans vara
virtually  being goaded into revolt,
Tha African case vaa put xather mom slaply, albeit
dramatically by one Dhlosi, hinself not a rebel 9 before tha N.X.A,C«
when hereearkedt
"The react u fo r  tha rebellion me that tha natives 
fee l overburdened and considered that they might 
ee v e il figh t and be h illed  straight away . . .  i f  
any nation aa strong aa the Sritiah mould appear 
the natives voold f ly  to i t  ovlng to the heavy 
troubles that a ff l ic t  than,"
A compatriot addedt "Bappy are those who fought and are deed", Xe
greater protest could be made.
The very diversity o f Interpretation suggests seas c f  
the diverse strands which sake «p the Natal disturbances. Raeh 
view bee its  soho in the events o f 1906, With the passage o f tie# 
however these views have to be put into perspective, and new questions 
have te be seised shout colonial rebellions, i f  the elder view that 
rebellions are aa iesvltable result of me contact between primi­
tive  peoples aad d v illa s tioa  wee an overslnpl i f i  ca t! cm so probably 
wae tbs overready response o f the humanitarians to am only the pro- 
veeative actions o f tbs stay without considering the varied reeetloa
o f Africans to the military pros— os
Ko—over, questions have to be naked t e a t  t e  nature
o f colonial society and t e  p—ssur— aad demands within I t  which 
made rebellion  attractive, albeit to a minority o f black Natal leas, 
about the nature o f traditional society which is  carried over aad 
trams—ted 1a  t e  colonial situation aad which fiv es  the rebellion 
it s e lf  its  particular shape and fora) about t e  pattern o f partly 
olpatlon, which in vim sheds light both on the eolomial framework 
and traditional p o lit ic s . Rebellion la only —a possible reaction 
to conquest, but t e  —b e lli— situation it s e lf  mate — a kind o f 
giant spotlight aero— society, casclnlm* its  nooks mod crannies, 
enquiring into a— '*  hop— aad —bitioas, their fern— end suspicions, 
hash section in society has its  —le  te play amongst t e  Afrle—at 
Christians —d pagana, tribesmen —d migrant works—, traditional 
hereditary ch iefs, go— a—t appointed ch iefs, new p o litica l leads— . 
The qpestion o f non-participation is  — —lev— t — participation! 
why ev— the most v io l—t p ossib ilities  could not deter certain 
groups froa rebellion t e l e  others found su fficient —wards within 
t e  —as society to seen— their neutrality i f  not their allegiance. 
On the white aide too, t e  response le  varied -  o ffic ia ls , settle—, 
m ilitary men aisoionarlcs, A** m* ^ w| their d iffe r—t demands
on t e  Afrlo—, a ll —sing ev—to through different eyes.1
*9sr — a—e ll—t die— 1— of t e  —none f —to— involved —A 
useful comparative material a— R. Stakes —d R# 1—  (e d s .),
iter, 1966), Introduction aad Chaptc—
A considerable volume of material ix leta  on the Ratal 
disturbances o f 1906-8, both o ffic ia l mid private, published and 
unpublished, Undoubtedly the starting point fo r  may fresh look 
at these events must s t i l l  be ^gptais Jaws Stuart's History o f 
a q u Robslllon  of 1906 in on* BLrouRUB's w r*»t trU l
m i •xp»trl»tlon.1 -tunrt, * fluent 2ulu linguist * o  h»d *  lan* 
career in the Ratal c iv il service, was an aottve participant in 
the events he describes t in 1906 he acted ae Captain of the Ratal 
Field A rtillery  and from 1906-9 was Intelligence O fficer with the 
Sululand Field Forces, Ae a member of the Greytown Court Martial 
which tried many of the rebels with Bsabatha in the Kkandla he 
was able to get muoh inside Information on the fighting "where, and 
to hear at an early stage some of the evidence implicating Diausulu 
in the disturbances. At the end of 1306 he was sp ecifica lly  delegated 
by the Commandant of the M ilitia  on the advice o f the Ratal Attorney 
General "to gather and report on a ll allegatioaa o f a criminal mature 
concerning Dlnmsulu*,* Although he did mot complete the teak, ha
l c«pt, v . bm m u a ,  j p a i L M a m  a  ja m  (i*aaon, 1907) *u o
written by a participant, ia far lame ooaplete a work eves as a 
narrative of the m ilitary events o f 1906,
2A00 1/ 7/ 56, Export la  no. 2 in A.8. to Kin. o f Justloo, 22.7.07.
m  personally responsible fo r  taking down the depositions of 
Baabatha's v ifs  and children who escaped from Mnumtlu'a kraal 
in tha middle o f 1907*
In 1906-7 he also acted as Secretary to the Natal 
Satire Affairs Commission and in 1909 he became, fo r  the brief 
period before Union, Assistant oorotary fo r  Native ^ffaixe.
Even before that, he had been associated with the tihder Secretary 
fo r  Native A ffairs, s , 0, Saauelaon, in drafting many e f the lave 
associated with P* 1# Koor’ s so-called reform o f native policy
ia  190&-IS09.1 i.i4ateg..at..Jila,. M a, *“  oo*«iaaionad
by tha Natal govemaant towards the end of the campaigns of 2906, 
though i t  was fin a lly  completed after the unification e f South 
Africa aad without tha financial support o f the Union government*2 
It is  thus act orly  the record o f m extremely well-informed eye­
witness sad participant, who had considerable knowledge of the
Zulu people, but also o f someone who had access te mash e ffis la l 
%material*
Aa an account o f the m ilitary campaign Stuart's History 
leaves l i t t l e  to be desired, and M s work relieves me later histor­
ian from haring to trace in great detail tha m ilitary aspects o f
XaiA 1/4/2C 0 ^ , Binut*, Pieman, Sae. to P.M., 19.2.08.
2ftrafacm  to glaterr o f 2*la Bahallion. pp. v l i  and a l i i .
•*A goad 4m l a f o ffic ia l natarlal km publish ad In 1906- 9, though 
Stuart probably also had aoaaaa to tegartaaatal fila a .
the 1906 disturbance, froa either the Quropeea or the frlcan side* 
Indeed his aooount o f the m ilitary system of the Zulu,1 although 
only marginally relevant to the 1906 story, remains one of the noet 
valuable pert# o f the book to anyone interested in the 2alu* Stuart
vaa to devote much o f his time end attention ia  hie Inter years to
ife\a study of 3ulu history^ and this interest is alreaSy clear in the 
History o f ttn> Zula M kHISL* i t  perhaps something of as
exception to the ganaral run of literature written as thia tine 
on colonial rebellions•
Tet having said d ll th is, i t  la s t i l l  nsosssary to polat 
a it that tha talus o f  ^tuart's book la aa a primary rather than a 
secondary source* *hile in many ways his sseociati a  with the Sstal 
gorernaenfc and m ilitia  waa of great advantage, i t  did also result 
in a nunher o f lim itations in his work* The fira t  o f those waa aa 
much a product o f his l i f e  and tines, perhaps, as o f any daliberate 
cheek as he may have placed on his frankness ae a government servant* 
Aa a neaber of tho administration and o f Hie Eat ml settler ooanunlty, 
he aoeepted many o f tha assumptions o f the Katal administration 
about Africans, a lbeit with a greater tolerance aad benevolence than 
the majority o f hie compatriots. Ha appears to believe that i f
only Hatal had remained true to the great -hepctonian tradition a ll
#
would hare been well*
*2 .1 .. (Jhaptwr XT.
^  X
AM m goTcrnacnt aerrant n d  aottber o f the v ie d  forces 
Mormotmr ho oould hardly examine Impartially a ll tha atony ahargoe 
that tha Kataliaoo vara handling tha disturbances in a crude aad 
provocative fashion -  lndaad ha dlttlaaed oritia  of Xatal policy ** 
"sons good people* f a c i a l l y  those liTing ~nd tha borders o f 
this colony knovlnt Tory l i t t le  o f tha facts*. Sat oritiaa 
Ilka Archdeacon Johnson aad Harriott a Colansoff Haute, Botha aad 
Barriaaa oould hardly ba ao ligh tly  dismissed9 hovevor aggrieved 
Xatalloaa night foa l at tha a ctiv ities of "ixator H all", ao tha 
Aborigines Protection Society and a lllad  radicals in Britain wore 
s t i l l  laballad in South Africa.
Of ao great account as Stuart's failure to taka into 
consideration cr itic ise s  o f Xatal'a handling of tha 1906 disturb­
ances, van his failure to aaraaine tha nature of the arid moa and 
Judicial proceedings against Dinuaulu la 1906-1909* His personal 
involvement in tha arrest sad tria l o f  Bisasulu soda i t  impossible 
to ba objective on tha subject* Proa an early data ha bacons con­
vinced o f Dinuaulu'a complicity in tha disturbances, and tha baalo 
assumption o f hia bock la that Binasulu instigated Bsahaths ho 
revolt aad Intended using tha uprising fo r  hia ova ends vhilat at 
tha sane tine protesting hia loyalty. %  and large ha repeats tha 
prosecution ease at tha time o f Dinuaulu1 a tr ia l and supports also 
tha Xatal government T ier that Dinuaulu deliberately prompted tha
mrdsr o f loyal chiefs In 1907 to increase M o own power* an 
accusation never tested before a court o f law* Seeing: Dinusulu 
aa the lnetigator-in -ch ief o f the disturbances enables -tuart 
to give a plausible and coherent explanation of the disturbances, 
and there may be sons snbetanoe in his belief? on the other hand 
he fa lls  to indicate to the reader the enoxnous d ifficu ltie s  in the 
way o f coning to so clear-cut a verdict, aad to aw how far the tria l 
vaa affected by the entire history of Sululand aad Natal, and their 
p o litica l re la ti onships. Be has even fa iled  to point oat the dis­
crepancies between his view and the final judgment arrived at by 
Sir tflillan  Smith after hearing the very long tria l before the 
Special Court.3' A recent R.A. thesis by ISLss 1. Perrett at ths
t t o i Y w . « j r  o f  r a t a l ,  a f a a n t o . i B a .J B a  S I W l  2
sim ilar conclusions to those of Ituart, although the smthor accepts 
the judgment o f the Special Court In rejecting the Idea that 2±m*- 
sulu actually sent for Bambatha to in cite him to rebellion. In 
other ways however her work suffers froa the same lim itations as 
Stuart’ s, sines it  was based solely on Stuart and o ffic ia l sources.
S tu a rt’ s assumption that Pinaaulu was guilty rams through 4.K .. 
but Chapters XXIX and XXIT e x p lic it / defend Ratal’ s polity  towards 
P Inman In ■
20ajafel. I960.
€~ ' 
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The chi of opponent of the Gover&aoa t-S tuart version, 
both of the 1906 disturbances in general end of the arrest end 
tr ia l o f Dinuaulu in particular, was Harrietto Ja il/ Coleoso.1 
her papers in the Satal archive# as veil as her Innumerable psaph- 
le ts , letters to the Colonial Office aad the Aborigines Protection 
Society, hare provide 1 a useful corrective to the o ffic ia l vice 
o f p o litics  in Jululand and# to a leaser extent, in Ratal, froa 
the eighties onward, -van noxaally hostile witnesses attested 
to bar "iaaanse and unparalleled influence* over the Julu. Accord­
ing to wir Katthev Ha than, Governor o f Ratal froa  1907 t i l l  1909*
Harrletta referred to the Julu as ’’ay people* aad regarded Dinusulu
2an her king. While thia nay be slightly exaggerated, the phrase 
"We <4*1a* occurs frequently in her correspondence. Amongst the 
2ulu, ter Influence was oontinually exerted on the side o f restraint 
aad surrender rather than on what she considered would be fu tile  
resistance and bloodshed. In both 1888 sad 1907, havixg advised 
Dinuaulu to sumndar to the authorities, she was to devote herself 
with passionate intensity to securing a fa ir  tria l fo r  the Chief 
and getting his sen Unco mitigated.
htox Harriett# Colsnso, sec ay "Harriett# Colenso end the 3ulua,
1874- to 1913% JW K .. 1965, H ,5.
Nathan Papers HSG 568, p .125, to Tooas, 12.7.08.
- . niN 
a* 1
Completely convinced of Dinuaulu*s innocence of any 
rebellious intentions either against the imperial gpveraaent 
In 1688 or against the Xatal government in 1906-7, Harrietts saw la  
hie tria ls persecution o f the kind ahioh he had had to endure sines 
becoming Cetshuayo's heir in 1883, persecution led by the * o ffic ia l 
clique’ in lululaad and Natal, who feared the Hulu Royal fou lly  as 
a focus o f national resistance to the snbitlonsaf vhlte settlers 
and their schemes to obtain 2ululand and labour* It is  d ea r toe 
that in the sain Hulu p o litica l issues of the time, the b itter 
s tr ife  betvean the tfauthu or followers o f Dinosulu and the Hand* 
lakaai fo lio  vara o f Aibhebfcu, and the rivalry between Diausulu, 
CotRhvayo’ a declared heir, and Kensolvandle, the posthumous oldest 
son o f his shier wire, Harrietts was an ardent partisan of ths 
Uauthn. Indeed it  can be argued that this is  the chief lim itation 
on tha usefulness o f bar contribution to our understanding o f 2ulu 
history*
Against Harrietts Coleaao i t  can also be argued that the 
was quite incapable o f seeing : inuaulu’ s shortcomings, and that 
her b e lie f la the Chief w s o f m  emotional rather than a rational 
quality* Apart from a ll d a e , it  is  d ifficu lt te kncv exacty hov 
mch Dimsulu mould hare divulged to her. On a certain le v d  i t  
is  d ea r that they were on a very intimate footing! thus in 3697 
when he vms in exile Harriett# could take i t  upon herself to send
<9 o
A naternal le tte r  o f caution and advioo to a young Englishwoman 
who had apparently intended accompanying Dinusulu haok from St, 
Helena to Zululand* warning her o f the impooaible situation ahe 
would face not only aa a result o f settlor h ostility  hut also 
because ahe would not be aooepted by the lulu people aa their 
King'a w ife*1 In Kay 1907 she ordered clothes for Mnuaulu'e 
v is it  to the Governor at Pioterwuariiabuig* and a oouplo of months 
later Dinuaulu wrote her a somewhat distraught le tter asking her 
how he should beet get rid  o f those refugees who had sought sanctuary 
at tha Usuthu. 2
Tat i t  la. hardly lik e ly  that Dinuaulu would have divulged 
hla u lterior motives to her -  i f  he had any* ohan, at the time of 
hia trial* Dinuaulu1 e chief adviser* Kaakulunana* was asked whether 
i arriette had been told of the presence of Baabatha'e fa  illy  at the 
Usuthu* he replied "no -  a fter a ll ahe is a white wwam". Bor is 
I t  lik e ly  that a white woaaa aisaionnry* however sympathetic* would 
hare been told o f the plane to murder adulterous witchdoctor*, to 
say nothing o f loyal chiefs* nevertheless* had Dinuaulu'a plan been 
to hare hia power aa ^Srcaount Chief recognised by the Imperial
*001.Col. 199* Tol* n *  oorreap. (copy) H.S.C. to Rtas Kar Jofcnatoae* 
Kaldlvia* 17*12*97.
^>oe below* Chapter 711* p. 4^0
government through hie raanifes tat ions of loyalty  in 1906 end 
a n*«ynifln o f terror in 1907 ae both Btatfort ^  Barrett 
contend, one would have expected core evidence of this in the 
Coleneo Collection.
Associated with Harrietts Ccleaso %h.re nost o f the 
individuals whoa 6tuart diselaeed as "some good people". Through 
her brother Frank, vtaa was living in London , Harriette had an 
extensive chain of ifluenoe uhic i stretched to Sadioal nenbexs 
o f Parliament lik e  Kair Hardie end Ramsay KaoLonald, A c  persisted 
in asking awkward questions inspired by her and her brother in 
the British Houae of Sammons on the Hatal disturbances.1 3he had 
also forged links in the last quarter o f the nineteenth century 
with the Aborigines Protection society and with a myriad of local 
independent radical-liberal organisations In Britain under whose 
auspices she had addressed Meetings on Sululaad in tho nineties 
in a passionate oaapalgn fo r  the return o f  the *nlu ch iefs. Her 
brother Frank also had contacts with South African Africans In 
Britain, and i t  would appear that Alfred Maagena was closely associ­
ated with him in his penpal gi against the H&tal handling of the 
disturbances.2 A ll these criticism s therefore hare to be regarded
1CA 4403, Papers re Alfred Maagena (London, 1909), p. 76. 
, pp. 40, 68, 72,
as essentially emanating from Hia «mm source o f In itia tio n  in 
Metal.
I f  tha goremmant Tersion of what happened and Harrietts 
Colon do's Tieva ere rather like * Point, vountorpoint* both eouroee1 
have boon used to illuminate not only the areata o f 1906 bat their
entire background. In addition, different perspectives vara pro-
2Tided by tho papers of sdseion aooletiea working in Natal at the 
turn of the century, of which the most useful were those o f the 
American 2telu Mission. I was hearer unable to see the arohlTea o f the 
Voaleyen Methodist Hisaion Jhurch at Rhodes Ghirersity Grahaaetown, 
although I hare aaea their printed reports and periodicals of the 
tia e .
For the aftermath of the rebellion Sir Matthew Bethea' 
papers at Khodea House were particularly useful, though I was un­
fortunately unable to trace the papers of Sir Heavy McCallua,4 hia
*For the o f fic ia l sources used, seo Bibliography, Sections XA, IIA*
^?or unpublished Mission records used see Bibliography, Section IB,
^Sir Matthew Hethan b, Paddington, 1862 o f Jewish origin. After 
a career in the HoymlEngineers became Sec, to Col, Befenoe Committee, 
1395$ 1399 Cot, Llerra Leone j 1900 Cor, Geld Coast | 1900-1907
Cot,  Hong-Kongi 1907-9 Got, Ratal; 1910 Seo, to C,p,0,| 1911 flhaiimaa 
o f Board of Inl£j d Revenue j 1914 Gnder-^eoretary fo r  Ireland)
1916 See, to Mia. e f Pensions) 1920 Gee, Queensland. Bled 1959* 
(p.B .g. 1931-40. » .6 4 5 -6 .)
*Sir Henry HoCellua, O.M.O., K.C.M.O., O.C.K.3. Born Tear11 1852, 
died 1919* Educated Royal M ilitary Academy, Woolwich, Col, toglneer 
and Surveyor, Straits Settlement and member o f Exec, and Legis, 
Councils 1884-^7j Gov. and C, in C,, -agoo 1097-9) Got, Bbwfouadlaad 
1899-1901| Cot. Betel 1901-71 Cor. Ceylon 1907-15. 1m a »  . 
1918-1928.)
}
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predecsBOor in Natal, I should also hare liked to hero found 
more private papers* o f both black and white politician s, la 
Natalt that I did not do bo wao in part through lack of time, 
in part tha reault o f reluctance on the part of white Nataliane 
to allow an utcider to look at fanily pap ere. Those that I did set 
were not vary useful,
Finally, i t  ie clear that increasingly work on -African 
history in the colonial period vi 11 hare to include fie ld  work, 
This proved quite impossible and would in any case hare been 
somewhat impracticable in the ttmeofc ay disposal. I f  ilarriette 
Coltaso was not told certain things because she was "a white 
woman11 in 1906, i t  la highly unlikely that 1 would hare been told  
much more in the short space o f time I had in Natal in 1963, My 
inly consolation is  that the amount o f African evidence f  und in 
the documentary sources was very considerable* r)inurrulu*s Papers 
Is the Attorney General9 a f ile s  and in the Colenco Papers, reports 
o f interviews In the Native Affairs Department and in tha Stuart 
Papers, the evidence before many Courts Martial and from thou o art* 
of Africans before the Natal Native Affairs -oattlsalon md oouth 
African Affaire Commission, tha 2tU.u-Eagllsh newspaper to say
'S'or tmpublthed private papers consulted see Bibliography, Section
IB, 2.
-
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nothing of the thousands o f pages of evidence in Dinusulu1 a 
tr ia ls .1 Combined with a ll the other material they enabled 
a detailed picture to be built up not only of human relation— 
ships in Natal at the tum cf the century, but also a reassessment 
o f aany aspects o f the 1906-3 disturbances.
"For a discussion on the d ifficu ltie s  of handling the oourt material 
see below, Chapter VII, pe^<-n. It  was found In many different
forms and many different versions. Frequently the simplest reference 
has been to the newspaper report. The sheer bulk of the material, 
however, made i t  Impossible to correlate the references to notes 
taken over a considerable period o f time both in London and Natal 
and found duplicated as depositions in A.G.O. f i le s , enclosed 
in CO despatches, in the Colenso Collection and published in govern­
ment records and newspapers.
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ChmctT I
TB£ COI/MtlAL FRAUBVOKK
" l i  is  Impossible is  agr opiates • i t  Is abeoletely 
lapeaalhle * to groat these people sop teams ef 
p olitica l egealitjr for hasire is  of years to earns.
M , tbs ioalaaat rase, ess set gala* to tel easts , 
It . Vs are the dosiaaat sees art ee asst raeaia so.*
V . 1 . Hear (Faresr» ss-Sosrstaiy for latiae Affairs, fatture F.K.
■ * .  4 a«*a jfM A rt A ffid a ,
190V S . Tel. XXX. p .230. see also p .213.
Situated between tha Brakaaabetg mountains to the went, 
ahleh separate it from the dxy plateau of the interior of South 
Africa, end the warm lailea Ceean to tho east, natal la oae of 
the aoet favoured ereee gcograpMcclly la boa them Africa. Zt 
baa a fertile# lorn ceil# high rainfall, lanh# nlaoet tropical 
vegetation and railing graenlrali# an well m a trap crate eliaate 
healthy to both ana and heaat# At tha beginning ef the nineteenth 
sectary it wea tha hnralrad ef ransrran leetn spading# Sgeai 
thief done. Of theee the Rnla were to beeoae the neat powerful  aad 
fanone# incorporating through neainllatioa end eoagaeet met ef 
the dene end tribee between the Portngmeee territories to the 
nerth end the Ohrl drain River to the eouth, rad leading their mane 
to the aaay peoplee between, the advent of 18h  of tho firat white 
trad era to tha eapltal ef the alghty Rnla king# shake# aaet ia the 
aidet ef theee nonentewe beppeainge bare apt eared a relatively ia* 
elgalfleant event# oae Indeed to be aqplelted by the king for hie 
era yerpoecs# bat ef little  rare importance then that. Reverthc- 
lean# Shake's legendary deathbed prapheey, whether it wee indeed 
hie era er eac invented by a later and oadder generation, that 
the ewal lewe (i.e . the Rarapeaaa) weald cone to rale hie kingdom,
mm ritfiU1 1km haadfel mt twtofi  m  aagaap of tttego to
QOKf,
|r too tom off <kt ateotoonto OMtup, too a t tn  m il l , 
political M i WQMQti itM itn  of tt* mtmm ted toa—oi . 
in ta lM otti M tiih  tiX iw  at tom lBIO'i M  too* followed tr 
Eh tab Tiw>»*>wi( m« toolr otm t la 1897 to i te— followed 
In tarn la 1849 tor M tU I m w U m  of «m a m  lotween tom 
togela aai tom W—tatola liw—a, part off toleh had oelgiaeUjr 
•gvsated1 l i  tbi liraflam M l U U i to Mi ftittli Igf tbi Min 
IriMPB* Tim iill aoliVM M fi i  liilu fi of IttaattllMliBlM Ml • 
datoaadaatt— aot to allow a port — toe ooa —ate to ladla fa il 
lata tom hands of a people tfeo m op U ti neither M lU t owpro- 
aooj aor toe rights of tom ifp&oaa pooploo la atoao aldat tomy 
foaad to—aalw—,* with too Irlttik anaexatioa, aoat of ttt M t»
li-—i tfakkal <*■. m m  to W fM lssal by —ttl oro o f Brltlabn fltoo
a— aad aosvoglaa origin. fla  British settlors predealaatod, 
aad Ip 1904 40°/o of total laaa were e till British bom. to UH 
too —all ooloajr a— raja—tteg Baptaa—tattoo Bsspeaalbls Oovara» 
a—t, aad 1a 1899 aolf  m in a w t a— gr—tad too tolta population 
whloh too u r n  lafforo lad totallad 44*000. tom oaljr lara to aa>
13— e.g. 8. x* too ah— aad 6. da towote, dJMMBUtfJOtlL 
(latal X.B., 1945), p.98.
**. Koblaeoa aad J. tollagter alto All— S—ap, Africa aad too
9f foMtfaMWI (f’aporbook edition,
plat* t r iiy ilM w  o f oatloo ■  tha fa r t e f tha alaotad aialotrjr 
o f lo ta l oar* tha pooora o f tha M a n o r  to raoorra any M il 
• ffM ttac tha nan-ahit* population fa r Iaparlal tpprm i .  A fter 
too yeore* aaapoaalea, any aoerred M il could ha dlaallored tgr 
tha sovereign. Hi otd ltloa , tha tom a a r tad aartaia porar* over 
tha Afrleea population aa m > ia i Chief uhioh i t  aao H a n g ed  
ha oaald ha ohla, la  tha fin a l m ljm li, t*  w w it ii ladopaadantljr 
o f hla raayoaalhla alalatora.1 Za tha araat, aa M m o r  o f 
Ratal orar aaartla ad thaaa fooaroi aa a aaahar o f tha Colaalal 
O fflaa a to ff  anaaaatad ta lly  la  1108,  I t  oaa a poo&tlaa ao Ratal 
(OTHwr avor aoooaadad la  liv in g  o f to** Thus froa hadng tha 
l ayaalaata o f tho h la  aavorolgn, hr i *  ta n  o f tha oaataay tha 
ahltaa o f Ratal had haataa tha daalwaat itU a i a laorlty  la  a «a >  
y) | j  tffcal#
tha araa of ahlto aattlaaaat had alaa aapaadad. Ry 1904 tha 
m fh  tfumty toaa o f Part Ratal hat taaoaa tho flaaot harhour la 
Southern Afrlaai tha ooloay hoaatod too fa ir olsod tooaa (tgr Sooth 
African otaadardo) aad a mtohor of oUlagoo uhioh wore nothing aero 
than a for alaplo hraaaa oloatarod aaoaad tho aaclatrata'o o ffla a , 
tho R a n t aad tha laaal atoro. Tha hwmlarl oa o f tha ooloay strot*od
H tb  aao
aao R .l.A . taaalaaal ltgaw, 1S99* U ,  h .  3, p». 9 tt. Tha oloaoo 
oaa laaartod oa tha iaalataaoo of tha 0,0. Boo 00 179/173/1PJ5 for 
th# alm tiB t
Slant* » . 1.1 art art CO 179/Ma/49979, $.12.06.
froa tha Okalataau la to* on to to fort****** Rmt Africa ia 
Ate M fH i 2ulali&d ted l m  incorporated Iftto Ate oolcwiy is  
1897 aftar too ya w  of t tm t  Tapariml aala.1 IM ai to fel»< 
land a m  to* torritorlaa jw t to ito  w att team a  ta*toag*1and 
and tolto tat toan n y tr a l Ior to* fcritiah ia U K  aftor a yn> 
lrai*< toaala alto to* tartof*** and to* Troaoyml Iqn U U .
M i i n i  t e m  Ate itgvcvMA Atvieisn of m iUnft* kf%&t Ate 
Rom %  Ratal a f i l n i  odditiooal territory (M  to* Tmmoal • 
to* Rortoma ti*taft«ta o f TlyteU, fftrotot aad ftoilpleterebeargi 
a i a  tad tarn aat aft fro* total aat V  aaomatalat lo w  la 1864. 
Kaon a* to* '» »  la y tU le ', 1* a a  tor** yaara lata* incorporated 
into to* faaam m l. to il*  6 i n  aa* tat • fa* teatrnd to ltw  to 
to* a**t o f total aat ia 1900, aat to*** «*r* aaialy tratam, 
ad**t*aarl*B aat eeaeaaaaat a ffltU li, tolto* tat tool? agr* aa 
to*** land* atitabl* for W in *  aat ***** plaatatloa* ia  to* n »  
aolaiat tom tolrto af tatalaod. tatoaa* 1908 aat 1904 a talialtaitlaa 
CoaadMia* a*t a*ld* *ea* * f tom* laat* far Rarity am im g a to a .
Ia addition to to.aat aad toit* la Ratal, torn* w it, ia 
1904, w aily 101,000 tatat* aat ateat 7 ,000 ympl* of ***** dme n t* 
ia  to* colony* Raittor af torn* fr«*y* am *dadtt*d to to* amks
1am ta w , R u fta  11.
f l a w  aagr tanr* ta to a ta t • aaatar o f  la a l«z m ta  fro a  S t. la la a *  
aad K tarlttaw  a ta  m m  not <ov*m *d by to*  R atal S a tiv*  Cod* ta t  to o  
m m  l i g lw lu  to  fo * l H s w ia ia a tie a  ia , fo r  «a a a y l* , to *  a o ta o l*  
• f to *  w in y *  ta *  R . f • M ata* C loak,
So*iola*l*ol Rtatr o f a 0*lm r*t 0—aa
o f the xaliag alaas. Socially, p o litica lly  and oaoaoaloally, 
tho 'M u n i *  peopla o f I d o l  vow  a vngr laotgalfloaat footer. 
Thooo oho oaro tho result of tho aUec—aatloa teteaaa te lte  
b o o  a a d  dfrloaa aoaan roro a — t t l  lag o i l y  aa part o f tha l a *  
digoaous population, holag goremad under natlro lav, ualesa 
opeolfloally  eaaapted froa Its  proriaiaaa.1 Unlike tholr falloaa 
la  tho C«po( thoy norm ooaotltated a ta ffar group huteooa black 
aad ahlto, oapoblo o f ooftoalag aad aodlfylag raoa attltudoa,
Za port thla oaa ha attributed to tholr abort history and lack 
at auMalool olFOfflti m v tU  i f  to tbi teaofM ii^ of thi fd t i  
poyulotioo of Xotol*
2a Xotol in f Xololoodt ooloturod non voro i m  fpolatod 
cfciofr ooor African fooylo la  oaoooooloo to tholr th ito fathom 
oho hod oorvod la  a a ia ilar aopooitjs In Sqluload tho offspring 
o f foha Dona* o  th lto tsadar oho hod hoaa a fovourlto o f Cotohwoyo'o 
—  ^ boon appointed oao o f S ir O m it  wolooioyvi  thirtooa
vom ohlo t f  thanoolooo to aolatola tho Boaan Catholic 
aohool la  Tlalalaat dirialonJ ^  Za Ratal proper, hath Charlie fpua 
aad Tin Ogle, ahoao aaaaa rrroal  tholr ooaaootiaa with tho oarlioat
1Soa e .g . Koport r .r . a.0 ., p .20, ahloh raaiaaaal a tholr oaoluoioa 
froa tea sporatloa o f aatlro lav.
S o*  belev, Chapter ZZ.
Soaa lo ft  23 videua aad 93 children cnhla danth la  1099 aooordlag 
to tho Ooraraorl
traders In Betel, heeded considerable gr—ps e f Atoieans la the 
colony. Bari at the fiatarhaaea■ e f 190d ao aetleeeMe pert war 
plated tgr the Oeleared population, although there deea area te 
hare he— eo—Id— hie strain he toe— the Oeloared ohlefe —d 
their people at thin tine. Oh—lie  Tpaa fo r  a——la  a— reported 
to m tn ft i M# *r»Wmrunuooi" o f My pooplo vto vocro 
fined hr W>»—ate la tha early Baps of tha —halll— for their 
hohartoar.*  fjraa a— dadd te ha ’ loyal* to tha ——tenant.
Despite their virtual —elealoa firm white society, the Coloureds 
e f total aoar tlha—eIwao — part e f the white group, they re- 
a—tad toiag ‘ pi— 11 call j  atigaatioed — natives •, ^  were die—
—tisfied  with their etnt— —tor native l —,* their laek e f 
p o lltl— 1 righto, h ,  tfl& N  ef the go— at te aake adequate 
provision for tha edaaatloa e f toelr ahildr— m t  their —sleslon 
froa the daf—— f ora— af tha —Ion? .4
Tha ladt—a a—a a tor —re at—hia nlaerlty la tota l,* 
lifio tu  ttid llS M loiy  U r  ||| y t i f i t i l  Mm from M tilH ll
l Cd 8909, to . to , Oov. te toe. S t., 39.2.04.
‘The phrase —a— to— a p etltl— to— tha ahildr— ef 1. 1. to—
who had ha— adviser ho to—, Oetaheaye'e half brother. 2—1. In 
CO 179/254/910, Oov. te —a. S t., 17 .12. 09.
3H.K.a.C., pp. 9 aad to .
4S— 2 .2 .l.C . to ld ., pp. 985-989.
*100,918 as—adlag to tha 1904 Oenaua.
lac th m rtm  la  2al*laat, 2tajr tat fira t toaa Introduco* la 
n  Ifldwaturod lftbottfoii fox At# cu^ur ted Ate plantatiw o 
ef la ta l'o  cooxtloado, at tht rc^uwrt of too a t t lt n  tta w iliw .
2^  thi tayw qf t l i  otetuir, tbsdjr tepid auwrlool lyowAi ted 
Ami oQ^dtitioa tfttQjr provided agefjast Ate m U tf thi At Artdtef 
forworn ted dcU lfd orA1 ff-wiiT a ili A te i  tflol«aUy dlillktd 
inntnniil tTi ^  I f  aaxtMfti iixiM Im  la Ate w Iw y vu  dioaatx 
ti^aiost ted Tr f4frt h w  Ate dtetowd «• Abo warn gwooFolljr w * 
form* to m 'oar aatlm a'* 2a 1099 a O  anaal tax «  la llm  
noltteff n a iv la i Ate&f tedwAosoo aor itiEuxalof Ad m
soaado ted teAdtlott of Ate Tadl n  w t to te ooowtod ter tho white 
m a iio llj. to prom U i north m a oitlam  aat A m  la the 
nrlvilam i ■ !  m aaooelhllltlaa af tho to lto  oeaaualtr.^ t t t ll  
1696 fit*  Xadlona (i*o* Atote Ate ted ooaplotod Atei* Aom of 
indonturod 18 ^ *  ov atertd  Ate ooloax at th*ix ova w&woo) 
ted Ate ommi teooofetoo xlohto m itilAida Sow ofter Ate gnuil 
o f M lfwtM M OiA to Hotel* Ate Hotel Bdniitnr aodo ottw oto to 
text tew  Hwowd tew  ted dlodtorol 10II* i f  Add w ild titk U  
opposition oa tho part o f last Rlpoa aa Colonial snemtary, ton
W  tha OBtl-lndiaa fooling la tha lU ^ e 'i aa* oayotl nlly tarn
potohoo aat omU n m  la  00 279/195 aat 00 179/194.
*Cf. 00 179/838/5*57, Baal. t . H ttw t o f Zotla Offlo* to Natal 
rtualoijiAl Ooiddiitlon* > "TJte tediOM hwwA oodA hlAi r l / 
to* diatiootioao o f aa*o « t  oolonr npoo ahlah aaqy of too Colonial 
ragalatloa* am hamt . . . .  Atom a ll tbogr w ant toin* laoladot la 
Ate woo wtogoxy with ted iodlgoaoud lohdhlAwAo o f * te l do tew  
to* hlatMy o f toa&r ooaatoy aat pooy l* jaatiflos torn la m yrttag
colonists cat thair Myr by the invention of a f ane —sing dorlee, 
when Joeoph Charter1! al a mm flaatetary of S M i for tbs Oolonlaa.1 
Xko Indian fMadhlee tel hardly oonatltuted • threat at fte tine 
of its abolition, although It is  intoreetln« that anoa—t tha 
arguraata «m< -  • !  with m m  affast at tha Colonial Offlaa «  
wars that It was hard to justify tha crmtlac ef tha frssohlsa 
to M U m  tho tors •foreigners* tea* '• »  mUvm* t it  sat ter*
It, aad that t u n  wa a te iw  o f M U a i artw tU t tha M lta aaa 
ahlah would endanger Afrieaa interests.* Aa argaaenta that 
ouallflad u m m m  ahoald tharafora to siren tte franohlaa to ja e- 
toot tholr sights acoiaat both tte Xsdlaa and tea ttrojpaaa dost 
not oaaar to tea Colonial Offlaa ataatea on ten anhjnnt. In 
gonaml  ten Rfflee mold appear to ham teas ayapethatlaally la* 
ollaod to tea settler rlaa o f tea Itodiaa as tea laglatetftaa acatnat 
T i^ w t im Zulmlsad t t i Colonial Offlaa M l M il yawp to
prevent dtaarlalaatlos reveals.3 te lla  tears aaana to tom  haan 
aota (11 aanaalon ar«r dlMviaiiifttofgr ltglalatiaa aaa&aat tha Intlaa
aa stazidduQS far Oalov tfaswsalvas la tha gradai «yf haawitf*" Cop/
fraa M rt, e f  India*a deep at ah Va« I# of 1905, Mala, 14.5.03.
*250# 00 1T9/189/14M5, Oar. to See. S t., 14.7.94 and 8 .0 . nlm taa.
3Cf. Hianta I .  F a irfield . 3 .8.93, as 00 429/16/11269, •Lord Slyan M U  
find tha IW a v  yayaaa TMHawa la  2uluiju\&  ^ lataaaatlaa aaadias* 
tear tear teat a fter a ll i t  la  hardly fo r  tea B iltlte  g n ria — it  to
ooanonlty than ovar , olaas* 1 •halation against tha Afriaaa, M il 
ct«c8 to have arisen froa p m ta n  by tha India Offlaa aad by 
prominent ox-ladisn o ffic ia l*  auofc off Icrd Upon, rather than fw a  
any thought oat or principled conviction la  tha Colonial Offlaa* 
Whlla thara was aa yat l l t t la  avidanas o f tha latar Hatal 
African d islike o f the Indiana, la  aoaa aaraaa o f dense Indian 
aattlaaant rumbling® vara beginning to ha haard froa African» 
against tha Indian nattier*1 Tat i t  la a reoarfcafele faat that 
daring tha dlaturhaaaaa ao Indiana vara touehad by African*# nor 
van their proparty daotaged. At tha outbreak o f tha dlatarhaaeaa 
tha laadara o f the Indian aa—unity, haadad by Kahatna Gandhi* 
offered their service* to tha Xatal government In cider bo prove 
their loyalty** Aa had happened daring tha Boar War, thay waa 
not accepted fo r  tha armed forces9 aftar aena ratal duration
cast tha fir  at atone at tha Boers la tha natter o f anti-Indian 
legislation ..* Though they n i t  not dlaerialnatad against I t
:;j^e tha ragulatioaa In Mainland aav to it  that Indiana vara 
not a ll ovad to bay bean plots (bafara ISK4 aunl laada vara
not fo r  sale) or gran tad trading licences.
00 427/12/17X43# Oov* be Baa* S t., 7.8.31. Baa damp* no. 32# 
12.6.93 la 00 427/l*/U269# ainataa* Also 00 427/24/3678, daap.
• re d . Baaorlal froa landing Indiana*
San a*g* erideace X.X*A.C»# p .775# Charlie Cindana (ez-ah lsf Bai- 
ieofeal, Jtlehaoad division) vho complains* o f tha latrodnatlaa o f 
Indian labourers "vho..* had taken vorac which should haws belonged 
to tha Katlvaa o f tha country*"
Jim. avia. Kofi, Pel el a division aad J . JL* Saba, Tarwlan, p. 939, 
B.H.A.C. P. Kanyll^, Sanperdewn, p*>03* Jin. 2.A.B.A.C., Vol. I l l ,  
f?vid* J* 2* Qnaads vho also complained o f tha Chinas# being brought 
to tha nlnaa* p* 462, 24,973 asp.
*3aa BareMuly 1906, passim, bat map* 2B*4*06, Impart
o f iaatlaf a f M U it  Indiana in Pavtaa 24*4*06* Gandhi's apaaah. 
Alma Indian Opinion* 14*4*06*
howavar tha Natal govaraaoat invited thm  to aoaoypaay the vfclta 
forooa as aa aabulanot  corps, forty  stretcher bsarere vara pro*
Tided aad paid fo r  by tha Natal Indian Coagrees. Taay aarvad 
atiniy during the f la i l  ^haa o f tha disturbance® la  tha Rapuzaulo 
division , landing tha Afrioaaa sounded and flogged.
For tha purpose o f a study o f tha disturbances, havsmr* 
hlaak and vhlta la  Natal asana aaaaatlally Afrlaaaa aad Europeans, 
There is  l it t la  need to rafar farthar to thaaa othar minority grcups, 
nevertheless thair position la Natal aoolaty confirms tha lmpmaalaa 
that Natal la  1906 vaa aa asolaalva, heirarchloel aoolaty with 
rigid caata aad m cinl division*. Despite thair aattlad and out- 
uardly aonfldaat character tha thites vara a t i l l  aa insecure froatlar 
coanualty. Durrounded on a ll a Idas by largo oad va il organised 
Afrloan societies la  Bvasllaad. Basutoland* and* oa tho
south, tho ooapact African populations of Mo Kao tom  Capo, thara 
voro also a boat o f Internal ’ frontiers* botvoan vhlto and black, 
perpetuated by tho system o f aatlvo adnlalatratlon fir s t  inaugurated 
by ; l r  Theophllus Shops tone, bat anahrlaod la  tho la  to r  philosophy 
oad practice o f 'native policy* o f self-covosming Natal,
It la d ifficu lt to kaov eocaotly hov flu? tho ooloalal pre- 
oonoo affootod traditionol ifrlooa nodal aad political attitudes, 
Evan outwardly by tho tarn of tha aontuiy Afrlaan U fa had act 
changed vary radically ! tha mat najorlty of tha 900,000 Afrlaaaa
JL ±
ef Ratal and Finland s t i l l  vow trlbsl dress, lived is  scattered
homesteads o o M litle : o f tha beehive shaped hate o f the Rgunl,
i  pwere pooped mnder their ch iefs, nb^nymne end indnna end 
looked la most oaeee te then fo r  leadership and get Haase. Tat 
froa being a nation o f paatorallete, cultivators md hunt#re, 
the Afrieaae o f Intel had become, by eat large, heeere o f rood 
and drawer* o f mtar fo r  Shite aaetavm, Rvmn the proud warriors 
o f aolmlead mere being eonrerted into the algreat labourers o f 
Ratal's farm , tame and ainee -  to nay nothing o f the gold­
mines o f the Vltvaterermnd. Although the presses had not gone ee 
far there aa la  Ratal, F in land 's days ef glory and In dependence 
vers a w .  I t  eomld be wrong to minimi ee the impact e f shite 
ro le , which in Ratal and la certain parte of Sulnlend nme far acre 
omnlpreeemt them la  the majority o f colonial territories la the 
seme parted, Tha aaay complaints e f tie  Africans before the Ratal 
Retire Affaire Commission o f 1906-1907 attest to the attest to 
shidh the Shite meafe preeeaee me fb lt erea by Afrieaae living 
ea wtnOy Afriaaa reserve Unde, foot a n y  from tha sh ite centrest 
the iitfnmerable lavs under shieh they vers governed end shleh 
affected an Important aid large segment o f their llv e e , the hami- 
Alatiag treatment they eaperl eased from even the hem blest isrepsea,
^Abcauaaeae -  deseeat group or elem bm&$>
2induna -  headman, not eeeeeeari ly  o f hereditary rank.
tad  i admit African# at tea eaaiatratc's © ffios, t ia ir  aa^ar and 
blttam sas oraar tha whitaataa’ a atUtuda te blntk woaaa. In 1905* 
23*252 Africans vim  aaataaosd Ay naaiatmtas mainly fo r  statutes? 
offanaass 2*569.7 par 100*^00 o f tea population* In 1906 tham 
vara 45*296 African* chargad, 4*462 fo r  o ff anoas under tea Has tarn 
and Sarranta Aat (no* 40* 1394).*
0a anotbar lawal howsvar* I t  ia aaajr to «K*egsrata tea aa- 
tant to telah tribal mluaa* indaad aran tribal ousto**, had baaa 
affaatad ty tea te lta  aatviam* tea ajmoratising gaaluo o f tea 
Bantu baa baaa fraqpaa tly  mnarksd on la  tha m illion s aphars) 
politica lly*  too* te lls  triba l ralatlooahlps wars distort ad and 
o. ■ by tea Luropaan do&iaatsd adalnl at rati to aad las'lslativs 
franawork* they raistealssa ahowad a r—arkabla raaillanoa aad
adaptability* Daaplta tea donlaatKm of tea aattlar season! ty*
: . . ..
team ia an iafranitruetum  o f tribal l l fa  which has a surprising 
continuity and v ita lity .*. * i ... : v . v . V:V .3 *»/
Daapita tha aapaaalon of white ssttleasat and tea lnaatiahla
«
daaaada fo r  ifriaan labour and land* ia fa ta l aany o f tha faatom s 
o f tribal l l fa  bad baaa xstalosd aad flTan statutory moognition*
Saport o f Artata teftra Cowl talon* p*326» Suppl anant to Jbhjbhk
5*6.06, Appmdis 1 and 264 W J 9 0 f l  * lathao to
P.6.* 17*12.07*
tolov, Chapter* VX and T il.
} sm  tolow, Chaptar XII.
largely aa a result of the Influence o f Sir fheaphilua Shepstone#
and until 1575 acted aa intermedia^ between the Watal colonist a 
and their African neighbour*!, either aa 9T>iploantic Agent9 to 
the native tribes, or aa Secretary o f Satire Affaire# Aa ex tramply 
complex personality, there haa aa yet been no adequate examination
tremendous problea o f mtslixisterlag the African tribee o f fa ta l, 
naay of then completely shattered by tte  Shaken Ware aad without 
their traditional ch ief a, Shspstone vaa to evolve Ms ova version 
of 'segregation9 aad 9ladlreet9 rule# Tha constant influxt o f 
freeh refugees froa aslvlaad, to leads already taken «p by white 
cottiers compounded bis probleaa# S***rtt*le*s by a f*mt o f com* 
slderablo administrative aad psychological sk ill ha vaa able to 
settle  the disorganised tribesmen oa reserve lands aad to restore 
some semblance o f tribal authority over them. Without resources 
of either manpower or finance, he was faced with a constant barrage 
of criticism  froa the settlers Who were extremely suspicions o f 
his sttempts to govern Africans according to their ova la w  aad 
customs# - iltmeemshowever that tte tribal African fsead 
Shops tons9 s role fo r  tte  moat part acceptable, aa tte aany ref er scoi
*yor a recent summary based oa sooondary source, sec h# ft# Henris,
i K o T C "  f& f c m S F * "  ******* p* 170 **• * "
mA T. Walfao*. f m  f
hopotona, th* son o f  «  Capo aiaoionary, ease to *atoI la  1846
of Ml* chorootor, phllonopfcy a# adhlaaaeaata.1 7oc*4 altfc tha
«ad«r WtaophUus rhapotone,,....
m s .
t t  4
to ’ the good oXd dears' o f Sonsteu otda before tha latal Battve
Affuire Conaiasioa o f 1906-19C7 aad tha relatively uaintermpted
half oentury o f peace during aad following his xegiae reveal.
though Shsp stone through prsotieal necessity was forced
to adsialater Africans through their traditional authorities, ha
also real load whan ha took owar tha aansgsaent of native a ffa irs
in Xatal that ths Government * oould not ooaaand a balanos of paver*|
ha waa also aware o f its  inability  to pat down any kind of In tarsal
disturbances tgr naans of tha white settlers alone and therefore
resorted to a policy of f divide and rule*. In Me own words s
"Instances eoaetantly oaearvad of individuals, 
fanlllaa and ssstlon  ef trihae taofiilnt dissatisfied 
with thalr hersditary chiefs and dssirlag to have 
than ssvarsd. X observed that these nil seat ante 
were not unwilling to ba plaeed under handnan of ao 
hereditary rank, a ll they eased h r  waa hunt thalr 
aw  hooitaon ohould oojoy th« aosfldanoe o f tha gevara- 
w o t . . .  thaaa ofelufa M m  inw iaiea, k m
ao hateraat la aupportiag te n llU q r  prutoaalonsi a ll 
tkatr laportaaae depemla upem tha k m tt o f h a  goaaaa 
■ant, aad although thalr position la fu l l /  acknowledged, 
they aw alva/e leaked upon aa ixtaa&opsM Ip ahlafa 
o f w olaat dasoeat and waakwers e f  thalr pover and la - 
flsaw a. Jt la 1 / tha p n h i l  and J ttttiw a  antansion 
o f this ayetra.. .  that X think ana ba found tha abortrat 
sad safest aasan c f  bsunkliicr down h e  wwrsn o f Thitw 
ditmzy ohiafs, without losing tha machinery aa yet in ­
dispensable to wn, o f tribal &xganisatlea«*l
I t  would ba wrong to aaa this aa a purely daohlavelllaa
proeses» Long before tha arrival o f tha fturepeaa settlers9 there
1Cited w. aeee, Calanao Letters froa Watal. pp. 704-5. Kaao 2B.1.74,
CO 806/27.
vara natural flsaiparous tendencies within Kfgonl p o litica l l i fb .
In part tha result af tha syetea of succession m i tha division 
o f tha fhedly into ’houses*. la lata l and Zululaad, tha general 
rule o f auooooalon waa teat tha oldest sen o f  tea ohlaf wlfa e f 
tha ch ief, Whose bride wealth was generally paid by tea tribe 
and Who waa generally warried lata la tea chief*® l i f e ,  should 
suaeaad his father. Ia pre-oolonial tinea, and certainly after 
tha Shaken ware* It would appear that la fa ct royal bi od sufficed 
fo r  a prince to attract a following m i w in tea support ha needed 
to beeoae a ch ief. Certainly tea M atory o f tha 3ulu &oyal fhnlly 
illu strates tea principle in tea breach rather than tea observance#* 
Whan t? ora waa su fficient rooa for eapansloa, tease divisive ta h  
denotes had generally lad to tha splintering o ff o f new tribes 
under a new head, generally a washer of tha chief* s lasted Late 
family, ’There ware also checks end balances within tea aywtaw 
to prevent tea ooapleie m i constant disintegration of tribes.
There ware two interrelated aspects of tea traditional process
l Tm a fu ll  di saw salsa af tela aaoagst tea Gaya V pn i, aaa <♦ 6#
HaascnA-Tooka, "Segmentation or 71 salon in Cape Wguni P olitica l 
Atnaa. fel* IXXf, *#• S* April, 196b*
,  flu*. fl*_  ak_  _fl — — * fl - A u jflfl fl__ f^lm^>fl^ *_■JUKBt U lM iT  DO. «M RX OX 1M XllRT Wu9| HvHtBN
gtMioaa ia  1816 j ha « u  i m m M  4r t»o o f hia tarothara, Diaeana 
aad Kjseada. 0*t»toas® , ao. e f Xpoda, N ia lu M  U i  to ia f r t n U  
la  t o t t l .  (notably KtelM l la  1854) aad am w m i i i l  tgr N im t o , 
tleo  not tha son of Catehvayo'a ohlaf a ifa . too tot*  Hmaolraodl. 
e ftar tta king's daath. to r  tha rivafr-t ataaau M m m ta md TTmml 
vandlo am tolow, Chap tars n i  aad TS.
q£ cm iM HjpUkL „■ i itlsfta Tfrs iX fst was mu&wtny la  vfoxok.
mam iA4<rft tiiA g§A<ma tk§ Mf im «■**< *>> sH flSAtlsXI lit
a| tttbss AtUoted IfrSiisslTts to aav bbAsXs* ififon wUUir tho 2s1a 
kijas*# y--.- i r-J ~ ^ to i ’roXsssfir OXucuiMGAu# 9 tbs ?^ff^ i)f<F^:Ti*liafc'1 oo^ faiw. nation 
oX Vf--' Ou;i*tdLtUSAt t l lt o i  SSS JLtijp-JJP1kSi*t ift mia.i n to-* i : r\j th* t^iWSX 
oX tho MatrAl so?sni*4.6tiAt ossar tbss"*^ Mooooiojr utt& i^ts th# qcm*»
• • *L V,SV ’ % * ’ •§»
Umuum o f o ioroo m ats* oX hsxsditiuqr eidsXtsinoies# o ooaol4oM ilo 
tttititboflr oX moo sfcisXtAiaolss ooo cursstsd Xwr thms bod X o /iD f a 
soxvod th* Slag. fhaa MJlula# iM u 'i  ( a m  nandor md fit&gma*«
#pima iiin iotor, *m oppolatod ohiof m i  th* S tall trlb* a i  giro*
• largo tract o f land m  a m u d  fox hla m iA om . Slatiartjr» 
th* laxg* traot o f land ooougiad hjr th* Bath*l*sl txibo aad its
pxoafnono* la  Zulu a ffa irs mu tha xoaalt o f thalx -h i*f Knymooa**
2her Inc W a  c*tafa*ayo'a M a t  Hint star, *a fxofaaaar t a n a  ha* 
goiatad out la  his oaalyals o f th* aoaial structnr* of th* feat 
Jaaaaoa Kauai, i f  a aaa was aet th* rightful h tlr in m y txihal 
m otion "h* oculd try to gala th* onggort o f Pi* load o f a highox 
•ogaoat md hog* tharohy to oho ago th* distribution a* th* lovor 
on#* dmrstl911 tHflM r^r* ff11\*,f\j iej/vjrtflAt mftty tbs
^"Analysis o f a -ooU l 
j m U tat* rap*r*. lo . 28, 1958 
147-154. .U.»o oltad f U ,lp M l f
yort Jmoaoa Mnai (im dca, 1954
*A. f ,  Bryant, Oldon Tins* y  m»a X*i *x ( u»doa, 1929), pp. 9M 0
V W>\c.<2^o f C3 T  ^
Arrival ot  ths suropsans* suo aaafAlasd soutrol ©vor tha ahol s 
StAt# SOd At thS SAM t*AA MIA I^ BASAAt ©f «04 SOt fcOUttd ty
mluftt Aiah Www>^  tha til A &yaiaiH. v 2hnaa Mftw** <nalv
w ith  ^ t iiX  fo tB #  to  t t i  A t u i t i o f i  SBu^i%4t tb s  H| b ^  Of SAtAl 
A
Aad MLulAnd, Qasa £sropsaa govsr&aaat took ow r» i t  almost 
lnovitsbly Assam  involvad i i  sioom lnn  duleputss 1 ntTA« 
triba l fhstioasllsa*
By tbs tu n  o f tbs ostitunr* t t i i  ^ ^ M tT liif dtooms bad 
Assa sick ly  srtsndsd in F itilrfin lilin ili #tw> Mat si kcfc.^ a 
British colony thers wars only alasty-four known trlbss o f shish 
about forty-thras vsrs s t i l l  m ss or 1ms intact. %  190b thaxa 
irsrs tvo-buadrsd sad thirty **4ht sa lts is  la ta l sad a fhrthsr 
sitfhVr^thrss in Zululsad.' la tha lA ttsr colony. tha nronsss 
had As** shorter* bat siass ths 2ala Mar sad as ths sdriss o f 
ths shepstonM i t  had bssu aash tha a ass. This ia tarMt ioa bstwssa 
ths traditional sspasts o f ssgasataUoa asd fission  md ths £bap"» 
atoas polity  o f ‘ divida sad m is ' is  a  faaoiaatiag stud/ ia  it s s lf . 
Xt “fr** also to hsvs y 1 yi ^f  *^ ths 1906<4I
^ u a w . i a  a flwnrtBf f*53.
a
^Das bslovt chsptsr TXf p#3^ & fo r  sa in 16-r &z ting sKiapls ia  Zalulani*
^ .I*4*C . A lt*  1906-7* F« Haaoa* p*47* Sa 1061-2 tha anabsr o f 
•trihso* ia fatal m s 102t un&sr 179 ehisfa asd hM&asn. Of thsss* 
99 Ana heraditary ohisfa* X»9«4«C« IMBMMZp tppsadls *» p*35«
1dieturhanoee.
Ta orttr to ctudy the interaction e f the traditional position
e f  the chiefs mS lineage heeds o f the ifrioan pop le with the
colonial sdarinistretioi*, and the aletionahip between the two, i t
is  necessary to tarn to the le te i Cede o f ftetire law, a Oo#» vhiet
both reflected the el teat ton a t the tom e f  the century, end by
defining changed it*  Although ereu under Shepetcme African* had
base governed according te eaetcaary lew ,thie was only codified ta
ISIS after he had le ft  hie position sa Secretary fo r  Satire i f f  mire*
fith the growth in the auabor o f magistrates sad in the absence e f
a single figure of the understanding and a b ility  of Shepsioae, tha
need was increasingly fe lt  ia the colony fo r  a Cede o f Satire Iasi
which would ensure uniferaity la the sdatalstretlon ef native lav
la  tha sagisterial courts, aad ewart te a certain extant la  tha f i ie f c 1
cents* S m  a sari ana fin e and liaAtatlims cn the ehiafa9 ju r is -
2diction  were inneaed.
After further debate on tha subject end aa *xf«taion e f the 
W7* Codaf taw 19 e f  1091, the second natal Code e f ia tlre  law waa 
pasead on tha rery eta o f the great o f a*lf»gorew am t to the eeloay* 
I t  was later reenacted by the Ratal parllaaeat, thus glring I t  
f'tatutery reoognl.tl.on* Tha Coda laid  down the lea in deta il on alaoat
lf*3*0e*
Of* Intelligence Report E« C* in gg / *Z suggest to the Ooremaent tha 
adrlaaM llty o f aaiataialng the old feudal system end to th is and
1 would send out emissaries whose business would be te endeavour te 
n u t  th* SU (w a s.*  00 179/W3/l**<0. B**I. X la  «•*?. a ,  16.J.G6.
h m  * .« . m u . S .A .l.i.C . XXX* f«  !•■■*««« v*. W 47 .
nsvsry mpote of *Sriomlit*, prortsioa* u«aUoe sitb  msb m rlsd
M t tm  as tte positim  o f tho cufm te Chlsf, sum sssion, adultery,
tte  labour otti«ationa o f trlteaam  md tte  reqplrsnmte o f " » t i w
«ood s u a w i md xmpsot to m tteritloo ".
Is am y m y s  item  m s moK ttet m s poa itirs la  tte Ids* of
s  iuitlvo -4W Coda, md ladaad la  tte  m dsrlyia* philosophy s f
S teal's natlTo poliay. 3te iataatloa Is povsrn Afriosa jpaoplsa
uadsr thair am lam  md oastau In so far m ttesa m rs not
rapugnaat to oivlU sod standards m at task la  Steal to as surly as
1343, (fell* it  oatedlsd a priacip ls tte Tory opposite of tbs
Cape Colony's policy e f 'assim ilation*. area tha Capa teo boon
forced to rooecalsa tits mlua md m slllaaaa cf tribal orgaalsatleB
uni ouatoaary in th# Tra&skaiaa ta n ltarloa , R atal's aathod
o f sllovl&g th* African, to *dsvelop according to their m  lavs"
u s  tha only oood tiv itli one in the teTlr d in  of the eolonrt la
the 106Cfe the Colonial O ffice vac to rtaaric that "the Ratal aystea
o f dealing with the natives ^ t i7  * one« perhaps*a• alee
one, that of leaving the natives* • * to he governed la a great
degree hr their oaa »«• lavs**1 As lew  ss 1896 lord M iner
vaa acre favourably Impressed with tha Ratal praotloe then vlth
e
an* -ther in Jouth Afrloa*
1^ee opinion sited la  A, V* i«an*r*l«ar# gfcs flrltiah at of Intel
(Cenbs 1950), p*?Q?*
S lilner to Asquith, 1S»1X«1897« C. Headiam ., t]jffl IttM T f t M t  (®a*) 
(London, 1931-193^b U l#  Xt p*177 hae only as sxtract of this re- 
vssHng X itttr* tha M l  hast has heaa p t t U t i i  la  *« ht«Uv9 
•Sir Alfred SULasr aad British Folioy la  Scath Africa la  3497%
Ifewartheleca, recognition e f Cttntranry law in act ttieame 
thing as its  oodifioatioa.* Althou ;h this was Insufficiently 
rsoognlrsd at ths tin# ths rory codification  o f cueternary las 
changed Its character sad introduced a rig id ity  which had not 
been present ->rlg±nally.* I t  saa partly fo r  this reason that 
shin 2ululand saa incorporated into Ratal In 1897 ths Cods saa 
not extended there although ths 1878 version had heen applied 
slnee 1867#^ Thia rig id ity  was especially mfwrtanate at a ti»<* 
whea colonial society was undergoing vaat changes aad ths influx 
o f Afrlom e to ths towns, sines sad whits fa n s  waa proceeding 
apace, m i ashing natch o f the Cede inapplicable to their daily 
life *  The code noreovsr could only be altered V  «  ia t e f the 
Katal F an im m t, although, as was admitted at the tise  o f Its 
Introduction into the Ratal Legislative issm hly, barely 5°/e 
c f  1ha nowhere had any concept o f what native las m s j  this 
scant that whan the Code waa aosndad, aa I t  was by data IS of 
1894, 40 o f  1896, 8 e f 1897, 1 o f 1901, »  o f 1902 end 47 o f 190J,
V4U X (Beaton, 1964),
*y©r an interesting d.teoussl on on the proa and cobs c f  eodlflenUcn 
see A, J* I  err, “The 
la Southern Africa*,
Xerr Irate with Ute 
Hr* I* Uubln (lea  Dept*, 8*0*1,5*) fo r  this reference*
2See the nrideaoe of Sir Rarahal Clarice before S.a.JM.C* 19C>5,
Vol. XT, 9*75 on the daagere e f "stereotyping n state o f lav and sue ton 
which le  naturally ia  a state c f  transition."
*i* J* fim r, "Keeeytlea m i Cedlflm ticn o f.* , law", n ,  f h K .
<K. U i« Debates U8D4# »«»•
Reception sod Codification o f sywtme of lew
f e U  2 ,  * o .  2 ,  1 9 5 8 . 
X an grateful to
these oacn&Bontc were more la the nature o f tightening up control 
over the tribal eyatea froa the Stoopean administrative point 
e f  Tier then Uluninattng m l aapending oastcwry lav.
v^tm in 3hepetoae*s top the fact that the Interpretation 
o f native lav rested with i& ite 1 experts1 carried with it  tiie 
danger that It ana the White *an*» Interpretation o f what arm- 
etltttted the principle® of native lav and those aspects e f tribal 
l i f e  Which auitcd the administration which were retained, Tndeo* 
according to Theophllus Shepatone*# evidence given before the 
Cape la tive iaa* end Customs Cooislcaisui thle van the exp licit in­
tention.1 I t  la quite dear that entire sect lone o f the "V jl 
Code have absolutely no parallel in native lavt the acre w ide 
examples o f this concern for example the registration of births 
and deaths, the acre subtle concern the positioned the Supreme 
Chief in tribal la v .9 While the social and loca l implications 
o f tho Code vere profound, fo r  the p o litica l historian it  la the 
hierarchy o f authority established by the Code that la o f parti­
cular interest. This p o litica l hierarchy which was wpposed to 
re flee t and parallel .African tradition*, tribal l i f e  was relatively 
straightforward* At the top of the ladder stood the ifcpraaa Chief,
*C .1 .1 .2  C*C» (Cap# Town, lSSji.pp. 10-12.
9Cf• fo r  sxenple Chapter XTO, £ 219 o f the Cede which la id  dowm that 1 
N ative good aanner© and respect to authority require the obeervsmec
3  the following sales t 
That tho supreme salute and recognition >;3arcto* he accorded bo 
the amprmae Chief, Secretary e f native Affairs, the hUges e f the 
Coast e f Appeal sad the bait* e f the Estiva Ugh Oeert."
a position fir s t  established fo r  the Limit, governor o f the 
colony In 1356 by Thecphilua Shepetone, vho v u  hie chief sdviaer# 
?roa the Sujflreoe Chief power ime delegated to a mmber o f leaser 
beings the recretary o f H atitf A ffaire, naglstrates, chiefs* 
tndaaa right down to the kreeXheeda, or descent heeds
' abomiasanc). (7le*rly with the incorporation o f fbreign el entente 
into f net ire  lew*, e  dhange wee being: node in  the whole delicate 
balance o f duty end responsibility which constituted the relation - 
ship between a chief and hie people. Shis wee however  rarely re­
cognised in  natal, where the aeeunptlaaa on which p o litica l 
authority in  the colony were baaed were stated d ea rly  and cate­
gorica lly  in  the aiddle o f the nineteenth century by the 1352-5 
Satire Affairs Cowtission:
Tfhe point upon idiich the thole o f Kafir law Msgta 
raw j/iia ?  anted responsibility and
;»b<?«ies<j. to th . .ra w  of th* ohief -  h i .  ward la  laa, 
h i . tomt la  — to*"*
i n  u tb le  tMft conception o f natlf i  law bed changed eae be seen
fr e e  the ■lamnranihis prepared hr $• 0 * "awiel enn i M e  Seereterr
fo r  Hatlr* i f d i n ,  and pufcLiahad tgr tha Moor « U a « t  i t  t o  t o
glaaiac of 1908 «  • oaa.torto.aat to to . W M  8— 1 8M1H i f f t l n
Conai solan report, which bed been fa ir ly  cr itica l o f lata l adalnl-
e tret ire  practice i f  not e f I ts  theory, flaanclaoa stated la  aleost
S.H .A .C . 1892-99 Koport, p .21.
*...tfeo wpmto* of x m t i y  odMinlotraticm in natal 
I# A ■tifcPiijffii ig iifina. o f 0 >vnmBrtf<it nor on ovor
tho T A t i r m  tfcoatJOlToo and i t  pooulisrly suitable
td + f f t i fofV ORtt • • 1% CMBRBltt
with it  wrtual responsibility or suretyefcf^  and 
' "^ .v i t i t  ntnwllidOt to
1^0 uipjr«dUio -7h w f t t  hsaiiiri nMdtTO Al£ajLP» wm *V?f^  noi la  
the xu>i. oodo to the offleer aha vm ia  ia*yt  o f tha
o f tha ooicmjr -  f t i a t l l y  the aatia* qoo>oimw to  at*
2ainlatrator* fender adaptor two* aeatlea fto tr  odt the Codes
Mi3io Sapreae Cfciaf it  not ouhjest to tlit Jhjwene 
Court* or to *ny othtr Court o f too fa tho Colony 
at fatal* fo r  or tp roaaon o f tap order cor jaroolaaatlaa* 
or in asp other tot or natter that*ooeer* in—1 tfn"r 
ordered, permitted* or toot either personally or ia 
C o-a il*  •
YMIe* tt  n— *y aid Ttttdhint point out** tho aoto o f tho &*pr—e 
Chief vere *epea \om rim  to aeoartain Whether they sore rithte tho 
teopo o f M i authority or tho sphere o f Ids duty** to too ahovn ia 
tho otto o f Haom l ▼. Siaiba*a vuartLm, tho Coromor too clearly 
in t  —ry strong petition* ^h«n tho Colonial O ffice a-preeA to tho 
further m tronohnent of tho pa—re o f  tho Cape—a Chiftf under tho 
Cod# o f I©91» i t  waa d early  hoped that vo Soraraer, tho not re -
*1*1 1 /1 /3 9 3 ^  .  lUoo published la  * — • « .
Jan. 1900, Al*o j«WLlriM4 04 9993 Bm X. 1 la  no. 25.
*Psrt 1 , O uster 1, % 5.
*In a footiwt* oa th« Satal Cod*, p .19, Stettin o f la ta l oeapilaft
and edited ty &• L* Ritcfeox® ond V. dveeney* Yol* XI (Hotel, l t d ) *
£" rV u I
aponslbl* to to* O m n M t, m U  tow to tot* t o
«w rt aon* influanoe ow r to* h w d liv ; o f natlv* nffalm  la S .te l. 
for thin rwsoa at to* tin® o f to* *r*it o f rweyonelkle §*rmr*~ 
aont than aw  a long «nd togortont dismisoitm on *  too IMapaatoto 
p « w »  o f tha 3m» w  Ohtof, tdoh mold to  anm iaat without to*
Iiniarfaranoa of tfcii Snoatin.4 8 «w M li«s  tha Governor ntvif 
ouoceaddd In living up to tha indapandont position anviaagad t^ r 
tho Colonial Offloa m i batweaa 1893 and 1910 tha % n »«  Chiaf 
vaa virtually tha aneoutive council af tha colony# ihlcdi tfcna had 
extranely aid# povaro of adaliiiotrativa action over tha Afrlaaa 
population, tha Governor aa Snpyme Chiaf asavaiaad all politloal 
authority aad povar oter tha natlvaa of Xatal, appoints all
Chiafa, could divida and aaalgaaata trlhaa *aa naoaaaity aad tha
good govaranant of tha natlvaa may in txia opinion raqalra” . In 
Couaeilt he could feanova'Cay dhiaf found guilty of any political 
o ff met# for iaconpatanajr#
• absolute paver* to call cfeiafa and thalr nan out fbr tha tafm aa
2o f tha colony a*d to I*pply labour fa* jmhlia m t a . 8a could 
remove entire trtaae or portic o  of trlban faun any onrt af tha
wtototowto 4jfi ^^tototo j. 4V Jtoj^to wtoSfenabdt van to* Ip jMtoto MWMto-w^lk touMMtoJI JtoJI h^tototofVlMif TO DRJf Otfiftf pSfia KSJI OMfrn ^  1) QKsTLM t?Qv Ty v“
^Tor to . totato w . CO 179A79 p w t*  md *9 . 0.0. tow tw .
" t o  ML«v fo r  t o th w  d.t*U  on to . ls ito lo  njrotw* f»
-
r  qo' C. J
prlnelpA  itw w W w  O ffl«*r, th* s*eMt«7  fa r Xattv*
(th* tlti*  *m AmrmtwS to • «!nl*t*ri*I on* in 1906) tho mm 
•la# M i ahii# aAvistft Ml th# ad#* «4 of natlw# lur.
ef, a# Hljr all H i m  wadar th# miw* (Court#) lot of 1098, 
th# wi»1 irtrataa of th# oolonr.*w - B . mL-'rw 7 «  w P h  M(F^ *  w
Th-?*o powtra mv# Jwctifiad m fetiaff H»ad m tbd flotpotia 
poaltick* of th# 9d« Ha** wndar trlhal law. H#M,1I iw  HUmd# 
holt th# powar of Ilf# mS tooth owwr tholr Mhjaats* IhU wlww* 
peiat h iwwwr ho# hoon y i rtt M  fraqnaatly hr aathropologiool 
wwrte an th# social sywtta of th# Smith haotosn Bantu. fro# Sir 
fhoo f^hila# Shapwtoa# toooefdaad that eMafa adalalat«r#6 thair 
trih## «al roftmod "with th# Mrlae of oouaolllora", on# polxttad 
out how dapwndast ctdaf* oal tholr aaaaaiUora wav# on pohlle 
optaien.* If chief# defied th# rlaw# of tholr follow#*# th#y 
would dapriw# th#w##lw## of th# iiw i to «nfor## tholr will. Swum- 
th#l##» h# m lxtaM  ##M#ntly that thla m  wot th# oaa# with
«•:-* ■•■v/ a ;*•> " "*t it. ^ * ' m1^'0" •#• -*. — ’*•  ^ A r • . 1 iv- * r 5b ,-i *± ®, , \,
th# ML* Royal ftetly  hoeaa## of tha larr# ttandin# way thay had 
hailt up la tholr own aapyort. We rlawa oa th# taalo of th# powwr 
of tii# itlu Soyal fMUy wav# dlraetly c •'utradl#B#d ty a# laaa a 
paraoa than Cotahwayo hi watt f  whan ha ip;p#ay#ft hafbra tha
l M t 19, U | l, S*t*l 0*4*, 0h*j>t*r I I , ^  55-40. J«t 49, 1098,
^  48-4.
•  _______
Cap# riot it#  Law# aad Custoaa Conalaalon, 1089, ?«M*
Coe»ia«io» on Wative Laws and Suetoac o f 1885* vban asked whether*
aa ktng, ha oould dhange tha aarriase 1mm o f hie people i f  ha
considered than morally wrong* shatever tha views o f  his people*
ha rep lied  quite categorically that
"..hesonld not consent to tha law being abolished 
haaanaa af tha sight «  M i l  af it*  tat haaeaaa
tha thole nation agreed to it ." *
idkad Mother he'ed the poser to aat independently o f hie ch iefs
and councillors ia  asking appctataaat* he answered:
"Wo, the King has n^t the poser e f electing on 
o ff  leer ae th ief wltfeeat tha approval  af other 
ch iefs. They are the aoet lap orient man* Bat tha -  
eneller chiefs he sea el set at hia ova it esTStl na i **
i»sea i f  tha sewer o f t it  Asia kiaa w  bolstered hr that of hia
xm*%* u^*u«tiiig aroy aoreoser* that easy sea eonpoood ef hia
people, tfr?ng*i af different tribes* th a ii tha U ai beoens tea 
iawppotio, uiey m tld rebel egalnat hia poser aad aeaaaalnnta Mftt
thm iasson that oenU fe. M m  firat Hm m m t a t t t a  « f  state*
*imS AAii ** «M«M l^Ae A as juwi *t ia indG T)m§ mohma e^ s^aMMfe AAtWat Jfewi virt —i rfidr4jm tiuo mruer in txu# or Dings&e. v^on xx tai ^ysq wro && t 
aaaaaatnatad *  tha final resort ef tha desperate «*► ha aeald veil 
lose hie fo i l  owing to a rlsal brother* uncle or eon* ahoald he 
net follow the eonseasns aoet af tha tine* e><« toe happened wrier
X- .518.
2$H 4., p. 524.
^K. Ciuekman, "The Kingdom o f tho Zulu o f South Trio*", la  
K . fo r t e s  end f.B .2Yw e-Prit«d«*4, tfrla m  P olitloe l Saratmm.
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Dingane, idxen Ids brother* %ande* —e tSblo to asccuft hinealf
as ch ief and take M s personal followers with Ma fee total*
In colonial total* the power o f the Stapreae Chief* advised fey
his white Rtrdsters, wee boo ed up by m finest entirely fehlfeo
aray end police force. Me auooeptiMli^r to African wifhea
depended on the tenderness o f Me conscience. Settler weecures
in general proved a acaeVhat more effective ejwxr to action*
*&iile however the positionof the 9npr—e Chief under the
Code war. so powerful* that ef the African chiefs who were regarded
as "aiadr deputies o f the Supreme CMdtf* was extrenely ambiwus.*
Theoretically tota l waa esppoeed to enjoy a type of 'in d irect
rtxle’ j according to Sir Henry HoCalltw ia  19C7 the aim o f the
govern*eat was "to  rule the Mack nations through their own Chiefs,
the chiefs having practically control o f their tribes.** ia
Justice Beaumont pointed cut before the 1903*9 South African
Bative Affairs ''om ission bovevert
*In tota l you are andewinlng the m tbority o f the 
Chiefs erery day* flraxy act dealing with Metises 
that is  passed acre or tars rndexwines the awthorlty 
o f the Chiefs, aid, on the other hand, you are -ry*» 
lag to bolster then up tc  retain t*%tr position. I t
* Chapter i f ,  § 46 ef Coda of Xatlve las*
*00 179/241/23101, toal* 1* deep* 86, 5*6.07* Interview ef flovcracr
with chiefs* p.33* HeCal l ua sppcavs to be echoing net only total's 
wUepstonism* but tha Ideas of 'indlnee* rule* being evolved by 
iugard la Algeria at this tine.
doac not d o .... Tou aare ttoinc mnxy the foundations 
o f  a  « U  md B vta f to f**a i t f u A  a n a  a
stand without on e..."*
though 3eauaont did not nention i t , tho aoet fundamental props of 
dhieftaixuy power, the whist's power to smut his followers land 
and ca ttle , had been undemined by tha pressures o f population 
within tha reeerrec, aad tha aeewre cattle diseases which had 
iaataatad A ftioa  owned cattle la tha oolony at tha turn of tha 
century.* v^lle theoretically chiefs could a till allocate allots 
Santa within tha locations to thair followers, this was not always 
a practical p ossib ility .*  *ha nano was true of those chiefs who 
hod trlbrcs&aa to 2urop*aa owned lands. */hi!e they 'tight ha ahOLa 
to sake minor  adjuetamte orar boundary liaaa, thair old poaltiaa 
ac landr-giTers tod notarial benefactors had arm#. This la It.calf 
suat have accounted in sway areas for tha waning of tha hold chiefs 
had ewer thair fallowing, thldh was so bitterly and frequently 
aoaplainad o f before tha ®atil Tfatiwe Affairs CoetoLaaioa of 190&» 
1907.
Cbdar the ff&tal Coda, chi *fr were appointed by tha aupreus 
Chief cid bald offlaa during hia pleasure, •contingent upon good
1 '.A.H.A.C. I l l ,  p.18.
^ oe  b*Low, (2 « ,t» r  H I, p . I&i-I85
^ClMfter YU, §  80, Im  19, 1891 (C o*.).
haTiertuui A d  m u l l  Aa "tli& f danatiaa" o f Aka
So/sw o Chiaf t t p  « m  a— M tto for • •  p a l  w o n t  a f  
PmkLr trlkos. "Pm m a t  muni m f mm tar Pm pan oM i o f 
d t fn w  o f  to A ppxtft d inM^ ff  o f  nWULloB aa aa u in v a io  
fo r  jaVHa aoxka ot f6r tha §aaaatl aaada t f  tha Colony** Thay 
alao had Jcriadiotion la  otv tl aalta aaonggat aaahava o f thalr 
aaa trlhaa and la  rlaor cxlndUial fH**#* botvoon oaabaru of thalr 
own tiflboo$ tha mxIbbb f in# thay oould Ih^obo fo r  a a ita ft
Ohto JM Pto a.0 ■■» aM M iAal 0hmt m m  ^  m J  m^kmm Mmm *%,, ^ r,. Im m um Jor cifrofirfl oar i it t i  M w n t r  a s  «s# auc aoy n o t  t&agr lapoeaa 
amam io /«d  t i l  taka )w tha load  n a fia tia ti. idio had aanv*f^f aa^ rBarM pmwp b^^^f^w^i^ bp
to enquire ia  to any o f  ta& v ju d icia l or othar aattoae* ^  Thalr 
prlrllaeaa vara *tho rank thay hold*! thalr aalarlaa froa tho 
govinifiOBtf raacod froa  to tto par annua* ^  thalr flaaa
^fcaptoF nr,  ^46.
^ iw im iI to *5 m i. 42 M v p P K lf —lor i p l t f  1909, "to
pjmrlda for tha hottar adadnlatre tioc o f native affaire. See 
M m  flfcapto* XX*
"*7ho jt tm t  M l jw ltdilotisa o f tttofo to M iI m I  naloo Cran sala 
tof«m  lto  mmmUm Ip P M  M l tow  *re»tor. to 1094 Sir P n M  
Clark# laaaaaaad tha Jurisdiction o f specially iT**it,7Ttefl- Joluleid 
ohlafa tha vara aatltltaR to hoar orladUoal aaaoa hataaaa rawharn 
of t o lr  m  M l oPmt triU o. too *i> H rt>  oourt to p rd jr 
Afriaaa aaaaa ohanaad a couple of tlaaa la  K thl under self govartv- 
■tot, tom  Pm Mjoof 11/ omotltoto* tottoo Hiah court M l 9 Jolca 
"Court o f Appeal to tha Supreae Coart of if*41*1 and V*^ again* 
la  htialaad bafora aaaaaatlaa by ratal tpj eal a vara aaAa to tha Raaldaat 
O— ltoltoto, to— afto r , to to* tottoo Hlfh court. 00 427/19/11345. 
too l, to Im p. 97, 6,6,94, too. flu— loolrmor to lo r . I .U .A .C . XXI, 
t o il. /• Shapatoaa, p.66. lotto* Coorto to t, ao. 49, 1090, Mr 19,
1091 (Colo of lotto* M r), Cfcflptoor XVXXX, «j % 013-0.
. qnd Zibhebhu
Pltooala roottood n t o r  an* -  £500 aol £200 rw /ootlooiy. Mmaato'a 
aolwqr oooll sot to olPilr—  without too appootoX of Pm soo. of stoto. 
Soo M m , rflMptwo XX aol H I.
r  ou  o
m  fooo of <mrl « l  «Uht to t *  rsopoot M i oM Iomo 
o f tht oooboro of thslr trlhM** ^
Tho Aity Of Qlli ifO ti OAli Ollt XflhoOT fo f t o  SOOiO M i 
yibi.to p^^ itro of tho ir^ H i^y «• Mo on—ool 1 of J&LS&L& * M  probobly 
tho jprootofft d cflo  ooooo of thotr unpopularity tho&r
trlbooBoa* Tho Botol Katif# Affolro OoodMdco Mot oo Our oo 
to mgroat Mot octt of tho Tuowfirm Afrloooo M i ootlfif from 
lootU n |q4 os to yrlTiti faunae von hrrnfnino of t o i f  ilo»»
tooto l i t  thio oorwio* Tho proportion of om to booAloi oot 
froo tho location* vn  ooo In o&ovm hits oo 15°/o of tho loootloo 
otelt OOlOO* Thio OOMt OhMt 3*000 MO MOO OOUoi OOt OtOOf Si* 
tieootho* *hsy moo paid Cl o oonth nd ooro givosx rations of oolso* 
Boood upon vhst woo oopposoi to bo tribal lot * tho ocnyixm 1 ^ K?ry 
oortioo TM*** o il young ooo moo oupposod to tooior tholr obLsfs • 
Mis MO OBttthOT IooImoo of tho ootMtiM of tho so sopootO' of 
tribal loo ouitod tho thtto 0101*0 purpoosoe Iho §i aystso 
oo thioh It mo fesooi* tho in t o  of todsiati of mooo mo foood 
by tho ohiofo io oooooiooM with thodr tgg outs iiofclo both for 
Military ooovioo M i litVnT h f  tho chiof o* hoi boon ootloooi* 
hy tho ttiro of tho (MntuiFf tho JLjllflhl o syrtoo ooo littlo  m s  
th«n. si ays too of forood labour at uneronpetitiYO OOOOO# Tho Kotol
1S«* Ratal Goto* Oi**>t«r IT, 1% 58-7. M in  Orarta Act no. 49* 
IS M  fTtiontor I f .  for ooosoo ioHoootoi to  O i l  m a i m L
179/a*l/30551, «M BMl. la 4M». US* JUa.07.
Xotlv* Affairs Ceeelesloa of 2906-07 «kUk w i i w l i l  its
d d i f  **>*♦ i f  tod *h  y n U iiu  la fmdixt ooaaoaal 
or W M i ta w  of M m H rt >11 ia rt^ ly  • pw W a of yaoaoat 
day oooaoal* policy*.^
2ho jnstlflootio& fot w liliilm  oyotoo ol lohcour a  
th* yataa aorta of th* ooloay 414 art vary a*k o«a» th* poors.
Thoo tho v m m  fo i its n tiiltlw  gtw*. tir H i ooloaloto to
’f ^  tataJI W  jtaM £ tak t tHW wltatak M^^ k^^mntathdk^O tafedtajft An^M^lk^h Akdttt JkW ^*<©JNI &aJB90fr*OQr lA  AOfJ raCf. 1541 AvIVXtUMMl OU.CR (10110% tS Jtift
oooooloo of Mol MitTinnrjr n  to Juitlfy tho fount to tho
MMAJOJfeMHMIS /X -^ trr untata ilk it t  Ita^kO An O O dtaJl »-n<k <h hi1k^MMkta.tafchi ^Fta/ k^^ k.4^ n^ncoouro £,or roiooo looooo MMf m um  cbi w m §d cixiofs/ MM| 
adopts!"* an  aaafc th* aaao or tttoso of sttcosssiu Colonial Englassrs 
kofoaa oaooooom  sssrstsri ss of Mato • <  fton ln fn *. Xa a 
asasrtadn to Lord a j »  la 1091 ths Coloolal r'tnl n oor rsitsrstsd 
Umh roaooao. isonpst thoa ana that *tta satin  aaato an n  
for that ho m il  aat amtia aeZaataay Uboa*% Hurt "sir aaatha 
lahoar at a fala aa«oa la a Ufa tlao la tha loaot that a aaUn 
oon ooo toils to tovooto Ho anTtnwoot to ho 0000 so aooh? 
oad that fr*hffh "rsafals tha aatfna that th* 4onaaaa la Bayaaa* 
Ohtof*.5
1toport ^  45. tt an oaly Maautlnol hr th* thloa O snm nl 
la 19U. a#* staart 1* t* yy* 26-7* staart ohjoatod to ita 
abolition, >tjh ^  socoo&isoi tho tbnatt
zc t u 4 t .  « .  taotaoo, a a j i t i a g - f l  O S T I I 0 4 w  t»  a a t t  tfrtta .
fTrstsrla# 19*7), tat adltloa, p.417«
5«C flo*. to Ss*. at. 12.1.91» tasl. 3, Baum an
sad X .1 .1 .0 . 190 6-7# m d . Chi of taglaaar# J.r.C. taaan, C.K.O., y.110.
Tho aslov saaooao for Mo extrene onooiMloritr of Tnotol o 
ooo act oioply that Mo roto of vogoo p«U ooo osaoldoroM# looor 
thoo thooo which ooold bo oarztod la tho towns, although thoy 
ooaparod act ontiroly unfavourably rlth thooo paid oo tho fkrni 
trlhooMD oooplalnod that young boys voro paid tho moo oagoo «o 
tho oldar oad aoro o^oriooood aoo aad that thoro vai oo rooogaltloa 
of looroaood «ffl«loooy hr tho Poblto voafco Dopartaont. thoro ooo 
oo propor ayotoo of xototloo* m i thda yoomltoi la shloft oo oooootoao 
oondlng oot ropootodly thooo ooo against ohoo thoy boro a gsodgo*1 
It oay aat hora hooa oatiroly oolaoldoaoo that ooo cf tho firs 
Baropooo eirtlloo* to bo hillod daring tho dlotorhooooo ooo tho 
oYorooor of o rood party votfclog for tho Public Vostro Popartasat*2 
It la olgolfloaot that tho ohiofo Ilk# Slgaaoada, *ula oad Ctlvono,
Oho a n  ooooood ood ooopootod by Mo govoraaoat of soboUloa, voro 
oloo ooooood of hoiag tardy to fulfilling tholr obligatloao to road 
aoo to voile oo tho read parttoo. 5/  IS«r« lo oo olgo that tho gorora* 
aoot rooogwtood tho ootroao dlffloolty of tho Ohlof vo pooitloa both 
oo "fathor of klo posplo* oad 00 gowooaoot sovranto* Assorting to 
tho aogiotrato J« 7# Qlboon
*S#o h tt#  paoola*
S tuart S«R*i p*43Q»
" i t  « u  *  f a ir ly  gauaral p o lic y  o f  tha goravaaaat 
that if a  a h ia f fa lla d  to  Aa righ t* thay dtp o std hia*
£ha iapraeaiou  ha got fro a  la fo ra a tlo a  suppllad to 
h ia  aaa that aay fa a lt  ao a a lttsd  ty  tha tr ib a t tha 
govacaaaat vagarAad aa a ith ar Aaa to  fea  a h la f'•  d ia - 
p a a itloa  to  Ao avaag o r  h ia  la s b iU ty  t o  aafbraa tha 
r l + t .*
Vhm  ah iafa  agpraaaai tha grlovaaooa o f  th a lr  trih aa9 fo r  sauMg>lo,
th is  aaa a ct ragarAai aa part o f  th a lr  la g lt ia a ta  Ai&tiaa aad thay
aara art ia fra g a a a tly  pualahoA fo r  aa dolag*
Tha o la a rly  sobordlaata p o s lt is a  o f oh ia fa  aaa aaatly  IXXaatrataA
ia  1906 abau a  Aalagatlcm r ia l  tad tha K lo la ta r fo r  V atlro  A ffa ir#
aad Priaa JKiAlator, f  • I .  Hoot to  pro to o t  about tha thru# b lU a
«a Matis# A ffa irs  than bafora  fs r lia n sa t*  hoor* a la a rly  dlaplaaaad
a t tha a r it la la a  o f  h ia  •raforaa* fro a  tho A frlaaaa* took tha oppor~
tm lty  o f raaarhiaga
"I  iiadarataad that tharo ara a  good aaay ahiafa vho 
hcra aoaa hara an th is  oooaaloa aaA X wish to  raaiaA 
thoa that thay ara O a ra n a a t aarraata aad that i t  la  
aora thaa K agiatrataa aaa Aa ta la a ra  th a lr  A la tria ta  
w ithout f i r a t  ob ta la la g  tha paxalaaloa o f  th o Goraramant 
aad ia  tha aaa# o f  I t U v t  oh ia fa  raforaaaa should b n  
haaa aad# to  th a lr  raapaotlra aagiatrataa* I f  th is  
happoaa agala* tha t m a a a a t  w ill hara ta taha aasiaua 
o a tia a  o f  I t* * * "  «
At tho puraly  lo o a l la ra l*  sash t r ib a l arsa aaa d lttdad  i s  to  
aarda aad •ub-oarda, bhlah aaa a latad ia rg aly  o f  "daodLaaat kiuahlp 
u u ita" oaah baadod by 6  •kraalheed1 o r  daaaaat group baad9 and*
V i.a .c . n a .  9. 994.
*00 179/248/455X9. Kart, ia 4m » . 944, 4.11.08.
over tho larger unit, °* ,M*MQ|trt< of tho dblof oho
mere responsible for oomroylng tho ox&aro ef tho ohlof and of 
tho administration to tho pooplo* fhooo imfuaa oho boro tholr 
porollol la tho groat ooaoonoro of tho 2Sla kU|, oppoar to hate 
hod hLttlo foundation la tho oasiy trlhal life  of tho Hotal trlboo, 
aad ooy la fact hare hooa aa ’ lavoatloa’ of tho Shabao monarchy* 
Iferertheleoo through tho alaotooath oontury tho no# of tho induaa 
oa tho king's servant hod oprood tho Zulu praoil mater
o f  d o ta l eh ie ften oloe#  oad bgr tho tod o f tho aao I bog iw ilog
to oust tho absftugsaRo o r  dooooat group baado fro a  ooaa o f  th o lr  
tra d itio n a l fu n ction s . They ooro in treaeln gly  rooognlood bgr tho 
a d a la lo tra tlea *  oa tho p rerts loa o  o f  tho Codo ohov9 oad tha fo o t  
that the? ooro not o f  aoh lo b irth  ood ovod th o lr  p o o lt lo o  s o le ly  
to  tho o h lo f o r  a og lotv a to  oho bod appointed thoa led  to th o lr  bo&ag 
favoured over tho dooooat group heads, oho had e lo e e r  lin k s  w ith  
tho peop le  under th o lr  oaro a id  fr o a  oboe* support they drev th o lr  
p ooor. I t  uoo through tho abeaoaaasj* that tho o h lo f ooaoultod 
tr lh a l ep lalea* h a f t  la  lu portaat aattesa a  m ooting o f  a l l  tho 
adu lt males o f  tho tr ib e  might bo bald*1
La ooaeo of people who were divided between son  than om  
aoglaterlel dlvioion, thooo noaharo outaide tho division of tho 
ohlof were ea&eraly tmdor tho authority of m appointed Jj&feAfr 
With tho attaopt of tho odalnl* trot Ion of tor tho groat of eelf- 
govomaeat to brook op tho longor trlboo oad to nationalise tho 
'word tvitoi**^ thooo «mm 1 aitrinftl nirl t ootlao la tho
oopoolty of ottb-ohlof, though they lookod tho traditional noglool 
•ad religious authority of thooo of royal blood* froa tho point 
of Yiov of tho odndnlotratlon, tholr pororo ooro "olaoot equal to 
thooo of tho ohlof*.* Oa thodooth of o ohlof moreover* Oftor 109V 
It woo tho praotloo of tho adalaiotratioa to hare tho outlying oootloao 
o f any people, hhoorbod by tholr neoroot ohlof torrltcrlolly. la 
this ooy it oat hoped to give ehlofo a torrltorlol mthor than a 
porooaol jurledletloa, though It la dlffloalt to know xaeily boo 
for thlo prooooo hod gone by 1&00, or ladood hov for It would la 
any ooeo boro gone without odaiol at retire latorforoaeof the Baata 
•peaking •trlboo1 of Sooth ifrloa olooya hod a torrltorlol definition 
la part,3 oad la  traditional aooloty eagaoatetlon and flnoloa of 
larror oalto, on no hare ooeo* ployed a ioodaont port la polltloe,
* 3 .. b«lo», ctm gtw T l, pf>ssib-T ’.k 5t"i-S
J, j t a v t i  Z» ,«32«
3I .  Soh*per», S ilM fllM il(Uomica
1996),
u J
Qrnit# «p«rt Am Aon AfviiNi llYlai qb n n l m om i  
or ftrnipiBi farm m lor And* trailti<raal mthoritlaa, thoro 
in  two furthor iioip i af UN African population to ohm n  
Mat turn our attmtloa in this yrtliitiixx skstah of Ao position 
of tho lin k  mb to Hatal at An turn of tho oontusn Ao hu11| 
tut liNTO—fag Mnhtr of AfrloMQ In An mrhan btobb of UUI» 
mi tho ooMiioruhlo m i ortiotfXuto Christian population, Mat 
of A m  Uvoi ob Kloolon immom , though a naahor voro alao to 
ha fouBi la tho torn# aa prufoaalonal am* traiara m i, to mall 
ortont* s't'i X1 cul artisans*
Ia 1904, thoro voro 55*000 oalo Africans 1b tho tooaa of 
total, tho aajorlhf la lonostla aorrloot tha imalnlar voro m  
ployoi m Tort or taUjr lahouraro cai tlkoha pull ora. Although 
thia motor «Oy oooatitutoi a aaall fraatiaa af tha fr&eaa papa* 
latloa, m i bom f  thm oouli to rotasioi m yatMoaat vrtm 
ivolloro, b graving proporti on of tho iatml ifrloaaa vm omlng 
m ior An influouoo of An  toma i f  «I|  for abort parioia ata 
tins* Thaa la hiytai for omapla ia 1901 tha araroia mu tor of 
fogt lahouraro, 1mmtio aasvmta mi rlkaha pullara la aarrloo at 
oajr oa# Urn vm 1*150* though tha mtlaatod am tor of Afrloms 
vho mtoroi thooo oorvioM throughout tha puar vm ovor 35,000.1
13lu# Book on Vativo Affairs* 1901* l«61.
tha 1* crsafilng iapo rtaaco o f th is  aovaaant to tha town* la  ahoua 
not on ly  hr tha tifih tan ia* ay o f  tha pass la m  to  co n tro l tha 
in flu x , hut a lao by Act 28 o f  1902 aad dot 2 o f  1904*1 th o  
fora a r la id  dona tha regu lation s f o r  tau t l abour aad tha oondi t t aa 
uadar which A frican s might autar tha tovus* w hile tha la t ta r  vaa 
p cra ia a im  le g is la t io n  enabling town S om a lia  to  araot looa tioa a  
la  which i t  would ba compulsory f o r  A frican s othar thaa ra sld sn t 
d o a n t lo  servants, thaaa axaapted froa  Hativa lav  o r  thoaa with 
th a lr  own freeh o ld  proparty, to  reside* In aauy boroughs, however, 
in  eluding thoaa la  ta lu la a d , A frloaaa vara baarrod froa  buying la u d , 
ao that tha la t ta r  category  vaa vary ava il*  la  general borough 
ragu lgtiou a  vara act on ly  designed a o la ly  fo r  tha whito aaa*a 
co n to rt, but vara a lso  tha aaault o f a ph ilosophy which ia p lia d  
that tha b lack  vaa had ao righ t la  tha whit# m an's preserve# except 
oa tha la tta r* a  tarns* Thus J . 3* C. Chadwick, A sa lstsa t C hief 
Vagi s tra ta  o f  Durban, advocating tha raasrvatlos e f  footp ath s 
in  the town fo r  tha waaluaiva use o f  taropesos expressed a  eomnn 
p oin t o f  v ie v ,*  which vaa sehosd by Jaaee Stuart oa tha fo llo w in g
They both fe lt
9**M o f tho MUM *l»o Book o* Batik* A ff«U *./th *t tho ifrloooa
*!btk tkMt kai OMllAV HMIiOlt*! in 1M( EhlMtOM
had triad ta lay cut a avail township ia #r aaar JKiataxaantsbemg 
far Afriaaa townaaaa aad ia 1074 ha aaaaaadad ia laps slug regulations 
•ta daal with tha prollea a f tarn labourers*, may similar ta ths 
1902 fogt labour ragulatloaa* % 1861 thaaa asm taut 7,900 
paraaaeat Afriaaa towpduailsre* fsM faaa , Seas Aanaata of^ tha^
thesis, Caiv* tfitmwaraad 1946, pp. 66-70.
*Hwe M e  e f la tim  Affairs, 1904# p.66.
i k d U  to  ( i w  to  w k te ita M
•that tbt lama ol aaa thi % wj.uk*. pxauaa
of I M *  fo r  tho * l « «  M B) t o  am  to *  *o**rn la«
M N ) t o i  t o t  I f  toogr JfiaUmt«0 to too** tom* 
to «*ak M pUjM Bt) toagr ***t MBj l y  « ito  to* n >
guistioBs sftit fB im iii bady*
to o * c* t  to w *  a t o l t t t t u  *•*• •  i t i k t l f  •* **4 M t e i i t l w
<Mfc lb* UMI cf fooiiNlSj^ St fiiiikM MA J?UkllC bflf AOUr*
"otoiJig to thi iiiU iiii hihlto if  thi sijiv lti tf ooiottiii 
fN M M *< 2 tot « t t o * (  t o  >• ■*•» to  m i s t *  « H | M  A frioaa* 
fmn ika Moviiioii i f  thi ttktfw m i droimfed iMMM of thi oh» 
• t M it l i i  i f  th i a'****! ^ t i l i l i t lT t  h M M h li t o  1694* ^  to r  
^ iQ lfln n i ^ar^nt* fw ftA  vai&daaiag to  tlia t im i  § ft# r  iiia oujffav 
hour •  ia  JAurfcaa 1% aaa a laa  a 'a loa k  *  and "a a l g iv in g  a  a a tla - 
f i i t o q r  aoioHftt o f  h la a a lf may h i i m i t o i  aa id le  aad i t o o i t o l i 4*4 
About 100 Afsviaaaa aaara arraatad aaab aoath fa r  aantxw oaU ** 
borough regulations*
w«lti atari froa tha bo tough x*golatioaa» II aaa watUoaally
- -'" ' • ■ r.
difficult far thaaa Aftrlaana too vlahad to baooaa afcillod artisan* 
la flad adequate t-4 iy at aaon Im  tha alaa limn
4 > u  Book on **ti** t fM l» , 1904* p.69.
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to*a *  tiimir » t f  to  g ir o  U i l w  M u t t U l  t w l i l i g  « m  
f i t f m O i  h la fe m *  t r  i i t m — l i t  m U m . a  nw Y rr o f  v lta ooooo
M m  tho i « W l  M i w  J t f lt lN  ft ia a t a a lf ( 1906-1907* t t e  m m  
AiMfeiONi o f M iiftl *o m m AI flM H fM tefixm  Adultt#A ih tt  Hm
lyfrlctittl lA T* AvHAJLd iMW9 ^HA iMyVAd U hlll
s m Ih ^ILU mI ><>sjh tikUiw% l i t  Um I  i&tlMV fPOA i t l i v
■MMlMtiMfi oY| m i  i*^ *i»rfcAAtf IM l ib iti art Ifiiiij hid jy# 
vrnitid m ifcit mom imlif i i i i  of hfvlflAft ikLLLaA iihoiur. as
o a r l*  M  1*96# m  s U t t e  U  tho IBflaVlif -frtortorlr  to o io o  u n t i l  
w  tho i t m i t t  o f  tho t e it e  o r tlo o o o  U  f e t a l  on pam * w ith th o lr  
yoa i tlo a  la  tho Capo aa* a a lio *  i t  *• f e t e  at 11 aao■* p a a a ilee"**
At that tloo tho attaatloa of tho fe lta  aoahav o f fe ta l aaa l l n i t i l  
i&iiflp igidAit thi thm i if  m p ititin  fhran xmUa irvi 1 id ail
ff Tffrl i l l  11 id n i f t i a i i | y AAfflMtfeiliS# tb i h A l f i l  i f  i f v l m i  
«h o9 fcy tb#  k m  i f  k «  MA k u y , wma m k i i i  a o d m  i l d U i  M l 
tM h ilfK ii tn i £ pinMinwi wsy i f  I l f  A 1a th i k A M f mmm A lii  
fIn flA A  th tL f A f  i i y f i i  iy  th t A O iiil i f m n n  aaA n o n n il o 
m itlvm  ihtih ihtti Moihiin m il I fiif t§ Wav mi tin MmtAotunn
M l filltliiAAA if filAla iM llliy tM» tA lll pfiMVllf MMfdif 
thMMUM APCi lAf&AA CMpititlMf pit i f  iM liW  to pPifMit 
AfffljMii trpm ip t li i  my itivM . t e  k i l l  Awn mm m  Aspllilt
Sm  itft Iy H« A# i« Slhniif p*2Sf And dt DlltoAp 31a »
Report o f  tb i X id A itr lii floM ilis le*  1a (hwrtt S i i f t t ia  EmppliAAAt,
6«2 .06 f pp . 3 4 -5 .
^Lt* Col» KlidAli9 • H i P n h lM  o f tbi U m  1a Affiei", «fe&A» !£$€, 
P. U  f f  a
5S i i  ih o f t ,  p . ^ $ -4 -2-
ooXowr t o r  ia  ilia  W vo«|h rocoX otiooo l o v m i i f  tha gvon tin g  
o f  Xi oooooo t o  t w l m ,  a oot horotghs a ^ o u r  to  hara sofoooO 
to  i « i t  thoo to  o ith o r  la t io a o  o r  ifr lo o a o  o o to o o lt ly  oa 
gfoundi o th or thoa moo#
n  w  a r t  k a m r  a la p ly  tea  te  te a  a teta ola a  p la a rt te 
t e o lr  Mgr l r  tea  te& te M a a d t y  te a l a t te la  atega  A frlaaas 
( M M  te  gat teaa  aaate ia  tea  teaaa a rt iH X l f a l l  a  > rl— y  
artaateM at te  teaftr teaaa ia  tea  a n t e * * « r  aaa I t  a i r  tea  
to  th o ir  h o i i f  l o f t  M f  foo& lioo  hohioO thoa ohoa ooa iao to  
a u k  t  a  tea  tN R ii teaa te ter*  a fte r  m t  aaaaaty  yaara o f  i a -  
teste& a lla a ltea  ia  Stat e  A frlaa* tea  f a l l  mt tea  a a ia te ja lte  
a r t  tea  to a t it la a a l aar mt U fa  aa tea  aftgaart aaitcar la  t t y  
ateaac* t e  t h is , aa I M U f Rayar tea  ateaa, a  M atiaaM aa aaat 
te  teaan t e teaaa  tea  ta r t lt ta a a lia te , o r  * M *  tfrimmt, a r t  tea 
'S a h a a l' o r  M a t e  a te a a tii p o tte r , Of tea  fc ia a r , a  la rva  
M a jority , mum  o f  thoaa aha hara apart ap te  tea a ty  a r  th ir ty  yaara 
ia  tea  to  mm, rrtaim  th a lr  ak teotaart to  ’ tear*  ia  tea  a a l  ( ia »  
te ia te  a r t  pi  aaa graat aa laa  aa th a lr  Ir r tlttn a a l aaraa te ia h  
ara  r ta p te i te  a rte a  U t la i  a r t  a a a ily  aaaart al  te  aa p a r lr t la  
a rt f r ip ia r t  r ia ita  hoaa, Thoagh f n f w a o r  H ayar'a rasaarahaa 
mm iu tea  faataaa Capa la  tha M M li « f  te a  te a a tlo te  a a a tiiy , 
tho n o  orm oluol o n  m i fH U R n llu tlo a t oonmi* to  f i t  tho o l t w t im
ti—n ft Trltew ftiAMi *h-laa> wu n (o.tr.r., ihi).
IV r4 ±
in la ta l at its  beginning* Thors tha distinction batmen tom 
and country m i  tha Aiatano# h h rn n  tha tiro vara relatively 
m all* tha Joumoy batmen tha tom md tha reserves aad faras 
on fhlsh tha majority o f Africans lived m  a short mat most af 
tha towns hoinc mrrcwtadod by African m a i m , aad tha tlm  with 
tha triba l bom o f tha m aaatora aad tha ohlaf vara strong aad 
abiding* thaw vaa l i t t le  to attract jsm aam t aattlaaa ta tha 
torn* vhare housing, oanltatloa md valfava organisation vara 
non oriatant fb* Africans, vho wort aad# to foo l aliens Ia aa 
alien world* Hot surprisingly tharafora at hia turn o f  tha eantury 
oroa tha African working in tha tom otH l oav h laself aa part o f 
a tribal unit md ruapondad to tha call o f hia ch itf or family 
head*
Probab ly tha ohlaf axeoption to this vara thoaa 40,QQQ Afri­
cans* vho bad by tha t i n  of tho amtnay oomo mndor tha laflaoase 
o f tha Christian Klooloaary, although man hara one oaaaot gonoxallse 
about tha disruptive affaata o f Christianity on triba l cohesions 
aueh depended on
missionary, and oa tha attltado o f tha ohlaf to Christianity**
Just otar tea yaara after the f ir s t  vfclte traders arrived ia 
Xululmd* tha f ir s t  durepaan mlssleaary made hia mgr to tha 2ulu
*V*1M«C* p .lW , sold* fa ta l Kissloaaiy ^ooiaty*
2Por a* iatatMttai M a u l ®f kn tM ttlim l *l*a*at* a t  M*l« n ltn *  
her* bun ia tw y m M  late te* A M * o f wrtertsx (b rU tla ltjr m  
9. a. a**ter. tel* Trite ia TMm H lte* Cte»ter t t f.
\ kJ
K la ii M i jH i !  U  th# f g #o*  o f  th# H im
O ifilM v  K .l«  I* h i t o i la l  y w y ty ,  to th  0 «H lM r»  who to 9 t#r 
#0# ih oH "41w d|  Odd th# o loo ioa ov lo#  #h# fo llow # #  1# h i#  wnkn9 
n n  t M ilt id  to  irtmj a  d ioopp oia tooot 1# thodUf C fcrlo tlm lo ln #  
l i M t o t ,  m  a h  I d a #  m t  h t o w M  t o  «M  # U U |  hoovla*4 0  
##d ##oipodot o f  th# o lto io ttorloo#  oop oolo lljr  w ith  # # # !  to  
f lr c a iM t  h it  aoAo U t t h  a f fo r t  to  aaoau a#o tho w w i m  o f  
th o lr  p oop l•»“ ip 133Bf a fto r  #• #kMO# of h o tte r  h o tt  th o loo*
f # 0### of th# fflnrth Wloilo# o#l#tT_ oad th# #1 i i lm i l  ■  of 
th# iAMiiM Booa# oho hod ho pod to otoot oinfrl **# 1# Solulond, 
vooo (M M  to witMaao. Xho laarteaalMrt vooo oooo to pool loo 
tho alraatagoa of oooftolo# ttU t attaatteM to fatal t o n  hr 
1890 thar hot 14 ol aolooarlao a* U  atattaas* aa* hoi haao jolao* 
hr atoolaaarloo of otho* loaaolaollioa. 2 im  aftor tho h h  tor, 
whldh oo oo#y o&oolooooloo hod hipod ooold f##llltot# th# oo* 
n id M  af tho Mh| hr hraHrtof  «ora 8m oootoolloat oiaaoahr 
oad oopool oily tho WjlMitel i j a f /  thar Mt o&th rolattroly 
Uttao aoaoaooi Taiolaa* w  to too taahoteat • oootttm  poll** 
tioolly for it  to raofoa* to tho roU#Uoo oobomo of tho oloaloo- 
ortoo. It om oolr la tho loot (hoota af tho otootooath ewtoay*
xSao J . «o  F lo o o io , f  j f c m a r  Stfl U l j t l f l  t o  Pt fi-
(Loacooaa, 1911), pp. &9~f32 m t  235-htO.
% W t  P-*59. oa* 0. f .  O k v» . t t f  S L & E k W m k t t
Xa -• 'frioo. Vol* H ,p p . 157 f f  aa* 258 f f .
’ *• * P » .  te tto ro  fto a  l o t o l .  p .3*8 .
with tha more settled conditions of tha British regime, as wall 
as the religions m ita l ia  Amerloa and Europe* that aission 
activ ity  gained any momentum. By that time there were forwegian* 
Anglican! German and Swedish missionaries in 2aluland|* the 
Anerleaa Zulu fission* despite their in itia l attempts aad despite 
the fast that together with the ifesloyan Kethodists they were 
tho most important missionary organisation la fatal* tad only 
a small settlement at Inpapala.,Sshowe in the Zululand f ie ld .2 
The fesleyans were only to start mission work in Bnlulaad la  1903.
It may he fo r  this reason that muoh o f tha p o litica l aad religious 
ferment notloeable in fata l by the turn of the century* was absent 
in Zululand* where p o litie s  had an entirely traditional aspect.
Ia fatal the missionaries had found the going considerably 
easier. There* traditional authority end easterns had been broken 
down area prior to tho appsaranoe of Europeans on tha acano. Tha 
Hfaoaaa. plus tha p o litica l upheavals ia Bululaad aftar the defeat 
and death of Blagan# end daring the reign o f fpaade* meant that 
there v p  a large number o f p o litica l refugees* rootless individuals* 
seeking asylum la  fa ta l. The mciatonee o f fela eleee o f people -
H . 6. X. 5«a<i)cl«r. Btota ?TOBh«t« In garth ifr tm  (Oxford, 1941, 2rt 
•ditlan), *.27.
cN.*.A.C., *.904, 3vi.<2. P. iM t f iu i  i t  i t u M  U  1090.
%^ee below, Chapter f i l l .
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lik o  John Dubo1* grsadaothor, 1 oao o f tho fir o t  Christians to bo 
ooavortod by tho ^ooricoa Daalal lladloy* or &oosga Chaapioa1# 
fathor -  proaoatad both a ohallaaga m i aa opportunity to  tho 
aia^onorloo. la addition thoro voro oattrs ooaaunltlaa o f p o lit i -  
oo! rofugoaa oho voro rocoptiro to tho Chrlatlaa aaaaaga. uioh 
voro tho Svaai vho voro forood ia  to tho tfaaloyaa hothodlot s s tt lo - 
ooato Indaloni 1b 1847 aad lo t or at Bdoadala by tho ^or* Jaaoo 
Aliaon.^ At tho saao tin* aa tho Boaorro loads o f Batal voro sot 
soldo fo r  Afrloaa oooupatlon, ooxtala loads voro also sot aaldo 
as alsslaa rosorrosi oroos doaorootod fo r  ooo or othor of tho 
aisolon organisations, within vhioh i t  aloaa oould oporato* At 
tho tu n  o f  tho oantury, than voro noarly 175,000 aaros o f Mission 
rosorro land, tho largoat and most important baing tho so of tho 
iMorioaa Mission#^
hr tho tu n  of tho aaatury too, thoro voro alaoat a oooro 
o f d ifforaat alatloaary soolotioo working ia Katal* Aa wall aa
John Bobo, aoo balov Chap tar T ill , >y&
‘iThswpion (A. W. o . Choapioa) hold tho position o f ftoorotoiy 
to tho dativs Bins Clarks* A*aoolatlon, Bo la tsr plsyod a pro- 
■law* part la tt«  Industrial I  C t iw c U l Wartctra Union (1 .0 .7 .) . 
In 1928 ho broka sway froa donoaso ladalio* s cxgaaiaation, foradng 
M s ova highly suooossful l.C«g« Taao Batal# 800 S. Boas, Tin* 
:.on^or than Hops (ViaocouriA, 19<U;7*» 1 7 7 f f  sad p* 192 f t ,  aad 
unpublishod B3S autobiography kindly shown a# by Vtr« S. fkapldo 
(Oalvsrsity o f garhsa)*
 ^ oo bolov, Chap tor TXT I , p«
S# !• Brookoo sad C« do 1* tfobb.
British, iasrioaa sad ^outh Afrisen aisaioaarles, there wexw 
also Scandinavians iud Osmans* With ths religious rwvival ia  
Aurops sad Aaerioa towards ths sad of ths alastssath century 
several new organisations satsrsd ths f  la id , aaay o f thsa Bap­
t is t  ia  b elie f sad practice.1 Older hodlss too wars sspending 
thalr work at this tins, perhaps ia  snsvsr to a growing d—and 
oa tha Afriosa aids too# Both fo r  tha soXsss religion soald 
Bring in tinea o f disruption sad ahaags, sad fo r  ths odasatioa 
offsrsd  by ths a issioasriss. £ha Africans, especially in Xatal, 
wars reel 1 s1 n§ increnalngly that sdnsatisn — kaowlsdgs wars 
ths kay to ths dwvsloping industrisi society ia  &outh 
-siven Basbatha, ia  so sash trouble with his whits neighbours, 
had requested s  missionary to tsash his psopl# froa ths Bsraanaa~
Borg Hissloa Sosisty ia ths yssr hsfors ths wprislag.
Ia Both 2alulaad sad la ta l, Afriaaa sdnostiGshsd always hssa 
ths oonssra o f ths aissisasry sss istiss9 thengh asny ha at hen 
ohiafa by ths twsa of ths ooatary wars requesting Govern aw t 
sponsored schools* 2a la ta l aiasion education was Brought undor 
gowsmasnt oontrol fo r  tha fir s t  tlas ia  1185 whan ths f ir s t  Inspsstar
Sae e .g . Ratal Blua Book 1900, Report o f laspso* of Batiwa Bdasatloa 
(a.Plant), p. 657* Plant astsd  aa aagarasao h r  aduostlen s la s s t
annually ia  hia reports (sss e .g . Blua Book 1895-4, 0.49, Bias 
Book 1899, C.48*) By 1907 th sro wars, assordlag to tho Vealeyaa
Msthodlst a la s io n sry , P. Kaaaa, 40,000 ooaaaalsaats and 100,000 
va4horaatsl to Christianity In tho oalony#»W«tiira j^ is y L la  
Past aad Present*in Who Ksthodiat Churchman, 19• 5.07.
of lativa  -duoatioa was appointed, although a grant la aid vaa 
paid Iqt tha Oovarnuent to tha aisaicm* fro» tha £5,000 welfare 
grant aetahllahed la  1648a1 Ultra vara ,ln 1385, alxty-four 
schools la HathL, with 3,785 pup 11 a, aa average attendance o f 
2«868, and a great*ia*aid froa tha gowmaent of £2,494* Tha 
number of gevavaaaat «1 M  aohoola Increased tgr leaps and bouadaa 
thara vara 73 la 1893, 145 In 1898 and 198 la 1901, vith 11 #051 
pupils* daw regulations aad nora etringent qualifications da* 
asndad fo r  haad tsaohars lad to a drop la 1904 o f forty aohools 
sad nearly two thousand pup 11 a .*  la  2ulmlaad# tha fir s t  govero- 
acnt grant la  aid to aiselea education appears to hart been la 
1893, to schools approved by tha Resident Coanlaal onar cad in - 
apaetad by tha aeglatrataa of tha dl at riots* On tha avs e f aa* 
aaxatioa by Ratal, thara vara aavantaan aohools fo r  Africans la 
*ululaad# saeclvlag a great la aid o f £8?6*8s* 3d.^ Tha syllsbna 
vaa each tha aaee la heth a&luland sad Ratals atndanta vara 
taught to raad sad vrita la Bngllah and 2ula, and laarnt grnaaar 
geegmphy aad *a l l t t la  history"* Baya vara taught "some in*
XC. f .  l*M *, Th* Wawtlw « f  Ih* S**«l Afn*— EatlTO (!*<■•
1917). p.54.
Zam  iTatlr* a*p*^jta lil  H gftrtl „!£■£. ln*p*«. o f oduoation, p .637
aad aoBcrt of. E*pt....of Adu.aitlon W jU  p.9. ttw rt 1904* >.19.
*co 4arA7/i8*05,«Mp. tb o«r. a* s*o.st., 4.10.93. eo 417/ 17/ 1904.
aad*. la dan. U Oor. to a**. St.. 5.3*97. tiwul d*pwt for 109*
la  ailalaad Bluebook fo r  189* (London 1897), p .6.
A uteU I wnrtt*, | M i van t a ik t  aowiag, aad, in ba—dtng M kN l*, 
kooM oik aad oooklag.1 9k* aajoritjr of tho aahcdla wara 'M h 1 
achoola, t tm U d  froa tho oontrel aioaion station, laapoeted 
both tp tho hur^Ott HM1M0 7  -  tho iaoricaa Shit i i a t M  M ad 
tax a tiaa to hara its  om opoclol Jupor intoodont o f iobool assk -  
•ad bjr tho y a w t  inopootoro oho rls ltod  tho oohoolo too oar 
thM« Hmm ssjp mntHo It  n a  eoBsiitaoei with tha itia d ftfii M t
tr th« jotiiiWKBit lMpMtos* Aloh tettndaid whatha* #r art I  
j>arwioui«r tphtol should ha ‘ TiioinlHfl* fcy tha ^cvtnuiB ti art 
thaa roooloo a cnat ia aid*2
fb » mu t  opoat bp tho la ta l gcnraraaoat aa Afriaaa adaaatlaa
vAif la U f iortti ox &«• JiiptrliiiiftdAati or d4uotUfift| jJ u lB lt iilill  • 
Coaparod to tha 17a. 44. yar hood o f tho papalatlas fo r  Swaps aaa,
5a. 94. fo r  aal aarada aad la* Id . fo r  Xadlaao, tha dftdaaaa t a t  
illO M ttd tffo par h U l i f  piJAlttiM  ft>X thO |IAf BrtlAf Jifttf 
UKd.4 About l® /» * f  tho Afr iaaa population a r t  at oohool la  
ISdl.^ hot aaa tho la ta l gevoraaont’ s attltuds to Afrloaa adaaatioa
, hr o. 3. lUdio Ia M f m l f i  jjM tt .fflr lw  
od. hr lav* l .  f l la t  aad J . B. f .  C ilohrist,
* Assorting to tho roport o f tho I.I.A .C . 19C6-7 "tho reqpisaaaats 
o f tho aoooi—aoat aaa oat o f proportion to tho groats aade< ..<•*» p.8T.
\ .X .I.A .C . I l l ,  M d . f.A . haraott, p .237.
S .S .A .3 . 1906-7, M d . I .  loses, p .46. Tho oqulToloat flaaroo par 
hoed on srorogo sttondonoe w r »  Cf>, So. 7*/4d«, £3.16#. 3*/*d. aad 
£2. 6. aVdd. ajl.A .0. goport, p.27.
V iri Vo- tf* •#• ^  4.M ia Capa, 2.76 ia Q.I.C., 1.44 ia taaaoraa l. 
1 3 9 4 .1 .  laport, p.50.
XSoo "Zdnsatiea in la ta l"
particularly aaooaraglag ia othar way*#1 A lsrgs aaotloa af 
tha ratal whlto an—unity fa it that education unfit tad tha 
black a— far Ida station ia llfa  * that af labourer far tha
9whits — « fills view was shsrsd by a number of tha nagAatmtcs# 
Thera waa sou# advocacy af Industrial training fa r tha African t 
aad pralaa waa wldaapraad far tha afforta o f tha Osman Trapplets 
fo r  thsir afforta in thia dlroation at their institution at 
hart—h i l l l o t  whilo many Batal p olitio isn s paid lip  — 1vice 
to tha nsasssity fo r  providing technical education fo r  i f f l — /  
in 1892 tha only guvemnont industrial 3ahool on tha Swear thsp 
loaatioa van aloaad down af tar only five yaars fo r  a number af 
reasons, oas o f which was tha cost par pupil par —num.* Xa 1884 
outcry hassuaa of possible coapstition with sk illed  white lahaur 
lad to "a Modification o f tho regulations regarding grants la  aid
^Sas below Chapter IX far tha ah—gs attar union* 
a*g* ItUm  p#169, 9* ImducB •
«.(• I .I .U . f  • CM* M i. « f Dip ttn r tp to . M H r  a t
Nathan M3S 401, p*231t Xativo A ffairs Confidl*, KoOallua*
*£eo s«g. speeches in 2*1*A# on tha Mission ieserva Aat o f 1988, 
V.Ii«A« Psb s lc c ,  w ei, 94 , peseta , hut sap . p« 9 7 /i#
5C* V. Lam, «>• MMrtloa rf tt« a. Af. W ttw. pp. to/1,
to iadaatrlal work*.1 Q ffirs by «  imahwr of ohiefs • »on ill 
tt to|V iU «v 81VUH In qhotwga division and tho Driafcr tain 
Africans • to prorida ths land md labour for n naw industrial 
school wars alqply allowed to drop.2 In 1904 an anount sotnaily 
sppaartd on tha oatiaataa far an Xnteatrlal Sehoal to ha art ah 
11 shad at xariafontaia • bat tha flaaiwlal dtpreasiou and tha 
dlatmhanaoa prevented anything aoalag of tha proposal#
On a diffarant laral* tha Ocvexnaaat dlstinotly iiuopppeved 
o f tha plana far aattlng up tha latsr-eeloxilal, later-donoadahManal 
oolJ.agn at % w 4al« *ditah was nooanandad hr tha ^onth Trlaan 
fative a ffa irs  C—sisal on. Tha gronada fo r  thair objeottaa 
throw an Jatamstlag ligh t on tha fata l ooaoept o f Attiom  aAa* 
nation at tha tins, Aesordlng to tha Stoparlntendant of SdanHUv 
in fa ta l
*Zha native education policy  of this Colony ohould 
oln rathar at tha 1 meaning o f tha uholo lnap af 
haathanian ***** iguorazics at tha xaicia^; o f
*fntal lla a  Bark 1V94-4W , Report a f laapaator  e f idcoatica,
3ae alas lasporta no* 107• 1696, uhoore V. a . Goodwin, Vardan,
St. A lh a f«  Colleges, aawpl ideal that a fter Responsible dwvosnnaat 
was aahiavad in fa ta l a ll gowsmaant aid for industrial soak vaa 
withdrawn.
*8 .».A .8 . m a . 8 .0 . 8 w t w ,  V .S.8.A ., p .18. Am .  to *. F llit ,
( * » *  1905). w>. 1C0-4, tb . s o n . to - 
llharataly hanpsrsd tha indaatrlal adneatioa o f Afrlaaaa.
?tettea  K * 372, p . 225 f f .  J i w  In tetM B  to S ir H, rttea , 15.1.08, 
n y trU a f .  m m m t t .  vith tte  fJ I . M l R .8.A ., M . t e r  m  tte  
•utajoot. Sm A m  IJ .A .O . ..r id ., ii.G. t e t l n t i  9.19, t o . j t w f l y  
r tjw H I to tte yM jM t " t e w  tte w IIvm  m sU tato i t  ^ te
'  ft. t e l  « l n t U  8 . i t  la  w h  m w r  m  w a ll art te  to -
fte  tte  t o i t .  yopul.tiao*.
few to a giddy bright above their fellow s, a policy 
antipathetic bo the creation o f ace like Hialaba 
end Dweae and antagonistic te everything that cnw tvi 
e f Ithlepl anise. I t  baa to be waabored that a 
College o f this kind la  South fr ie s  w ill be no a u n r  
tee of I—unity firm the asgalonKala which oversea 
edaaation lndaoas in the native aind, nor w ill i t  
prevent tha native aspirants after cheap degress firm 
s t i l l  going to laarloaa colleges* whore the asaospfcere 
la  heavy with raelol animosity,*1
Despite tho ffcet that vfica representative institutions were
granted to Satal in the add-nineteenth century, aoaa thought
waa devoted to tha question e f a non-raeial franchise, thia had
never beam s a rea lity  in tha colony** Under aw m o f 1845
Christian Africans would petition  the Oorsmor fo r  ereoptiaa
froa native lary under law 11 of tha aano year, a fter nets* pears
m en tion , twelve years* residence in fa ta l, proof o f their atvlllaed
way o f U fa aad with tho requisite property qualifications, I filsm s
could syply fo r  tha franchise. la  practice however certlfleatsa €
exception were granted only vary reluctantTy. Throughout tha
period la which Sir thaophilus Shepstoao controlled native a ffa irs
978 i f t  tn f#  M eats an inter solm la l native soilage,
by C« J . audio. Cf. BJJ.A.C., p. 21, £vld+ $ .o# ramalam# hhleh 
virtually  echoes thaea words, adding only h a  h a d e  and Tango
Jabsvui to the l is t  o f bleak undesirables.
*^aa 3# Trsopido-, "fa ta l9a Boa-Fecial Franehise 1A356"* ^frlcaa 
studies 22(1), 1943, 22-32.
ia  fa ta l, not a alagla grant o f asanptlon aaa aada.1 hr 1504 
that* « m  a till uadar 2,000 baarara of eartlfiaatoa o f a»»
m
onptiori, art thoro im  concidorablo ooafualon <rror tha otataa
o f ohlldron of azoaptod parenta*^ fo r  tho Christian Afrlo—
boinc tmdttr tribnl loo could iapooo ootu Morafcl® hordahlp*
I t  Might noil noon bio boiag aafejoot to o non-Chrietian and
feootHo ohlofa Xt ooold probably affoat tho tor* of hia MO*
ring* m ond tho inboritanoe of ftto ohildvotu complain ta o f
tho fraiiMu aa tha Ohrtatiaa >frioaaB war® oallod In Satal* oast
f it t tm t  and fclttor on thla aooroi4 indaod a epoolal T—pf l
la t iv i Sooioty vm  fo n id  at tho h » f  tho ooatury to to n
«
tha attaatim  of tho govomnaat to thoir grioraaooa. M P tU i
to ?• &• Moor tho raaaoa for Watal’ a roluotanoo to grant ooart l-
flaatoa o f oxoaptloa vaa that i t  pat tho Afriaaaa in a falaa
poaitdoa hooauao
"although thay Might 00*0 oat o f thoir law® aad 
aadar oara, Im tha proooao o f  ttao oar PartiMwat 
has found i t  oxyodioat to oot up a aumbor o f Ian® 
tfclah 1m|>o®o diaabilitioa 0® than® pooplo Mid 1
^Braokaa aad wabb, 4 BUfrMffi 9 i  * M M a  9 * T t .
■>— ksi.v 1096 md 19 0 6  3UL6 potition® nor® gran tod» 229 w l t i i t  M i 
91 ohmdoamd* swa 1 A /5 5 4 5 5 H  .
06
^.AaB.AsCa Told H I, 1909-5. iirida G«A« do I« L^iiatour* p .9 h  
vO# jjfld* paaoi a.
W  l/l/Z)£2j& .
do not think It  in fh ir that aa mould gat than 
oat o f thair oaa lavs there thair status la 
elearly defined md plaoa than under oo n il tier a 
there thair atatua la  aery haay and m at 1 artist,lnstly 
defined. '1
Moor am have ham influenced ty consideration fo r  tha plight 
o f tha Aa *T*ptloo M* it lU
oufcjoet fto *  iw W r af dioerlaiiiatoxy lu s t  ioxtepa hawwrwr 
tte  t e M t  PwxU r ' ■oor.te ty  fo r  Katlvo “ ffa ira , s . 0 , 3mm1- 
MA| mm tedag nor* honoot A n  te oaUod tte  inr p rw rlllif 
fo r  nmnption "*  M-ot oa our statute took" boomaa te ttoaSti 
" t t e  gor oiaaaat A n i l  n t e m t  aa far aa poaaibla to U n it 
aad tea? t e n  t te  p o A A U U tte  oaongat tte  oativaa for t t e  
atteioaont o f tte flrnoh lM 1«^
t e lal aon a i  proteUy noadiaaoly alarm *. I f  owrtlflaatea 
o f oxaaptia* w n  f m M  with tte  atnoot relaetnwe tte  fw w tol— 
n t  hardly arar granted at a ll* 8 m  Aim a ll  tte Comal N friM * 
aante ted tean oat, tte fraaahiaa amid a tiU  te vitetelA  a i 
tte  govaraor'a diaaraUcn. At tea tdaa of ttoiaa tteaa ram  tea* 
tellavad to te  bom alx ifr io m  TOtera oa tte  te te l o io itera l n U ^
xs .a .i .a .a .,  aria. v o l. H i, 1903- 3, p .a ? .
*S*A lA /3 1 8 ^ , Aante 23.11.05.
h ,  I . Tteapaoa, Tte telfloatio* of South AfAaa (Oxford, 1H0) » ».U0.
I t  m y be because tbe franchise In fata l bad bam aa patently
withheld, that at tha tin# of tha grant ef Basponsibl* Govern* 
went to tha Colony there w asllttl* or aa debate on the ijim tim  
o f pro tooting African righto thorough tho grant o f a qualified 
franchise on the linaa o f that inyoaad t^ob tha Capa in tha a id - 
oentury. I t  aaana alnply to hero bean aamaned that fhtfcl weald 
never accept a colour-blind franchise aad It mu sot worth 
pressing i t  upon bar. By the tarn of tha century i t  was a m m  
assumption that the franchise waa no real safeguard, that i t  
sinply in«re>n»d racial antagaaim end oould easily bo uuVvewted.1 
The ^ eeta d e  in tha Cepe at tide time o f politician s attm pttsj 
in various way* to U nit tha black electorate and tho growing 
fear, oven in tha more ♦liberal1 colony, that whites vara meat 
to be swam ad, taken together with tha tragic fa ilure of the 
negro franchise In the Southern states of tho Dili tad Statm o f 
Maori ca, played a part In th is. %  thia tine Social l arstaim  
and Znparial arrogance had also undermined an eadLler faith  in 
tho p ossib ility  c f  transplanting representative institutions to 
non inglo-Caxon cornual t ie s .
Despite tha rsluetaiice o f tha fata l goverunent to gmat 
recognition to tha aacultursted Africa*,by tha turn o f tha emtasy
H as fo r  a m p le  the leport o f tha *euth African native Affair* 
Comission 1903-5# pp. 46-70*
O
O i
•liiB ttd Afriaaa opinion aaa beoouiqg articulate fo r  tha f lia t
tin# aad "a now independent sp irit* aaaaad to be nan 1 fa*ting
it s e lf  ia tha Separatist Churches which ear# springing up a ll
arar * outh Africa at the tom  of tha century, and la EurupMi
type p o litioa i crsanicaticnc. Although the load arc of lath
thaaa a om an ti rasa Iuuj : together by aoat
whitaa aa "seditious Ethiopians", tegMtodlaa* • in axle teaaa
zkore for tha te a  o f tha aatirns than otherwise,ui tha aoweaeate
vara ia  f ia t  tvo diatlaat "reactions te conquest"* to  fto a if
the acre wjmpathetia tfbserrars thie new attitude, "although
raiding d iffle a lt  problems aaa la  aartnia waya m  enccuraging
in d ica tion ... an aeilr suing froa tha nlaap e f egaa and a a lllia r*
aaaa te naauM reepoaaihiXity* oq tha port o f tha wttn natal
Afrlcen, both la  Clank o f fa i l .  Md ia  rapxaai tlag tha A M
o f tha root o f tha 4 Mm  population. Jteca tpplaal o f  tha
whita reantlnn however* vexe the vorde e f  ft* Itekhaa who
wrote la 19041
*A wuren^c laawon in at preoenc wothiq.:; &sson£ the 
educated fa fflrw  throughout the country, a leaven 
to whieh tha affaire of tha Ethiopian Church hear 
emphatic teatiaony... A wav ideal la taking pcaaeeelca
*G*<MUlabiatenr, Attorney Oeoaral, Intel s .a .K*a .c* 1903-4, Tel* Z n 9
p* 9®*
*ARK T /l/2  Annual Report o f Aaarlean 3ulu Klsela* 1897* Raw* 1* I* 
Rrldgeaaa, 1*8*
of the black can** alnd* #*frlee fo r  tho vfrloaos* •••
the ola o f  tho lo t tor day educated native la  frooden*** 
in o i l  astters p o litica l aad social* This sp irit la  
am lfestlng Ita o lf by a aorioa of that are called aov 
ncvaaente, generally connocted with religion* •• the 
result has been the creation e f nuoh discontent md 
restlessness throughout th# oountary**."*
V* R# fsxkhaa was probably correct in seeing a  oonaeetlsa
between the relig iou s ^  p o lit ica l aoVMsats, fo r  bom arose
cat o f tha ease general background factors, the imposition e f
white rule, tha aaaantaent soused bf the bar* tha aostflst
2fo r  and the deumd o f the Myites fo r  labour*" Moreover
both drew the tv leadership froa the ranks o f the Christian Africans* 
Kerartbslana. the 1 gthioelsn bovcw&V • te use an Inaccurate* bat 
shorthand tern, was nore complex waat cun temporary observers 
mh^ Hi allow, aad the nflot l fltch^p between It  end the early p o litica l 
activ ity  mangel the afrlaaaa in ?fr tftli aa [j, sseeil tha fem e*
t ic s  e f tha fa ta l dative Gengyeas h U b  was founded? in  1900, was
*
set ample*
Christianity and adaantlen were probably the neat isportsnt 
feetoia saving far constructive f^a^ nge in African oot. *<?fcy* b u t  
a rlticisn  ef the aisslonsriee in resent tinea has centred on their
V a . ffffi a a  .te -forth, jfla a a  ( «aa«». 1904) ,  p. m .
3unfflA«r, Bantu Prophata. Chapter I .
5Ea« telow, Chapter T C I, ? r 5-5.7-s
disruptive oo tribal l i f e  and their underlain lug o f
traditional vtlttM . Indeed a number of vitneeees before tho 
1906-7 Condoolon complained that sin 00 tholr worn oaf olh had 
loaned European clothing aad become Christian, they had boo oae 
immoral and uncontrollable*1 imonget the oottlore i t  vat a
coneon b e lie f that tho oduoation provided bar the miaaia arlte
2•imply produced lacy ^ d -fo rn a c  things, and that secular 
agnate fo r  chaage» especially a spell o f work on the ferae or 
elaes or la  the c it ie s , had a far acre eboleeo— effect* 
while i t  la true that ia  >/try instances the of sociologica l
underetaading oa the yurt of aieoionariea added unnecessarily 
to the burden of the Qhrletim convert, ' i t  eea be argued* ae 
has been done recently by Dr* a. Vilakaal,^ that they neve at
B«g» *•• M i .  n to n tt (M m tt t* ), B.W.A.C., 9*740. U a .M i.
Jhief JCcaakanyekl (JNnro— tle ) , p. 729*
8.g* o n  the v iew  o f s . 0* s—nelson ea the Ohrieti— Afrleee*
"Vhmy ere comparatively fee ia aoaber end very mmj e f h e u «*  
hate by no ae—a improved by having beeoat d v illeedy  they ere* 
ae a rale leea truthful, leee honeet aad leoa true tworthy, they 
have aa a rule adopted acre c f the vices and fee o f the virtu— c f  
the superior race* end are net — e l—eat that i t  wtXd be de­
sirable te intrude into the aldet c f  loyal native population*" 
isu  i/i/2x**i£L  « 
oo
T^ot m erpositlon o f thin vievpoint a— S* B. Hutchinson, "Be— 
SMlolagAMl taMfMOM* of 19th otntoxy adMionaiy **tirltjr anMgst 
tho 3. Afr. Baata”, Aftrlwu Vol. XXVX1, April 1957. no. Bt pp. 174/9*
4a a »  Tymtfonnntiomin a  sta te  rf. t»* /jaw aflg. ojt t* if ■» ftrm r*
(Univ. datal, 1jo2J, p* 137*
the M e tLae e n m n g  their eeaverts to come to ten #  with 8m 
aodern industrial society by broakiag; down tribal barriers m d 
traditional attitude?, and by not almply allotting then to te a  
refuge in  n society whleh aaa bound to lose many of its  positive 
features wider the strain o f white rule. In thin way, the 
missionary bodies did play a v ita l role in  the creation of the 
new, independent sp ir it ee noted at the turn of t e  omatury* •  
and from th is point e f view, t e  euepieiom with whleh they were 
r awarded hr the set tiers* determined to retain their pclltinal* 
sooannl a and al dosixitto^i wee almost Inevitable*
teee them were the major population groups in Betel end 
I *  Mjor ilv U im  wlthla th* ifitM  population, a* * U  m 
mb* of th* salient fBtM B of thalr «ap of U f* at tho tor* of 
IB* oeatury. It obo apalMt this hoot drop that tho r a t i  of 
1906 am  plsyvd sort, l a  1906 o*oh«T th* different ifr lm  trap*
-  tribal, algroat aoifcers, Christie* -  roepondod ia * different 
mgr to tho rebel mum. Uni* me however oufflelont unit, to* 
tM B tho* ia 1906 te reus* Km m hbb of *  B lw ltf fOVMBmat 
proa* to roly far tho g iw w ttm f order oa division* titw ni 
hereditary and appointed ahiofo, hot— a rival tribe men e*d between
*-o* below, Chapter TU I.
• t h e  s t a t io n  « n d  k r a a l  1 s t  i r e " *
—
Chxntxr IT
it a a s a a ,  i m
Be la  tha butt o f the white people1 a writings 
vkto shite people wrote thea md narked then 
They were being written attentively by soldi ore
md Carbineers 
By the Abeagenl md Ajaaowasl* 
hr the Besataa mu w*.*jnfe,
By the ftosulaaas md ftocaablques,
By the Portuguese md Dutch**.,.
One south ohmeea to nake a reply 
I t  geea to tea those who hare two aoatha each 
.They take one mother’ s part 
. WiMfii take \»fte mother*# i-^ y
*2iweAi sod Wnyaauna teke one mother’ s part 
Eo is  the expeller of the >seekrsbblt from Casa 
And he takas up the utvcle p iece ,. . .
Cose le t  us go, thou who are la bad favour 
■• p,j let as sake for the barren soiled
i ott aps to the Ttagasl d istrict.
Part o f Dinusulu’ s Praise Seng 
(la ltea g .) t n u U M  lat 
a*G*A* Sanualscn, amc
-•*eo. p .285*
*Eec below, p. 9 -^
*£•« b .lo v ,p  # '56(0.
*Ihc reference is  to the defeat o f ribhehhu at Ceaa md hie 
snyels&sn free northern Jululmd in 1864* dee halew, p* ioo
*!• *. te t e  tea* l— i twy «f te . 't e . t e f  m  m m , 1 ,102..
Although by 19Q& Ratal aad aslulend ware yoked together 
in a somewhat unequal anion, p o litica l l i f e  ia Mainland aaa 
s t i l l  aery different to that in the settler dominated south*
The 1906disturbances can only he understood in the contort o f 
ijulu p o litics  from the end of the Aula War o f 1879 *nd agaiaat 
the background o f  the relationship o f Ratal end Aululand ia  
the 2680's and 1690*0* Indeed fu lly  to understand ao aasy of 
the fears in the minds of White Matalisnn one has also to bear 
in oind the nineteenth century history x  the uilu nation end 
the terror which the nanee of the 3hska, Diagane and Cetshwaye 
s t i l l  inspired ia the ainds of white Hatalians. It la true 
that, by the turn e f  the oeatury, the &Xu king no los^or eolsted 
ia  law, end Aululaad had been incorporated into hatali a m »<  
thaleec i t  waa alaoat inevitable that i&musulu, a boy o f fourteen 
or fifteen  when his father, -etahwayo died in 1664, should have 
boon associated with a ll the threats -  real end imaginary «*
\ghloh white lata) 1 ana s t i l l  sew coning from Auluiaad."
Dinuaulu, heir to his fh t e r 1* kingdca, was also heir be 
a ll the proUlena which had beset Oetshwayo in the last year e f
some of t e  lasginary cnee eee below. Chapter IT.
'*'5 •
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hie life *  After the dula *arf Sir Oarnet -olaeley* British High 
C—ml—loner ia  Zululend, had gratuitously granted tho lead 
disputed between the Boer* and Sola to the meet o f the Bleed 
aad Buffalo liver* to the Boor* from the Transvaal % yet the 
Boer desire for Zululaad remained as un^ieaehed aa over* Be 
the south, shite traders, ooaeeealoa eeeker* aad farmer*; hoped 
fo r  a British annexation o f kduland shieh would open up Zeisland 
to their a ctiv ities , blthlm the territory i t s e lf , anarchy end 
ooafunion reigned*
After the defeat end exile o f Cetshvayo la  1979, -rfolselay 
had divided hie kingdom under thirteen independent chieftains, 
many o f shoe ear la the defeat o f the *olu Hlng ea opportunity 
o f extending their ova power* Ohief o f theee thirteen chief te l— 
were £ibhebhu, Ubasu, John B—a ead a *x»tho ch ief, lHufei, she see 
rewarded for hia service® on the British side during the Bala Bhr 
by a large trace of lead in  the Hqutu d is tr ict, taken Bros *»lraye 
and hia sous for their alleged part ia  starting the war*2 BUfcefcfca,
1D. I .  R orrl., .ft (J* <*•*>•. ^96«), p. 596 f t .
Korrla's euuaeary of the period is  the moat recent : and ia  on the 
whole acre accurate than the coverage fa Brook— and Webfc, A History
o f H atsi.
* -ir  Bartle Jrere, British High Ckwmi—loner in $,A», gave — hie 
Justification  for presenting Cetshvayo with the ultimaturn —at le t  
to tide *uiu «ar tha faot —at ^irayo • s ease had crossed —  Betel 
territory la pursuit o f two o f Strays1* absconding adult— a lives* 
Zhs ooptaxed wives were k illed  in Juinlend* cetahwayo refused —
S S L S  S M W i d *  asth*t» bo&jaf: *•«; o f '****1, I a n , auleer, MM
f i*t**M ta n —ft  ttls (ttmgh fa* «mM p m t o M r  tav* t—  III * 
l*rg*»  fin *) A n n  i *|t 9*4 tk* o ffe r  ooteicht.
the king1* cousin* ft doscondaat o f Kopita* hod fought on Cot9h« 
wayo’ s eide during tho war* deapita a violent quarrel with tho 
King J-.*st before the outbreak of the tar. So had led a regiment 
at Iaandlvana and commanded aomo o f tho troops at tho final 
battle o f Dluadi.1 Kith Cetahwayo oat dt tho way* ho d early  
cav i t  in hia own interest* to co-oparate with tho Sritiah and 
vac granted a oonei dorable location north o f tho Black Dwfcloai 
in tho Sdvandve d istrict of ^alulaad* which included ranch land 
that had boon aottlod by tho King’ s moat inmedlate follow ers.
In addition ho vaa granted authority over tho king’ s brothers* 
Kvtabako and Zlwedu* aa well aa over Frince Dintisukt and a large 
number of tho tfaathu2-  the direct follovora of tho King.* Uhaau* 
tho King's half-brother* had deserted to tho British aide daring 
the actual war* apparently realising tho hopelessness of Ceteh-
JT>. H. Horrls, XMhiM Sith« :iM M - p. 561 M t p. 996.
‘‘Aooordin^ to BL.hop C lm o  the tor* originaUti whm Hpmd% IM r iM fi't  
father* sent an impi against tho Jaeuto and tho lolu  "brought back 
much cattle which m e  greatly adairod, being very euoh larger than
the lulu oat t ie . -o Cetahwayo’ a personal follovora o f tho ISteubera 
kraal weald eey boeetinglyi ’ *• are the data c a t t le .. . ' then they
took the word •tfeutu* as their distinguishing cry and wood i t  In 
thair gamea." When the Ukubasa kraal later beoaae powerful the 
•Usutu’ cry was; retained* becoming the mr~c?y o f hia party la 
the c iv il  war against Hbularl in 1856. Thereafter i t  beoaao the 
national cry "as the whole Julu people are bsutu belonging to 
letehwayo” . ?ro« Bishop Coloaao’ a Digest o f the Blue Books e l ted 
la  P. h. UoiaoBo Md K* Ouraford, m* aim  af (i«adoa,
1364-5), Vol. I , p .984.
JJ. T. OltMea, th . S toryot **»» ZnU-tt* (Prt« 1909), p. 225.
wayo's causa and hophg himself to gat Into Dritiah f stout *1» 
order to saeure his appointment as King aa sueoessor to Cetsfc* 
wsyo".1 Under feolseley'e cettlaoont he was ths only camber of 
the King's immediate fea ily  to be recognised as a chief and ha 
was granted Juris diction ewer the Qalusi people, over whoa 
Cetchwayo had direct control, governing through an appointed
ia .
Bryraaana, Cetafcwayo'e Chief minister, a man of extensive 
power, and chief of the Butkeleai people, la it ia lly  elected to 
serve under miaou, apparently acting in the b e lie f that Uhaau 
would aueeeed te Cetshwayo'e position under he new order, aid 
that he could retain Ids position as the b lag 's ch ief m inister.*
Jobs Dunn, the fourth of these thirteen chieftains, was a oaae 
on his owns a white trader who had settled in iululaad aad 
married several African wives, he owed his entire posit las ia  
the country to Oetshweyo, who had frequently used hia ss an 
intermediary with the **atal government. During the war, despite 
hia in it ia l attempt to sain tain a precarious neutrality, ha waa 
drawn over to the Britifcl aide* Aa a reward, he mm aade th ief 
owar a large area la  Acwtham ^ululead sad by 1081 had grown as
1C 5162, p. 55, no. 54* anal. Minute X. Osborn to 31r Evelyn Wood 
n.d* (about 51*5*61).
2C 5162, p* 33, as. 54. Air svelya -ood (dating High Caanlssleaer) 
to Sec. St. (Sari of Kimberley) 25.4.81. I f  the reason for hia 
refusal def m  independent chiefdoa was loyalty to the king (Merrie, 
p. 598) him oheoalng to go under Uhaau 'the truitor' ia <aurl«»Q*
G  n}o- 6
powerful thst he even tried to get recognition frora tho % itieh
m  is*ipreme Chief over the 1* 0X0 o f Zulu land.* To the Zulu
loyal ffc iily , he seemed the greatest tra itor o f e l l , mC their
feelings about his vere wceedingly h itter. The entire basis
o f the Wo1eelay settlement see to "exclude a ll persona closely
erelated to ex-King from o ffic ia l e d itio n  and poser* 1 i t  paid 
l i t t l e  heed to existing division* and rival rise and it  vas eooa 
a fresh and fru itfu l source o f new inter-tribal dissension* 
and violence.
There were frequent oosaplaints from tho adherents o f the 
tfsuthu of 111 treatment at the hands of £lbhebhu and Uhaau9 and 
tho ” eating up" o f ttsuthu cattle by these chiefs on the grounds 
that these vere the '3Lag*s cattle which should have been surrendered 
at the end of the war. ess a critica l source of fr iction . This 
policy o f confiscating the loyal herd was particularly nlsgulded*
ac most o f the cattle in the hands of the tJsuthu vac in fast
r
loyal cattle which had been *ele*»e<i»' to tfces end free which they 
drew their eustanaaoo.
3182, Snel. 1 and 2 in no. 90. Puna to Geborne, 53»9«&X» Oabosn
to *ocdf 8.10.61. bee also 0. 6, shield*, jLo ,vX M fa J S m
*uth fr ies
(uapufcl.) 19>9.
2C 3182, p .38. Misute encl. in no. 34. a. labors to air Seelya 
Mood, n .d i, c.31.S*81.
^ i.e . ca ttle  vhlch the King *leat* to his subjects vbe eared for then 
aad could us© their milk. The natural increase however belonged to 
the King 1*0 recalled the cattle fo r  ’ periodic inspection*. *31ea*
ca ttle  appear to here been an essential decent ia  the held the i d s
ting end ether chiefs had over their feU evers. See X* ilnahsea,
P I Q
An attempt to rosolve the probles by placing Ndabuko,
Dabnlac&nzl and Dinusulu under John Dunn vaa even acre b itterly  
resented. By 1880 aoreover Kayaaana had realised that there
V. #>'
vaa loo Intention of salting Uhaaw King, and when hie request tc
be sade chief In hla ova right vae refused by the adalnletration,1
who by nov had labelled hia a •reoleter* 9 he forced the Zulu
Bational if art-y together v l th Cetebvayo's brothers to agitate
fo r  the return o f the ’ Bone*, ae the King was eupbemi etc a lly  
2o d le d . The nevly appointed chiefs reseated these attempts 
to return to the old order, aad further penalised the tfsutbu for 
demonstrating and petitioning the government for Cetshvayo'e 
returns a tte s ts  it  sey be added vhieh set with every rebuff 
aad obstacle at the hands of the o ffic ia ls  in Zululand md the 
Qevemor in Natal. Very soon fighting broke out In a number o f 
places In Zululaad, the cost serious o f these episodes being 
BMstu' s attack on the Qulusi people, which amounted to a massacre, 
the arrival o f a 'pretender9 who claimed to be the true Kthethvt 
ch ief and contested the position o f Klandela, one of tfo lsdey 'e  
appointees, also led to considerable bloodshed.'* In the absence 
o f the King or o f any established British authority, there was
The Kingdom of the Zulu-, p. 45 in M ^ .oy ^ ^ U tica l. ^XSSsm 
ed. h. Fortes end 1. Evans-iritohard (Oxford, 1940)*
*0 31o2, en d . la  no. M» p .>4. Minute Osborn to Voed*
C^O 427/14/21124, B ad. in no. 07, 5*10.92. Hsport o f meglstratee Beast 
aad Olbeon ea testera boundaries o f Mdveadve.
Morris, p .602.2
no-on® with su fficien t authority to restore lav and order. 1%
vaa la ft to *lbhebhu and John Dunn to aid thalr fa ll- v—ohiafa.
lo t  surprisingly, tha ffatallans who looked on tha entire situation
with horror, called the thirteen chiefp "The Kilkenny, late'’ ! 1
In 1882 Cetshvayo waa allowed to v is it  inland, and aade an ex*
treaely good lnpreesion both on the British public and cm Qaaan 
2V ictoria. By 186?, reluctant to taka on any further ooaaltaeat 
in South Africa and an always preoccupied with the need fo r  re­
trenchment, the Britlah government had deelded that tha only 
ana war to the confusion la Aululand waa to restore Cetohwayo.
But i t  waa already impossible to return to the 1678 situation.
1 nuaber of vested interoats had been aat up, and the British 
governaent were ia honour bound to see that the ’ loyal* ohiafa 
would not suffer fo r  their loyalty. Thus it  waa decided to aat 
aside a large reserve aa a sanctuary for John Dunn and Uubi 
and for any others who had aoaa reason fbr not wanting t o  return 
to tha ling* a Jurisdiction, sim ilarly, north o f tha Slack TJnfoloai, 
hibhebhu aad Uhaau ware wall secured in their possessions. Catah- 
wayo who had not been ^iXoraad ia  -ondon of the fu ll extant o f 
these reserves, returned to a severely truncated and divided 
xingdoat. hibhsbhu barely bothered to pay his respects to the King
1 Brooks* and V .M , a ftUtonr o f p. 145.
*IMd. .  p. 150. Korrl*, p. 602.
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on his ntarn , end very scon after Cstahvayo had bam installed 
back at TTlundiy fighting on a large scale broke cut between 
tbs Usuthu and the adherents of Zlbhsbhu and tfharnu* la July,
1683 Oetahvayo was forced to flee froa the -*oyal kraal to tha 
Hkandla forests and vas actually stabbed by ons of -ibhebbu's 
followers. When he died in Labove in the following yeart there 
were aany <ju1u who attributed hia death to poisoning by Zibhsbiau* 
In an attempt to *nrenge hia father's death and to regala 
the Loutha lands taken by tha u&aadlakasl, linuaulu accepted 
Boer aid. In Kay, ltiS4 a party of Boers under Coe&raad hsyer 
roco^ised binusulu as the new ,.ulu Liig, following the precedent 
set by the Vcortrakkere of the Matal ^public, who had tried in 
similar fashion to win the favour of hia grandfather, “pande,
and to assert their auaerainty over hia. At the ease Uaaf
2they promised htai aid against his rival.
Dinusulu soon found himself la the position of the young 
lady who went for a ride on a tigeri Boar olalae for a reward ia 
oattle and land were so exorbitant as to threaten to swallow up 
even acre of his domain* than Llbhebhu'a ambitions* In return 
for the Commando which waa sent to fight Aibhehhu, and with when#
J. T. Gibson, The torr of the Zulus* pp* 225# 247-50* Brookes 
and «ebb» A .hte^aPL...aL.ftHA# PP* 152*5# Morris, pp* 605*7*
*C 4214# ttulver to Lao* St* (Lord Derby), 15*7*64• Brookes and 
Webb, pp. 153-4* Morris, p*608.
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•Id Dinuaulu vaa able to utterly rout his r iv a l,1 tha Boors 
claimed nearly three m illion acres of the boat cattle  country 
In t5 • healthy upper belt ef Lululand, stretching to the natural 
harbour o f St* Lucia Bay* Dinuaulu and hie councillors im­
mediately protested that the Boers had grossly exaggerated any 
promises made to them end that the signatures appended to the
decumants in which Dinuaulu was alleged to hare agreed to their
2demands were fraudulent* Dinuaulu9a uncles, and guardians 
Wdabuko and Tchlngana, appealed on several occasions fo r  British 
intervention on their behalf, but in itia lly  the Boers rejected 
British offers to mediate* Finally however the British and the 
Boers oame to an agreement ever the boundary o f the territory 
c l aimed by the Boers which was to bo known as the Hew Republic, 
in return for British recognition of their annexation of the 
d istricts  of Vryheld, Utrecht and *akkerstrcaa, the Boers gave 
up their claims in the Entonjanenl d istrict -  which had already 
been subdivided Into Juropean faxes and was known aa Proviso B 
territory ~ and were also to give up St* Lucia Bay* They also 
gave up their vague claims to sovereignty over Dinuaulu and the
^Though Zibhebhu also had a snail number o f white •advisers*•
C 4214 Bulver to Lord Derby (Gov* to ~eo* ot*) 22*7*S4« p*17.
2o#e e.g . Declaration o f « iliia a  Grant 22*?*al?*Col.cel 126 fe l !•
Grant was the Lulu 9agent9 at the time* For a tribute to
Grant*a knowledge of the "native questin' see Transvaal Labour
Commission, 1902*3, Svid*, p.6C. Sir C. Lagden on Grant*
J.T.Gibson, Ltfifig; ..?* J&Xj&iSb PP* 270-80.
reet of Zululand** Froa tha Zulu point of view thin was almost 
couple to acquiescence by tha British in tha Bear point o f View, 
and i ad aad, after tha fiasco of tha annexation o f tha Tranaamal*
tha Brltieh Government vaa preoccupied with pacifying- Boar opinion
whilst safeguarding its  own »tratagio intareste, by denying tha
2Boars an outlet to tha sea* Amongst tha paopla aoat effected 
by the Boer’ s annexation of the Hew ft a public were tha Buthalaslf 
followaro of Cetahwayo’ a chief minister Knyamana, tha Caalnl, 
a clan closely related to the ;,ulu Royal family, aad tha >al*al, 
who ware amongst tha Kim:1 a closest adherents. In addition tha 
oherlehed burial sites of the ulu kings fe l l  into the Boar 
domains.
Zulu protests at this demarcation had l i t t l e  e ffect, Appeals 
for outright British annexation soon came from the Ratal o ffic ia ls  
stationed In tho Southern -iululand Reserve, who found that they 
vara powerless to deal with a steadily worsening situation. To 
thair voice was added that of the Ratal Government and &embers 
of Legislative Counoil, who wanted to forestall iranevaal expansion 
into thair hinterland, as well aa that o f tha hunumitariane lad
i Meirle, pp. 608-9. Brook#• aad tfebb, p. 154*
2o».^a. 8obiBK)n,^J. ^Q*UMh*r aad 1. ..frlo*  « d  th*
3 k» T. 3ry*r.t, ld.n Tlw.ft ..in .bad l>.39.
i f .  T. Cibeon, Tb. to rs  of tft. -frla**. p. 280.
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by the redoubtable Colansos and Aboriginal Fro tact ion faaiety.
Thia combined e ffort resulted in the annexation <f Lululaad in
1867 by the British Grown.* U  D. R. Morris had remarked i t
2 _waa "warm years too le ts  to do any good". this time,
the British stand over the haw Republic aa well as tha attitude 
o f the o ffic ia ls  in Zululand to Libhcbhu,' which ssamed to the 
TJauthu to he open favouritism, had compromised them in the eye# 
o f the 3ulu, and their genorous gesture of allowing Oetahvayo 
to return home after his exile had been obscured by tie sorry 
events which had followed In its  wake. Though the British Resident 
Sir Kelaotli Osborn* aa well as Lir Iheophilua ^hapatoae inter­
preted Lulu failure to express open opposition to the proposed 
British annexation as 'ta c it  approval' i t  is  clear from shat
followed that a large number of Lulu were by thia time disillusioned
5with Britain and not at a ll eager for her 'p rotection '. Dinusuln 
appears to have tried to maintain a precarious independence 
throughout these years by playing o ff Boar and Briton. It was
1 Robinson and Gallagher, /LTrios and the ▼lotorians. p .216.
2Th. Washing o f the Spears, p .609.
^To Zlbhebhu and the British o ffio la ls  themselves the situation 
may wall have looked d ifferent. Brookes and Webb suggest (p .154) 
that in 1884 British and fatal o ffic ia ls  "saw hia fa ll without 
rendering him any help". Certainly however by 1887 us born was
rendering hia eons5 durable aid.
^Slr Mel^th Osborn entered the Natal C ivil Service in 1854 aad 
remained in the fatal C ivil harries fo r  23 years before going to tha 
Transvaal in 1877 with Sir T. Lhepetone as Colonial £■ ocretary.
In 1660 he waa made British Resident in the South Bulwlwd Reservei 
in 1887 ha became the first Resident Commissioner ia  ftaluland. Ha 
retired in 1893* /a ju t.
A \ ■ 
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a losing, indeed a hopeless struggle.
Throughout ths eighties, Osborn appears to nave nisooaftraed 
tha mature of tha situation In ~ululsnd, o Tar eat lasting l^Uhabhu9s 
strength and -ulu * loyalty ' and uaderes tlaat lug Dinusulu's following 
and tha allegiance ha had froa tha hulk o f tha alIu people.*
in  tha basis of Information raaalTsd froa us born, on 14 th 
lay XBQ7 tha whole of jululand was deal sred a British reserve 
territory. Dlnisulu however took l i t t le  notice of this change 
ia his status, about vhloh ha had hardly bean consulted, ia o a -  
tiuued to rule his people sad give judgments as o f old , ignoring 
ths various summonses froa Us born, who fa it tha chief was exceeding 
tha ju risd iot Ion allowed him under tha oav dispensation, fie wee 
also vary suspicious of Dinusulu's v is its  to tha Haw depuhlle where 
Dinuaulu•» most ardent supporters were to be founds Osborn fe lt  
sura Dinusuku was intriguing with the doers ones again, /roe 
Dinuaulu1 e point o f view, vshorn was far too closely  a llied  with 
a policy o f support for £lbhebhn's pretensions fo r  hia to ba able 
to repose any trust in his im partiality. Osborn's major failure 
o f Judgment in faot came on this wy issue, when he decided to allow
libhebhu to return froa the Reserve to which he had fled  ia  1884
S ee e .g . C 5466, lanl* no. 28, 15.ii.82. Osborn to Sir fi. Bulwer (Oov.
lately and CO 879/50/370 (Confidential Prints -  African South!, pp. b>-4
aad pp. 66-7. *nol»# Haveloek to Knutsford, lb .9 .68 . Sim. 60 427/lw 
2111, lu cl. Hicnte Osborn to Oov. (Ratal) ltil2 .9 2  in which ba e*>- 
prasaea the opinion that I t  is  certain that the talk e f the people. •• 
are aati~a*utu”.
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after hla defeat at the bands of Dlnusulu and Boars, to tha 
lands north of tha Black tfafolosi, froa which ha had bean ax- 
palled at such tremendous cost* The supporters o f tha Cuuthu 
who had always lived in this territory, a a wall as those who 
had flad thara after tha Boor annexations, found themselves 
displaced once acre by thair traditional snotties, tha Handle! mat+ 
now map ported by tha fu ll weight of tha British adainictratios# 
Though doubts ware expressed at tha time as to tha wisdom o f 
using Eibhebbti in this way as a oounterweight to tho Royal 
family, both the Coventor o f hatal and tha Colonial Office had 
be on persuaded by Osborn that tha return would only lead to tha 
displacement of a vary small number of Usuthu.~ The o ffic ia l 
figures at tha time aupasted that only eight hundred Uauthu would 
have to be removed to provide for tha return o f tha Kandlakaale 
Being lis ts  provided by tha 1691 boundary ooaeiesioa, however, 
Henrietta Coleaco established that in a ll nearly fiv e  thousand 
people were rendered homeless by J&born's decision* Hot sur­
prisingly, violence erupted once again in the Bdtrandwe division 
between the two sides, end the sparse administrative aad police
1C0 4*7/2/685, Sot. to 3m . St. 10.1.88. Tel., WimtM B. *aisfl«14
and H. Holland (la ter Lord iumtsford)*
“ 30 rhe -ulu ttf MilM^ dSiSjaiLSt. t o  »■ ^ 7-9
»y MgfigacJ.S ASS3 (London 1392J. p. 12 f f .
force found theaselves oppoeod hgr araed and angry TTmithu.
Cshorn culled ia the aid cf the Hatal garrison ae well as 
loyal £ilu levies -  including the followers o f Knyaaana who had 
apparently been ae tranced froa Dinusulu♦1 vfter a couple o f 
•harp moountere between the two sides, the Rsuthu leaders,
Biauauiu, fshlneaaa aad Idabuko, fled to Tryheld ia  aa attoapt 
to surrender to the Boers, cr perhaps to enlist their aid*
The refusal of the esbarr&aaed Boer o ffic ia ls  to shelter then, 
and a aonewhat anguished appeal froa Harrietts Col ease that 
they throw themselves on the mercies of British Justice, M  
the three leaders to hand theaselves over to the British author- 
it le e  in Pieteraaritaburg.
After a tr ia l for high treason in which they were defended 
by Harry Knoc-abe, the aoet eminent hiatal advocate of his day 
and one o f Its nost illustrious politician s, 7)lnusulu and his 
uncles were sentenced tc ten and fifteen  yearn iaprloonncnt re­
spectively, and exiled to - t ,  Helena* Throughout the trial and 
a fter, the chiefs and their supporters, including «aoabe, aaintained 
that they had been completely loyal to the British government,
XCC 427/14/21X24, Hnel J. In Oot. to St., 5.1C.97. import on  \Kt 
3utfcele*i.
*i£>. B rit. ai||» % 5.18. C 150/187, Up— g> to -ulu OhlMfji
froa H*;;*Coleaso ( ihodec House; copy, also encl. in letter to 
lov• .ululand, 1*6*85 and forwarded ae enclosure to the 
^•cimitary of the A«P*», Hr* Cbeeson (with letter)*
'8«« • .(. K. I* iM M lM  M i V* 0* MMM-tf i M M t B M i  But
ftf tM  a>lM a t r f * .  Jwm U89| M M Ii K. 8* CoX«om*• 
l i t t m  to 8m. M ., M *  * •  m * m tX, ia  m . 35, 00 879/50/370 
( t M M  S w tkt O M f* fatato) M i  * .  I *  0o1mm» " f i  7 iF M lritr ilii
a o
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aoot potont oihooo of tho &»Xu rohollion.*."1 m t  a tm  i»~ 
T tttiiiitd* thtvih mo nniii m dtd hr tho Colooiol
j « n U i y ,  Lord Kuatafosd, tor waaailng U s yawn  lit flojggla^ 
aanbcre of tho Otutfcu . *
It Mgr MU to tho* fr a  their pelnt of slaw Cabom* 
aU Imb and other o fficia ls  fe lt  It aeeeaeary to la fllo t oorao 
aiaaoty puniehaoat oa people they oonaliorod to to dlotvurtoxo of 
tho poanoi tut fr a  tho point of slew of tho 2aln people it  
snot ham oanotltatod a considerable shook to tho body p o litic 
to aao nariras af tho loyal fm tly t r a tod In a deliberately 
kuaUiatlog say tor yonlahlaf that* am pooplo fo r  se ll m og  
nlooff ottmom ubIit  tribol lor9 ofellot ri«<iap nfToioio no 
tha partof Zltketfca qppmr to hams tom  tary laryoly oralookad.5
tho oouooo o f  H i H iH rtO km  o f oo4 tho oouroo o f 
o ra ta  In aalalaad la  tho oMfhtleo hsaro aana tarn looked a t la  
any detail | they soold ache a faaainattag atady In 1ha polltlaa  
o f  aol l htoanttan and ra lstaaea .*  that tha nphaasala « m  in
Httaete an oo 4*r/ao/mx tm . *> r a . o t. u .1 . 95.
200 dPT/fi/90678* tlnata an Kitahall to XMtoford 30.9.89. H r
p*SS3
’ r a  boles, p. t2£>
4Those hare toon n oosplo o f mtoadod aoaaya (snpnhllahod) on tha 
aabjeot dens at tha Bhlsereity o f la ta l baaed an tha Oamaad Papete.
Isna aa yet ham triad to look at i t  in taana a f dfsiaan polltlaa . 
e .g . X. Cope, t w  trltiah  Aaaaaatlaa a f lalslaad. 1867, ®.A. Beaa., 
1999| X. J . my* Haadhlakasl aad Pautm Tha C ivil «far la djlolaad 
fran 1P8C-1864 aad tha roaotloa e f h l t f ib  O fflo la la . h U h a a .. 19
largo M iiun tha await of tha power n m i aftar imperial 
lnterwantlon ta toluloataa wall aa of tonyaan annrnnohaant 
on tola lands can hardly be doubt ad. How far haw waa tha 
dieturbanow of m s  warn also a typioal *flrct raaation' to 
British annexation ta difflault to any* Osborn'a yeliegr of 
deliberately Ignoring tha foaltloa of tha "ulu King aad hia 
follaaars aad sponsoring Sltoehto aa • eounterweigfct soold 
appear to hara aada tha tranattion froa lodapeadaaw to M a i 
a oolonlal poaaaaaton particularly difficult.1 than la llttla  
widen as to n « t  that aftar tha dafaat af 1ST9 tha tola 
Royal fanlly would aat hara collaborated with tha Irltlah. l i n .  
sain aw a young lad at tha tins of hia aeeeeslw, aat aywpathatloally 
haadlad aat girw yaw annt authority, aa fosboeshoe's saaa had 
Im  Is h# Mgr vsll Im i rtspondtda Ia 2ulul«ad#
faara froa total that tha raatoaatlaa ef tha tola fanlly would 
soaatltato a military threat to tha aalaay aaaat that tola £«na 
of ao oyaaatlea aw twaly eaetwplsted. tow at toa tint howarar 
a oat ara af toa Colonial Cffise staff taahtot toa wlatoa of bolstering 
up llth a ton against toa tola loyal fanlly in stand of trying to 
aasnra tha loyalty aad ao operation af thaaa ohiafa aha had tha 
majority of too tola yaoyl a behind tow. far froa Zltoaton
aa wises ef C.O. staff far leaaple w CO 4f7A4/lt5Bl*
defending laperial inU restn, in 1388 i t  appeared aa i f  Imperial 
iatereete were defending Zlhhehla*.* The disloyaltyof the thrate 
was taken far granted. Bov ter i t  would hare been possible fo r  
the Usnthtt to cooperate with the Imperial authority waa newer 
really pat to the teat* I t  ia  elear that Osborn, advised by 
the Shcpetoae t e l ly ,  newer thought thia a feasib le policy!
In feet he in it ia lly  resigned hie position as British tssldsnt ia  
Mouth Zululand than he heard that Cetswaye was to h# returned 
fro* exile in 1883. Host e f the other o ffic ia ls  la  Balnland 
shared cshorn9e views, aad would hare agreed with the Oeremor,
S ir Charles BlteheUfe view,* that, after anaeaatieu, despite 
hia assy protestations o f loyalty to the Qaaaa, the dUegiaaee 
o f Biauaulu end the Beutbn to the Quean waa 9 shadowy9 te l lasted 
only w i l l  they found eat what t e  nature e f British sale was.'*
I t  waa unfortunate fo r  Plantain that t e  Oeaaads upon hia fo r  
allegiance were t e e  in t e  days M ore  t e  alee tie s  e f indirect 
rule dipoaaey t e  been perf ected,  t e  when allegiance te t e  
Queen scant *auperoaaalea e f  t e  dynasty e f  CctehMy*"*
l soo Riant* I . F«lJrfl*U. 00 427/2/12780 an Oot. to aoo. 8t. » . ( « .  
2S1» chnrloo S. M tefcoll, Ooom or W d , W M r . 1895.
500 427/1/17004 Si* 0. RltoboU to Lot* I n M t ir t , 50.7.89.
Aaoogwt th# o ffic ia l#  o f 2ul*landf th# Shape tout an ri#w 
o f th# 3olu loyal family pr##mll#d. Froa aa aarly dat#9 bat 
especially aftar hia amexatloa o f tha Traasraal la  1877$ s ir  
Thecphilme Shop#ton# looked upon th# Zulu Royal t a l l y  aa a 
throat to Whlta latal# Xa m Important artlol#  la  th# latal 
W#re»gr o f  1392* h# m t#  o f I t  aa "a par# m ilitary doepotlea*, 
contrasting th# a ilitavy  «hl#fa o f Zmluland with l####r bare* 
ditary patriarchal chief## Ha termed th# fora#r9 th# Zhla 
kinge9 Shaha* Dingaae and C#tahvayo9 mod also th# fdebel# ohiafa 
Kalllkasi ami t#h#a#ola9 "aa absolute hindrance la  t a  way e f 
d r i l l  eatlea” # Ba f# lt  their organisation m i oa# "la  which. #. 
public opinion or triba l council# have wary 11 t il#  te coy# fhla 
a####easily eometltut## a dally danger to a aclghbour*# Im 
bhcpatoae*a t ie r  thero wme ao each thing aa a tela nation 9 only 
"autonomous tribes" yearning fa r  * their amelent separate cx ist- 
cnee* end t iger te threw o ff  the "terrib le laeabua e f t a  Zulu 
Boyal family"#* fhla may bar# base time o f t a  fa ta l tribe#
XI9 .1 «.
*C 5351, »•  30-1# m l*  la  <•#. 30 Md also #lt#d la  I* I ,
ColMtao, Tto roalUoa w>a*»t feo ~wlua (toadoa 1053)
(Paap&Ut), p.ld*S#> ala# J . *« AwiteM . aatolt or Pi# (ri#to*» 
xuuttobuxg, 1907), (?#aphl#t)» p.13* 'M u k t't iffw t* to w#lV 0m 
fclaak tsitoa avid aavwr 0a fV M M itt.. toaaaea vf 0w laaato 
ofcjaatloa #t 0m M Im  to daapoti# sola. I f toa aattvaa ted# 
rirortvd to toalr aatoaal atoto to#? vsald km  toa r t m iiit ... 
ofcjMtloa to tolac aad# a m li  of a paxaamnt ahlof #ltoal#d 
in Zulu!aad.*
flfeattmod lagr tho hfaaauo Kith vfeloh Shofatoao oaao 1ftto ooaUot 
la tho oorljr dagra of tho 00X00/  of Batal oad la  tho Kao tom 
Capo har tho 109C’ a» ladood hf tho Uao of Cotohwojro, i f  sot 
of hftoado. It voo alaoady a ooaoaomtod plotuxo o f tho
actual aitaatioa* oaa mm M ttn iy  aa a juotlfloattoa for la* 
pasiaX aad fatal pwiioy towards tiw« aa ac^urato por­
trayal of rti) 1 tr. Xt la row 0x002X0 that DlBxasala'a
■oat faithful M N kt) P—Pilii— a she ast*& aa iadaaa aver tha 
fteutha t iv itt  hia fU tt wrilt aad anofwuEiinltl hla oa hla &oco&d«
vaa of tho fidoondoo trlho oad a il root doooaadaat of
tho Irtwanlui had hooa Shtica1 a aoat foaaldahXa ODaoaaata la H i 
oarXr dagra i f  dula ox^sasioae Mowortholooa I f  aao hdd 
atamotype af aataaeaaua tribe* yearning far thair aueleat separate 
art ataaea* It ia aat su yrU U i B at p a y  ladleattm  B at Mm» 
aalu halt ooaaldamhle amp « n »  tha allagianaa aad loyalty ef 
tha aojovit/ o f tha populatiau la 1^** - ^  ^  oooounWd!
far la a alaiatar my* that* arm la Petal* Afrlaaaa regarded
hia with In>mn1a§ 000 aad yoopoot aod ooasldosod tVinaoolwon aa 
part o f tha aatloa oaa aaaa aa tho moult of tho aanlpulaticA 
o f tho oltuatloa hy Diouaulu aad a dollborato attoiapt oa Ma part
S l. I .  Oolaaao* ^UL .SPWJPit ftU M ?! B tB lft O f  O liff* »•“ •
te increase hit power. Srea matters of 8>e tost trivial nature 
w it  itfcH id  by tho o ffic ia l a at Kevin* "«n u lterior active 
behind It for the attention o f /Rig7 lnflncMt"*^
the appointment of Siv Barehal Olasfce ta Accident Com- 
alaelonor la  Sulmlamd im plate of the retiring Sir Iclmoth Oe- 
borm In 1893 martred a brief apell o f rntv thinking about Zulu 
problems. Claitre# a member of the Imperial colonial eervioe 
(unlike aoet c ffle ia lt  im Salmltnf tho oaae froa the ffatal eat* 
vie#) eeae to Xatal froa Basutoland#* there he had beam oeo\*>led 
in paaifyia* the oountry after the 1085 •Gmn Varf against 8m 
C«pe Colony* 8# arrived im Sain land im tha middle e f 1893* n th  
inetraetlome to ttvlev the eenditloa o f hmlmlatid end ite  people# 
the relatieajhlp of the peaple to the government end to oae am- 
other# aad to eoaelder the faeetiea ef Dlnueulm'e future.5 Be 
foead the country at peeee# bat 8m people "eeved end depressed*# 
to that It eoi d ifficu lt to grthay independent ouprosolrm froa
Athat oa any cabinet*. by tha ead ef the year however he waa
*BIA l/i/l8 C*& iaglatrate Leslie, loagona to Attorney General# 
3.3#07. w
*Ke had prerlonaly been a aaglataeta im Batal# Special O fficer im 
the Treaavmal# Magistrate la Basmtelamd# roaat etl onei e f le U a  im 
Cape Colony* After aetlma aa laaldaat Coal set rniar im laeetelaad 
ead Zuleleod he ended hie career aa Bcsldeat Commissioner im B« 
12*d**l0. T«l, IT, p.72.
■*CO 427/16/69990, draft doopotoh froa Lord fiipoa 6* I , Clark.,
2.6.93.
4C0 427/17/417, Marat .1 Clark.'a Sopost oa aolalaad, 8.12.93, *aal. 
la dot#. Coaf. 16.12.93*
N iiy  m v ln t l  tht lu tiiA ti n t m  ef Mm m Ik s i  m  
nneloo m  H m H iI ix  m  || |§ w tt lii iin i ond
^rou i^it fii i iy h i h  loporlol m t fll*  Allhou^ tHo 'i i l l *
JSU&DU plTty* Ml DillUWll*0 OppODIfltt VOfO liH fd f ^tntfKl ISO
m o t  loyalty m  *tkd» «iw | ily*i M ac* as Vagr m i ,  <•»
yaatoat «  tha i i w — t  fo r  O a f  y m ttM  to toa  — toy ,
Oim n f i l l  o fo o g lj iksl i f  kith tl i m  m «  htndlod i f  r tlil
«ad oJULoooA to to to^osH f tto too to would oloo pron
ttolo Xoyolty iad or op iriti td lt tto oov ngloo i i  totolooda^
iooovdtog to tonrlotto O itoM i tar W t  tto onjr i n  too tto
loot H to v tt *o aoto vitov ood doopox BMOlai) and on touthu
• lo M f  t o l l  « t o  o t lU  t o w  to  oxprooo t t o  o o t l— 1 
fo o lin g  ood tto  d o o lio  to  y w n lo  coo p o o flo  u t o  
to oU ok  n i l  vltO  w i a  tbooooodo o jip o t t lo o  tto o og to o t 
Dm D m  Jala m v lM M  a f DM f n u m d  aa M U  aa 
ia  M U D  Tatalil
ft ik a «  Dtrakal O a M 'i ttim k a iD a t D D  Dm 'lo y a l' ahiafa
III to tto toot ttot o o f  o f ttoo w t topool ol l j  Sittotto &ppoor
ta haaa aaa* t t r ii loyalty aathaa aa m h  tha Scasa af ahapatwn *
o f ahiah Oatoaa m il  ha tayaNot aa aa hoaoMty aoatwr -  thaa
5
to DM Sm b . la  fa it that tha yaat yolioy M  alayly a a m ta M  
Dm taaaitwa ta tha taa tiy  ty aattiag ay U tor-trlta l foafto ahiah
XC0 4 1 7 /S i/3035. htal. ia «aay. Oaaf. 34.1.94, laaahal Olaika ta 
Boa. 14, 1*94. Alao yyiatai ta Afriaaa (Saath) Caafl4oatlal f ia t s ,
♦77.
*00 437/15/31065 to 3m .  Stato, 30.10.93.
300 437/2/30603, Kim to, I . Fairfiold aa May. 157, 19.9.1M4.
led te lend disputes end fnotion fighting*1 Asoordlng te Vein* 
fie ld  et the Colonial Office# a competent el W it external ob­
server# by thia time "the treating up e f tribee end the exaltation 
e f mare hangeie-en and eonstablee ef the Magistrates* Courts haa 
been carried to monstrous aseees In Mtlulaai under the Shapstonlae 
eysteh".*
Marshal Clasfee*# alme mere very different* Tnstoal ef 
trying te g i l t  tha Win into factions and undermine W  power 
o f the hereditary chief* he proposed te grant considerable power 
both te these hereditary ahlefa and" to certain ethers «ho fcnve 
rendered epeeial eerwiae te the government*# eneenragftng the 
Zulu people "to leek te then in the firs t instance aid through 
then to the Magistrates aed tha Resident Conmieaioner".5 thia 
eaa the policy which ha lad employed la Basutoland# bet which 
involved "an entirely new departure in native policy aa It haa 
bean understood in Metal under «•* tha lata Sir theophilus shop* 
atone and in Bululand under 3lr Relneth Osborn"**
XCO 427/17/417, UrMrt 8.12.93.
S inai* 22.1.94 «  U n U I eiaak*'* n fo rt 8.12.93* CO 427/17/417*
*00 427/17/417, toport 8.12.93*
4CO 427/17/417* M r. to B«*. 8%. 16.12.93.
Xfc* now W idont Ceauisaionor vm fu lly  otim  that tha 
rotum of Diauaulu would ba fraught with d iffiou lU o* . Aa ha 
polatad out la a sorlos o f Import ant despatches oa tha p o lltloa l 
situation la  ^ululand,1 It  vaa altar that la  tho yoars slaos tha 
Zulu bar oany inttrusts had grown up, had ladood beta deliberately 
b u ilt up by tho Zululand adainlstratloa. Iheee would opposo Dinu- 
aultt*» rstum to say thing rsooabllag tho position of his fora* 
fathers* la  tho old ‘ roaorvV torrltory o f Sou thorn Zululaad* 
fo r  oaaaplOf a asabtr o f fatal ohlofs had boom oatabllahod la 
an attaspt to oroato a loya list • buff or1 botvaoa fululaad sad 
fatal* fhsso ohlofs feared that PlnuMl»*« rotum would prowolco 
tho <telu undsr tholr authority to throw It aaldo and rotum tholr 
alloglflaoo to tho Zulu flag* moreover ohlofs lik e  Zibhobhu aad 
sons o f tho othor thlrtooa ohlof talas appoints* by Sir camot 
Volsoloy s t i l l  feared, mot only that their etoaded m thcrlty 
aad territorla l aoqulsltlons would bo roduoodt tut that thsy 
might su ffor roprlsals free tho Usutfcu* la aauy wayw tho situation 
roa cabled that at tho tlao o f C#tshwsyof a rotum ♦ or cop t that 
tho proooaw o f divide aad m is had gsas sash furthor» aad tho 
laporlal powor warn now rolatlwoly woU established* Tot i f  i t  was
l a#port 8.12.93 BmI. la 00 427/17/417 437/14/3035. M »«rt
18.1.94 Sa*l. 1* imp. 34.1.94.
impossible for l^ousuiu to return te the position of the £ulu 
hlogst It see eqpaUy Uvreettoal to imagine diet he could 
or would iftuit simply ee see ef the eighty"three petty ohtafa 
ef Mttland with authority only ever hia immediate folltsers# 
the Ueuthu proper*1 Aa Marshal Olarfce pointed out# however 
well 'meaning Bimaulu himself might he cm his return# an attempt 
would he made te make him the epekteasn ef the Zulu people* 
k^ l t  he would set neeeseerlly ha tha eause ef sueh dlaaomtant 
m  a t# t tcdm\, to «n U  UwrtUUjr Mww its o y * M t.!
Clark* t l w » f » n  prapaoad that* ofcU a M aaaals ataoold a ct  b* 
iU « « M  to  1*| n t  k l*  M tk a iib r  «a M jr*u  n w l l l l ^  to a o a o p t it *  
ha teaold  t o  n t U M d  to  • aaatrol p o a ltlo a  la  Sslalaad* m  • torloa r*  
aa t t t t n  a f fa lia  aad "iadaaa aad aaafldaat a f tha gm reraaeet*. 
t o  aaa to  to  paid  a  l i t o r a l  sa la ry  a t ISOO aad a  baaa* vaa to to 
f r o n t e d  f o r  him oaar T d o w . I t  aa* a t «aa tla a  aocpaatad that 
ha a to o ld  t o  aaaflaad te  th is  ( v r u u w t  t o u t  ros ltea a *  a t Sahara, 
tha aaat a f  the t o la l—d a d a in ia tra tloa , t o t  tha C aaaloaloosr app oaat 
th is  aa to o  greoadr that I t  w o ld  a ssd ls ss ly  ra a tr la t  t ta a s a la 's  
f r aatea  aad l i a t t  h is  naalhlaaaa aa a  aorraat a f  h i  Oovaraaaat, 
fa r  t o  vaald  t o  aat o f  tooah n t h  tha paapla. s i r  torahal Siarfca
*00 427/18/9699* Gaol* 1 la daap. daarat  10.5.94* K. (Osaka to dor.*
5.5.94.
2lapsrt 18.1.94 la 00. 427/18/3035.
also pototed out tfcs fu t ility  o f trying to prevent Mnusolw 
froa zeoeiving vie i  to re or froa *oonnmnicatiag freely  with*,, 
t ie  partisans throughout aelulendf without subjecting Me to undue 
restraint. * On thie seore ee on others, Claricefe view* dif f ered 
very aaterlally  froa those o f enoeeeeiwe subsequent Betel govern* 
neats end indeed frae "eost, i f  not e ll the J* th jgr/offioiele 
in Jululend*#* On thie eooouat Dlneeulu wee to  ren into the 
opposition of S ir Beery KoCelluet thus hie request in Heroh*
April, 1907 to he soeoapenled by cone of hie jo in s! supporters 
froa the Yryheid d ietriot on e v is it  to Pleteraarltsbure wee 
pereaptorllj refused by the Governor, deep!to the strong support 
e f the Coeaieelonor fo r  Native Affaire, S ir Charles Soundest, 
who sear nothing sin ister la  tie request end holierod that eon* 
plianee with i t  would tend to n llsy the ensylele&e fe lt  by Men* 
sulu at that tine shout geveram t Intentions towards hia.^ Te 
the Batal govermeat o f the tine the request yet mother 
sim ple o f Ptaasal uf s trying to esert inflaenee over people out* 
aide hie eontrol.
X«o 427/18/9639 m i WO lOlfylM , K* (Oufco to (too. Soomt Kim to
9.5.94.
3Ju14.. PrlToto lo tto* . K. Claiko to Oo*. 5.5.94. Bool, to too?.
: aorat, 10.5.94.
’ n o  0 .1 .4 . to P.B ., 1 .5.07, BO. 6, mu 90. 00/ BOX, Saoaftno
to I .  B. Ooloaoo, 8*5.07, "Btrlotljnwritoto ob4 ootflB ootlol*.
Substantially tha position envisaged by Marshal Clark* 
fo r  Dlnumlu vaa vary stallar to Mbs on* proposed by Barrlstts 
Col an so la har innumerable letters sad patlttons to tha Colonial 
Offlaa during Dlmtsulu1* axil* to St* Helena** In Kay* 1894*
Clarke9 a final proposals were accepted by Sir Valter Bely- 
Rutofclnson aa Governor e f Bululmd (be was also Governor o f 
fata l at tha same time) end in October tha Colonial Office 
agreed on tho data o f Dim sain9 a departure from St* Helena**
Oa 22nd January* 1899 bo md hla uncles received a free pardon* 
md were informed by tha Governor o f St* Helena that they meld 
be leering the Island within a few weeks
At this point* however, the fatal government* who wove 
not to have bean informed o ffic ia lly  o f  tho departure until It 
vaa about to take plaoa, 4 appear to have got wind of tha pro­
posals* On the 17th January* 2895* they presented tha governor 
with m ultimatum amending that Zululmd be incorporated into 
fatal before Dimumlu be allowed te return* This adnata* unlike
^ o o  o*g* har .’reoeqfc.Condition aaaim the Zolas .and aofcc
(London, 1993 -#♦**)«
2PHC 101/112* Minote Gov* te Mins. 28*1*95.
5C 8732 Further in n iin Q1^ —^  xvletlxur to tha affaire a f Aulal and■
■o. X. Lori tijwr. to  B*XjHto**M**n*t 4*4*95 B  ** Uh u | * M M iw  
a*A iml*6>* *  oomt o f th* conditions.
400 4X7/19/2X949. OB. to 8m . S t .,6.12.94.
5i*0 101/112, Confld. Kinuto 7 .1 . to  O B ., 17.1.99.
previous oeauuai oat loos aa tha sab j  oot in 1394 f mm tha uaanlaama 
opinion ot alalstasa aad both tha <*owmor and S ir Xajshal Clartaa 
adviaad tha Colonial Gffioo to dalay tha daparturo of tha ohiafa 
laat thalr ratum ba aarrad by daaoastratinns and agitation ia
tha aolcwqr.1
Shat thoro should bars baaa aoaa agitation ia  Hatal against 
tha rstuia of tha ahiafa mm not surprising. Tat tha aataat a f 
tha faaiiag of tha hatal d ials try la 1899 la  far our o f laoorporatlta 
asaas to hars takaa tha Xaparlal Gowsraasat aoaavhat unawarss, 
althoaah hatal daaaada for ZalalaaA had bagaa dhortly af tar har 
aofu lsitioa  o f Haspaaaihla Oetasaaeat, i f  aat aarliar. low far 
thia  daaaad aaa baskad by papula*. fooling ia  d iffla a lt  to £«ugo <*• 
Just aa i t  la  d iffla a lt  to gaugs tha aaomt af popular faaHag 
aaoag vhitas ia  favour o f Baapoaaih ls Gowaxmaat ita a lf» oa which 
tha Coloegr aaa vary aloaaly diridad* fc& tha qpaatiea o f Zululaad 
i t  would app oar that tsaJhgs vara svan aora aixod. Tor aaay* its  
diroot onnaaatioa by fatal would aaaa tha addition o f aa
uimaaaaaaiy burdaa o f dsfaaas oa tha oelo&y. Far bat tar that thoy 
ahould ba pvotaatad fboa ttda pstoatlally  dangsrou* naighbour by 
tha prssano# Ia  2ulalaad o f imperial troops than that Total*s 
txpM na A m U  to law n i id . W t o  tofto* i t  l a t o t o t i  tho
*C0 179/190/5031, Oot. to too. S t. Seorat 25.1.95.
annexation o f Aululand b ill  before the H^ wae o f Assembly la 
Betel ia 1097, the Betel goveraaeat sought reessurenee thet 
the imperial garrison would he retained et Behove, in order to 
etreagthea Its  heed, ee pehlio feeling la fhvour o f sanexatloa 
"wee aet strong".1 The townsmen especially fe lt  that they 
already had a aajor share of the trade o f Zululand end that 
these waa l i t t l e  reason why their gueineee venture© would sot 
prosper ea well m**tr  Imperial ee f*Ttt7 administration. ®
Betel else already reeei ved a laxge share o f Zululend’ e 
oeetoae dues, wader an agreement whieh wee highly favourable 
te the eoloay end east unfavourehlo to Jmluland. This led to 
fre  quest oomplalats froa the Beeidmt Coeeieaioners ia  Zulttlaad 
ia  the nineties* Aooordlag to tho Colleetor o f iuetoes ia  Betel 
la  1096 far steeple, the smount vhloh should have hean due to 
flai ulaad froa the eoahiaed eelleetioa  o f oueteaa ia  the two torri* 
torlea was £6,000* The Treasurer o f dalulaad thought the sue 
should ho £0,000* Bader the Oustoae Agreement, She seetdved 
£1,000.5 Thus even before iaeorperation, ^ululead was beginning 
to lose  financially to Betel*
l C0 427/28/24862, Oot.  to S h . 3*. to l. 10.11.97. Sw «l«o  WO 101/llX , 
Riant. 58, PJI. t® O ct., 12.11.97.
*M .t1 Vita— .  4.10.99.
300 4X7/27/5407* XMl*. ia  «m , .  3. «•*. to SM. S t., n .1 .97 .
Oa tha other hand* fo r  tha sugar aad oattla f  amors o f  
fa ta l thara appoamd to bo t o n  to am exatlm t tha
pro ©poo t o f good augar lands along tha ooaet md tha onoollm t 
grating laada o f Ykaadla md fqptu to tha Booth*1 fhrearh tha 
alnotloa thara me ometaat agitation froa tho Boom in tha 
mouth eastern Transvaal md froa t e a m  la  tha Uplands o f 
fa ta l fo r  lead la Zhlalmd* The offsete o f  oven a m all part 
o f  t e  hat tar gracing Imds being eat aside fo r  teopeaa ooanpatim 
wae fraught with t e  wore d ifficu lty  than allowing augur planta­
tions on t e  sparsely inhabited md unhealthy ooaetlm ds «• 
though i t  was a e&auon assumption o f  tha tlao that eventually 
both te e a  oatagorlaa o f land would be opened up to white settle ­
ment* t e  discovery o f gold at Yondweal in the fqutu d latriot 
aroused a oertala axpeetatlon o f  mineral deposits to bo ten d  
In tha territory* Already by 1994 there wore over a hundred md 
f i f t y  Suropoaae oa tha fondvoni gold fields* There wae known te 
be gold in the fhandle md Sutonjaaml divisions, as well m 
deposits o f coal la  hath thooo divisions sad la  flablaa* * Xa 
addition to tho diroot demand fa r  land m t e  part af ten ors  
and spowulatora, i t  was aloe a eoaaoa asoaaptlom m w r t  white
W t t a r  -ebb mi Pro ok— , A f t f l f f g  H  j | L  — *  Sturt, M w
note t e  laportaao* o f cattle farcers in this agitation though 
they mention t e  sugar planters* In fre t, aaat e f t e  agitation 
fo r  t e  hrrsalring up o f Balalaad cams tea  m tU o farmers e f t e
f&tallans that thoy could dispose o f their surplus African 
population across the TUgela aad oo nalre room fo r  further 
wh.l to sottlcaont In fa ta l.*
Apart from tha question o f land, however, there a n  addi­
tional prestige motive* vhieh appear to have lad alalatara to 
aako thoir claiaa fo r  3nlulaad la  1894-1095. fo r  British re- 
eognltion o f Transvaal Jurisdiction over Sraailmd, and* perhaps 
oven aora important, the Cape* annexation o f Pondoland, olioaa 
a f territory fa ta l had also had designs oa, lad fata l polltiotaaa 
to faal that their Just claiaa had been ignored ia  the final 
stages o f tha South African 'Scramble’ , this disregard for 
tholr Just due could only ba o ffse t by tha recognition a f their
6*1* F rie usal sad fees tha uplands (f.d .) fa ta l, 2hs aaaat lands
vara sparsely populated and unhealthy! tha a ffects however o f 
area a n a il part o f tha batter great m  lands af tha interior 
being sat aside was far aora portentous. I t  was only tha rlnder* 
past o f !0£* whiah enabled i t  to ba dona at a ll.
2C0 427/19/15503, t o l .  5 la  4mj>. 71* 1C.S.94, «U  00 427 /l«/l745 , 
Address of valooaa to Gov. on tour ia falalaad, Sept. 1P>4. 
Snlulaad Annual Kapcrt 1094, p.9*
XSm . , « ,  CO 427/18/5055, Oot.  to m ,  at. 24.1.94 « 4  CO 427/24/4451, 
Bp.% UUulaad to Sea. St. n.d. raaalvad 29.2*96, printed ia  ifrleaa  
477. c #s . Sanadar% at tha tins latiag Seoretsiy, to the - hesitant 
Coaeioeioner, had a further raflaanast of thia proposition ia  1094 
when ha suggested that a I.S.A* Ooapany proposal to en list 200 Zulu 
poll cowan be used to start an axodns of Zulu to tha "vide open 
spaaes" o f ffcodeelaj GO 427/19/1X4682, fa a l. 2 la  deep. Copf. 50.5.94*
*The Capa alas aaaaxad British Baahusnaland la  1095 and though fatal 
bad no plana thsrs i t  did naaa additional aggrandlseaent fo r  tha Cape.
a y.f
JL ^  ±
e l alas In dolulaad** At thin stage however the Colonial 
Off lea ware not disposed to taka thaaa elalss too seriously. 
B etel's "eyes were Mg, hat bar teeth neve poor"* aad tha Colonial 
O ffice tended to brush o f f  her fears that tha areb-enauy Rhodes 
would gat 2ululand i f  aha did not as aara "childishness".* Voter* 
theless, la August 1994, Lord Ripon assured the Ratal srinietry 
that at aueh tines ae Crcm Colony goveraaent case to an aid 
in 2ululand, tha "prior el nine" o f Betel te the territory "would 
be recognised",* With this the Betel expansionists bed for tine 
being to be sa tisfied . When however the question of Msusulu’ e 
Imminent return arose, the Betel eahiaet clearly decided to use 
i t  ee a card ia  the annexation ,sae.
Ministers sow alleged that the return of Dinuzulu end hie 
unelee wee attended by eo greet a danger o f disturbance in aulu- 
lead and Betel that they oould only agroe to it  i f  they had con­
tro l over the ateU lstretlea of aululead end the detorninatioa o f
l23aas. rtuam» *.5.94. **\i naan 60 179/ 1*7/ 4545. ,
Minutes end werloue deepetohee in CO 179/186 end 197* Also 00 417/ 
19/6911, Oov* to foe* St*, 91*9*94* 00 179/197/9101, Oct. to &ee*
St* 4*9* 94 end Baal, eixrate P.M. to Oev* 2*9*94*
*To adept a phrase o f A.J.P. Taylor's about Italy on tha ere o f
world Bar X*
5 CO 427/19/7719, Cow* to Soo* St* te l. 9*9* 94 end Mina tee.
*Bee 00 179/197/6949, Minutes on Bipea to See* S t., 14*4*94, where 
Ripen refused to pat a defin ite date to th is, despite the alantee 
In favour in <50. C 8792, as* 1 to BeXy-Sutehlneou, 4*4*99*
the polio ies to he followed there in their own hands*
Both harwhal Clarks md Hely-Hutchlaeon rejected m mnuwptlam 
that Dlauaulu's return would belmrmldnd ay disturbance* as un­
warranted by the evidence at their d isposa l/' but fatal** renewed 
and adaaant daman da put a brake on the plane fo r  tha return of
the ch iefs, shortly before they were due to leave 3t. Selena they
were informed that thair departure had bean delayed* In itia lly  
this was to have been a temporary postponement* The chiefs did met 
leave St* Helena t i l l  December, 1897*
tilth the advent of Joseph Chamberlain at t e  Colonial Offlaa
in the middle o f 1135, It  seemed ae I f t e  departure o f the ch iefs 
was cam again imminent. Iaiti&by Chamberlain appeared to favour 
both the immediate return of the ohisfs md the incorporation o f
the territory by fa ta l, though ha apparently hoped to keep the two
2
issues separate. He fe lt  that with the incorporation of British
Bechuenalmd by the Cape these was l it t le  reason net to allow fata l
mto annex Zululmd, which she would develop "better than we do"*'
*C 0782, no* 1, fUfon to Hely-Hnt chin son, 4*4*99*
2co 179/192/14677, Hinute oa U tter from fata l Agent General 
by B. F a irfield , 90*8.91.
C^C 427/22/2!C>92, Fdmtte Chamberlain 51.11.95 (an H. g* Colemso 
to B. F* Wilson (C.O.) 24.11.95).
Ci the other hood ho A lt tho Chiefs should ho allowed to atum
immediately, irroopootlvo of this laauo9 provided ho oould got
Ratal agreement. aheaborlata hod ho, od to uoo tho annexation
question oo o "lever to got Hotel to federate with tho Cepe and
G.V.S*".* After tho fieaoo of tho Jeaeeaa hold hovrrer thio
scheme hod to bo postponed fo r  tho tlae being, though then thoro
v«ro thooo la tho Colonial Cffioo oho favoured !?atalf e omoxotloo
o f ^uluload oo well oo o f Brltloh Aaetongelead &s I j a "knoeto*
adown blow to tho South African Republic"* Tho er^uacnt vent 
tho other way oo wolli by handing over Sulaland md Aaetongelead 
Britain amid looo bar otrotoglc advantages o f bolag ahlo to re­
tain troop* right m tho ooo tom  frontier of tho Tronoveel* -  
oa orguaont rather different to tho one used by F airfield  before 
tho Jeaeeoa raid la August, 1895 fhon ho deplored tho foot that 
o whole cavalry reglneat woo bolag looked up la  Ratal which woo 
needed at Houritlua and the Cep#**
1CC 427/36/3993, Kim U  (on H .1 .0 o 1 « r » o  to s o o .  f i t .
21. 2 .96). 16.3.96.
2Or oa i t  woo more frequently knownt of Hbeglee, Hdhelenl and Seabaae* 
territory9 which hod juct boon token over ee a British eolcny*
3CO 179/197/1481, Hlnut* (? » .  Or*haa).
4C0 179/192/14677, KlmttM Fiddes aad Qrahaa 22.8.99.
5C0 179/192/14677, Xlm t* 30.8.95.
ViUit# spar t fro® tha arguoaata la tha Colonial Offlea hovavaar* 
th# £atoi govoraaont vara uoahakaahla la  thair 4atermination oat 
to allow Llnusulu'a ratura axoapt aa thair ana to m *  £hs 41a* 
suasion dragged oa through 1696*7* fcaeh tloa tha oaaratasy a f 
State suggested that tha tiaa via ripe for tha ohlof a* return, 
tha fa ta l gcrasroaant found aaaa oauaa af objection* thus ia 
18*6 i t  vaa dollyod haaauaa part af tha fa ta l garrison had to ha 
raaovad to hhodaala to help put dova tha Sdabala aad chona rabailiaaa, 
vhlla 1897 vaa a poor o f faaiaa and aattla diaaaaa ia  -outhara 
Africa md tha fata l ainiatara again argued that thia vaa aot 
Oonduoiva to i>inuauiu*a poaoaful ratura*1 Plnallp, vhaa tha 
principle o f incorporation had haan aaaaptad hp tha hrltiah govern* 
meat, oaa af ita  prerequisites vaa to allov tha return of tha 
Qhiafa • Aaongat ita  athar conditions vara a fiva  poor pauaa 
haforo dulu loads vara to ha opanad up far auropaan oaaupatioaf 
a jo in t im perial-fatal Cooni salon to lap aaida auffiaiant lands 
for Afrloaa occupation hafora that vaa dona and a bar oa 1ha sola 
af liquor* African trlhal courts vara to ha maintained, hut a 
aourt o f appeal fra* than m* to ha established*^ A pvapoaal fro*
h rsc  101/1X2. Co a t . Warn to no. 59, Hlnuto* to Oev. 7.10.96,
00 427 /25/22o41» Got* to See. St* 9*10.96, uhioh also encloses
tha above#
^fhara vara im adiata protaata ia fata l that thin vaa too long.
ISC 101/112, 2X* to Col* Sac* 8*7*97 (oopp).
^flC 1 0 l/ll2 , Qov* to £atal, Klim tee 5*9*97* C«mf. flou ts oa, 19*
the C*E 4. mt the beginning o f 1396 that the Xatal rote fo r  
African welfare be increased by £5 #000 fo r  the benefit o f Zulu- 
land vaa rejected cat cf head by the Xatal ministry**
Cnee the Colonial O ffice had given way to Xatal preeeure 
Ia January, 1693, the Xatal hand vaa a strong one* The chiefs 
had already been prcaieed their return and it  vaa clearly a 
breach of faith  to keep tbeaa in ex ile  any longer than vae ab­
solutely accessary* On the other hand, I f  Xatal were so vahcnaatly 
opposed to the ch ie fs ' return, title it s e lf  oould create the dis­
turbances Xatal ministers professed to fear* This vae a period 
In which many other weighty natters ia  >>outh Africa were preoccupying 
the Colonial O ffice, aad although Cheaberlaln vae not the sen to 
allow himself to he pushed around by a very snail, I f awkward, 
colony, this was also act a period in whloh the rights and Intercets 
of Africans were upperaost In Imperial thought* Moreover, by 
liaklag annexation end the return of the ch iefs, Xatal was th is, 
at least temporarily, to via over ths humanitarian elesent re­
presented by the Coleasos and by the Aborigines Protection Society# 
which took its  cue in these natters at this tins froa Harrietts, 
in support o f their claim* Although she did not support the Xatal 
claims for very long, there vae even a report at one stage that
l XA 32 0 §  O.I.A. to S .I.A . 10.2*95 « u  £•*. F .l. Hinut*, IB .2.98.
Earriette Colenoo tntsaded persuading Elnuaulu to refuge re- 
patriot ion unless tha immediate Incorporation o f Zululend took 
piaca.* Indeed tha Governor o f fata l wanted to throw the re­
sponsibility for the delay ia the ehiefa9 return aa bar shoulders 
on the grounds that aha had ancouraged the fa ta l alaiatera in 
their atnbltioaa. Deluded by K•combe* a presence in Hie fa tl 
mini a try into thinking that rea ponsibls Govera&ent had inaugurated 
e new libera l era in fa ta l9 e attitude to the 2ulu, she fe lt  that 
what Zululaad needed waa a oonsi atent policy  without interference 
from either fata l or the Colonial O ffice.* The events o f the 
eighties had disillusioned her about the ability  o f the Colonial 
o fflee  to control its  o ffic ia ls  andf above a ll , her seal for 
IHausulu'a personal cause appears to have blinded her for a short 
while to the deeper implications o f incorporation in fata l for 
the Zulu people as a whole. Dinuaulu9 a perception of the dangers 
was keener* Referring to an attack on hiaaelf in the fata l V it- 
neaa on the 8th August, 1896, he wrote to Harriettet
"••• see now the aniaoalty o f the people o f fatal 
. . .  though ve are aIre i t  la on aaeennt e f England 
who loves ua and a ll the Zulus. They ^ a ta jJ  ***** 
to be in charge af ue to oppress us, i f  we were la  
their hands we would know that we are dead and the 
v&eea has fvreaks!i u s."3
*Col. Col. 166, f . Clarke te H. B. Colenao, 29.4.99.
*3— h .r a d u l« a d . th . a il« <  C h l.f«. m i th . CoXobUI
Mtr isst,W£k£u L on *»  W 5 .
30ol. Col. 170, 7.10.96.
Tot by tho time Dinusulu wrote to tho Colonial Offioa on tha 
subject Mo plea vas rather auted. Baring boon informed by 
tho eorotary of Jtate that hlo return would only ooao after 
tho incorporation of iltlulo&d by Ratal ha wrote asking that 
tho land
"Should not bo distributed into farms.•* i f  oo 
ova uaaor Bar Majesty* e protection w  shall ba
oonfortablo. Wo bog that though vo may ba governed 
by Batal9 that vo ahoald bo governed by laglaad
too* Jo that I f  vo have any matter in vhioh vo 
are aat satisfied  by Iatal*e te d  e lse , Mat vo
should bo allowed to appeal to England*
In a ll o f this* tho &lu people voro not consultod ia any way* 
kn attempt by Dlnusulu aad hia unolee to Tie It London - a atop 
vhich may conceivably hero had some boaoflelal resulte * -  waa 
rejected by tho Colonial O ffice, aa likely  to bo used by 
Harriotts Coloaoo aad her supporters for stirring up trouble,
and load Dlnusulu to look to tha Secretary o f State over tho
head of the Government ia Ratal/Zululand, "vhoee word should 
bo fin a l"*2 la 3ululand it s e lf , tho o ffic ia ls  seeaed to foo l 
that tha Afrleane did not cars mu oh whether they voro to bo 
under direct Imports control or that o f Ratal* I t  la slightly 
surprising In the circumstances that tbere vaa l i t t l e  hsaaaitarlaa
*C 8782 1898, 2nd. in no* 27# P*17» Diausulu to hoe* d t .f 4*9*97.
*C0 4Z7/25/22M0, Rlaut.8 oa Oot. to Soo. S t., Co a f. 2.10.94.
CO 427/2B/2595B, Klnut. H. W. la a t.
opposition to tho annexation, although tho Bishop o f wululand
was a notable sscop tion .1 This osn largely ho ottrlhutod to
Harriett# woleaeo9# attitude. *Mle sho woo soon to withdrew
i
hor support fo r  fatal* * schemes, sod was particularly dis­
illusioned when tho 1897 elections removed Harry Eeooabe fro® 
o ffic e , her ardour to soo tho ohlofs rotum probably prevented 
hor tm  raising tho outcry against tho annexation o f lolulaad 
tgr a oottlor comaunity which ono would eursly have expected 
froa ao Indofatigahlo a ohaaplon of *ulu lntorooto •
During th# v is it  o f Harry -scoubs and tho Xatal Prise 
Hiaieter, ir  John Hoblosoa, to hoodon la l&yi, Chonborlaln 
had aado oloar hla dotaralaation to aoad bank tho ohlofs in 
16/7* i t  was only at laooabe9# 'urgent request9 that ho agrood 
that tho repatriation ho dslayod to tho second half of tho yoar.^
To this declaration ho was determined to adhere, dooplto a 
last minute r*a*-guard action by tho new Xatal ministry to delay 
tho rotum yot again until ?obinary, 1896* tho oaao tine, by 
tho oad o f 1897, tho *agl0-Boep struggle was overshadowing 
ovosy other question in outh fr ioa . Tho last manant o f laporlal
1s«& SO 427/28/23996, Bp.. "Atl«a«na to foo . S t., m i CO 427/26/4451,
sp, -ululand to ->eo. St. (n.d. received 23-2.96;.
^460 1/7/62, Ho 8. Coloamo to Sir John Hobiaaoa (P.R. Hotel),
3.12.96 (oopy la  427/24/24813) and Col Col 138, Vol. I ,  H.S.Colenso 
to Marshal Clarke, 2.2.97.
56ee e .g . CO 427/26/22918, Interview J . Chamberlain aad J. to to neon,
5.11.96.
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opposition to Ratal’ s incorporation of 3ululsnd disappeared*
It newer secas to h era bean bar ad oa an appreciation of tha
difference between diroot Trap©rial rule aad eettler rale over
African pepplee. Hun when Rlztusulu arrived In Eehowe on the
10th January, 1896, i t  waa to a Mainland already annexed to
Ratal, aad with the conditions o f hia return subtly altered
froa those ao optiatstioally  presented to Mb at the beginning
of 1895* Hie tera •confidant* was struck out of the English
version, end rhile the deletion of the word waa regarded aa
insignificant at the tine,* i t  waa symbolic o f what Ratal’ s
future attitude vac to be* Despite Rarahal Clarks9s warning that
i t  would be laposalble to treat Dlnusulu as an ordinary petty 
2ch ief, froa thstury outsat Dinusulu was expected to confine 
h iaself ntrlcty to the affairs o f the Usuthu In his own district#
By pretending that his wider powers did not ex ist, Ratal, ostrich - 
lik e , hoped to Insulate herself froa the effects o f those powers# 
Ratal’ s annexation of Zululand saw the transfer of Sir Rarahal 
Clarke to Southern Rhodesia, aad tbs ^polntaeat of Charles 
Vsunders in his plao > as CiTil Ooasdssloner sad Chief Registrate.
( lig h tly  later the t it le  was ohanged to that o f Coaalsaioner of
*PRC 1 0 l/ll2 , t • Graham (C.O.) to P.H, J# Hobiasoa, 17.7*97, Confid# 
^See above, p. 117
Hntivo Affaire)* Vhile founders was undoubtedly a ‘vary able
and impartial adcdzuctrator of the paternalist steep, ths
transfer did deprive Slnusulu of the support and advice o f a
nan vho may have understood his predicament and vho had had
no pemaction v ith  the unhappy affairs o f the eighties* olr 
1
Charles on the other hand, had been in 2ululand la this 
troubled period, aad indeed la 1890 had discharged Zlbhebhu 
for  the murder of Ussutehvaaa, an Uouthu supporter, on the 
grounds that there was insufficient evidence though vithout 
taking legal advices It van an opinion vith which the Ratal 
Attorney General disagreed* ?his is  cot to argue Hie rights 
and wrongs o f the case,but simply to point out that purely 
froa rinusulu's point of view, there was probably already * 
barrier between hia and the admin 1 st raters in -ululaad when 
he arrived* In 1907, launders was to confess that neither he 
nor anyone alee In Zululand were "ever**** able to understand 
the meaning and effect of his ^Jinusulu*j 7 appdntaent as lnduna 
and adviser11 as savlsaged by Sir Marshal Clarke, 5 ffe never­
theless did everythin in his power to help Dinuaulu aad until
*3ir Charles .sunders had joined the Ratal C ivil Service in 1076 
end transferred to the Mainland Service In January, 1888*
2C0 427/6/17005, Oov* (M itchell) te Xbntsford (dee* &%•), 51*7.1809*
5SIA 1/6/29, C*I*A. to attorney General, 14*2.07, private*
Marshal Clarke aado the same ooaaeat in 1094. 00 427/10/9659, 
copy o f private le tte r  to V, K* Rutdhlneon, 5.5*94 with. deep, 
secret, 10,5.94.
*id -1 9 c7  a ttested  to pro loot him tram tho mmjr aoousatioas 
made against hi a*
*hila C laris's proomoo nay wall hmo eased po iitioa l 
relationships in *,ululand# aad aada oimimulu’ s position Isas 
frustra-xAg# oaa mutt m t overestimate tho differeaoe him 
preaeaoe would have mam on tho key question of oottlor pm#~ 
tratian of Finland* i t  was a general assumption at tha tiae# 
area la tha Colonial uffioe# that a osrtaia aaouat of waits
settlement would ha bsaafioial to tha African population,1
2-van S ir *a lter Hal/«Butahinaon who was awara that “from th# 
point of Yiaw o f tha interests of tha N atives.,, i f  i t  vara 
poaaihla to kaap ^ululand separate aad govern i t  ia paternal 
fashion# and preserving tha adatiug s/stea of ooacunity o f 
u&oultivated lands (a le) this would ha heat"# fa it  that it  vaa 
"hupelesa to expeot that i t  w ill ha poaaihla so to kaap -ululand 
separata* -ooaer or la tar i t  w ill haoosa undesirable to resist 
tha persistant deaands of katal fo r  taoorporatioa.***"^ Clarke 
himself did not dissent froa tha provision in tha tarns of 
annexation whioh allowed for tha delimitation of land is  Julu-
XS*a CO 4 2 7 /ll/ll0 9 5 9 Coy* to Sec. St*# 4*5*91 and C.O* Minutes* 
*£ir waiter Ualy-du *chinson was Governor o f Satal# 1895-1901*
5C0 427/26/3995# Memorandum to Lord Sipon* 20.2*95*
land for jatropaaa MtUantnt af tar tha lapae of f lv i  /aara, 
although lila original auggaatlou vaa that thara should ha a taa 
yaar pauaa*T Cuoa thara vaa Katal gavaxnaant oeotrol aad 
vhitae ia ftnluland vara glvaa tha fraaohlaa (which I t  van la ft  
opao to tha <atal govamaant to grant uudar tha taraa of aanaaatiaa)* 
i t  ia doubtful how far avaa aa axtraaaly able administrator oould 
ohang# tha broad traad of want#* Chi tha land laaua la aa/ oaaa
i t  ia  olaar that Sauadara vaa aa gjrqpathatia tovarda tha ^ulu
a
aa Clark a would bars baaa*
Da#pita hia radaaad atatuav aad curtailed authority, thara 
ia l it t la  doubt that "tha lulu aa a whola ragardad 
ratura aa a raatoratioa to than of tha raaogaiaad haad o f thair 
fioyal fiouea". On tha othar hand# i t  vaa alao aoon avidaat 
that tha traditional la ta l h ostility  to tha haad of tha lulu 
ttoyal family had baaa but l i t t la  ahaagad during tha yaars o f 
hia axils. Tha 'vaataralaiag9 affaota of hia stay at I t .  Hal ana 
did not laaaaa this hoatility* aany whltao hia a ffort to build 
a waa tarn-typo houaa fo r  hinaal f  aad tha prograaalva idaaa about
EC 179/19 73050, &«▼. to a««, ■*., 0oaf. 23.1.93. h / 7.3.96 
Clark# aooaptad • 3 /M r ; u m  (00 179/194A1T00).
2 m  for e*aapla hia widens# bafora S.lf.A.C.f p. 135-137.
S^BU 1/6/29. C8A to Attomagr Oaaaral ,  14.2.07.
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agriculture* whioh ha had acquired overseas, vara enough to 
label his a "spoilt nigger"•* Tho stereotype o f Dinuauln as 
a drunken debauched potentate, indulging in every kind o f senaual 
vio# van not an infrequent on# aaonget vhite Hataliana, although 
this picture hardly squared vith tha opinions o f tha people vho 
knee hia hast. Tha lapraasloa ha created in 8t« Helena seaaa 
to hara bean alaeet entirely favourable, Thus S. A, Baraolooghf 
hia tutor thara fo r  two years, wrote to tha Colonial Of floe  
o f hia "exemplary behaviour" and "hia straightforward and aanly 
character".** Saunders h inselff although admitting that ha had
j
never liked Dinuaulu, denied that ha vaa any more fond of liquor
a
or voa«m than any other ohlaf in hia position in Sululaad, 
nevertheless tha iaagt died hard, and vaa even repeated by the
g
Attorney General o f Stxluland at tha beginning o f 1907, aa vail 
aa by the Bishop o f aululand, vho sited tha opinion of his aroh- 
doaoons thara that Dinuaulu vaa an lnaorsl nan whose influence on
X0ol. Col. 159, Vol. I I , Corroop. B. B. Ooloaao to Bm. 11,
8.9.09*
*Ct .  s t w t ,  3 .E .. p .n o . md jr. Crod (psoad.), .Ifrloon Cdyooor
(:«oadon, 1939)*
5*o Mttiotea, 16.2.97, Snol. la  CO 179/196/8505.
4C0 179/227/41441, Oct. to Soo. S t., lihol. 1 doop. 25.10.05, 
diary of events Ujunders aada tha xaaark to KoCallua).
*2, ATchivea 28, Papers relating to Zulu Rebellion, CoTi.A. to 
I .I .A ,, %2,07o .
6400 1 /7 /5*, Blauto to £ .■ > . ,a .d . (to d a a la , 1907).
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his people " is  e l l  for ev il" .*  In tide Tie*, the -xehdeacoas
were echoing Anglican attitudes to the ^ulu Royal family which
predated the 2*lu h r .  In part this waa undoubtedly a reflection
y
o f the aaiaesity f e l t  by many alsslonaries to tha Zulu Koyal 
fanily, who, they fa it , inpeded missionary progreas in the country. 
In part, by thia time i t  nay also hare reflected the b itter 
struggle between the Church o f the Irorinoe and tha Coleaslts 
Church o f l&gland in Ratal -  the price Dinusulu had to pay for 
Harriette Coleaeo•a support#
More important however than theee allegations about hia 
personal behaviour • revealing as they are about the settler a tti­
tude to the acculturated or partly acculturated African -  wars 
the rumours which circulated immediately on hia return about Dina* 
aulu'a schaaec to build up tha power o f tha Zulu Rings ones more 
and to extend hia authority over the whole o f Zululaad. Vi thia 
a couple o f months of hia return the ctreaa of young non who cast 
to pay thsir respects to hia were regarded by the police as evidence 
that he me deliberately trying to create a following aad to regain
*00 179/242/250806, -a d . 5 la deep, secret, no. 1, 19.1C.07, Pte 
and Confidential. Bp. o f Jululaad to Oov., 10.10.07.
^Though net those of the Kemanasburg Lutheran Mission established 
at Xongaaa who were very thankful for Dlxmsulu’ s protection during 
the Boer bar. Sea ileruaaaa burger Hi aalonablatt, 15.7.03, p. 209.
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his old pcaition.* Th© Co«ai8aion«r for native A ffairs, Charles 
sunders, van tad to give an carder prohibiting th© young sen from 
going to Dinuaulu*» kraal without th© peraisalon o f th©ir magi©* 
trato, but Hely~Hutcl.I neon, probably © till under th© impression 
o f Hershal Clark©'© visor councils, refused to give i t .  Even 
th© public reconciliation o f Dinuaulu and his old enemy, Zibhsth*, 
vaa regarded by th© Seoretary o f fative A ffaire, at that tiaa, 
c ix  James Liege Hulett, ae da^crous because it  would in eoae 
ray indicate that the Covemaent recognised Dinuaulu1a pirMtmntqf,* 
That both Dinuaulu and Harriett© Colcrnso were disappointed that 
the eon o f Catshvayo had been returned aa one petty chief amongst 
many, In defiance o f the recownendatione of S ir Narehal Clarke, 
s eon a clear.* That they intended using sin ister methods in 
changing that situation is not nhown by any o f tha evidence even 
In the government f i le s . There was csioh to be said for Harriett©
Col an so* s contention that tho question o f Dinuaulu *o authority 
was mt a question of the fata l or of tho Imperial government 
-giving or withholding power free hia, tut o f controlling the
1cSa y  4/22 y^r • Report o f Intervie w between S .f.A . and Inepeo. 
Clarice, fata l Police, 6.5*98.
2W 179/^3/5070, 0.T, to 3M. S t., Conf., 11 . 2.9a .
3iOO 1/ 8. 113, 3.B.A. to O.B.A., A n ., 1096.
4S0 179/203/5070, Oot. to 3m. S t., Coaf., U .2 .96 . M U , Chi o f M |U . 
end C.C. (launders) to P.H., 28.1.96. Col. Ool. 140, Vol. I l l ,  1 . B. 
Coleneo to Dir W, fathea, 17.12.C7 (copy)*
paver ha has without as. Xf i t  ia  oat recognised# i t  ia not
controlled aad i f  ha diad toaorrov another of Cetahvayo's
|ft tn  1  ^  B M W *  j t a  "  X
Jtevixm Uk% 1399^X9^5 ^a«X<>^o#r ««r» D ia ta U 1* p o « i t l «
o f
Katai* *iuia Colonel fiottoalay's uaa of Diaaauln*# authority not 
o*uy to defend tha borders o f dalelead hut als-, to aaad aoouta 
aad oatuo-raiding parties into «ranevaal terr, tory* ama strsnanaaly 
opposed tgr tha Natal government aad by tha a iv il ntainietretioe 
ia  ^ululand**' fhe authorities fa it  that thaaa aatlvitiaa not 
oaiy directly ©ontradietad thair daalarad policy  that this vaa 
a ’white aaafs war* ia  vhioh tha blaek aaa vaa to hare ao part# 
hut that i t  also neat *ralnat thair e fforts to atatatse ia ovary 
say tha hold which Liausoin had over tha Jala people* departs 
that iiwiaulu vaa put la charge by dattoalay o f Tafeaalbeave's 
luthalaai people* lad waundare to protest that ttiia vaa a deliberate 
attempt oa tha part o f bimiaulu to aaaaaa control over tha Bathalavl
*5people*y tho JUtheleai had beooae estranged from tha Ceuthu when
XCol. Col* 142# ? o i. V. H# E« Colaaao to Agnes Colenso# 3*7*97*
See also Chapter IX below fo r  faara that hla brother Kaasdhvaodla 
vcnld hold an actually powerful position after Dtnosulu'e axils*
*B*e various despatches In CD 189/218.
5CC 173/218/16.21, Owpjj* jnol. In deep* 4*4*01# Samdsn to P#K*| 3*4*01*
W K jmm*,  Tefcaalteeae'e M m » i t e l  g i n i  Ida allegU aee te 
tte  M t t t e  ia  im ip  aad Iw te i u t e i f l  the t enths l u i a i  te «
Xaan ite te fteM iit^  iehlad theee tlijM tte i lay tet f t e l l ig  
that «arning tha te it  a m ll give the* ftlaa Idaaa a f te te t aaa 
povese... aad areata a position te lte  v a i l  latear aeah t o n  
l it f la U t  tha wlttaet# settlement af mwap aaaa la  tha prevlnac.*"
SfcUe aat denying fo r  oaa aoaaat that Ei iae*l*f Ilka Mqr 
aaathar African ruler* aaa to lly  capable o f playing * autetle 
aad aoaplax p o lit ica l aaaa la  attempting to t e l l l  ap hia paaar  
alth ia  tha aaa p o litica l faaaawak, ia  thia aaaa I t  weald aaaa 
that aa w te lla v  ilka Battaalogr* given a ntHtawy taak to partem* 
v w ii  look fo r  tho aoat e ffic ien t a ^  a f dalaa it*  Far thia 
purpose, ha simply recognised tha natural aassndamoy of maanuln 
ia  tha araaa bordering °a tha iraasvaal Aepublio." thatewur 
tha tarns of 'inuaulu, s return* fo r  tha m ilitary aathoritlaa hia 
h all orar tha ailegiaaoe o f tha tribesmen la tha aaatara fraasvaal
1 vofcSee above, p p /.n  189® a amber of Tfhaibexse’ s young nan had fo&v 
to aaalot in tha building o f  Plauuulu*u nut a without reference te 
their chief who was reported aa personally hostile to Tdmnaulu.
CQ 179/203/9C54* AatUBR Oot. to Sm. St., Conf., 2.4.98. Bnel. 4*
C.C. anA Cf. to Col. o o ., 1.4.98.
*CC 179/213/4943, Cov. to 3*». S t., 14.2.1900 t « l .
^1* tiu, C.S.J.. polatoA oat in 1907< "It im not .  $>Mtlon o f Dlnasnln 
haring acquired his present position since hia returnf this ha 
poaaeaaed in vary nuch greater degree before hia exile  when.** ha 
euooeedad hia ttther. So long aa ha lives Dinaaulw w ill never ha 
regarded as an ordinary ohief." SXi 1/5/29* C.V,h# to Attorney 
general, 18.2.07.
M l —1 —l allpla tk# lk|kill dlotriot mb tw  |Ml an opportunity 
to bo a ifM i o f vouotiutiaft liM ii tho wear lim it  s u i i i  t o  w  
yeora • owWr o f Iko V q M I ofciofe aotuolly took refuge vith 
Wtwoati aft tho tfauthu totaU o&tk tho ogresnoat of tho govoa»■■ 
wont, m l Dinuaulu ooo nulled upon on oovoruT, ooooaimo to eontrol 
tho Qolnol people**
m «r  tho hn»t with tho motcxutleu of fu ll nogl atari al 
anthority ore* Dinuaulu, sun dvrs hod hlo way that thoro *euld 
ho mo orionnlootloo hotooon Dinuaulu md tvibesaau other than 
tho tJwtha without o ffio lo l consent. Ihia voo o anttor of oco» 
eiderafele perplexity to tto Onluel oho fo lt  that while Dinuaulu 
waa "autfcorioed to manroiao control over thou ohan tho hritloh 
were fhood vith tremble, ho la dauiod h o ly  friendship in tin# 
o f  peace."2
•'-port fxuu tho Qulual hovoror, it  la aloor that ia tho post­
war poors oven tha • frtoaan la  Metal wort looking to Manuals 
fo r  sobo kind o f leudarohlp In tluaa o f oonuidasuhlo street and 
ohange.^  Hoot otrlking o f a ll vaa tho foot that omen Christian
1iea 1C*y^ff C*H.A* to F*K., 2«5*07, vhero ho outlines tho 
relationship between Dinuaulu aad tho Quluei people.
^aic C#I*A* to F.K., 1*5*07, no. 6f and Z.A« 29, C.1I#A« to
P.M., 5.5;07*
^00 e .g . CO 179/2/935C, Snol. 2 In doop* 29, 23.2.06* Intollloaaoa 
leport Lieut. Col* Leuohars to Cor.
a n
-i- »V
tfH M U  m i l  a w i M *  m A «  o f th* M U  U yal itoU | M
tv.* enhollnent of tholr national p rllo , a «w w «t»rr  on tho «n if*» 
Ine an^ootn o f a will ay o f  'M rlJe an. m l#*.1 shortly aftor 
rotum fro* «rtl#  M# na*o hoeaa# tho oontro of a hoat o f Reaslanl* 
tm o maoat* tn l Ohm 1* 190 6  rohollton hrefco out ho appo*ro« to 
■my, hotfc H u *  m l white, to ho it*  lastl/rotor In ohlof.
C*o holev, Chapter T ill , 
2Soo holov, Choptor I f .
i t s
Chapter III
—    PCTaaanggga
"Oh, indeed ire cannot understand where the Government 
ia that they should be constantly demanding money 
from us. I f  we knew where they were, we might go 
and ask them where a ll the money is  to come from 
which they are demanding from us, Would that we had 
died along with the cattle o f  the Rinderpest, Ndabesita.*
. . . .  They want us to pay the money so that when they
destroy the country they may have devoured it .  We have 
not the money, Nageba,/ what say you?"
AuO 1/7/62 Letter from an anonymous 
writer to Dlnusulu, 26,8,05*
♦Praise names of Dlnusulu. Ndabesita was the takazo of several 
clans (e.g. Sibiya, Kbata etc,) whose ancestor he was, Upon 
conquering these clans, the Zulu took over the takaso or praise- 
name, and it  was solely applied to them, (Bryant, Zulu-Snglish 
Dictionary, p,410)
/Hageba was the son of Zulu.
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I f  the colonial situation it s e lf  led the Africans even of
Natal to look Increasingly to Dinuzulu for  leadershipV “their
poverty at the turn of the century and especially after the Boer
War made their need for a messianic-type saviour all the greater.
1904-9 found Natal suffering, in common with the rest of south
Africa, from the post-Boer War depression; labour d ifficu lt ies
on the Rand, the problems o f  farming in the war-torn areas and
the end of the reconstruction book in the conquered Republics,
a ll had their repercussions in Natal, the economy of which was
closely attuned to that of the interior.* By June 1905 Natal’ s
public debt had risen annually since the Boer War by about C2H
2to a total o f just over £18M, and the expenditure for that financial 
year exceeded the revenue by £429,750. -  not much In relation to
present fay budgets, but a considerable d e fic it  in relation to a 
total income of under The colony’ s volume of trade, custom*
and railway profits "decreased alarmingly".^ As railway rates
'‘‘Axelson, C.E., The History of Taxation in Watal prior to Onion . 
TJnpubl. Thesis for Master of Commerce degree, Natal Univ. College, 
1938, p .143.
p
Natal Statistical Yearbook (Pietermaritzburg,1908), p .7.
3
Cited L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa. 19Q2-1910 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1961), Appendix A, no. VII, p.492•
^Axelson, p .144*
accounted for 53°/° of N atali total income, and gup toms dues 
for a further ^A^/o,^ and as hoth these sources of income were 
dependent on South Africa-wide customs and railway agreements 
and were therefore to a large extent outside the control o f Fatal 
ministries, -the financial situation appeared to demand drastic 
action.
Fatal governments (there were three ministries between 1903
and 1905, the last being a coalition of the two former, formed
largely to cope with the worsening financial situation) strove
in various ways to make good these deficits . From 1904 onwards
various taxation proposals were made in the *atal Legislative
Assembly, but the situation was made far more d ifficu lt  by the
2strong ”no taxation” sentiment amongst whites in the colony.
Thus while a measure imposing succession duties on property,
estimated to bring in .€5*000 was passed by both Houses, and an
3increase* ta r iff  on spirits and beer was agreed upon, attempts 
to introduce a graduated income tax, the most equitable of the 
remaining measures suggested, failed on more than one occasion
^Thompson, p .54.
2C0 179/231/19167, Sot. to Sec. S t., Conf. 1, 12.5.05.
3
H.L.A. Debates, Vol. 38, p .141. Axelson, p .141.
to pass either tho Legislative Assenbly or tha Legislative
CounolX.1 A ttw pti to tax houses — tho equivalent o f tho Hat
Tax paid fay Afrioans2 -  alao foiled  to beooae lax aa did tho
%Tariouo proposals to tax non-faoaof 1 o la lly  ooeupiod load. Thooo 
proposals in  fast aatodatod tho depression, having boon soo tod 
fo r  tho f ir s t  tiao in  1899, sod had othor no tiros bosidos tho 
purely finanoial ia  view.*
Suggestions fo r  Imposing additional taxatian oa tho Afrlosa 
population ware fa r  more favourable reeeivod both in tho Asssably 
aad fay tho eleotormts. Thoso also aatodatod tho depression sad 
wars not purely finanoial measures. Thus ia  1903 a now root of 
£3 «as plaood oa tho inhabitants o f tho Mission Reserves, which 
had just boon taken oror fay tho satal 1st Its Trust in tho asao 
yoar tho rant o f "sfoattors” liv in g  oa Crown loads was raisod 
froa £1 to £2j6 and in 1903 tho Stssps sad Liooasos lo t  Inyo sod
1Inl905f 1906 aad 1901 Hoor orwntoally managed to got aa Inooao Tax
aoasuro passed in 1908. Soo fo r  example 00 179/232/31526, Oov. to 
See. S t., dosp. 137, 8.8.05. Oort. Oasottos of Natal, 1905-8.
% .L .A . Dobatoo. toI . 39, p .549. Troasuror, 5.7.05.
**I.L .A . Dobatos, vo l. 38, p.141. Priae Sinister for tho 1905 aoasuro.
froa 1899-1908 with tho exeeption o f tho war yoaxs thoso proposals
also rsour alaost annually.
*Ths objoot was mainly to disoourago tho boldine of largo tracts of
load fay abasatoo owners who rwatod i t  to Afrioaa tenants. Bonefioial 
oocnpation was dofinod as bona fid s occupation fay a white man for
9 months o f tho year. I t  was also hoped that the tax would bo partly
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a £5 license fee on a ll native eating houses,1 uhioh sere oommonly
believed to be dens of v ice . This tax was doubtless passed on
by tie ovners to their clientele* By thr the most import ant of
these measures however was the Poll Tax which passed into law
2in August, 1905. This was in fact the second o f two Poll Tax 
proposals* The f ir s t , entitled the Satire Personal Tax B ill imposed 
a £ l tax on a ll African males over the age of eighteen, and a 
further tax on a ll African wives after the first*  Although the
Mative Personal Tax B ill passed in the Legislative Assembly by
3
26 votes to 9, i t  was rejected by the Legislative Council an the 
grounds that i t  would in my case be disallowed under section 8 
o f the Constitution, whloh reserved a ll class legislation  for the 
Royal Assent.* Hie sot as eventually passed was somewhat milders 
i t  applied to a ll who did not pay the But Tax and
passed on to the tenants who would then be forced to join  the 
labour market* See also below,
^Act 49* 1903t Mission Reserves Act*
6Act 48, 1903. __________
■*■(30 179/232/34982, Enol. in daap. 2 03, 4.9.05. lo t  to an and th . Stamp 
and Licence Act £2.
2Aot 38 of 1905.
3K.L.A. Debates, ?o l. 39, p .295, 20.6.05.
^See ikboMt, Chapter J. p. 3(o
were not indentured Indians. That i t  vaa s t i l l  intended as a measure 
"to get at the native and the ooolie" was exp licitly  stated by a 
member o f the government.^
There vas l i t t le  discussion in the Colonial O ffioe on the 
advisability of these taxation proposals. Indeed there is  a re­
markable dearth of informed discussion on economic issues in Ratal 
in this period, whether in the Colonial Offioe or in lata l it s e lf .
By the turn o f the century sad probably even considerably earlier, 
the main outline of economic domination by the white settler, 
and o f policy  on land, labour and taxation had been firmly estab­
lished, and the sain principles accepted apparently by a ll settlers 
and by the Colonial O ffice. Thus even when Sir Henry HoCallum vrote 
to enquire whether the Poll Tax should not be reserved, being
neither Just nor equitable and therefore "repugnant to the lavs 
2o f Engl mid", the attitude of the Colonial O ffice vas summed up 
by H. Lambert who minuted " I f  Yatal likes to revert to medieval 
methods of taxation I do not ass that that is  aoy business of ours".^
0. Xaydon, Minister of Railways mid Harbours to a meeting o f his 
constituents in Durban 20.4*06. Reported in Ratal Mercury. 21.4*06. 
He stated " . . .  Durban as loudly as any other part of the colony 
asked fo r  some means to be devised o f getting at the native . . .
The tax vaa also devised to get at the ooolie and in order that 
they might get at these two classes they ^ L e . the vhites7had to 
agree to submitting to the inoidenoe of the tax.H
2C0 179/231/16127, Oot. to See. St., Conf. 1, 20.4.05.
3Ibid. . Kindt..
i n
There was l i t t le  other comment on the subjeot, even when the 
Aborigines Protection Society wrote to protest against the tax 
and pointed out that its  collection  was lik ely  to be fraught 
with d ifficu lties*  To their remarks that the tax was calculated 
to increase the labour supply of the colony,1 F* Graham, an Assistant 
Secretary at the Colonial O ffice, retorted somewhat smugly that 
"the A.P.S. hare got i t  into their heeds that the tax was levied 
fo r  the purpose o f forcing out the natives to work, whereas it  
was leried*•• fo r  reeenue purposes"* The attitude of the Colonial 
O ffice towards the A*P*S* in this psrlod was indicated by A, B, Cox 
on an earlier occasion whan he said ”V* do not taka these people 
seriously, I think."3 Theo* Tisws are understandable trom th* 
Colonial O ffice in the post-Boer Mar, "we must pacify South frioan  
colonists and gat w*# xajuur supply organised" era of thought on 
South African affairs* The A.P*S* i t  ia true tended to be somewhat 
awkward ia  their views on S* Africa and their suggestions were not 
Infrequently rather fancifu l mad unrealistic, nevertheless i t  wee 
far d o  ear to the rea lities o f the situation in Xatal than the
1C0 179/259/6249, A.P.S. to S*o. S t., 21.2.06.
2CC 179/259/6249, Hlnute 8.5.06.
3CO 179/228/27521. Th* A.P.S. ware urging th* dl**llow*ne* o f th* 
Natal Code Amendment B ill (23*6*03)*
Colonial O ffice, which vaa only to wake up fu lly  to Natal9a handling 
o f native a ffa ire after the diaturhanoea and the publication of 
the Natal Natiwe Affaire Commission eridanoe and report*1
It  vaa commonly believed in Natal that the Afrieana did not 
contribute their fa ir  share to the colony*a exchequer* Figures 
vere produoed to show that they did not even contribute euffioient 
noney to pay for the coats incurred in their own administration*
Thus according to the Under Secretary for Native A ffa irs, S* 0*
Samuel son, vhereaa £402,831 vas qpent on native admlnl stration 
and welfare^ only £310,000 vaa contributed by them to the colonial 
revenue* Thia la tter sum vas made up of the 14 /- tax on huts paid 
annually on every hut in a kraal, a 3 /- dog tax ( i t  vas l o / -  in 
the Northern d is tr icts ),*  pass fees and licences of various aorta, 
fines and fees of court and the rant paid by Africans on Grown 
lands and Kiasion Reserves* It also included an eatlmSbe of the 
amount paid by Africans in customs dues. There is  however every 
Indication that Samelson9a figure vaa both an underestimate of
■^ See below, Chapter IX , p*^77 H •< c..v
2C0 179/232/39275, Oot. to S*o. S t., 11.10.05, 4**p. 227. Enol. 2.
3
A figure which included the salaries o f the Secretary fo r  Native A ffa irs, 
the Commissioner fo r  Native Affairs in Zululand, the cost o f afein iater- 
lng the Native A ffairs Department, end two-thirds o f the expenditure on 
polioe, m ilitia  and magistrates, apart from the rather meagre amount 
allotted to African education, health and agriculture*
* i.e . Vryheid Utrecht and Paulpietersberg (the la tter had been part of 
the Vakkdstroom d istrict o f the Transvaal).
tho amount paid by Africans into ths revenue, and m over-sstimsts 
o f ths amount spsnt by ths stats on ths African population. Thus 
undsr ths f ir s t  heading, he did not include tho amount paid by 
Africans into ths railway revenue in 1903 -  according to ?• R. Moor 
i t  amounted to approximately half ths to ta l.1 Els estimate, moreover, 
cf ths African customs revenue as £40,000 vas probably far too low. 
This vas pointed out in tha Report o f tho South African Motive 
A ffairs Commission, which shoved that this gars a total o f IcV^d 
per head per annum, ths figure for tho African population in ths 
rest of Southern A frica, including Basutoland aad Bechu anal and 
where the figures were far more precise, was nearer 2/-d per head. 
Customs dues on articles intended fo r  African consumption were 
as high in Ratal as eleewherein: South Africa. I f  Satslson* s figures 
wars accurate, they could be interpreted either as extrema poverty 
or exceptional backwardness amongst the Africans o f Natali poverty 
and backwardness greater than elsewhere in South Africa.''*
On the expenditure side, Ssaielson* s figures also do not 
inspire confidence) i t  is  d ifficu lt  to believe that Africans wore
^W.L.A. Debates, vo l. 33• pp. 94-5.
^S.A.R.A.C., Vol. I ,  p.85, 39S-4.
 ^Cub to . 8 Aim oa baada, bluikata lntandad fo r  th . African Mrkat, 
and shawls, ranged between 20©/o and 100o /o . Appendix 12, Blue Book 
on Native A ffairs 1906, p .76. Ths general ta r iff in the oolony was 
raised froa 10%> to 15°/o with a rebate o f 3°/o on British goods in 
1906. Thompson, o p .p it ., p .57.
not in fact covering the cost of their own administration in
1905, when in Shepstone's day they were covering the oost of
the administration of both black and v&ite.1 In Zululand under
Crown Colony government, the Africans had paid the entire cost
of the administration purely from the prooeeds of the Hut Tax
2and the very mu oh lower fines and fees of court* Indeed before 
its  annexation to Natal, 2ululand was the one Crown Colony not 
to receive a grant In aid and aotually to produce a small annual 
surplus*
In these various calculations, moreover, the actual earning 
capacity o f the African population was frequently not taken into 
account. According to Samuelson once again, the average earnings 
of an African i f  he worked for  a European employer a ll the year 
round were £18; the average wealth of 1he African population 
in 1909 was £5. When introducing the Poll Tax in the Legislative 
Assembly and defending i t  against members who protested that it 
would inequitably tax rich and poor alike, the Prime Minister, 
while admitting that in certain countries such a tax would operate 
with "gross unfairness", maintained that "in the conditions of
( 2» O
Cited C* W* de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in iifrioa*/b*194* 
^See Zululand Blue Books 1899-1899* *F- c_ 2.-3
3SNA l /x / 3 10 ^ ,  Minut* 2 1 . 3 .0 5 .
l i fe  in this colony, the incidence o f a small Poll Tax w ill not
be oppressive.1,1 This remark could only have been made with
circumstances o f the white community alone in mind. While I
have been unable to trace figures for the average earnings of
Europeans in this period or for their arerage wealth, i t  is  clear
that the disproportion in wealth between black and white vas, in
Natal, as in the rest o f South A frica, very considerable. The
lowest paid European workers in Natal were probably the agricultural
labourers, who earned an average of £4-£5 a month. Their number 
2vas minimal. African farm labourers received 14s. 5d. on an 
average in the years 1905-5 -  and the majority o f Africans in 
Natal ware probably s t i l l  dependant on farm labour fbr their cash 
income. The qualifications which enfranchised two-thirds white 
male Natalians also suggest the very such higher level o f the income 
of Europeans; to possess the vote white British subjects had to own 
immoveable property to the value of £50, or to pay rent of £10 
a year or receive £8 wages a month.* Uhder these circumstances, the
*4f.L.A» Debates, v o l. 58, p .253# Supply B ill debate. 0. X. Sutton, 
4.5*05. This vaa a few days before tha ffcll o f tha Sutton ministry 
and its  replacement by the 1905-6 Staythe cabinet.
2461 in 1907. 5% in 1908. (S tatistica l Yearbooks 1907 mid 1908).
Vo strictly  equivalent figures in earlier sta tistica l yearbooks of
C.20th.
5Natal S tatistica l Yearbook 1905-5. In 1907 i t  bad riean to 14*. 8d., 
but tha wagea in many places in the Midlands aad Uplands ware far 
lower than elsewhere.
4Tho«p.on, o p .d t . . p. 110
finanoial obligations of ths African population to ths stats
vers relatively far heavier than those home by whites.
Whatever the truth o f the matter. Natal leg islators proceeded
on the assumption that Africans were not paying their fa ir  share
of taxation) and of ths Africans who wars escaping their tax
burden, it  was fe lt  that ths young, unmarried ones wars ths worst
cu lp rits.1 It was fo r  this reasoa, among others, that a Boll Tax
rather than an increased Hut Tax was imposed. A further reason
given for Imposing a Poll Tax was that i t  was in the interests of
uniformity in Southern Africa -  ths Transvaal, Orange River Colony
and Rhodesia levied a Poll Tax on their African inhabitants -  and
that i t  vas in accordance vith ths recommendstians of the South
2African Native A ffairs Commission. What this argument fa iled  to 
take into account waa that there vas no Poll Tax in the Caps,
Bechuanaland and Basutoland, and that the Natal representatives 
on ths South Afrioan Native A ffairs Commission had opposed the 
introduction o f suoh a tax in Natal unlesB ths Hut Tax vers fir s t  
repealed, and ths system o f palling cat young man from the lo  aat ions 
fo r  compulsory labour on ths public works of ths oolony were f ir s t
1N.N.A.C. Report, pp. 33-4*
H^.L.A. Debates, vol. 39, p.66. Treasurer, 13*7.05) S.A.N.A.C. I , p.87, 
408.
abandoned.1 itfhile it  ia true that married men who paid the
Hut Tax were exempt from the Poll Tax, the legislators overlooked
the f&ot that i t  vaa the younger men who provided the money fo r
their fathers' tax. It would appear that although the kraalhead
vaa responsible for the paying of the tax, it  v&s levied on
a ll huts in hia kraal, including those of bachelors, unmarried
2g ir ls  and widows. It is  probable that i t  vaa largely because 
the younger men were shouldering the Hut Tax that there vere 
so many complaints froa kraalheada that the Imposition of the 
Poll Tax undermined their authority.^
It ia almost Impossible to oaloulate what the Africans re­
ceived in exchange for their taxes in terms of state expenditure 
on them, apart from, the administration which they shared with 
the white population and which was largely geared to the needs 
of the la tter.*  In Samuelson'a estimate the Afrioan population 
ware responsible fo r  two-thirds of the expenditure on police , 
gaols and the m ilitia  -  a total of £292,456. When one coniiders 
however that tha main purpose o f the police and defence forces was
^S.A.H.A.C., I , p .90, % 419.
^N.N.A.C. Report, p .53.
S^HA l /l /5 2 5'^ qV  ^ • Summary o f reports of Magistrates. • • on African 
reaction to the promulgation of Poll Tax, n.d. c. 11.9.05.
ASea below, Chapter lv fo r  example fo r  attitudes of magistrates. 
Apart from expenditure on administration and education in 1902-3»
to protect the settlers against a black enemy, the true irony of 
the situation is apparent. While to some extent the police did 
investigate crime, faction fights and civil actions in the reserves 
and amongst Africans in European areas this was a very minor aspect 
of their duties, which were fundamentally to ensure the status 
quo and protect vhite property and labour. Magistrates too vere 
far more preoccupied with the needs and pressures on them froa 
the colonists and, despite the fact ttiat Africans vere expected 
to contribute two-thirds of their salaries, there is l it t le  doubt 
that their sympathies and interests vere vith the very small Euro­
pean population in their magisterial duties. Needless to say 
there vas no blaok magistrate, and the major part of the money 
spent on administration, even In its lover ranks, provided the 
salaries of vhite colonists. Chiefs, court induna and African con­
stables received only a very small proportion of lt| there vere 
no African clerks or interpreters -  a fact vhioh caused considerable 
complaint amongst the educated seotlon of the African cosmonity.*
a boom year -  the £7,700 voted for African welfare vas expended 
as follows:
£ 6,000 on irrigation £30 aeeds and implements
£ 1,400 on Inspectors of locations £ 6 medicines
£ 108 Barracks for chiefs £40 miscellaneous
£ 116 cottage hospitals
SHA 3042156 Accounting Officer, S.N.A. Dept. 25.8.03.
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See evidence before N.N.A.C. of almo.t all the Christian Africans.
In the early 90s there had been one or two African clerks aad inter­
preters, but as a result o f the objections o f European o ffic ia ls  vho 
objected to sharing rooms, as veil as the b e lie f (substantiated by one
On the other hand the provision of state employment for shite 
o ffic ia ls  vas of importance, e specially during the years of 
depression, when one in every eight shite males vas in the employ 
o f the Natal Government Railways qviite apart froa other c iv il service 
employment.1
It vas generally argued by shite settlers that the money 
spent on public works, on building roads and railvays, setting 
up departments of agriculture and health, and generally expanding 
the economy of the colony, benefitted a ll sections o f the oommunity. 
It is  probably true that in certain areas the expansion of tha 
European side of the economy had beneficial side e ffects for the 
Africans. At times sheer self-in terest led colonists to take 
African health or agricultural methods into consideration -  aa 
for example in introducing compulsory vaccination against small­
pox in the locations, or setting up dipping tanks for scab-infected 
2sheep. On the shole, hovevdr, the main attention of the various 
government departments sere devoted to the needs end interests of
episode) that Africans "can 't be alloved to handle money". There 
sere none by the turn of the century. See Summary of evidence given 
by U.S.N.A. before C ivil Service Committee, 5.6.07 in SNA l/l/3 7 6  
2483.
07 ------------
^Nathan MSS 368 (Rhodes House), p .13. Six H. Nathan to Lord Sal borne, 
15.9.07.
2Blue Books on Native Affaire 1901-10. (Natal Departmental Reports.)
the European population. While the most important state activities 
at this period were railway building and the setting up of agri­
cultural advisory services, neither of these activ ities did ouch 
for  the non-white population. By 1904 not a single branch-line 
had been constructed through the R e s e r v e s A fr ic a n  squatters 
on private lands may hare benefit ted from the proximity o f the railvsy 
lin e , although i t  is  probable that in many instances the proximity 
of the railway and therefore of a market for produce would have been 
sufficient to raise rents on those particular lands. Although i t  
is  true the Department of Agriculture provided stock inspectors 
to tour the reserves the object would appear to hare been to pro­
tect European stockfaimers rather than to help Africans improve 
their standard of agriculture. There were only four Inspectors
2deputed to supervise the old locations and two on Xlxsidn r Reserves.
In the period under consideration, action by the Department caused 
considerable grievance amongst the African farmers, largely because 
of the lack of oommunioation between o ffic ia ls  of tiie Department 
and the African population. 3he methods adopted to combat cattle 
disease especially increased Afrioan suspicion of the white men's 
intentions, la 1B97, when the innooulstion of African cattle against
^See Hap in S.A.H.A.C. I , Annexure 8B.
N.N.A.C. p .662, livid. S. 0. samuelson.
the Rinderpest led to the death of apparently health> stock* end 
in 1905, when what Africans alleged were disease-free animals were 
quarantined with those already infeoted with Bast Coast Fewer, 
there was a great deal of restlessness amongst tribesmen. On 
this la tter occasion, the shooting of infected stock in the 
Kahlabatini and Nongoaa d istricts of Zululand "caused the greatest 
dissatisfaction and unrest", and without the restraining action 
of Dinusulu the Commissioner for Native Affairs reported "the
extensive slaughter and movement would never have been effected
2as peacefully as it  has been". In 1907-8 the mere branding of 
cattle neExt to the locations by stock-inspectors almost led to 
another bout of violence amongst members of Silwane's Cunu people, 
who fe lt  that "the Poll Tax is only a small thing in comparison with
the taking of their cattle".
On the positive side, two irrigation schemes in the Upper 
Tugela Valley and at KeaSe's D rift, started by Sir James Liege Hulett 
and F. &• Moor respectively, should be noted. le t  the money expended 
on these schemes, unlike the money spent lay the Departs ent o f  Agri­
culture on European Settlement schemes, did not come from the general
1C0 179/200/21500, Desp. Conf. Co t. to Sm. St. 11.9.97. On th i.
occasion the Government were more oaareful than ax the subsequent 
occasion, and forbore pressing innooulation on reluctant tribes.
2SHA 1 / 1 / 3 2 5 , Minute C.II.A. ailuland, 2.10.05.
3SNA 1/4/19, H ^ie. Mapuaulo to M.N.A. 6.11.07, and CO 179/245/ 
18652, Memo, to Magls. Umvoti 21.4*08 by 2 Intelligence Men, Encl.8 
in desp. Gov. to Sec. St. CO 179/244A2033» Gov. to Sec. St. 14*3*06.
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colonial revenue, but from a special loan of £30,000 raised on the
London market by the Natal Native Trust by mortgaging certain of
ite  lands#^  By 1909 the Governor of Natal, Sir Mafcbhev Nathan,
vaa to regard schemes as failures and both "costly and 111- 
2
conceived"•
In viev of their economic situation, on being faced vith the 
new Poll Tax most Africans stated that they simply could not afford 
to pay it# This contention vas upheld, by and large, both by 
the reports o f magistrates in different parts of the oolony 
about the poverty o f Hie African population,^ and by the report 
and evidence of the 1906-7 Native Affairs Commission#  ^ Ths 
enormous indebtedness o f the Africans to the European population 
vas one indication o f this poverty# In many areas farmers spoke 
o f i t  as the usual and general practice to advance loans to African 
labourers as the only vay o f obtaining labour# The labourers vould 
then contract to pay the loan back by voiking at lover vages Instead 
of interest#^ The interest charged ranged froa 60°/<>, vhlch vaa 
common, to betveen 120 and 200°/°» vhloh vas not regarded aa out
1SHISJ XII, KTid. a. A. Labis tour, p .91. H.H.A.C. Erid. V.H.Armstrong, 
Clerk to Natal Native Trust, pp# 182-3*
2CC 179/254/340, Sec. St. 6 . 1 2 . 0 9 .
5Se. Blue Books on Native A ffairs (Departmental Reports), 1903-6.
AReport N.N.A.C^.8e 
^Report, N.N.A.C., p#8#
of th* ordinary.1 It vaa assarted by nor* than one vitnass 
that Bambatha and those members of his tribe who followed hla
into rebellion against the government forces were deeply in
2,3debt to the farmers on whose lands they lived . Baabatha himself 
had appeared before the courts on several occasions fo r  failure 
to jay ren t
There were both long-term and short-term reasons fo r  this 
impoverishment of the African people. The long-term factors 
differed to some extent in Zululand and Hatal, and it  is  probably 
true to say that while the long-term trends were more important 
in Hatal and Southern Zululand, the short term fmotors were what 
were causing the greatest distress in northern Zululaad. It is  
significant that the disturbances did not affeot Northern Zulu— 
land, although there were other reasons for th is.
In Hatal the most important long-texm reason for Afrioan 
impoverishment was the system of landholding in tha colony. As 
Prof. de Kisviet has shown in his masterly analysis of "Land and
^Report N.H.A.C., p .26.
^See below, pp. \ 74--s , 'SZ/S
^e.g. T. J. Hei, H.L.A*, H.N.A.C. Evidence, p .530.
4Bambatha was Involved in 30 c iv il and criminal cases between 1901 
and Jan. 1906. This in it s e lf  must have been a major faotor in
his impoverishment. SUA l/l/33322> . -
Lawlessness" in Natalln tha 1870s and 80s, the system of land
allocation in Natal had, froa the earliest days of the colony,
1 „  been extraordinarily wasteful. The traditions of the vooi*-
trekkers, who had allotted two farms of three thousand morgen
each to the f ir s t  comers, and of the British government, which
In the early days continued these extravagant grants in order
to keep the trekkers within their jurisdiction, had lived on
in Natal. In the f ir s t  decade of the twentieth century, the
average else of European owned farms vas s t i l l  between 2-3,000
2acres, and farms of 4-5»000 acres vere common. The same vas 
true of the newly annexed Northern d istricts, where the system 
of land grants had been as lavish. Moreover large tracts of 
land vere locked up in the possession of absentee owners. The 
largest o f theee was the Natal Land and Colonisation Company, 
with its  headquarters and most of its  shareholders in  London.
3In 1902 i t  vas in possession of 250,000 acres. Already in the 
period before the Zulu War Natal was suffering from an a r tific ia l 
land shortage. le t  the necessary land reform vas not undertaken
IfThe Imperial Factor In S. Africa, pp. 188-9.
2Agricultural Industries and Land Settlements of Natal. Dept, of Agrio. 
1907 Pietermaritsburg, p .7
*S.A.N.A.C. I l l ,  Evid. J. L. Masson, Surveyor General Natal, p.144.
and by tha turn o f tha century tha land shortage me far nor a 
marked. The problem had been much aggravated by the tremendous 
growth in Natal*s population at this time. Thus betweenB94 
and 1904 tha minute white population had more than doubled9 from 
45,707 to 97,109, although the 1904 figure ia probably soaewhat
inflated by the presence of Imperial troops and discharged soldiers
1 2 who did not remain in Natal. At the same time, the African
population was also increasing, although not as rapidly as the
figures suggest: there were 503,208 in Natdl alone in 18949
910,727 in 1904 In Natal, Zululand and the Northern districts.**
In addition there would appear to have been an Indian population
explosion in the 1890*s, whether the result of natural increase
or immigration: their numbers leapt from 35,411 in 1894 to
100,918 in 1904.^ While however the majority of Europeans aad
unindentured Indians lived in the towns, the Africans were s t ill
predominantly a rural community.
A .t* ! Sfctfel.ti.al T—igboolc. 1907, p«3* The figures for 1904 were
taken from the Census held on 17th April 1904*
2Vhll* the absolute figures of the European population remained minute, 
the doubling in their number did lead to a olamour for new lands for 
settlement. The old ideal of every colonist as a great land-holder 
died hard, even i f ,  by the early 20th century the majority of white 
Natalians were town-dwellers.
^Natal S tatistica l Yearbook. 1907, p.3« The 1904 Census was the 
f ir s t  enumeration of the African population: the 1391 figures were
based on an estimate of the number o f inhabitants in eaoh hut in 
the colony.
4Ujid.
This meant that i f  the whites were complaining o f land hunger,
the Africans were suffering fro2. acute land shortage. Of the
twelve million acres of land in Hatal proper, over 7^/4 m illion
acres had been alienated or were in the process of alienation to
Europeans.1 The population density of whites in rural Hatal including
Zululand after its  delim itation, was 1 to 184 acres o f land, o f
2Africans -  1 to 8 acres. Of the remaining 4 m illion acres in 
Natal, approximately 2V 4 m illion acres had been set aside as 
Trust land fo r  the occupation of the African population.^ This 
polioy of setting aside land as 'reserves' fo r  the Africans had its
origins in the years 1846-1864, and was dictated both by humanitarian
4motive# end administrative needs. Although i t  is  impossible that, 
at the time o f its  defin ition , the amount o f the land so eet aside
was, am ia suggested by £• Arookes aad H. Hnrwita, "enough, with a
5
l i t t le  to spare", after 1864 the reserves were neither added to , 
nor improved toy the Hatal Native Trust -  the Executive Council of 
Hatal -  appointed to administer them. Aa a result, by the 
turn of the century, there can be no doubt that tha reserves r
\igric. Industries and Land Settlement of Natal, op .c it . . p .l .
9 1TBUiM p.2. Acc. to S.A.N.A.C. I , p. 18, it  was 1:9 /2  acres.
'S.A.N.A.C. I , p. 18. The fig ire  given differed slightly in various 
publications, S.A.N.A.C. gives 2,192,566 acres.
^B. H. Brookes and H. Hurwitm, The Native Reserves of Hatal. Hatal
Regional Survey, Vol. 7, publ. for Natal University 1957, Chapter I .
5Ibid. . p .4 . F. Wolfion in So— A«p.qta of natlTe adalnletratlcn in 
Hatal under Th—. Shepeton. 1857-75 (M .i. W it.. 1946), p .29.
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were overpopulated and overworked. Almost every witness aa 
the subject referred to them as barren, rugged, arid and oold*^ 
Indeed, even In the 1830s, there were those who thought them 
" fit  only for the eagle and baboon" . Although Sir James Liege 
Hulett thought that i f  they were worked by Europeans the reserves 
would be able to hold four or fives time their current population,^ 
thia strikes a curious note when one remembers the actus 1 sise 
of European holdings in Natal and the amount of state aid they 
needed to make them economically viable* In the circumstances 
it  ia not surprising that over half the Africans of Natal proper 
lived on private lands belonging to Europeans, despite the labour 
and high rents daaanded by farmers from thsir tenants* The rente 
just after the Boer *ar ranged from £2 to Cl a year per hut,
4end, eooording to the Surveyor General of Natal, J* L« Masson, 
in aany areas amounted ho rack-renting, as the farmers were charging 
the Africans more rant than the land was oapabla of giving In return*
the fie serves were inadequate for African needs*
0 6© e.g. S.A.2V.A.C. I l l ,  p*63, Evid* J* W» v hepstone.
*The Native Reserves of Natal, o p .c lt .* p .4* Cited. 
5 S.A.N.A.C. I l l ,  Erid. p .149.
4 IM d., W d . ,  p .143.
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In addition to tha ordinary reserves there were also about 
174,000 acres of land which had been sat aside at more or leee 
the same tine as Mission Reserves: defined areas within which
only the o f f ic ia lly  designated missionary body, in which the 
trust of the land was vested, oould carry on its  work.'1' These 
reserves were transferred to the Natal Native Trust in 1903 under 
the Mission Reserves Aot. The motives for this act wexe sized*
On the one hand it  vas welcomed by the missionaries as relieving 
them of the burden o f ad ministering the reserves, an obligation 
which had interfered with their ordinary mission work. ^ The 
residents on the Mlssicn Reserves were not only Christian converts! 
the in it ia l idea hid been to provide the missionaries vith a 
settled community amongst whoa they oould work. Partly for Ihis 
reason, the missionaries did not always find i t  easy to retain 
oontrol over the people on their lands. A major declared reason 
fo r  the Aot o f 1903 vas that i t  would enable the government to 
control the movements of the "Ethiopians" ^ who, i t  was believed,
^The Native Reserves of Natal, op .c lt . . p .16.
2Act 44, 1903.
A^BM v /l /4 , Annual Report 1904 (J* B. McLeod).
*See below, Chapter, VIII, Minute S.N.AG. Leu chats cited in  CO 179/241/19581 
Enel. Memorandum by S. 0. Samuelson on American Zulu Mission.
vere preaohhg sedition on the Mission reserve lands.
On the other hand, the imposition of a £3 tax on the in­
habitants o f the Mission Reserves, and some of the measures 
taken by the government ostensibly to stop the spread of Ethiopianism, 
vere regarded by the missionaries vith distinot disfavour* The 
missionaries of the American Zulu Mission especially fe lt  that 
the tax and the asgulations of the government vere designed speci­
fica lly  at making residence on the Mission reserves less desirable, 
and thus at hampering their work.1 The £3 tax roused considerable 
opposition from the African converts on the Mission Reserves of 
the A*Z.M., and in some oases led to a deterioration in the re­
lations betveen the missionaries and their converts* Although 
some of these reserves vere on good land, they vere in general 
as densely populated as the ordinary reserves of Natal, and the 
tax of £3 vas clearly excessive. Largely as a result o f the re­
presentations o f the American Zulu Mission, i t  vas lovered to 30/-d 
at the end of 1906*2
For most members of the Natal Legislative Assembly, hovever, 
the Mission Reserves Act vas probably regarded as a f ir s t  step 
tovards getting Mission Reserve residents to vork for Europeans,
■^ABM v /l /4 , Annual Report o f the American Zulu Mission, 1905 
(s*H*C* Ransom)*
2ABK n i / l A  p. 325i J . » . Taylor to E«v. Judoou Ssith, 27.4.06.
and towards acquiring the valuable lands along the ooast for 
white settlement. The act sprang very directly out of the re­
commendations of the Natal Lands Commission Report o f 1902, 
a Commission appointed to look into the land problems of the 
oolony, and which regarded its prime function as encouraging 
closer settlement of whites in Natal.1 The Commission ex­
hibited a very strong bias against the Mission Reserves, ead 
especially those of the A. Z. M., which i t  deplored as a "stumbling 
block to the progress of the country", because they had locked up 
lands which could hare been "utilised for European occupation
and ^oould have/ participated in tne general progress of that
2part of the country" • "That part of the oountry’ was a reference 
to the land occupied by the American Zulu Mission Reserves of 
Umvoti, tfmlazi, Amansimtoti, Infumi and Ifafa -  a ll exceptionally 
good sugar lands. While the Commission were careful to stress 
that the vested rights of Africans on these lands -  some of them 
had been granted freehold and quitrent farms on tha A.Z.M. Reserves 
should ba protected, i t  also implied that the resumption of tha 
lands would ba in the interests of the oolony as a whole.^ Qnoc
Lands Commission Report. Pmbg, 1902, p.4.
2Ibid. . p .28.
^Ibld. . p .27-30. S.e aleo ABM IV/l/4» Report of Trustees of 
American Mission Reserves, Animal Masting o f Zulu Mission at
Adams, 1902 (C. V. Kilbon.)
taken over by the Trust, presumably those portions van tad fo r  
European settlement oould ba "cleared” of natives, who oould 
be provided with less valuable lands elsewhere• Whilo tha 
h ostility  o f the government to tha A*Z«M. vas tha outease o f 
many complex factors, * the fact that they controlled half the 
Kisalon Reserves of Natal, and that many of them vert on valuable 
land, vas undoubtedly a powerful reason in predisposing i t  to
launoh a vigorous campaign against this particular body from
xthe time of the Cornels a ion Report*
There vers tvo other outlets for Africans on tha land, 
apart froa living on private farms or reserves -  the fire t 
"squatting" on the remaining Crown lands o f  the colony, tho second 
buying up Crown or private lands as thay came on to tha market* 
Keither of these vas vary satisfactory. In view of tha a r t ific ia l 
land shortage, the amount of land cn the market vaa restricted , 
aad prioea vara generally beyond the reach of Africans* Although
in certain instances, entire tribes had dubbed together under
3their chief aad bought a tract of land, in general the idea of 
buying land vaa foreign to African traditions* In oertaln areas
*5ee below, Chapter vu\ , p. - s 2_s
*s** below, Chapter vw\ , p.
5S*e *.g . S.A.H.A.C. 1905-5, Tol. IT, p .2. m d . Hev. G. A. Milter, 
missionary of tha American Roard*
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howsver, especially in the Klip Hirer division where there 
vere no reserves, syndicates had been formed in order to 
bay land."** Wesleyan Methodist converts vere generally behind 
this movement, at least in its  early stages* By 1902 Africans 
possessed 106,000 acres of land in either freehold or quitrent
tenure, and a further 204,000 acres vere in the prooess of
2alienation* Clearly this could only provide for a very limited 
number of Africans* Nevertheless even land purchase on this 
minor scale vas viewed with antagonism by most whites and vas 
partly blocked by the government in 1903 or 4, when an instruction 
was given to the Lands Department that no further bids for Crown 
lands should be accepted from Africans* Both land and labour 
considerations would appear to have motivated this instruction.
In Zululand, similarly, despite the recommendations of the De­
limitation Commission to the contrary, Africans vere not allowed
4
to buy lands outside the Reserve areas. This would appear to 
have foreshadoved the South African Natives Land Act of 1913,
XS.A.N.A.C. I l l ,  Evid. R. Plant, p.2*8.
2Ib id ., Evid. Surveyor General, pp. 140-1.
^N.N.A.C. Evid., p .652. According to S. 0. Samuelson, 11.5*07, the 
instruction vas given ”3 or 4 years ago".
4C0 179/227/41439. Gov. to Sed* S t., desp* 309, 21*10*03 and end*
P.M. to Gov. 15.10.03. Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal . 
p. 186 are incorrect in suggesting that the recommendations of the 
Delimitation Commission on this were accepted. The file s  show very 
conclusively that despite the protests of the Commissioners and the 
Colonial Office the government refused to accept theee recommendations 
of the Commission*
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and one is  therefore le ft  to explain the views of Natal delegates
before the 1903-5 South African Native Affairs Commission and
the Natal minority report in  the Beaumont Commission Report.
In both these instances, the Natal delegates were opposed to the
banning of land sales between Europeans and Africans.1 It is
possible that the representatives vere out of tune vith o ffic ia l
policy in Natal and vith general public opinion. It should however
be remembered that the 1905-4 instruction applied only to the sale
of Crown lands, and not to private lands,and the seemingly liberal
sentiments expressed before the Commissions could be interpreted
not only as a realisation that the existing reserves were far too
small, but as reluctance of white Natalians to lose the chance of
2buying up African lands when they came on to the market. It was 
generally assumed in Natal that Africans vere incapable of looking 
after their freehold lands, and that they would be bought out
3eventually by Europeans or, less desirably, Indians. According 
to the Purveyor General, there vere very fev sales of private lands 
to Africans in the years preceding the 1905-5 Commission, although
^See S.A.N.A.C. I , Report p .27 § 199, and Report of Native Land
Commission C.T. 1916, pp. 41-2, Minute by Chairman dissenting
from delimitation in Natal and Zululand.
2This rather than any liberal intent seems to be borne out by the 
fact that the Beaumont Commission recommendation of setting aside 
as African reserves was cut down by the Natal Provincial Commission
opposed the demands of those Africans tfio van ted to buy Mission and
i i z
i t  had been fa ir ly  common in earlier years.*
There were about 4t000 huts of Africans squatting oa Crown 
2lands in 1904• Although they were not subject to the exactions 
of landlords, and were not subject to compulsory labour as Africans 
on the Reserves were, they also suffered from certain disadrantages•
Their government rent of £2 a hut per annum was not low when it  
is remembered that the 1,800,000 acres of Crown lands remaining 
in Natal and the 350,000 acres in the Northern d istrict were 
only Crown lands because no European wanted them. They v*?re in 
the least accessible parts of Natal, and in general the soil was
3poor. Moreover their inhabitants had no security of tenure and 
were liable to be summarily ejected when the lands were sold, 
unless the buyer wanted either their services or their rent, 
which he could then generally command on his owntexma. This 
disability  was shared by squatters on Crown lands vith Africans 
living on private lands and on those on the Natal Land and Coloni­
sation Company.
In the post-Boer War period when European settlement was 
sharply accelerated, this process of ejection ooourred to a marked
.Reserve lands on individual tenure* By some curious log ie the
prohibition of sale of private or Crown land3 to Africans vas 
ostensibly to prevent Indians from buying them out* e*g* 00 179/
229/9691, Gov. to Sec. S t., te l. No. 2, 18.3*04*
“3 .a .N.a .C. I l l ,  Evid. J* L* Masson, Surveyor General, p.141*
^Report U.S.N.A. Blue Book on Native Affairs (Dept* Aepta.) 1906*
4,261 huts would give a population of o .20,000 people* In 1913 there 
were 37,000 according to Report of Natives Land Commission, o p .o it ..p .5*
Ss.ALN.A.C. Ill#  Bvid. Surveyor General, J.L.Maseon, p.147*
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degree, especially in the midlands, where farmers vere taking 
up previous unused lands for wattle plantations and intensive 
dairy farming.^ In 1905, for example, over two thousand Africans 
were given permission to move from private lands to the already 
overcrowded reserves, while a further 115 huts (about 460 people
or more) vere moved from private lands on to Crown lands, pr*»
2sumably largely for this reason. A major reason for the rest* 
lessnese amongst Tilonko's and M sikofeli's peoples in the Ixopo- 
Hid Illovo area would appear to have steamed from this. The 
resumption of lands in this area by the Natal lend and Colonisation 
Company caused considerable insecurity amongst Haikofeli' s people, 
which may well have led in part to the many zumours of rebellion 
in that part of the country, amongst both white and blaok. The 
desire of vhite farmers in the Richmond area to break up the tribes
4of these two chiefs, a desire which expressed, it s e lf  in numerous
5petitions and public meetings, may also have been the result of
*N. Hurvits, A,:;riculture in Natal 1860-1950, Natal Regional Survey,
Natal Univ. 1951, pp. 54-5 and p.90.
2
Blue Book on Native Affaire, 1905 (Departmental Reports), pp. v i i -
v i i i ,  Report of and Appendix 16, p. 170,
^TT.M.A.C. Evid. D. Strachan, p .595. For Tilonko and Ksikofeli, see 
below, p.
*See below, p.
A series of deputations and petitions about these chiefs were sent
almost monthly to the P.M. or S.N.A. from the beginning of the disturb­
ances until the end.
5
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tension over land and the fear that these two moot powerful 
tribes In the area would resist the expansion of the European 
settlers.
In the oase of Bambatha, too, the importance of land cannot
be overstressed. In 1905 the Assistant Magistrate of Oreytown,
H* von Gterard, wrote to the Under Secretary of Native Affaire
that Bambatha
’Vanes the allotment of a location . . .  His people 
are oppressed and squeased /s ic7  by certain landowners 
on whose private locations they live . T. J. Nel and 
P. R. Botha are joint owners of a certain piece of land 
on which they place these unfortunate people on very 
high rente. The land is useless almost for aiy agri­
cultural pursuits, “ithin the last three days forty- 
eight su—onsee hare been issued against Bambata's 
people . . .  for the rent due . . .  three weeks ago. An­
other batch of summonses, about twenty-five, is  yet 
to oome.... /This is7 A most deplorable state of 
a ffa irs, the more so as there seems no remedy for 
i t • ... My sympathies are entirely with /Bambatha'js7, 
people, . . .  but I see no way out of the d ifficu lty ."
Bambatha had been haring an exceptional number of court eases
vith his white neighbours, very many of them Boer farmers, erer
since the middle of 1900. At that time there were apparently
attempts to victimise him and his tribe for Informing against
othe fanners who vers assisting the Boers in the war. To what 
extent Bambatha himself hoped to profit from turning informer against
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the Boers and vas disappointed is d ifficu lt to sey. Neverthe­
less the increasing signs of lawlessness on the part of hie tribe, 
which were shown in 1905 in two fa irly  serious faction fights 
for example, must be seen against this background o f poverty and 
landlessness. This in turn was in part to lead to Bambatha*s re­
action to government orders in 1906 over the Poll Tax and hie am
deposition, and in the end to his fighting against the government
2forces. In the Hapumulo division too, where the final phase of 
the disturbances took place the many disputes about land, and the 
frequent faction fights revealed a situation of overcrowding long 
before the disturbances. In the 590 sq. miles of the division 
were 55,000 Africans -  215 huts and 89 people to the square mile.
In this area 97°/o of the cattle ware killed by Rinderpest. While 
there were many aspects to the restlessness in this division in
3
1906, clearly population density and poverty ware among them.
While i t  is  d ea r that land was a burning issue for the Afri­
cans of Natal just before the disturbances, there were also those 
whites vho saw in the disturbances themselves a good opportunity o f
Hiatal Witness, 21.11.08, Svid. Inspec. Rose at Dinu Zulu’ s tr ia l. 
They were on 12.4.05 and Jan. 1906.
2See below. Chapter , p.
5fc>ee e.g . SNA 1/4/6 o|| Magistrate J. J. Field to S.N.A. 4.10.99
and Blue Book on Native Affairs 1899, B.65, Rept. Magis.
solving their own land-hunger. The breaking up of African lands 
was the favourite solution of many Natalians to the problems o f  
landlessness,1 although usually it  was restrained by -the more 
responsible elements in the population. In general the advocates 
of this view did not say what would happen to the African popu­
lation living on these lands. A not infrequent suggestion before 
the Natal Native Affairs Commission was the transference of the
2Africans on private lands to their natural 'homeland' in Zululaad. 
Sir Charles Saunders even suggested Southern Hhodesia ac a possible 
outlet for Natal's surplus population. This hoary solution to 
the native problem was enshrined in Vocrtrekker philosophy on 
the subject -  the fira t referenoe in ^atal to transporting Afrioans 
to their own 'homelands' was the Volksraad decision of 1841 to 
move a ll Africans beyond the five families required on each farm 
as labour, to the area between the Umsimvubu aid the Umtaavuna
X  A
rivers. Shepstone toyed with this scheme as late as 1854» but
1See evidence Natal Native Commissions, 1852-3> 1881-2 and 1906-7
as well as Vol. I l l ,  S.A.N.A.C. passim.
^N.N.A.C. Svid. p .135-6, where the Chairman, H. C, Campbell, asked 
Sir Charles Saunders whether natives on private lands In Natal
could not be moved to Zululand.
^Tho Hative Reserves of Naval, o p .c it . . p .l .
^Ibid. He v also toyed with schemes of removing Natal Africans to 
Zululand or Basutoland (see Wolfson, o p .c i t . . pp. 352-6, de Xiewiet
Imp. Factor p«33)*
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i t  was as impossible to move the Africans to the south then
as i t  was to move them to the north in 1906. Partly because
the f ir s t  white traders and trekkers had arrived in ^atal whan
it  was s t i l l  suffering the effects of Shake's wars, the tradition
that Natal was empty In 1830 and that the 'natives' who appeared
on the scene were 'foreigners' with no Inherent right to the
land died hard, and lay at the base of much of the colony's
justification  and rationalisation of its land policy.*
While some N&talians saw Zululand as a possible centre for
the displaced Africans of Natal, others saw it  as their own
hinterland. While it  would appear that Hie main motivation of
the Natal ministry at the time of Zulu land1 s annexation in 1897
2was mainly p o litica l, within the colony there was a strong 
pressure group which saw the lands and labour resources of Zulu- 
land as their natural heritage. Appeals to the Governor of 
Zulu land (who was at the same time somewhat ambiguously Governor 
of Natal) to throw open the lands of Southern Zululand to white 
occupation are a recurrent feature in the 3890s. Petitions oaae 
primarily from the farmers of the Natal midlands end highlands
E.g. N.N.A.C., p. 113, Evid• J « C « Barnes, C •G•, P• >* • D•. See 
fo r  example a most interesting letter to the Sec. St. froa the 
veteran Nat a ll an J. Bird (the editor of Annals o f Natal 1 
on the traditional cry to break up the locations aid for the 
rationalisation upon which i t  was based, CO 179/179/2379, 10.11.
See above„ Chapter 11 ,pp.2
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aad from the Boers ta the Transvaal d istricts o f Vryheid, and 
the "Proviso B" d istrict of Zululand. The storekeepers and 
prospectors of Zululand formed & class of their own and were also 
interested in getting land grants from the British Government.^
Itfith the incorporatinn of Zululand in 1897 and the "Northern 
Provinces" in 1902 into Natal, these various pressure groups com­
bined in their demands for Zulu land. To them the decisions 
of the Commission appointed in 1902 to set aside certain areas 
of Zululand for white occupation and to reserve certain others 
exclusively for the Zulus appeared singularly misguided: according
to the Final report o f the Delimitation Commission (1905), the 
Countssioners were
"met on a ll sides by residents and others who appear 
to be labouring under the impression that a ll the 
Commission was required to do was to indiscriminately 
throw open the whole of -the lands suitable for Euro­
pean occupation, irrespective of the interests of the 
Natives occupying those la n d s ... ."2
In a ll 2,613,000 acres were excluded from the area reserved for
^See CO 427/9/928, desp. 146, 12.12.90, End. Petition J.Palmers
and 53 others.to R.M. Nqutu 
CO 427/9/23350, Gov. to Sec. St. 5.11.90 
CO 427/11/11095, Ends, in desp 57, 4.5.91.
CO 427/11/6019, desp. Conf. 25.2*91, &ov. to Sec. St. and End. 
CO 427/12/15530, Encl. PrtitafaN 
CO 427/16/58168, Gov. to Sec. S t., 15.3.93.
C. &• Saunders and -d. h. ^eachcroft,18.10.04.
2
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the Zulu , who were le ft  the remaining 3»887,000 acres,1 In 
the areas set aside for white settlement as a result of government 
instructions, Africans could neither buy the land nor live on aa 
rent-paying tenants -  they had to become labour tenants ( i f  wanted 
as such by the farmer) or move* Nevertheless at the time almost 
the only criticism  of the work of the Delimitation Commission was 
that i t  had disregarded the interests of the European population*
While F. R. Moor was Secretary of Native Affairs , a cabinet 
position elevated to ministerial rank at the end of 1905, the 
complaints o f this group did not have much e ffect, although it  
can also be argued that In any case wie in itia l decisions of the 
Commissioners who fir s t  delimited the coast lands aad set aside 
a very considerable area for sugar plantations were more generous 
to whites than their later delimitations in the interior lands 
suitable for stock-farming* The agitation of the colonists for 
the release of more land was however supported both hy the Sutton 
and the Smythe ministries, although it  appears to have l i t t l e  
direct effect except in the restrictive regulattns already mentioned.^
T^hn Native Reserves of Natal, op .c it . , p*12*
‘‘Govt. Gazette, 14.8.06* Rules and Regulations for the disposal o f 
Crown lands, p*1149»^ 14 and 15* SNA l/l /3 7 G ~ ^ »  C.R.Saunders 
, to H.N.A. 15*6.07. A Minute from Sec. Kin. A g r 15*7.07 indicates 
that the dept* would however turn a blind eye to arrangements made 
by tenants to pay rent in lieu of labour (ibid)*
i .e .  The prohibition on the sale of non-Re serve lands to Africans.
The leads most longingly eyed by the ooloniste vere in the
Nkandla and Nqutu districts in Southern Zululand. Both these
divisions vere densely populated, because i t  was good cattle
country, and because severe inroads had already been made on
the land of tribes of these areas by the Boer *New Republic* o f
1884 (which had become the Northern districts of Natal).*  In
addition, tribes from Natal and the neighbouring Boer territory
had removed to Nkandla and Nqutu under pressure from the white
settlers at different times. After the Zulu war moreover it  had
been deliberate policy to settle 'loy a l' Natal tribes as a buffer
in this area. Already in the 1890s population pressure in theee
districts was showing itse lf in the number of boundary disputes
and faction fights in these two areas. Nevertheless the Commission
did delimit a certain amount of land in these districts for white
2occupation: 81,000 acres in Nkandla and 27,000 acres in Nqutu.
It is  perhaps not surprising therefore that in South Zululand 
the land question would appear to have played an important part 
in determining the attitude of some of the tribes and chiefs to 
Baabatha when he fled there to organise his resistance to the Natal 
forces. Ilanga lase Natal indeed blamed the deliaitatlon of
*C0 179/230/35662, 8th and interim Report o f Zululand Deliaitatlon 
Commission.
^Out of 487,680 acres md 400,000 acres respectively, PMC 100*^5 
Minute P.M. (Natal) to Gov. 16.9.04.
Zululand for the rebellion that took place there.^ While tfaia 
is  n* the entire story -  for according to Sir Charles Saunders
those people vho had been most severely disturbed by the allotment
2of farms did not participate in the rebellion -  i t  vas certainly
rt
an important element in ^igananda* s decision to fight. Hoxeoer 
quite apart from the tribes actually affected by the alienation 
of land, there can be l i t t le  doubt that the agitation in Natal 
for upsetting the awards of the Commisslnn created a sp irit of 
uncertainty and suspicion in Zululand, where, as Sir Charles 
Saunders remarked in a forthright statement to the Natal Native 
Affairs Commission* there had already been so many "breaches of 
faith" over land, that the Zulu oould hardly be blamed for taking 
threats of "land-grabbing" seriously.
On:the other side of the coin, it  Bhould also be noted 
that i t  vas in precisely the ooveted areas of Nqutu and Nkandla 
that both the Commissioner for Native Affairs and the magistrate,
C. J. Hignett, remark on the attempts of the troops to "push" loyal
14.U .06.
2N.N.A.C. Evid., p .136. Saunders suggests settling "an entirely
new class of people on the kraal sites of rebels in S. Zululand.
He recommended those people M who had been hurtled o ff  lands taken 
up by European settlers. These were the people who might hare been 
expected to revolt and yet they gave not the slightest trouble."
^See below, Chapter v  , p. >^3*7 -3 4 ^
4
PP* 136-7. see also Memorandum by Sir Chari.es Saunders om the 
subject in GO 179/245/22270.
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or neutral chiefs into rebellion.1 While no motives vere given
for this, i t  may partly have been motivated by a desire for the
confiscation of African land. Immediately after the disturbances,
there was a strong movement to g«t the lands of ’ rebels* in Zululand
2confiscated and granted to settlers instead. The attempt failed, 
although the tribes that had participated in the disturbances vere,
in some instances, removed and replaced vith others who had been
3displaced elsewhere by the incoming Europeans.
I f  land pressure was the long-term reason for African im­
poverishment in Natal and Southern Zululand, there were also shorter 
term factors leading to the situation of extreme distress In 1905, 
as the dramatic rise in Hut Tax arrears between 1902 and 1905
4shovs. Of these, the disastrous Rinderpest outbreak of 1897 vaa
undoubtedly the most serious. Between 1897 and 1898, six-sevenths
5
of the Africans* cattle vere wiped out. The importance of cattle
ZA 28, Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion, C.R.Saunders to
C. J. Hignett magis. Nqutu (personal letter) 14#6.06s " . . . I  quite 
agree with your conclusions as t> our men trying to goad the whole 
population into rebellion and you have n0 idea of the difficulties 
one had at Nkandhla in trying to protect people who one knew perfectly
well were faithful to u s .. ."  See below, Chapter
N^.L.A. Debates, August 1906. Notion by Tonga and Brunner, Hs. L»A. for 
Zululand. See also Greytown Gazette 18.8.06, Report of Meeting at 
Nqutu which passed a resolution in favour of opening up confiscated 
lands of rebels for European occupation.
See belov^eix p $C>8r9,
S^NA l/l /5 2 2  • Summary of arrears of Hut Tax on 30.6.05. The
arrears rose from £127*8.0 in 1903 to £511.0.0. in 1904 to £5056. 2.0. 
in 1905i these figures are somewhat misleading as it is probable
I ff* ?•A. J
in the social system of the Nguni made this far aora than simply 
an aoonoalo hlov. Aa a rasult o f th# Rinderpest, in aanj araaa
young nan could not gat married because their eattle for lobola 
vere a ll dead. Moreover as the price of oattle soared, the
ten head stipulated by the Natal Code of Native Lav as tha aarlaua
payable for the vives of commoners, which had in fact beooae the 
norm, was far beyond the reach of eligible bachelors, The result 
was the sharp rise in immorality noted by magistrates a ll over 
the colony.1 At the time of the outbreak i t  is true that magis­
trates remarked on the calm and philosophical way In vhieh the
2Africans reacted to the loss of their oattle. The extent of the
disaster was masked during the Boer War because of the demand
3for their labour and the higher wages paid during i t .  Thua 
i t  was only with the depression that the reality of the lose vaa
that the arrears for 1903 and 3904 were t aken from die final figures 
of the year, whereas the 1903 figure is  probably the mid-year
figure. The tax was generally collected in the f ir s t  half o f the 
year,
5 ' ' W" m.Natal Departmental Report si Annual deport of the Department cf
Agriculture, 1902, p ,14. In Natal in 1896 Africans possessed
494,402 head of cattle, in 1898 , 75,842. In ^ululand in 1897
96,587, in 1898 46,235* In some places in Natal losses were up 
to 9Q°/o. Ibid. pp. 12-15.
^Blae Books on Hatire Affairs 1900-1901 pasai*. Also Natal 
Departmental Reports: Reports of Magistrates 1899 passim,
2Ibld.
rnrnmm rn— mmm
See below, p. 1.913
properly fe lt . The absence of oat tie  when Africans returned to 
agriculture in the areas which had been invaded during the war 
also areated a further d ifficu lty  in that on nany homesteads
there were no oxen to drew the plough.1 The * growing neglect
2of cultivation" amongst ths Africans may bars beau partly due 
to this, although ths almost manual visitation  o f some form o f 
agricultural pestilence -  locusts in 1896, followed ty wheat
blight, drought, mr invasion losses, more d rou g h t, blinsards
3and aphis -  must bars b esn su fficient to discourage a ll but 
the most doughty agriculturalists. The position was exacerbated 
by the fact that African farmers generally sold their produce 
at a time when there was a general surplus and prices were low, 
and than were forced to buy when there was a shortage and prices
4
wars high. While this was generally attributed to their th rift­
lessness and ahiftlsssness, i t  is  not an uncommon feature of the 
poorer sections of any community. It was only partly a ftmotion
1Bla. Book on B»U t .  A tta in  (D«pt. Heports) 1901, p. 1330.
2Heport, K.H.A.C., p .8.
5H .t«l H I  jP f ld t l  Bwort o f D row rt.it of A «rio..
1905.
S w  Bln. Book oa H.tlT. A ffa ir .. 1904, p .r .
of lack o f foresight and improvidence. It vaa at least as auoh due
to the faot that the immediate demands for oaah, for rents or
taxation, oould not be put o ff until prices rose, md there vaa
rarely a backlog of savings vhioh could be drawn upon for immediate
exigencies. The accumulation of wealth md the saving o f grain from
one season to the next vere d ifficu lt  in the social structure of
African l i f e ,  where the demands of family, hospitality md mutual
aid tended to svallov up the savings of the more th rifty . Sore-
over, although Africans had been dram into the money economy in
very many vays by the turn of the oentury, in so far as wealth
was accumulated, i t  was accumulated in oattle. J o t  many Africans
the ravages o f the Rinderpest must have been the equivalent of
the great Vail Street oraah.
European pastoral is  ts had Also of course been h it by the
outbreak, but had lo st a smaller proportion of their oa ttle .1
In any oeee they vere in a far stronger position to recover from
the blow. Thus while African oattle holdings increased comparatively
l i t t le  between 1898 md 1903, by tbnt year European farmers had
2more oattle than they had poasasaed before the outbreak. Aa a 
rem it o f the high price of oattle, sheep farmers found i t  profitable
1
About h a lf. Annual Report, Department o f A grio., 1902,p .14.
2In 1904 Africans in Ratal, Zululand md the Rorthem d istricts possessed 
345,159 heed o f oattle. See p. 1*2 n.5 above. Ratal Census, 04, p.831*
In 1904 Europeans held 314,756 homed oattle by oomparlson vith 
152,583 in 1897 or 238,448 in 1895, the beet year in the 1890s.
See R. Hurvita, Agrio. in flhtal. o p .o it .. p .87 md Ratal Census,1904.
to turn from sheep farming to ca ttle .1 In some arm aa the expansion 
o f European oattle farming vaa made possible by elimination of 
African cattles in Zululand fo r  example the Conmisaioner fo r  
Satire A ffairs pointed out that the destruotion of African oattle 
gave the oolony a most favourable opportuni ty for delimiting African 
lands which had thus been vacated*
lo r  vas the Rinderpest the only oattle plague to a ffect 
Btook in these yearst lung-siekness, East Coast fever, scab and 
mange added to the tale of woes*3 It is  not surprising that after 
1897 the united voice of white stock farmers vas heard far more 
loudly demanding state aid and protections* protection not In­
frequently given at the expanse o f  the Africans*
In addition to these various ^pricultural disasters and 
because o f them, Africans vere also deeply affected by the post­
war depression which affeoted the whole o f south Africa, notwith­
standing settler views to the contrary* As the anranues o f em-
5ployment contracted and wages f e l l ,  Africans could no longer fa ll
IAnmUl Report. Depart—at o f Agriculture. 1906, p.20.
C^0 179/21?/21864. Baal, Report toy C,R,Sounders on delimitation 
o f Zululand*
3Annual Rspert, Dept* o f Agrlo. 1905.
*See below, p*i39 f f .
^Report N.N.A.C., p*8* 00 179/226/21678, desp* 237k Gov. to Sec* St*,
20*5.03.
back on sailing their ca ttle , or even, except In a few areas 
d o ss  to ths towns, their surplus grain and vegetables, as 
they had in earlier years, le t  at ths same Hue they were faced 
with increased rents end taxation* There was, i t  is  true, a 
constant demand fo r  farm labour and every indication that in 
this period of finanoial depression ths agricultural sector of 
the whits economy waa expanding*1 Nevertheless, aa has already 
been noted, the farmers paid ths lowest wages in ths oolony*
A major motive behind ths extra taxation imposed on Afrloans 
between 1903 and 1903 was undoubtedly ths desire of the farmers 
to get Africans to work on their own terms* This In fact vas ex­
p lic it ly  stated by the Minister fo r  Native A ffairs when he ju stified  
the Poll Tax in view of the fact that
"for the last twenty years to uj own knowledge, 
the Inhabitants o f this oolony have asked fo r  m  
increase in taxation, generally upon the natives 
o f this oolony as far aa their wants are concerned, 
and what for? The cry has been fo r  labour, and 
until you increase the natives* wants, so long you 
w ill be without labour**•* The government of this 
colony are actually paying ths natives 3/6 a day 
at ths Point. Ths Corporation of Pletsrmaritsburg 
are paying ? / -  per day, the ffcrmers o f this Colony are 
paying £2 to £3 per month*•• Every farmers* Confsrenos 
that haa taken plaoe fo r  the last tan or twelve years 
have /s ia /  agitated fo r  m  increased Hut Tax, and why?
1 Annual Report. Dept, of Agrio. 1906, Report Sec* Min* for Agrio* 
pp* 5-6*
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To Increase the natives' wants and ao bring about 
a better state o f la iou r.”!
"To bring about a better state o f labour" had frequently
been a major motive in African taxation in settler A frica, aid
the efficacy  o f taxation in ensuring a constant labour supply
for  the white man was well recognised froa the earliest days
In Katal. From the beginnings o f white settlement in Xatal,
the oolonists had found considerable d ifficu lty  In persuading
a su fficien t number o f Africans to give up their own oattle
and gardens to look after those o f the ^xite man. At that time
the cliche o f popular economic philosophy In South Africa, "the
wants o f the native are so few that he won't render voluntary
labour", had some valid ity . It was d ifficu lt  fo r  settlers to
await the growth of new African needs before satisfying their
own need fo r  labour, especially as at ttafc time the Africans had
su fficien t land > v* . to make the employment offered
by whites in general unattractive. Although these conditions did
not last long, the attitudes to labour and the solutions evolved
lingered. Thus the solutions o f resorting to forced labour for
2the Public forks of th* oolony -  a policy which appears to have
T^T.L.A. Debates, vol. 39, pp. 667-8.
^For the policy  of foroed labour on public works or Iaibalo as i t
was called by the Africans, see above, p.
been adopted in Nathaaial Isaacs's day and ifcioh was o ffic ia lly
established on a government basis In 1858* -  and of imposing additional
taxation on Africans, vere s t i l l  believed in im plicitly , despite
the arailable evidence in the Natal census of 1904 that by 1hat
tine the vast majority of African men and women vere in active 
2employment. The image of thousands of Africans vhiling away their 
id le  hours at beer drinks vas simply not borne out by the facts, 
le t  the object of the taxation measures in this period vas 
not simply to get the Africans to work, nor even to work for the 
vhite mans they vere to a large extent designed to get them to 
work for the vhite farmer, Froa the 1880s onwards the farmers of 
Louth Africa vere faced vith increased competition from the mines 
and towns and railway expansion. The Iatal react ton to this labour 
drain vas typical o f South Africa as a whole, While proposals to 
raise the Pass Fee which Africans had to pay before they could 
leave the oolony to seek work froa l / -  to £1 fa iled ,^  other pro­
posals to stiffen  the penalties under the Masters mad Servants 
Lav against desertion,* to impose licences upon Labour Touts aid
*E. E. Brookes, The History of Native Policy In South Africa 
(2nd edition, 1927, Pretoria), p,417«
2 op,678, 61,76 /o  of native male population and 6%430/o  o f female
population were breadwinners compared to 74«59°/o and 13.67%> of 
the European population (p ,6 8 l),
^See for example H.L,A, Debates, vol. 22, p, 275 ff«  Reply to address, 
speeches by C. j .  Smythe and H. d. Winter, P,H, mad M.N.A, respectively 
in 1905-6, Natal'eeconomic dependence on the Transvaal mid the fact 
that she drev considerable labour from the surrounding territories , 
esp, Pondoland, probably account fo r  the failuze of this particular 
measure.
to prevent them from •touting,* on private farms without the per­
mission of the land-ovner,* and to register and issue identification 
passes to farm labourers? (also to prevent desertion) were more 
successful. The 1905 Poll Tax which had to be paid before passes 
oould be granted fcr  travelling outside Natal was a step in the 
same d ire ctio n A lth o u g h  European employment o f African farm 
labour vas extremely wasteful -  the number of farmhands required 
per 100 acres o f crop vas 15*4 compared vith 5*38 in Britain or 
9*33 in Tasmania* -  there vas no attempt to improve conditions 
or increase efficien cy in order to solve the prcolom of labour 
shortage. African farm labourers were probably as in efficien t as 
the fhrmers alleged, but there vas l i t t le  incentive for frem to 
change their ways. Employed only seasonally at wages less than 
half those currently paid outside the rural areas, frequently heavily 
in debt to their employer, the Africans were bound to the land by 
restrictive lavs which "made a serf o f him" and which prevented
Act. 40 of 1894, 35 of 1899 and 50 o f 1901. Of th. 45,000 African, 
charged before magistrates in 1906. 45»OQ  ^vers brought up under
these acts ( i.e .V lO ), SEA l/l/39Q ^s., Hinute Nathan to P.M. 17.12.07.08
iToutu Act o f 1896, amended by Act, 46, 1901.
2Acts 49 o f 1901 and 3 of 1904.
 ^ ^10 of Act 38 o f 1905. "All license, pass or registration officers 
. . .  are . . .  reqidred, whenever say mala parson applies for a liosnss 
pass or registration of any kind whatever, to maquire o f such person 
whether he has paid the Poll Tax due upon the 1st day of tha previous 
January or n o t ..."
*Natal Census 1904.
them from seeking the most remunerative work.1'
The Boer War had also affected the supply of African labour
for the farms; the demands of 1he military a ll over South Africa
for African labour, and the wages they were prepared to pay -
2and the nations they vere prepared to issue -  roused the ire of 
the farming community of Natal. During the boom years of 1902 
and 1905 also there was an unprecedented demand for black labour.
In Natal the increase in the vhite population was probably 
another factor contributing to the increased demand. Vhile how­
ever there is some indication of a rise in African wages during 
the war and immediately afterwards, the xlse hardly appears ex­
cessive t thus at the Point (Durban Harbour) wages for Togt Labour 
(labour engaged by the day) rose from 2tos. -  35s. to 30s. -  40s.
for longer working hours. On the coal mines wages had risen from
*
30s. 6d. to 43s. and below the ground from 43s. 6d. to 50s. 4d.
Hsre the 'solution* suggested by the mineovners and accepted by 
the government was to import labour from Portuguese Bast Africa.
Between 1902 and 1906 1,350 "foreign natives" entered Natal fbr
^N.N.A.C. Bvid. S. 0. Samuelson, p .13.
^Ths Governor o f Natal, Sir Henry NoCallum, became most heated on this 
account. In 1902 he wrote to the Sec. o f States "I  find that our 
Zulus were being demoralised by their drawing of m ilitary mtions 
similar to those drawn by European troops instead of the inexpensive 
mealierations to which they are accustomed. -  I determined in this 
particular as Supreme Chief to make a stand. CO 179/222/7666,26.1.02.
5CC 179/222/7666 End. Report of Labour Conference held at Newcastle 
23.1.02.
twelve months9 indentured labour, probably mainly in tha ooal 
mines aad to some extent on tha eager plantations*1 Aa la  fee 
caae of the indentured Cbiaaaa labour em fee land im fee aaaa 
period, thia enabled nine rwiore to lavar their usgee • a ladmatloa
which found its  aobaaa throughout fee eoeuomy.
The largeat employer e f Afrleaa laboar towards the end of 
the war and just a fter i t  vaa the army* At a speeiml oonfereaee
called by - ir  Henry MoC alien at leveastle at the baglnatng of 190S
2to discuss labour problems • a forerunner ef fee more famous
Transvaal ~<abour Commission o f 1902-9 -  i t  vaa deaided by a ll 
employers, including the army, that the average vega o f Afrioaaa 
should b§ lowered to Joe* Ha essential Aid EeOallua regard the 
reduction of wages by the m ilitary, feat ba offered to aaa his 
powers as Supreme ohief5 to sa il out* any additional labour re­
quired by the foroee, and sim ilarly to break up say strike aat ion 
on tha part of d issatisfied  Afriemas either under Martial Lav or 
under the povere eonferred upon him by fee tota l Cede** Later im
*M.K'A'C, Svid* H* Smith, Chief Immigratiom Restriction t ffle e r , p*28*
2CC 179/222/7666, op .e lt.
8*e j f .S la~l> bo
4C0 179/222/7666,
1902 th© Commanding Officer in Natal, Major General N ethers tonhaugh, 
remarked that the native labour question was "the only matter for 
some time to come to cause any disturbance su fficien tly  serious 
to ca ll for the presence o f troops".*
Although the labour shortage complained of so b itterly  must 
have been alleviated by the ending of the boon*, the withdrawal of 
the Imperial forces and their labour needs, and the import of in­
dentured labour, the complaints o f the farmers continued. Ini­
tia lly  this may be scribed to the fact that during the war many 
fam ilies Had earned enough to enable them to pay their taxes and 
other immediate exigencies, and wanted to follow  their own agri­
cultural pursuits. Nevertheless by 1903 the drought which affected
most parts of Zululand and Natal soon consumed most of these eara- 
2ings, and on a tour o f Zululand the Governor remarked on the ab­
sence of almost a ll the young adult males earning money in the
•9
colony or on the mines. In the same year, y . R. Moor pointed 
out that whereas the xmtio of Africans rendering service to the 
white man in the Cape was one in eight, in Natal i t  was one in
*C0 179/223/36293. Copy o f Confidential desparcr9i to Adjutant General, 
V.O. 5.7.02, en d . in desp. 213*
^See Blue Books on Native Affairs 1903 and 1904.
300 179/227/40555. (JOT. to S .o. S t., 3.12.03, d .sp . 234.
f iv e .1 By 1903 the number of ^atal Africans seeking work In
2the Transvaal exceeded the number In any pre-war year. By 
1905, the shortage of labour probably meant shortage of labour 
at the wages offered, and It is  In this context that Winter's 
speech on the Poll Tax must be seen.
What remains to be explained however is  why the farmers 
of Natal, who vere only a small fraction even of the white popu­
lation were able to affect the land and labour policy and the 
entire tax structure of 1he colony so powerfully. On the one 
hand, legislation was directed at immobilising African labour 
and keeping it  on the land; on the other, as Professor de Eiewiet 
has pointed out, referring to the 3870s, "The story o f native 
taxation cannot be f il ly  understood without remembering . . .  /?h a t/
3in part native taxation was a device to avoid heavier land taxes • ■
When referring to the more complex economic situation at 
the turn of the century, 1he qualification 'native* is  hardly 
neoesaary. At this time, labour policy and the tax structure 
reflected very clearly the polltioa l power groups in the oommunity.
Thus the only groups to be directly taxed were Africans and free
*N.L.A. Debates, vol. 33» PP» 94-5#
*th. numbers also rose considerably between 1903 and 1903 and after 
the disturbances rose 59°/° by 1909. In 1894 the number of Natal 
Africans seeking work on the Rand numbered 10,300. In the later
90s i t  was nearer 20,000. In 1903 and 1904 c 23.000, in 1905 c 26,000
•*The Imperial Factor in South Afrioa. p. 190.
Indians* Both ware wholly unrepresented in the **atal Legislative 
Assembly* Most indirect taxation on the other hand fe ll  on the 
townsmen -  who were woefully under-represented.
Although by 1904 more than half white Natal lived in the 
towns, the Legislative Assembly was largely in the control of the 
farmers of the interior -  the midlands and uplands of Natal.
The Assembly consisted of forty-three members from seventeen 
constituencies. Of these only eight were from the truly urban 
areas of Durban and Pietermaritsburg, which between them contained 
nearly half the whi te populati an and 38°/o of the electorate.
Thus, according to Prof. L. M. Thompson, "the farming element
2always had the decisive say in Natal p o litics" • This can be 
traced even before the advent of Responsible Government; what is  
significant however is  that the rapid growth of the towns towards 
the end of the century was not accompanied by any loosening of 
the hold of the farmers over the Assembly. On the contrary, their 
influence became even more marked after the grant of Responsible 
Government. Before 1897, Sir John Robinson and Harry Escombe, 
the principal architects of Responsible Government, were able to 
on sure that the representation of their own urban oonstituencfes
*Seeefcove, Chapter I , pp. 4-° “4 2 -,
2L. M. Thompson, Ths Unification of South Africa, p.127.
more or less equalled that of the farming community. The passing
of an additional duty on impctted meat by a vote of 25t i l  in the
Assembly, shoved the waning of the urban influence in 1897.1 In
that year's election the fanning interest returned two thirds
2o f the members of the Assembly. In 1906 five-sixths of the 
ministry vere farmers. Yet the Natal census of 1904 gave the
number of farmers in Natal as 6,500, many of idiom must have been 
absentee farmers, as the Ministry of Agriculture generally gave 
the figure of 3»000.^ This was out of a total lhite adult male
population of 56,758.^ It  must also be remembered that when am
refers to the influence of the farming community, one is  not re­
ferring to the influence of the sugar planters on ihe coast, whose 
interests on questions of Free Trade md labour, for example, were
very different to those of the stock and wattle farmers of the in -
15terior, and whose po litica l voice at this time was minimal. The 
addition of two members to represent the whites in Zululand after ita
l C0 179/201/119* Got. t> Sm. St. 10.12.97, deep. no. 191. It  wa 
rejected by the Legislative Council by 7 tl.
2Ibld. lln u t ., E. V. Just, 13.1.98.
^Hatal Census, p .672. This equalled 7 .5 °/° o f th. whit. population. 
For Ministry of Agriculture figures see e.g . M.L.A. Sessional Papers, 
L.A. no. 25* p .363*
*1904 Natal Census, pp. 85-6.
5C0 179/192/14677, CO Minute dated 3*9«93» The sugar planters used 
Indian not African labour and were In favour o f free trade with 
the other S.A. colonies. Natal*s ta r iff favoured the stookfarmers 
who, unlike the planters, faosd competition from the rest of S.A.
*Incorporation in 1898, and the four aembere lvho vere added to 
the Assembly after the Boer War to represent the n ewly annexed terri­
tories of Vryheid, Utrecht and Psulpietersberg, further strengthened 
the stookfarming element in Natal p o litics .
From the debates in the Natal Legislative Assembly i t  is
d ear that the farmers vere. in traditional South African style,
far mozltextreme in their rievs ox the "native question" than many
of the planters and urban representatives. There vere o f course
notable exceptions on either side.^* Nevertheless the extremism
of urban whites tended to be directed against the Indian population,
2which at this stage constituted the greater economic threat.
There vere several reasons fo r  the race attitudes of the stock- 
farmors o f the in terior, many of them doubtless lying deep in 
settler psychology. In general they lived furthest from large 
centres o f vhite population. Their fhrms vere large mid isolated , 
and most of them had a number of African fam ilies liv in g  on them.
*e.g. ?• S. Tatham, member fo r  Pietermaritsburg, on the one hand, and 
7. R. Moor, vho vas, by comparison with the rest of the assembly,fairly 
moderate, on the other. See belov, pp.
*See CO 179/195 and 196. Agitation by vhite artisans In the towns 
against African skilled and sem i-skilled labour vas just beginning 
to make its e lf  heard in the 90s. The Indian trader and craftsman 
however was a far greater objeot of racial hatred. This did not 
prevent discriminatory lavs against a ll non-whites being passed by 
a ll the municipalities o f Natal. See above, Chapter I , p.
^For a discussion of this subject from adifferent point of view, see 
L. H. Gann and P. Dumgnan, White Settlers in Tronioal A frica
(Penguin, 1962).
Should there be any real threat of violence or rebellion on the 
part of the African population, they and their families would 
obviously be in the greatest danger.
Apart from the fears of people s t i l l  living in the shadow 
o f the Zulu War, there were also economic bases, and extremely 
important ones, for the attitudes of the stock farmers. In 
the earlier days o f the colony before p o litica l factors had tipped 
the economy irreversibly in favour of the European farmer, 1here 
was, after a l l ,the powerful con flict of interests between African 
pastoralists and European pastoralists, a con flict over land, 
water, cattle and labour. Unlike the sugar farmers of the ooast, 
the stookfarmers relied entirely on African labour and regarded
the failure of Africans to work for them virtually as a criminal
offence.^
#
While the struggle over land and water and cattle had, by 
the turn o f the century already long been won, that over labour
had not. The intense competition for African labour which has al­
ready been mentioned, sharpened this particular battle and gave the 
legislation taring the twenty years of Natal1 a self-government its  
peculiar character. Finally the agricultural Ht«n plagues" which
*See for example the report o f Polise Inape©. V. F. F a irlis to Chief 
Commissioner of Polices "Vith regard to crime the principal complaints 
made by Dutch farmers to patrols waa of the refusal to work on ths 
part o f ths n a t i v e s . R e p o r t  o f C. in C. of P olice, Departmental 
Reports 1903* p .67.
10$
hit Natal froa 1896 onward increased the insecurity o f the white 
farmer as i t  had of the black, and the new note of stridenoy in 
farming representations after 1896, and even more a fter 1903, ia 
not entirely surprising. In view of the human tendenoy to search
fo r  scapegoats, many farmers treated their own failures in these
years as i f  they ware caused directly by the pernicious ways of 
ths African population. Thus cattle disease waa blamed on to 
the oarelesaness of the Africans and gave farmers a good excuse
for cutting down the number of stock they were prepared to allow
their tenants to hold, while the failure of sheep-farming in many 
areas was blamed on the innumerable "stock-thefts" by Africans, 
although many observers pointed out that most o f the supposedly 
"stolen sheep" were probably lo s t  in gullies and over c l i f f s ,  
or died through exposure, largely aa result of the farmer* s failure 
adequately to check hia animals.1 Increasing drastic cattle steal­
ing laws were devised, some white farmers evidently feeling even death 
by hanging an insufficient penalty for this particular crime.
Whatever the reasons however, the fact that p o litica l power 
was in the bands of such small groups of unenlightened men probably 
accounts for the extremely narrow range of proceedings in the Legis­
lative Assembly md its  complete lack of any outstanding individuals.
*e .g . Natal Departmental Reports t Blue Book on Defence 1898, T 31 
Report o f Sub. Inspec. Natal Police Dundee division, Sim. CO 179/ 
204/26844, Oov. to See. S t., Secret telegram 26.11.98.
Pros the inception of self-governnm t, Natal p o litics  had been
very lite ra lly  •parish-pump" -  and railway bran chi in e -  politioa .
There was scarcely a time when there were su fficien t individuals
of the necessary calibre end character to form both a viable
ministry and a liv e ly  and constructive opposition. For a couple
o f years after the loer War, ministries were extremely unstable,
one in particular haring to rely on the easting vote o f the speaker
to get its  legislation passed.1 Nevertheless divisions on ideological
2lines were virtually non-existent, although the entry of four
labour members at the end of 1906, who held the balance between
the 'in s 1 and foute9 did introduce a semblance of party p o litics
Into 1he Assembly.^ The result o f  a ll this was, as Sir Matthew
Nathan remarked scathingly after a few weeks in the oolonys
"Far too maoh of tha time, energy and money of tha 
small oommunity of this oolony seems to  ba tticen up 
in governing themselves badly -  municipaHy and nationally 
* aad the native population worse."4
Self-government warn interpreted purely as "govenm at to the interests
1C0 179/227/31474, got. to S««. S t ., Conf. 31.7.03. Th. Hua. ministry 
remained In o ffice  in 1903 after the Deo. 1902 election solely by 
elating vote of the Speaker. The government resigned inAuguet 1903*
2See T. Hyslop to M. T# Steyn, 23.2.10 (Steyn Papers). Cited in 
L. M. Thompson, The Chificatioa of South Afrioa. p .41.
3
L# M. Thompson, The Unification o f south Afrioa. p .41.
^To Lord Selborne, 15.9*07. Natha% MSS $68, p .13.
o f se lf, and the general good is  too often set aside for individual
and local advantages" he vrote to Sir Charles Laoas a l i t t le  later.1
Sir Mat the v Nathan's views vere shared not only by both previous
governors of Natal under responsible government, but also by many
eon temporary South African statesmen and politicians, including
2Smuts, Botha, Herrlman, Richard Solomon and Steyn. Perhaps parochial­
ism and government in the interests of the individual is  a not in­
frequent feature of small territories; in Natal natural smallness 
vas aggravated by the unbalanced distribution of politioa l pover.
The dangers of this situation in a multi-raoial society 
vhere the bulk of the population vere excluded completely from 
politioa l l i f e  are also manifest. As the Natal Native Affairs Com­
mission put its
"Considering its  origins and oompositi an, Parliament 
stands virtual^ in the relationship o f an oligarchy 
to the natives and naturally it  studies more the In­
terests c f the constituencies, to vhon members eve 
their position, than to those vho had no voioe in 
their election , more particularly, then the Interests 
o f the represented oonf 1 let vith those of the unre­
presented. "3
Some members representing rural constituencies nevertheless cherished
1K«than MSS 568, p .20.
2
^N.N.A.C. Report, p.l3«
201
L. M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, p.47*
the illusion  that they were also representing the interests of 
the African inhabitants of their d ietriot. This somewhat implausible 
argument was in fact urged against a more equitable urban-rural 
redistribution of seats.*
Of a ll the members supposed to represent African rights, 
the Secretary for Native Affaire was theoretically appointed for 
this purpose. Vith the exception of Sir James Liege Hulett, a 
prominent, British-born tea planter, who held the o ffice  for a 
brief spell in the BtLnns ministry (1898-9), a ll the Secretaries 
for Native Affairs were Natal-boro stockfarmers. Both J. R. Moor, 
who held the o ffice  for most of the period, and H# J. Vinter, who 
was Minister of Native Affairs (the t it le  was changed during his 
tenure of the o ffice ) from 1905 to the end of 1906, represented 
the large sheep-farming d istrict o f Veenen, while Col. George 
Leuchars (Secretary for Native Affairs, 1904-5) represented Umvoti 
division, another stock farming area. Both Veenen and Umvoti 
divisions had slseable Dutch communities, although i t  is d ifficu lt  
to assess how much this influenced the views of their represeribtivesf 
there is  l i t t le  to indicate that there was much difference between 
British and Dutch farmers in Natal in their attitudes to native
*J. Robinson,''Principles and Problems'vreprinted from the Natal Mercury . 
4.9*1899* p .9. See also R. Moor In N.L.A. Debates, vol. 30, 1901, 
p. 644.
policy, land or labour. ^
I t  is  also not easy to estimate exactly what part the
personalities and views of different Secretaries for Native
Affairs played within the politica l structure. It is  dear,
for example, that there were considerable differences in the
approach of P. R. Moor ax the one hand and Leu chars and Vinter
on the other. Observers as favourably disposed to the Africans
as Sir Matthew Nathan and Harrietts Colenso, John Dube in TT,
lase Natal and the Natal correspondent of Im^ (the Cape-
Xhosa-Engliah newspaper founded aid edited by J. T. Jabavu),
saw Moor as "a rare exception in this oolony" -  a man with "some
sympathy" with the African.* Harrietts Colenso wrote in 1903
to a close friend and supporter in Britains
"Here in Natal our Secretary of Native Affairs 
is  really I believe doing his best to obtain 
some measure of fa ir - play for ihe n atives....
Cf the evidence of T# R# Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond (O.U.P. 1967) 
who shows that in the Cape Afrikaans-speaking ihxmers were in general 
more extreme in their views than ihe English speaking farmers, 
though he suggests much of the "liberalism" of the English speaking 
farmers may have had a p o litica l rather than a principalled derivation 1 
i t  was a way of "scoring over" the Afrikaners, and may also have been 
dewided to attract the non-white vote. In Natal, where the Isfcgliahr* 
Dutch politica l division was non-existent and there was no non­
white vote to attract it  would seem there was l i t t le  to distinguish 
Boer and British race attitudes, though the latter tended to rationalise 
and articulate their prejudices and give them a more legal framework, 
perhaps because of the tension between their attitudes and the more 
liberal approach taken in the outside world.
but he is very much a lon e...."*
Both Harriet te Colenso and Sir K&tthev Nathan vere destined 
to be disappointed in Moor, Nathan largely because of his inability 
to bring his colleagues round to his way of thinking, Harriett©
Colenso because he vas Prime Minister and Minister for Native A ffairs 
at the time of Dinuoulu's arrest. Moor vas pre-eminently a vhite 
supremacist in the Shops tone tradition -  as Sir Matthev Nathan re­
marked, he vas shocked when the Governor "shook hands with some
native Christian chiefs and is alvays fearful that I shall treat
2them in a way they are unaccustomed to"; He firmly rejected any
idea of social, p o litica l or economic equality between black and
3white. Compared with even the Afrikaner members of the South 
African National Convention which met in 1908-9 to draw up a draft 
constitution for the unification of South Africa he vas illib era l 
and extreme. Nevertheless he was less rigid than his Natal colleague?
oXlanga lase Natal, 3.5.07 and 26.6.08.
3
1mvoa 19.6.99.
^Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Lord Selborne, 15.9*07.
*H.E.C. to Mrs. Hollo Russell, 18.4.03. Letters at Elazvgeni, Amersham. 
These views vere shared by missionaries of other denominations Also.
^Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Luoas, 3*10.07.
^For Moor's views on native policy  his evidence before S.A.H.A.C. and 
N.N.A.C. '06-7 is  illuminating. His stand against the Cape 
franchise at the 1909 National Convention vas also typical.
in hie understanding of 3ulu traditional l i fe , in hia realisation 
that the Africans were contributing their share to the economy 
of the oountry both in finance and labour, and in his opposition 
to the more extreme measures proposed by the upcountry farmers*
It was apparently for these reasons that Col* Leuchars, himself to 
follow Moor as Secretary for Native Affairs In 1904—5# accused 
him of being equal to, i f  not worse than, "one o f  the most raibd 
individuals of Exeter Hall".1 Nevertheless i t  was during Moor's 
period of o ffice  that many of the severe laws against oattle steal­
ing2 and controlling labour* in the interests of farmers were passed 
through the Assembly, having been introduced by him* Thus even 
i f  he wanted to, it  was virtually impossible for him to withstand the 
combined pressure of the Assembly and his own cabinet -  to say nothing 
of his Veenen constituents. Kocr himself did not in any oase possess 
a particularly forceful, or decisive personality so that, as happened 
in 1907-8, his colleagues were frequently able to take actions of 
which he, as Prime Minister and Secretary for sative Affairs, dis- 
approved. Under the droumstances, it  is not surprising that leg is-
Debates, toI .  33, p. 311 (1903).
See p. \c\<i . . above. He was responsible for the Spoor Law of 189^1 while
he was not directly responsible for the 1890 Cattle Stealing Act he 
supported i t .
**e.g. Masters and Servants Aot of B94; Touts Aot of 1896 and amendment 
of 1901; Native Servants Identification Act of 1901. The Aot of Amending 
L^aw no. 10, 1876 (Spoor Law) of 1896. Act no. 6 of 1897 (Trespass Aet) etc
a.L.A. D .bfct*.To1, p* 675 f f *
lation under Moor represented a difference in degree rather than 
in kind from that of his successors.
On the other hand, during the time that Moor was Secretary 
for Native A ffairs, some of the worst excesses o f  the Leuchars and 
Vinter regimes were avoided. Through hjft intervention, for ex&npl#, 
o ffic ia ls  were instructed not to apply the provision*! of drastic 
laws too precipitately, as in the case of the Native Servant Identifi­
cation Aet o f 1901.^ In addition, i t  is clear that he set his face 
firm ly against the idea o f cutting up Zululand simply for the benefit 
o f the white man, aid fe lt  that the Delimitation Commission should 
be Instructed to lay aside su fficient reserves for the Zulu without
taking into account what areas would or would not be suitable for
2European settlement. In this he was overruled by the rest of 
the cabinet, but it  was le ft  to the Smythe and Sutton ministries 
completely to reverse his p olicies.
Uhder these m inistries, instructions to o ffic ia ls  and magis­
trates froa unsympathetic ministers could make l i f e  far more d if f i ­
cult fo r  the Africans. Under both Leuchars and Vinter, chiefs were 
A rbitrarily deposed by decree of the Supreme Chief, largely  it  
would appear fo r  daring to voice their people's feelings j and apprehensions
^H.L.A. Debates, v o l. 55t p .54. C. J. Yonge, member for Zululand, 
charged Moor with instructing police not to enforce "this Act) in 
his defence o f his native policy , Moor did not deny this charge.
2CC 179/228/20459• Minutes enclosed in deap. 126 of 5*5*02 (2.5*02 
and 5*5.02).
about new lavs* Thus In 1904, Aethg Chief Njengabantu ms removed
from his tribe allegedly for Insulting the magistrate at the tine
o f the Census enumeration. His version o f  the story ms never
examined before a judicial authority, although he maintained that
the evidence against him had been given by & court lnduna, brother
of a chief who had a long-standing feud with his tribe over land.
All he had done, so he claimed, vas to voice his people's fears as
to the purpose of the census, which he considered his duty even
though he did not share them.1 Inl905 twenty-two kraalheads and
other Individuals vere summarily removed from tfieir respective tribee
"for  defiance o f the authority of the Supreme Chief or th e ir ...
2tribal head"• At the beginning of 1906 when many chiefs were voicing 
their people* § fears as to the purpose of the Poll Tax and their 
inability  to pay i t ,  the removal and punishment of chiefs without 
tr ia l was the remedy suggested by the Secretary for Native Affairs.^
Ia the case of Bambatha this was to have considerable repercuaaiaaa, 
fo r  here was a case of one Of these deposed ohiefa suddenly turning
4round and defying the minister's order.
1C0 1 7 9 / 229/ 1 9 1 1 0 , desp. Conf. Z, 6.5.04. Sir H. Bala, Administrator 
Hatal to See. S t., 6.5.04, and CO 179/230/34957, % o l. in damp.
15.9*04. Petition from Hyengabantu ka Sobusa.
2Blue Book on Native Affairs 1905, p .v ii.
5SHA Resume of matters connected with the Poll Tax 23*2.06.
Vinter suggested the fining of Chiefs Charlie tynn,
Hgobizembe and Heaeni, and the deposition of Hatomela, without tr ia l.
^See below, Chapter v  ,
Vinter's views as expressed before the Natal Native Affair*
Commission which was appointed after the disturbances were In
keeping with these actions. Thus on being asked whether Africans
had any cause fo r  grievance in Natal, he replied:
"he could give them a whole string of what the
natives considered causes • • • but not what he
would consider causes of dissatisfaction. He did 
not know of any reasonable ground of dleeatiafaction 
either against the European as landlords or against 
the system of administration *“1
When K. b. Brans, a member of the Commission, then pointed out that 
under those circumstances i t  oould bardlyhare bean worth while 
appointing the Commission, Vinter confessed that the Commission had 
been appointed by Parliament, but he personally considered it  un­
necessary. 2 At the time of the formation o f the Natal Native Affairs 
Commission Vinter had tried  to stop themfroa ooamunieating with 
chiefs and informing them of the purpose of their v isit*  In this 
however he was overruled. ‘ by the Prime Minister* The grounds for 
hia objections to the aim o f the Commission o f  giving Afrioana "an 
opportunity of opening their hearts and speaking such words as 
they desire" was expressed when he was asked, again by X* S. Brans,
whether he thought a ll magistrates were suited for their duties in
^M.N.A.C. Evid., p .221.
2Ibid.
3SHA 1 /i /354^tP- . Sec. N.H.A.C. to H.K A., 27.10.06 and KUmt. Sec.
p . m. ,i . i i . o s :
connection with the African people and whether Africans were always 
informed of the laws affecting them. He then confided that, while 
he considered himself the "Protector" of the natives against .un­
suitable magistrates,
"You know what natives are. They will make a mountain 
out o f a m olehill. You w ill hear m 1&-advised native 
who wants to make mischief say 9I never heard the 
m agistrate.1 Then you get the Individual white man who 
backs the native up. These are the people we must guard 
against. I f  these people were not in aadLatenoe you 
would not have any trouble with the natives and you 
would not get any complaints from them."!
The a g ita tor theory of African grievanoes has always been a popular
one in South African and Indeed colonial fo lk -lore .
In these views Vinter, who had been Minister o f Agriculture
in two previous administrations, would appear to have differed
but l i t t le  from hie predecessor , Leuchars. A somewhat narrow man,
with the stereotyped views about Africansof so many o f his oompatriota,
Vinter is  only o f significance because of th# position o f power ha
held in the dangerous days o f 1906, md because he was representative
ofa major element in Yatal society md a majority element in tha
Hatal legislative Assembly. Both under him md under Leuchars, thar#
was a complete and deliberate cutting o ff of ooamnnioation between
^ .M .A .C . S r id . ,  , .2 1 5 .
2Cf. tha evidence o f Vinter both before tha Saleot Committee on 
Hative A ffairs April 7, 1911, SC V  -  10 H.A. (Uhion Qovt.) p. 457 
md hia evidenoe before tha Saleot Committee on Hative Affairs 
1917, SC 6A 1917, p .529 f f ,  which more than corroborate# this view.
the governing pover end the governed* The disturbances o f 1906 
can be in a large measure seen aa haring oome very d irectly  out of 
this failure of oontaot*
flfegBi f l c. . j r
RUMOURS AHD RED HERRINGS
"I have had interrieve with a Zulu of high family 
in ZaluXand . . .  a man who haa bean strongly at­
tached to me fo r  many years* His information to 
ma ia not 'rumour1 ••• i t  ia  ••• absolute faot 
and I thoroughly believe him*srv
Dinusulu ia not loyal* Ha baa bean and ia 1he 
haad and font of the whole movement mid is  pulling 
strings in Zululand, Ratal, Swaziland and hart*
All tha oh itfs In Zululand and nsarly a ll in Xgtal 
look upon hia aa their king and take their orders 
only from him*
• ••• Tli# warning haa been • •• to pro tee t the women 
and ohildran in tha towns and especially Durban, 
aa tha ardara and intentions are to riaa at a given 
signal and have a maaaaore of tha woman and children 
when the towns are denuded of men •••• "
Theophilue Shepatone, Pretoria 
to tha Prime Minister, Ratal, 
22.4.06.1
1C0 179/235/22656, tesp. Oo t .  to S *o . S t., Bnel. 2
In the tense and la an years aftar tha Boar War zunoura 
that the Afrioana vara about to unite and rise against vhite 
rule vara rife  a ll over South Africa. In la ta l, vhere a senior 
Magistrate tamed then "an annual hysteria” , these ruaours 
gathered intensity in the exceptionally hot sunaer at the end 
of 1905, after the inposition of the Poll Tax. Widespread 
Afrioan opposition to the tax, as veil as to the other burden- 
sone features of European rule noted in the previous ohapter, 
Manifested itse lf in the oninous killing of vhite eninals aad 
in a fev acts of defiaaoe to the Magistrates attenpting to col­
lect the tax before it  oould be legally enforced. This hostility 
roused considerable alarn anoqgst the snail vhite populatian of 
Vatal, and Many eolonists began to build laagers or to trek froa 
the renoter districts in the face of Aat vas regarded as in­
evitable and ianinent rebellion. When, on the 8th February, two 
police officers vers killed by a group of Africans amed vith 
assegais, the vorst suspicions of the Elites vere confirmed.
The folloving day Martial Lav vas declared throughout the oolony 
end the M ilitia called out.
Tor alaost tvo Months after the declaration of Martial Lav, 
folloving the reports of Magistrates, spies or neighbouring settlers,
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that a particular chief or triba was "rebellious", armed foroes 
marched through their locaticne, burning crops and kraals and 
oonfisoating cattle* After summary tria ls  by Courts Martial, 
chiefs vere fined, their tribes divided up, , and in some mses 
deposed* Apart from their opposition to the tax, and a generally 
fe lt  but unorganised feeling of antipathy to the Hatal government, 
i t  is  d ifficu lt  to knov exactly what 'rebelliousness9 meant at 
this stage* The fir s t  overt African resistance to the a ctiv ities 
o f the troops came on the 3rd April,from one of the deposed 
ch iefs, in the Oreytown d is tr ic t , a considerable distanoe away 
from that in vhioh the in it ia l episode had occurred*
The importance o f the nature of communications between 
groups, the different way in which events were perceived by 
black and idiite and the role o f rumour in this sequence o f events 
cannot be overstresaed* Rumours mid continued reports o f 're ­
belliousness1 amozg the Afrioans vere amongst the chief Ju stifi­
cations o f the Hatal government fo r  the declaration o f Martial 
Lav over the entire oolony) once Martial Lav was declared, the 
way in vhioh the M ilitia  and government obtained its  information 
continued to be o f overriding importance* Constant mutual sus­
picions aad antagonism vere a feature of Hatal society even in 
times o f peace* Vith the declaration of Martial l«w they vere 
given nev scope and significance*
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Within each community news and opinions war* trananittad 
alone oertain regular channels. By 1906, roads and railways 
had linked most of the centres of till ts population, although 
the railroad had not yet penetrated to the aoently annexed 
Northern Prorinoes or to the isolated European Missionaries, 
traders and o ffie ia ls  in Zululand. English-speaking Natalians 
had a fa ir  range of newspapers to choose froa, though their 
opinions represented a oontinaua o f opinion rather than a spectrum, 
especially on ' native a ffa irs1. Thus despite the isolation  of 
many o f the European farmers, they could get news and information 
from the newspapers, letters and books. There vere in addition 
a couple o f newspapers in Dutch. The tightly-knit nature of 
vhite Natal, the free mingling o^ o ffic ia ls  and settlers, of 
farmers, shopkeepers and artisans led to a high degree o f uni­
formity and conformity of opinions on most issues, and to stereo­
types being formed o f the other racial groups. During the disturb­
ances, when whites fe lt  i t  more necessary than usual to present 
a 'united fron t1 both to the non-vhites o f Natal and to the out­
side vorld, tills conformity vas area more marked. A fter an attempt 
by the Natal government to impose press and telegram censorship
had been discouraged by the Colonial O ffice,^  the newspapers
very w illingly inposed a voluntary censorship on themselves.
As the editor of the Fatal Witness wrote to the Prime M inister's
Secretary: " . . .  I am only too anxious to odiolde in every
respect vith his /th e  I tine M inister's/ wishes and to see A at
matter vas / s i c /  l«* t out of the paper vith which the authorities
2sight not have been pleased.”
Amongst A s Africans, in precolonial tines, orders and 
commands from the Zulu kings had been very rapidly relayed by 
specially trained and swift messengers. In addition, as befitted 
a m ilitary regime, Aere were spies in most parts of the country,
A c "eyes and ears” o f A e  King.^ The penalty fo r  transmitting 
fa lse  information vas high. At A e turncf A e century, i t  Is 
d ea r A at each ch ief s t i l l  had his messengers vho oould trans­
mit orders to his followers through A e ir  kraal- or family heads, 
or whom he could send to neighbouring chiefs vith or fo r  in­
formation.* There is  plenty o f evldenoe of cross-country oossuni-
XC0 179/ 233/ 3435# ««v. to Sec. S t., 16.2.06. Od 2908, p. 13-14.
2PMC 101/288, 9.4.06. See also Editor, Matal Mercury, to F.M., 
2 1 .5 .0 .6 ., ib id .
~*M. Oluokman, "The Kingdom of Zulus of Sou A  Africa” in H. Fortes and 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African P olitica l Systems (Oxford, 1940), 
pp. 38 and 42.
*Stuart, Z.R .. p .75.
cation in tha yearn before the dleturbaaoee -  evidence which me 
prone to rouse fear and anxiety amongst the ih ites. Amongst the 
Africans news s t i l l  travelled remarkably sw iftly. Thus during 
the disturbances the stum  o f tribesmen on the order of their 
ch iefs, not only from Durban and Pietermarltsbarg, but even froa 
the Hand, occurred especially in th last phase of the disturbances 
in the Kapumulo-Lower Tugela area.1 In this oase, migrant workers 
who carried nevs to and from the African areas may veil have been 
responsible.
As in precolonial times, at the turn of the century, most
o f the important chiefs had contracted a large number of maxri^es
o f diplomatic significance. Dinnsulu for example vas related to
every ch ief o f importance in Zululand, though he only had one or
2tvo Hatal wives. I t  is clsar that theae marriages had a p o li­
tica l purpose mid that messages could be transmitted through the 
family network, end that family occasions -  wedding fesate, 
mourning parties -  could be used fo r  p o litica l eastings. Euro­
peans generally interpreted these p o litica l purposes as anti- 
white, though in most cases they vere probably part of the working 
out o f tribal p o litic s .
1SHA 1/ i / 367 Eept. Chisf Magistrate P. Haas (Durban), 19*1*07
2ZA 28, O.K.A. tOSH.A., 5.2.07.
In addition to tha personal messenger system, lay the turn
of the century there vas also an increasing class of litera te
Africans, largely the product o f the mission stations.1 Dinoaulu
vho had himself leaxnt to read and write daring his years o f
exile in St. Helena, employed a secretary from the time o f his
succession in 1884 until his arrest in 1907, and vas in receipt
2o f a large number o f written communications. Literacy also 
meant that a fa ir number of Africans could read the colonial 
newspapers, mid s la te  what they had read to their illite ra te  
fellow s. Several attempts had been made at starting up a Zulu 
newspaper,** and by 1906, the Hew. John Dube's Ilanaa lase Hatal. 
founded in  1903 and published in Zulu aad Aaglish, provided a 
useful forum for African news aad views.
Communications between black and white were less straight­
forward. While a small number o f the colonists spoke Zulu end a 
small number of Africans spoke English, i t  is  probable that their 
degree of competence hindered rather than aided understanding.
Quite apart from language d ifficu ltie s  however, communication 
between the two groups was between superior and in ferior, whether
^See above, Chapter I , -^ °
oSee below. Chapter Til, p.'A^/t, 55
3The fir s t  newspaper in Zulu seems to have been started by the A.Z.H. 
in 1866, and possibly earlier. It  vas called Ikwesi and obtained 
an annual grant from the government. See William Taylor, Christian 
Adr«ntttr»» la Sooth A m o». London, 1867, p .467.
i t  was Jooksd upon aa between father and child or aaatcr and 
servant, in either case i t  tended to be a one-way eomminl cation.
If this relationship were not accepted by the Afrloan he vaa re­
garded ai best as 'cheeky' or 'in so len t', at worst as a 'dangerous 
aedition-monger' • To sons extant, this attituds vaa reflsotsd 
by A s 1903-5 Sou A  African Native Affaire Coaaission, where 
interviews with chiefs A o accepted A e paternalist framework 
end their status vithin i t  proceeded far more courteously than 
interviews v iA  Christian Africans A o had a claim to sqpality 
which the Connie s i oners oould not oontsaplats.1 In Natal A s 
attituds vas strikingly revealed during the Dinuaulu tr ia l, when 
A e Minister of Justice and Attorney General, T. ?• Carter, re­
torted to a witness, A o waa refuting one o f his allsgatioasi
2"What] Would you dare contradict a white man?”
The extremes to which this attitude vae taken aay hare 
been peculiar to Sou A  Africa and Natal) yet A at Paul Bohannon 
has rsoently called " A e working misunderstanding", A e fact 
that inevitably Africans and Europeans look at a particular problem
^Sss evidence S.A.V.A.C., Y d s. H-Y, passim.
2Th* Trial o f Dinuaulu on charges of high treason at Greytown,
Address o f V. P. Schreiner, p .51.
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through tota lly  different eyes, is  common to a ll colonial
situations.1 In fa ta l, the •Misunderstanding1 vaa exacerbated
by tha extent o f the arbitrary power held by the white group
over the African population. As R. 0. Samuelson, the brother
o f the permanent Tfader-Seoretary fo r  Vatiwe A ffa irs, remarkedt
"One of the greatest mistakes i t  the b e lie f o f the 
Native A ffairs Department that they are fu lly  ac­
quainted with the disposition o f the natives, where­
as they are not* The native. •• beats about the bush 
to find out the real wishes of the authority he 
speaks to, so that he nay please him.”2
For many Africans aad even fo r  ohiefs, i t  seemed far too dangerous 
to voioe their opinions openly, even to the magistrate who was 
the authority meant both to represent the government to them 
and to transmit their views baok to the government* Thus one 
Mvandhla, giving evidence before the fata l fa tlvs A ffairs Com­
mission in 1906, was asked whether Afrioand could mot go to 
tha magiatrata fo r  information on different matters. Ha replied, 
almost with horror, that a man in hia position weald never dare 
do a thing of that sort because "as soon aa ha asked a question,
3he would be arrested". jsven the ohiefe, eoeording to hia, were
1Afrioan Outlines A general Introduction (Penguin African Library,
1966;, pp. 22-4.~
2The Native Question. ( Pietermarltsbura. 1906)(pamphlet).
^N.N.A.C., p .696. See also arid. Ch. Sikumbu, H .I.A .C ., p .789, who 
statsd that "they who were the hereditary ohiefe of the oountry 
wears afraid to apeak" la st they be deposed. Several othar Africans
99 <\
afraid to go to the magistrate on suoh questions as the Poll 
Tax. While Mvandhla* e vievs may v e il hare been exaggerated, 
and the situation differed from magistrate to magistrate, there 
is  l i t t l e  doubt that there vere in ten se  barriers in the vay of 
communication in the oolony. Under the Code o f Native Lav,1* 
vhich regulated most aspects o f African l i f e ,  government in­
structions vere supposed to be transmitted from the Supreme Chief 
through the Secretary o f Natiye Affairs (la ter the Minister) 
and the Under-Secretary o f Native Affairs to the magistrates.
Next in lin e  oaae the ch iefs, then their headmen or induna. 
kraalheads (or heads o f fam ilies) dovn to the individual African 
at the bottom. That anoh could go vrong tvixt the cup and the 
l ip , even i f  a ll the constituent parts in this long chain of communi­
cation vere in harmony, is  obvious. In the dividbd' society 
o f Natal, the chances of neve being distorted in the transmission 
vere high. While in the days of Sir Theophilus Shopstone there had 
been a personal element in native admlnlstraticn, and many African 
chiefs had fe lt  free, at least to a certain extent, to discuss 
their problems vith him, under Responsible Government, there vas
in Ixopo divisions oomplained that they vere afraid they would be 
arrested i f  they spoke openly before the Commission* mad I.N .A.C., 
pp. 804-5#
^ e e  above* 51^1
2?1
l i t t le  p ossib ility  of Africans bypassing any link in ths chain. 
Despite the lim itations o f  the system, the government, 
on its  side, generally derived its  ideas o f i&at vas happening 
in the non-white areas from the reports of the lo ca l magistrate.
The re lia b ility  o f  this source of information was o f the utmost 
importance, fo r  on i t  Government action depended, and, to a con­
siderable extent, taring the disturbances, so did m ilitary action, 
There were undoubtedly some very fine men in the Natal c iv il 
service, md what follows should not be construed as some special 
form o f magisterial wickedness> nevertheless i t  is  also clear 
that, as the Natal Native Affairs Commission remarked, Africans 
regarded the magistrates "not as their friends md protectors, 
but simply as the punishers of vrong-doers md the collectors of
taxes” , 1 Ilanxa lace Natal went mch further, md called them
v
bluntly ”the oppressors of the natives” ,
Natal-Zulul and vas divided in 1906 into forty-one magisterial 
d is tr ic ts , The magistrates, vho had Jurisdictlcn over a ll the 
inhabitants o f their respective d istricts , were appointed by the 
Department of Justloe, whose servants they were. Their actions 
with regard to the African population however were directed md
1Saport, p. 14.
23.7,08. The a rticle  vas m titled  Tonje Amadoda amend1 and 
translated in SNA l/l/40522ZI .
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controlled by the Department of Batlve A ffairs. According to 
the permanent head of the Hative Affairs Department, the 
Under-Seoretary fo r  Hative A ffairs, S. 0. Samuelson, hews 
not consulted as a matter o f routine on their appointment, and 
had no say, even vhen they vere appointed over large native 
areas.^ Many magistrates could not speak: Zulu and vere com­
pletely  dependent on their court headman or lnduna.2 A large 
number of them had no legal training and according to Samuelson their 
appointments vere unjustifiable. There vere not infrequent 
allegations that magistrates got appointed through p o litica l 
favouritism -  not surprisingly in viev of the paucity o f able 
administrators in the colony. Because of the dual nature of 
their functions, the magistrates vere generally overworked and
underpaid, while the Africans got the fag-end of their time and 
%attention. For administrative ab ility  there was a tendency 
to substitute the lash, md to regret the passing of the good
4old hanging days in Zululand.
1BVid., B .I.A .G ., p. 654.
2Ibid. fivid ., J . C. C# Chadwick, p.469.
^Ibid. . and p .32, M d . S. 0. Samuelson*
4Cf fo r  example A 60 1/7/63, R# H. Addison, Magistrate, to ¥• S.
Blgby (Aeet. Proeeeutor in Diunsulu's ease) 3*4.07, in vhioh ha 
regretted the passing of the old days in Zululand, vhen he had 
seen "six  men hanged M ore breakfast in the sight of n lo t  of 
nativesH. R. H. Addison vaa appointed In 1909 one of the four 
Mative Commissioners in Yatal, chosen for  their knowledge of the 
African population under F. 1. Moor's reform o f native administration.
In Zululand there vere fever oomplainta o f the quality of 
magistrates, this vas perhaps because there vere fever vhite 
settlers contending for magisterial attention and subjecting 
him to their pressure, perhaps because o f  the personality of 
the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Zululand from 1897 to 
1909, Sir Charles Saunders, uho vaa a firm but not unsympathetic 
paternalist, in telligent and capable* All the same, dravn as 
they vere froa the settler population, and being part of a
unified Natal-Zululand c iv il service, the difference vas one of
1
degree rather than of kind. In general, the magistrates 
shared fu lly  in the settler stereotypes of Africans and in its  
vievs on most subjects, especially in its  pre-occupation vith 
the questions of land, labour and stock-theft* When the magis­
trates vere asked in B04 fo r  their opinions on the various lavs 
under vhich Africans vere governed, the bulk of their suggestions 
sounded remarkably like those of any Natal Farmers • Congresst 
raising native taxation, increasing the sentences for breaohes 
o f the Masters and Servants Lav, and for stock theft (penalties
lrA t-
vhich the Colonial Offioe had already 0 ailed somevhat "Draconian"
_  2 \by comparison vith those of the Cape ) , introducing flogging for
^In 1898 fo r  example according to the Gov*, Sir Henry Hely-Mutohlnson, 
magistrates considered i t  infra dig to a it on a bench vith ohiefs 
(Under a Procln. o f 1894, Zululand, this had bean a f ir s t  court o f  
appeal)* As a result, the composition o f the Appeal Court vas 
changed. See 00 179/203/10087, Gov. to H.V. Just,Private, 12.3*90.
2C0 179/195/16201, Kiaut* on dMp. 125, Oot. to 3m . S t., 9.7.96.
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several new offences, md farther lim iting the grant of certi­
ficates o f exmption froa Native Lav to educated Africans.1 
The exceptions, men like J. T. Gibson, vho vas magistrate at 
Richmond at the beginning of the disturbances, became unpopular 
vith the Europeans in their d is tr ict, md vere liab le  to be
transferred to less desirable posts by a Government sensitive
mto vhite public opinion. This indeed happened to Gibson for
querying the necessity fo r  the Courts Martial in the early days
xof the disturbances. By and large, the magistrates had neither 
the v i l l  nor the desire to resist loca l opinion.
Both beoeuse they vere overworked and because it  vas 
natural that magistrates should devote more of their attention 
to the dominant white community, the magistratea tended to rely 
on the police , spies or their own court induna fo r  Information 
about the African populatlnn. According to Judge Beaumont of 
Natal, the only o ffic ia ls  really in touch vith the African popu­
lation  vere the police , vho vere, i f  anything, even more un­
sympathetic to the non-white population and out of favour vith
1See e.g . Reports o f Magistrates to sar.A ,, 1/ 1/ 309^ 2. .
S^Ha 1/ 1/ 367^ ^ .  H.porta to 0 .5 .1.A o f I n t .  Ih g l,. H. C. C o in -
brander 2£:i,6y( And Major J* J, Field, 10,1,07 refer to this
p ossib ility ,
5FM J. Haririck (Richmond) to F.H., 2.4.06 and Sort. C as.tt.,
16.5.087 p .576.
them*1 It vas the poliee-spy * both African and European -  
and9 daring tha disturbances sad after, the m ilitary spy or 
* in telligence agent1, vho so often brought alarming rumours to 
the ear o f the magistrate* Ia 1397* Sir Janes Liege Halett, 
then Secretary fo r  Satire Affairs* had instituted a system of 
specially  p aid Africans to report on the various tales of un­
rest vhich vere reaching the government* as he fe lt  that in ­
su fficien t Information vas ooming from the ordinary polioe and 
2magistrates. The Intelligence Agent used daring the disturb­
ances varied from an lik e  Captain James Stuart* vho undoubtedly
had a fine knowledge of Zulu language and oust cm, and vas fa ir ly
3 Adisinterested* to loca l traders in Zululand* whose objectivity*
disinterestedness and knowledge are open to considerable doubt.
The M ilitia  Intelligence which originated during the disturbances*
vaa put on a firm basis at the mid of 1906* end became a regular
5naans o f obtaining information.
'"SKA 1/ 1/ 3895! ,  Kin. Ataln. Beaumont to P.K., 28.8.07. 3m also 
H.H.A.C. Report, p .14* Evid. Archdeacon Johnson* p.89#
M, S. Evans. Motive Policy ia fa ta l. (Pietemaxitsburg 1906)* pp. 24-5» 
aad M.H.A.C.* Evid.* pp. 31-2.
2SHA 1/ 4/4 c|7, S .I.A . Sir Liogo H ol.tt to Col. Soo. Katal.
See above, Iritoo^ vAc_‘Vior\ ^
*liko V. Calverloy and E. Tittloetad.
5M llltia  Circular Lottor no. 13, 31.12,06 in SKA l/ i/ ll
Even the police-spy system was regarded as dangerous by 
some magistrates, who, after 1894» were no longer In charge of 
the p o lice , and resented "••• men prowling through their dis­
tr ic ts  in search o f information on some subject about which they 
hare been told nothing".* This remoral of the supervision of 
the police from the magistrates, while probably neoessary with 
the increasing complexity of administration, was the cause of 
much dissatisfaction amongst magistrates, from the Commissioner 
o f Native A ffairs in Zululand downwards.2 The m ilitia  spy 
system was probably even more questionable as a means o f obtain­
ing accurate information. In 1908, sir Matthew Nathan was to 
remark after a particularly flagrant case in which a spy had 
deliberately tried to bait a prominent chief into seditious 
utteranoes t
"I hare no doubt that i f  j/the views of7 these fishers 
in muddy waters are acted upon, i t  w ill not be long 
before we have trouble in the country again* "3
While this view was hotly contested by ministers, there seems to 
be considerable substance to it* Part o f the d ifficu lty  in know­
ing exactly what was going on amongst the African population in 
this period is  that so much of what wae reported was l it t le  more
*ZA Conf* J* X* Gibson to C*N,A*
2• >©e ISvid, C, Saunders, N,N*A*C*, p*130* Also Evid* p, 686,
J.C.C.Chadwick, Judge, Native High Court,
5WC 105^, Kinut, to P.H., 27.2.08.
than unsifted rumour or id le beer-drink gossip. The situation
vas further complicated by the sot unnatural desire of the
African info nan t to give magistrates information which either
suited his own particular interests, Aether tribal or personal,1
or, as has already been mentioned, information which he thought
vould accord vith the magistrate's own views md predilection.
It is  probably in this way that one can account fo r  the tota lly
different md incompatible pictures which were frequently held of
the same chief by magistrates in neighbouring d ivisions. One would
report that a particular chief vas Insolent and seditious, mother
2that he vas helpful and friendly. An area reported by one man 
to be seething vith rebellion, vould Is reported by another quiet 
and peaceful. The significance of this during the disturbances 
once troops vere actually operating on the basis of information 
received in this vay hardly needs stressing.
The oharacter o f the magistrates vaa of particular im­
portance as the pezmanent head of the Native A ffairs Department,
S. 0. Samuel son, vas not the kind o f man to introduce any kind of 
rigour into hia department. Reports vex* therefore forvarded by 
magistrates which often had no further basis than the prejudices
an elaboration of this theme see below, Chapter TI.
^See below, p.3\^
and preconceptions, even the fantasies, o f  the particular 
magistrate in charge, Samuelson, the son o f a Norwegian 
missionary,1 had an excellent knowledge of the Zulu language 
and a considerable, i f  somewhat biassed, understanding of 
African Quaternary lav. He appears to have been a rather 
char&oterless individual, however, vith fey, i f  any original 
thoughts. There vas a sim ilarity, extending even to phraseology,
between his thought and that o f the 1852-3 Natal Native A ffairs
2 ,  _  _Commission, while in 1908 the Christian Express was to oause
something o f a sensation by publishing next to h is testimony 
before the Natal Native A ffairs Commission of $06-7, the exaot 
sou roes from which it  had been derived, sen ten oe by sen ten oe, 
i f  not word for word. The article  vas entitled "The Deadly 
Parallel",* Samuel son in turn created something o f a s t ir  by 
publishing his anewer to the Natal Native A ffairs Commission Re­
port in the Natal Government Gasette, also at the beginning of 
1908, This step vas hardly calculated to increase the oenfidanoe 
o f those who saw the implementation o f the Commission report 
as the only hope for a reform of Natal native administration and
^S. K, Samuelson, one of the f ir s t  Anglican missionaries to enter 
Zululand, in 1861, He founded the mission state of St, Paul's, 
Another o f hie sons, H,C, A, Sam el son, gained renown In the tr ia ls  
of ,;Eiaurilteiboth in 1WS-9 and in 1908-9 (see below), A daughter, 
L, H, Samuelson published a couple o f books on Zulu customs and 
fo lk lore,
2See above,pp. SS-3& md below, p.
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i t  led to Sir Hatthew Nathan's expressing strong doubts ss to 
the soundness o f Samuelson* s judgment. 1 By April 1908 he
vent so far as to vrlte to Roderick J ones "I have absolutely
2no b elie f in Samuelson. Nathan's predecessor as Governor,
Sir Henry MoC&llum had already expressed his doubts on the sub­
ject.^
le t  Samuelson was in charge of Native A ffairs in Natal 
from 189? to 1908. Not surprisingly he sav his ovn function 
as simply to oarry out the different policies of the various
Ap o litica l heads of his department. As a result he was known
to many Africans as Yumasonke -one who agrees to a ll -  and
Kdambill -  Mr. faoing-boto-waya. In so far as he can be said
to have had a philosophy o f his ovn, i t  consisted in "separate
development"9 "progress along parallel lines" and greatly in -
6creased powers, fo r  the Supreme Chief and his subordinates.
Nathan MSS 368, Hathan to S«lbOT?n<* 21.1.08.
Sathan MSS 368, p. 88, 8.4.08. Jones was Reuter's correspondent 
in South Africa.
^Nathan KSS 401 f p .234. Paper marked "Native Affairs Confidential" 
a.A# and unsigned, but i t  appears almost certainly to be a memorandum 
from HcCallum to hia successor.
*SMA lA /3 9 5 ^ ^  , Minute Samuelson.
’’ aBM H l /1/ 3, p .522, J . D. Taylor to Sr. Strong, 1.5.07 and S. A. 
Maaviok, "« jy  th . Satire. Rebelled", I , M.<1 . 20.9.06.
Svid. U.S.A.O., p .644 f f .
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He believed that the only nay o f ensuring control over the 
African population vaa by securing their "unswerving and in p lic it 
obedience to constituted mithority" .* fo r  the Uhder-Seeretary, 
there sere only three ways of governing South Africa s government 
by one white section, by both vhite sections ( i .e .  English- and 
Dutch-speaking) or by the black scotion o f the community. The 
fourth p ossib ility  o f government by both the white and black 
sections of the populationv even on the modest and lim ited scale 
atteapted by the Cape, was not considered even fo r  the remote 
future. ^  When the 1906-7 Natal Native Affaire Commission sug­
gested that regular meetings be held between magistrates aid 
chiefs or headman. In order to improve the obvious lack of com­
munication between the administrators and their subjects, Samuel- 
son objected moat strenuously, fie feared suoh meetings would 
lead to complaints against the farmers mid o ffic ia ls , and that 
in order to satisfy  the ooaplainte, the country would have to be 
handed over to the Zulu, so that "the keynote to Bthiopianism, 
•Africa fo r  the Africans1, nay be realised even sooner than the 
natives would lik e  to do so«”^
^Minute U.S.N.A. to M.N.A. (n.d. )  found amongst Marshall Campbell's 
Papers headed la tive A ffairs Commission (K.C.L.)
20ovt. notlee no. 39^/21 sc Jan. 1908. See above.
3m a .
In these views, Samuelson did not d iffer  greatly from 
hia p o litica l masters, who were even lees likely  to exert the 
necessary control over the magistrates. Most o f them combined 
the portfolio  o f Hina tee af Native Affairs with another, sad 
had neither the time nor the inclination to intervene on behalf 
of the Africans. The dangers of the situation were, however, 
highlighted in 1910 when Natal had become part of the Union o f  
South Africa, and an 'outsider9 had a look at the way in whloh 
she conducted her a ffa irs. In that year the magistrate of 
Nkandla division fined Chief Siswaaa of the Biyela tribe for 
not reporting oertain rumours to him. Ee further recommended 
the ch ie f's  deposition and his removal from the d istrict for 
"general unreliability" and for "sitting on the fence" during 
the 1906 disturbances. His reoommendatlons vere supported with­
out further question by the Acting Under Secretary for Native 
Affairs in Natal, until the la tter  vas specifica lly  instructed 
to enquire into the matter by the Union Kin is ter of Native A ffairs, 
Henry Burton,1 As a result of this enquiry, the Natal Under­
secretary withdrew hia support for the magistrate, finding that 
since the la tter 'a  assumption of o ffice  in the Nkandla division, 
Siswana had done nothing to warrant the proposed act! cm against
1/4/22 Minutes.
him. In view of what has bssn said aa to ths importance o f tha 
magistrate as government informant on native a ffa irs, and what 
w ill ba discussed below on th# eubjeot of rumour,1 Burton's 
further comment on this episode is  of considerable interest.
While noting the Under-Secretary' e reversal of opinion, hs con­
tinued:
" ...th e  Minister cannot allow so serious a dis­
closure to pass without observing that i t  is a 
Matter of grave concern and no l i t t le  disquietude 
that a looal responsible o ffice r , should, by 
making . . .  'a  mountain out of a molehill' mislead 
the Government es to the state of feeling amongst 
the Natives, and persist in urging a course of 
action which had i t  been pursued would have involved 
the Department in a deeper travesty of justice than 
i t  would appear had already taken place.
It  is  to be deplored that the Magistrate took 
serious heed of a rumour without sifting  i t ,  with­
out making sure of his grounds for importing i t  and 
without apparently taking such steps as would have 
been reasonable to make the truth known aid dispel 
any possible alarm. He did wrong in representing idle 
talk to the government in the light o f faota o f grave 
concern.••"2
£he pathetically small white population o f Natal was prone 
to see sedition in the merest whisper of oritioism from the 
African population. There ia , i t  would seem, a natural tendency
^For speculations as to the sources of this kind of "information" 
see below, Chapter Yl, p. where similar allegations against 
other 'lo y a l' chiefs are discussed in a different ecntext.
2SNA 1/4/22 0 ^ , Acting S.N.A. (TJhion) to Acting G.S.N.A. Natal,
24.12.10.
o f the vh ite  settler to become authoritarian « d  despotic im
his relationship vith conquered colonial people. This can he
seen very d ea rly  in N atd. The psychological security of the
vhite community depended upon the unquestioning acceptance of
their superiority by the Africans. Any questioner -  black or
white -  was considered as an extreme threat. &• C. Saaxuelson,
for example, vho vas one of Dlnusulu's defence team, complained
bitterly  afterwards that his participation in the Chief's defenoe
completely xuined his lav practice, and that he vas socia lly
and professlondly ostracised by the oommunity.1 The animus
shown agdist Harrietts Colenso, xhe Chief's foremost defender,
vas even fiercer , though this may veil have been related to her
2own passionate and partisan nature.
This reaction to criticism  vas also embodied in the ex­
treme sensitivity vhich vas fe lt  towards lawyers appearing in 
African lav-suits. O fficials justified  their rduotanoe to dLlov 
lawyers from appearing in African oases on the grounds that 
lawyers vere unknown in African customary lav, and that many 
second-rate lawyers made a living by fleecing their gullible 
African d ien tele .^  Nevertheless, while these reasons vere partly
^Col. Col. 202, Correspondence R. C. Samuelson to H. E. Coleaaon,
29.7.10.
2See my "Harrietts Colenso and the Zulus 1874-1913", J.A.H.. Tol.IV: ,
1963, no. 3, pp. 405 and 411.
^See e .g . N.N.A.C. Evidence, p .10, S. 0. Samudson. Also SNA l/l/3 0 9  
■Si Suggested dterations by magistrates o f various mat ire lavs 8.3.04.
true, behind them appears to l ie  a dislike of any questioning 
of the authority of the magistrate, even where his actions vere 
disapproved of the higher vhite authorities. Thus in 1904, 
when the magistrate J. V. Cross vas under f ir e  from the govern­
ment fo r  a tactless speech, the Governor, Sir Henry KoCallum 
expressed the hope that th# Colonial Office would not make 
their disapproval known as it
"would affect his prestige amongst the natives 
o f the Colony. You w ill recognise . . .  how im­
portant i t  ia in the interests of lav and order 
among the natives that the authority of the 
magistrate be upheld as far as possible. h1
For the same reason, many magistrates opposed appeals from
magisterial decisions in native cases to the Native High Court
or the Supreme Court o f the colony.
Under these circumstances, i t  is  perhaps not surprising
that fear of an African uprising in Natal vas "strong, enduring
and, at times, almost pathologioal", from the very beginning of
2its  oolonlal history. Rumours that the Africans vere about 
to rise vere accelerated and aggravated at times of particular 
stress. Droughts, depressions, erises In neighbouring states "
1C0 179/229/19920, Gov. to S«o. S t., Coaf. 2, 2 .5.0.4.
2Srook.e and W.bb, A History o f  Satal. p .114.
of whites by blacks. Innumerable warnings to this effect appear
in the f ile s  o f the Secretary for Native Affairs,
How the perennial reports of a native uprising -  which one
1experienced magistrated called an annual hysteria** -  were
spread, was suggested by the Acting Assistant Magistrate of the
City (Pietermaritaburg) division, when he stated in his Annual
Report for 1905 that they were
"simply * engineered' by interested parties who had 
some u lterior objeot in view, such as the removal 
o f the restriction on the possession of firearms 
by a section of the community (a reference to the 
disarmament of the Boers during and after the Anglo- 
Boer War) or the establishment of a policy camp in 
the d istrict or a garrison of troops or m ilitia  
may be thought to be good for the trade of a d istrict .
The interested party sets the ball rolling by a sen­
sational letter or two to the papers on some real 
or imaginary action by some chief or natives which 
he ingeniously makes out to be an indication o f un­
rest, • • He talks of the matter in confidence to 
some nervous o ffie ia l or other person9 hinting 
that he knows a good deal more them he cares to 
te ll  ••• These nervous people make enquiries from 
the natives and write to the papers and babble on 
about i t  generally before children and other thought­
less people who in their turn question the natives 
and so on until the natives themselves get alarmed 
as they know of no cause on their part for i t  and 
talk about i t  among themselves. Someone hears them 
discussing the question and immediately comes to 
the oonolusion that they are going to r ise , and tails 
his friends and probably writes a letter to the papers 
and so i t  goes on and the natives themselves begin 
to wonder ••• whether i t  may not be the ldiite people
a ll these produced their crop of rumours of an Intended massacre
S^MA 1/4/14 0£~ , Kinute K. Mathews Dund„, 6.12.05.
vho are going to rise and turn than out . • • • The 
educated natives reed the letters in the paper and 
probably only half understand them and put their 
own const ruction on then and give them to their 
unlettered brethren, and thus the mystery grows 
deeper and deeper and suspicion of each other's . 
intentions is  engendered between black end ldiite,"
The above quotation has been given at length, because it  is such
a good analysis of the way in which rumour can snowball from
& mere t r i f le .  It is  however an oversimplification to see rumour
as always 1 engineered' by interested parties. There were, i t  is
true, specific incidents to which the Assistant Magistrate warn
alluding in the above extract, and one can sometimes trace a rumour
to one individual. Thus in 1903 for example when the entire Oreytown
district was shaken by a tale that the Africans were about to rise ,
i t  was a ll apparently started by one man who had just returned from
Bhodesia, where he had participated in quelling the rebellions of
21896-6. Similarly during the actual disturbances, the entire 
Kelmoth and fiehowe districts suddenly became panic-stricken over 
a report ttat a ll Africans were going to jo in  the rebels on or 
before the next fu ll moon. According to the Commissioner for 
Mative Affairs, i t  was sparked o f f  by Col. Wools-Sampson, a man
Fairer, Report for Annual Blue Book, 1905 (unpublished) in 
SHA 1/1/554.
2SMA 1 / 4 / 1 2  Qry*$ v. R. Wilson to i t .  Col. Lugg, Ratal Mounted R ifles 
27.7.03 and xo 0. Plowman, 13.8.03, and SHA A Baxnwter to
Chief Commissioner of Police, Greytown, 3*8.03. 03
in high military command in Natal at the time, who had a parti­
cularly fevered imagination on this subject.1 In neither of 
these two instances however were the individuals doing more 
than giving expression to their own inner fears and fantasies.
The significance of the rumours aroused by Woolls-Sampson 
however can be gauged from Sir Charles Saunders' remarks on this 
alarum in Zululand that as a result as far as he oould gauge the 
situation at the time, "we are far more in danger of such a 
rising being initiated by ourselves than our supposed
enemies."2
Before the Boer War, the magistrate of Nkandla was to
write to the Resident Commissioner in Zululand that there was
considerable agitation among the Boers of 1he d istricts bordering
Zululand who talked of an imminent African uprising and feared
x
that they were a ll going to be massacred on Christmas day. In 
accordance with this belief several Boers were trekking from 
Biggarsberg to the Orange Free State. This vas a time of great 
tension between Briton and Boer in South Africa, and, in addition, 
the farmers of the Zulu border lands were eager to acquire even
Z^A 28, P$ers re Zulu Rebellion, C^ JT.A. to R. H. Addison, 16.6.06.
2Cd 3027, p .79. End. 7 in desp. 114, no. 4, C.N.A. to P.M., 7.6.06.
^The frequency of Christmas £3 the cr itica l day is  partly accounted 
for by its  being in the middle of the very hot aatal summer, and 
of the Zulu planting season which is generally a lean period fo r  the 
African population.
■ore Zulu lend, so that the magistrate's remark that he would 
"be disposed to think that there is a conspiracy among the 
Boers to bring about some d ifficu lty  between the British Govern­
ment and the Hative population" was certainly plausible. He 
added however a remark that goes to the heart of the ambiguity 
of a ll these rumours -  "The thing that puzzles me is the apparent 
evidence that they believe in what they profess to fear",*
A frontier society and a divided society is  always sub­
ject to rumours, and Natal was s t i l l  in some ways a frontier
society. Nowhere else in South Africa were Hacks and whites so
2closely intermingled and yet so apart. Surrounded on a ll
sides by the large African populations of Zululand, Swaziland, 
Basutoland and the Eastern Cape, within the oolony Itse lf the 
location system set up a further series of frontiers between 
white and black. These densely populated areas, physically border­
ing on the areas of white settlement, were yet terra incognita 
to the majority of the white settlers. The fact that many locations 
were " natural strongholds? from which it  was believed that Zulu 
armies "could sweep the country in a single night and return with 
their plunder" was as much a source of anxiety and suspicion in
*ZA 51 Conf. Minute J. I ,  Gibson to Res. Magis., Zululand,
14.12.96. y
<5 __
C.tf. de Kiewiet, The Imperial factor in S. S vica (1st. ed. 1957# 
C.U.P.), p. 188. Written o f the late ISTO's this statement was i f  n y -
thing even truer of the situation at the turn o f the century.
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1900 as i t  was in the 1850's.1
Moreover while in the early days, the separate administration 
of Africans and Europeans under different codes of law was a 
practical and administrative necessity, the Natalians made a 
virtue out of necessity; as a result}the system lost that flex i­
b ility  intended by the provision of terms whereby 'c iv ilis e d 1
2Africans could be exempted from the operation of native law. 
Believing they had the best form of native administration in 
South Africa, the Natalians failed to realise that whatever the 
advantages of their method, this separate social and legal frame­
work both perpetuated the existing barriers between the two groups 
and in many ways contributed to the tensions between them. It 
obscured the fact that Africans were no longer only governed 
under customary law, but also under a host of leg islative enact­
ments passed in the interests of the white electorate. Land oould 
no longer be distributed freely by chiefs, aid the traditional 
bases of their powers had been to some extent upset. Demands 
fo r  African labour and taxation had no parallels in tribal l i f e ,  
and with the grant of Responsible Government to Natal, the belief
XSNA Memo, on native affairs by S. 0. Samuels on to
Commandant ^of M ilitia , 1903* The words used are identical 
to those in the 1852-3 Native Affairs Commission, p. 17*
See above, Chapter I , p.2
that the colony vaa governing the African population according 
to their ovn beliefs and oust aaa became even aore of a f  lotion.
Thia myth of 'parallel development1 also obscured the fundamental 
faot that by the turn of the century both Africans and Europeans 
vere subject to the seme economic vicissitudes. Despite outvard 
appearances, the tvo oommunitles vere interdependent, and economic­
ally  and even culturally could not fa il to influence one another* 
Amongst the better informed in Natal, there vaa, in general, 
a greater understanding o f African tribal l i f e  and less of a ten­
dency to condemn it  out of hand than say ii the Cape.1 J. V.
2Shepatone, brother of Sir Theophilus, vas to go ao far as to 
remark to the South African Native Affairs Commission, that he 
thought the tribal ay a tern "veil-night perfect". On the other 
hand, by constantly thinking in terms of the group, rather than 
the individual, and by failing to come to terms vith the problems 
o f transition and change, the Natal 'aystern' vas exceptionally 
favourable to the formation of stereotypes and race prejudices. 
Across the barriers, each group's notion of the other became hasy 
and suspicious.
*Cf. for example J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, or 
the writings of M, S. Bvans on this point.
^H. was S.N.A. in Natal 1875-1884.
“V ol. H I, p .115. S .. also S.A.N.A.C., Vol. I l l  pasaia, I .L .A . 
Debates (e  ^ . Vol. I l l ,  p .68, where the Kin. for Agriculture in 
1903 congratulated the colony on our "a ll but, i f  not quite, 
fclamelees” native policy).
As Gordon Allport has pointed outf ethnic rumour is a 
highly sensitive barometer of group tension; he goes so far 
as to state i t  as a sociological lav  that "no riot or lynching 
occurs without its  accompaniment of rumour " The prevalence 
therefore of these rumours amongst both sections of the community 
in Natal, is an indication of the underlying distrust md the 
apprehension fe lt  by each as to the intentions of the other*
For some members of both the black and vhite communities, pro­
phecies of a native uprising may have been an expression of 
wishful thinking, for others the projection of their own h ostility , 
and yet to others a reflection of their deepest md most genuine 
fears*2
With the attempts by Imperial governments to impose their 
authority on colonial territories in a real sense for the f ir s t  
time, the turn of the century had seen a spate o f colonial re­
bellions and vars in many parts of Africa; the upheavals in Uganda 
in 1897, the Ashanti War, the Mahdist Revolt in the Sudan, the Sierra 
Leone Hut Tax rebellions, and, closer home, the Shona-Ndebele re­
bellions and the campaigns waged by theGermans in Aast Afrioa in
*G. V. Allport, The Nature of Pre.ludioe (N.Y. , 1958), pp* 61-5.
See also G. W. Allport and L. Portman, The Psychology of Humour 
(K.T., 1947).
2
See 0* Haimoni, Prospero and Caliban. (N.T., 1964) transl* P. 
Powesland* J* Lollard, L. W* Loob, N. E. Millar, 0. H* Kovrer 
and R. R. Sears, Frustration and Aggression (Yale Uhiversity Press 
Paperback edition, 1961. 1st publ. 1959). G* W* Allport, The Mature
sgJBBfldttat*
the 90»s and in South Vest Africa in the next decade.^" Though 
the causes of a ll these events differed widely, both between 
themselves and from the situation in Natal, voices were not 
wanting to point out that what had happened elsewhere in Africa, 
to say nothing of the United States, would shortly happen in 
Natal. The Natal colonists were outnumbered by non-whites in 
the ratio o f 1:10, a fact brought home by the 1904 census, the 
f ir s t  complete count of the non-white population to be held. De­
termined to maintain their position and privileges as the ruling
raoe at any cost and against any odds, they constantly fe lt
2themselves threatened.
While there were many rumours even before the Boer War, and
especially during the d ifficu lt  years of agricultural diaster
which, p laced  the country just before its  outbreak, this feeling
of insecurity was certainly increased in large measure by the war
it s e l f .  'Whites a ll over South Afrioa feared that the spectacle
of white men fighting one another could m>t but encourage African 
4.insurrection. In Natal in august, 1902, the Governor implored 
the Imperial government to leave garrisons at Pietermaritzburg
*According to Sir Henry KcCallum, the failure of the Germans to 
put down the uprising in Damaraland ( i .e .  amongst the Herero 
in S.V.A.) was a major cause of the disturbances in Natal, Gov. to 
sec. S t . , 21.6•06, Cel• 32471 no.1.
^Report N.N.A.C., 1906-7, p#10.
abor., Chapter XII.
4,0f. 0. Swute'a Letter to I .  T. Stead, 4 .1.02, no. 169, y o I .  I ,
am ia Papers ad. J.van der Poel ^  k. Hanoook (C .I.P .), pp. 483
and Newcastle to daf end the colony against a Zulu rising fo r  i t  
vas said "that the war has brought the inevitable conf H ot 
betveen the black and shite raoes nearer by twenty years.•#."1 
This fear of the dire effects of "white men's wars' upon the 'native 
mind" is  a recurrent theme in colonial Africa. While such fears 
may be exaggerated, there can be l i t t le  doubt that European ware 
do hare their repercussions on sub j  sot peoples, although perhaps 
for different reasons than those generally believed fey whites# 
According to Hdabanlngl Si thole, the fact that during World War 
II Africans saw "the so-called civ ilised  and peaceful and orderly 
vhite people mercilessly butchering one another, Just as hia so-
called savage ancestors had dons ••• had a revolutionising pay-
2chological impact##." Professor Shepparson has recorded the
similar impact mads by World War I , especially on those Africans
3actually involved In i t .  But ^ lile  these wars have undoubtedly 
encouraged Africans to look afresh at European pretensions aad 
assumptions of superiority (as indeed in many oases they have 
led Europeans so to do) and have led to an awakening o f African
Wo 179/223/36293, Oot. to Sec. S t., 6.8.02, no. 213.
2
African Nationalism (Cape Town, 1959), p .17*
^"External Factors in the Creation of African Nationalian, with 
particular reference to British Central Africa",pp. 317-332, in 
Historians In Tropical Africa. Proceedings of the Leverhulme 
Inter-Collegiate History Conference held at U.C. Rhodesia, I960,
publ. 1962.
nationalism la na&y areas, It vaa not siapljr the fighting, 
nor Indeed "the ffcaillar way in which the natives vere treated 
by the soldier* • •• /vhioj^ engendered feelings of contempt* •*
/jmjff lessened /tho airopeanj^ la the eyes of the natives***
In bath World Wars, allied propaganda vaa directed ga in st 
dictatorship sad towards spreading the ideals of uuruooxa#y 
aad equity* This la I ts e lf  mm an Important message to colonial 
people, for many of whoa the dlstinotioa between paternalism md 
tyranny oust hare been fine* And British propaganda during ths 
Boar ar was not disaiailar to that ia ths *orld Wars* Aaong 
ths ostensible reasons for ths outh African war, vas ths daslss 
to free the oppressed Ultlaaders froa Krugerfs 1 tyranny1 sad te 
aaellorate the condition of his non-white subject®* Africans 
can hardly be blamed for taking this propaganda seriously, 
though in sons areas i t  apparently lad to a b e lie f that the 
Africans would be able to taka over ths position sad prop arty o f 
the defeated Boers* Tho acre sophisticated however noted the 
paradox between ths declared alas o f the British fc the Transvaal
*3ir Charles Saunders, C.I.A* Bulslsnd, to JT. Stuart, 5*12*06, Stuart
Paper*, (&,v*Lj
p
Le# e*g£&* ~* La Bay, iari-Uhk ^  »*uth >frtan 1B99-1WT*
p .54 siting Lord Salisbury's atatssent of war alms, 4th Pari Deb*
Ixn riii 257.
oe Heraannsbyit " The Lot o f Blacks a fter ths war ia  t*i»
U.K.*. Xaieer-Hsbron, 20*9*04*
and the practice of the British colonists of Natal5* as a corres­
pondent to Ilanga lase Natal wrote, when commenting on the d ictatoria l,
and, to his mind, biassed administration of the lav by the Assistant
2Magistrate at Umzinto, 5*. E. Foxon^
"If he is competent, oust we understand that he 
allows himself to be so carried away by bitter 
feelings against & native . . . .  that he forgets 
what is  expected of him? . . .  His very action . . .  
would have been heldpip by the same people ( i .e .  
the Natal colonists who applaud his severe sen­
tences) as one o f the main reasons why Kruger's 
government should have come to an end, had this 
been done in the Transvaal. "3
Nor did Africans fa i l  to point out the very different handling
they received froa the Imperial Government once the war vas over
v
as compared vith the treatment meted out to the Boers, who had
Aactually fought against the British.
As a result of the white fears as to the way that the Boer 
War would undermine the prestige of the white man, i t  was con­
stantly Natal's polioy to maintain that i t  vas solely a 'Vhite 
man's war' and to advise the African population not to partici­
pate in i t ,  despite at times very considerable provooation. Much
\
\
\
^See e.g. Ipepa lo Hlanga. 14.12.00., transl. in SNA 1 / 4 /8
^F. E. Foxon.: magistrate of Umzinto from 1897. In 1903 he had 102 out 
of 13 3  sentences on participants in a faction fight reversed by the 
Native High Court. (Minute, Prosecutor N.H. Court to Attorney General 
17*6.03 re faction fight in  Alexandra County, £HA V l/302223. .)  In 
1904 he was apparently responsible for sentencing a 10 yea9^ old child 
to 2 years Hard Labour and 15 lashes for stealing a goat (Natal Witness
indignation vaa aroused in tha oolony by Colonel Bottoaley* e 
use o f the Zulu aa aoouta and to raid the Traasvaal-Zululand 
borders in the Dhleke expedition. It vaa fa it  that the "methods 
o f native warfare are barharoua at a ll times" and that it  vaa 
inpoaalble "to restrain natives and keep them under control, 
even i f  offioered by whites".1 It ia interesting, but aa we 
shall see, probably more ooincidence than direot result, that 
tha major area of oonfliot in 1906 vaa in the Nkandla and Nqutu 
d istricts  of Zululand, vhioh had been invaded and raided by 
the Boers during the War. Oh the other hand, the ^adysmith, 
Newcastle and Dundee areaa of Natal vhioh were the aosne of the 
moat b itter fighting in Natal during the Boer War, did not witness 
further violenoe in 1906*
On the whole there was very l i t t l e  in Afrioan behaviour 
during the mr toaerit the charges against the barbarous nature 
o f their warfare. Yet the woret fears o f the whites appeared to 
be ju stified  by an incident on the 6th Nay, 1902, whan a party 
o f Boera vaa heavily defeated by Zulu at Holkranta in the Vryheid
8.9.04)• In 1906 he vaa ones again singled out fo r  personal attack
by
^Letter froa Onmtu Qnosisi, 21.8.03.
41. Mansetgh, Sou th,, A fri o^,, lfflfr-jSlj „ The JPrtoy. o£ I t f
S. Afrioa . pp'. 71-21 Allen A Unwin, 1962.
1 OH 569» G 234/00, P.M. to Gov., Minute no. 3, 14.2.00.
2See below, Chapter Y, .
d is tr ic t . The episode was tha culminating point o f a long period 
o f h ostility  between the Zulu and the Boers In the d istrict which 
dated bade to the 'annexation9 o f the New Republic by the Boers 
in the eighties.1 Boring the Boar War, the Africans had been 
angered by tha wpilaitiadng of their horses and oattle by tha 
Boars, iho had fa iled  to give receipts. According to Lieut. Col. 
K ills , who vaa appointed by the British government to enquire 
into tha incident, entire hards had been acquired thia way.
Africans vara said to have been shot fo r  tr iv ia l offences without 
tr ia l, sometimes simply on the suspicion that they vara spies fo r  
the British. When in Karcb-April, 1902 a Zulu l*pl came Into 
tha area, i t  encouraged loca l people to settle old scores. Goaded 
beyond endurance by the taunts of the Boar Commandant, three 
hundred Africans fa ll upon tha Boar encashment mid k illed  f if t y -  
six  of the seventy man there. They themselves suffered the lose 
o f fifty-tw o k illed  aid forty-eight wounded.2
This incident, reaming latent memories <f the battles o f 
Blngsns and the Yoortrekksrs, o f Vsensn aid Biood River, as wall 
as o f the aora recant experiences of the Zulu War, le ft  deep scare 
in fa ta l. Tha Boars especially desired revenge fo r  the "massacre
^See above Chapter IX, p. 102*
^Report o f Col. G. A. K ills , C.B. cm the causes which led to i l l -  
feeling between Boers and Zulus culminating at B&lkrants, 6.3.02. 
(Publ. Pmbg, 1902).
of Holkraats". General Botha called i t  "the fou llest deed of
the War"!1 according to Lieut. Col. K ills
"Every Boer expresses the aoet b itter hatred of the 
Zulus. They e ll  express a wish that the Zulus would 
rise now while the British troops are in the country 
so that they My ha praotloally wiped out. The 
Bo ere a ll say that in the event of a rising, every 
one o f  then would join  the British troops in order 
to have a ahanoe of paying o ff old aoorea against 
the Zulus . . .  when I f ir s t  oaae hare I visited  farms 
and asked the Boers what they .thought of the advis­
a b ility  o f keeping troops here. They a ll said it  
was most necessary, aa they vere afraid o f the Kaffirs 
and i t  would not be safe to etay on their farms i f  
the troops withdrew . . .  Taking everything into con­
sideration I oannot help being forced to the opinio n 
that aany Boers intend to provoke a Zulu rising i f  
they oan do so . . ." 2
These views were corroborated by the Comissloner for Native
A ffairs in Zululand and the Magistrate o f ttryheid, A. J. Sfcep-
atone. They both fe lt  that tha many rumours of a native uprising
in the Northern Provinces vhioh vere annexed to Natal after the
Vat, vere deliberately fostered by the Boere, both ti order to
provoke the Zulu and also so that they night get baok the sms
vhioh had been confiscated during thevar.^ There oertainly was
a most prevalent post-war rumour amongst both black and white
1C0 179/229/3336, Botha to Acting High Cosmleeioner, Sub. en d . 
in 1, desp. 4, 6.1.04.
20H 517 0 818/02, Con*. Lieut. 0 . A. H ills to Chiaf S taff Off lo w , 
Hatal (tfafetal), 1.7.02.
S^HA 1/4/13 Ogf Kanorandun of Hop ort on Hatira A ffa ir ., A. J. Shap- 
stone to S.N.A., 1.6.04.
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that, now that tha issue between Boar and Briton had baaa 
settlad, they vara going to jo in  hands "to teach tha nattrss 
a lea son**.
At tha tine o f tha 1906 disturbances, many latallans, 
including Jaaas Stuart and Sir Chapas Saunders, pointed to 
tha Holkranta episode as tha beginning of African restless­
ness, although in fa ct the Qnlusi, he aotoal people involved, 
played no part in later events*1 This is  o f partiouBr inter- 
aat as tha Qnlusi2 vara among Diansulu'a "aoet reliable aad 
voted follow ers".^ Towards tha and of 1907, vhen rumours as 
to Bisnsulu's Intentions vara onaa sore r ife , and troops vara 
despatched fo r  his arrest, thara vara again aaay xunours o f an 
impending uprising in tha Tryhaid d istrict to assist bln.*
Despite th is, however, when tha troope carried out their search
thara fo r  unregistered fir s  arms and for incriminating evidence
■
against Dinusulu, thay net vith no active resistance.
S tu art Papers I.G .L. C.I.A. to Stuart, 9 «lt«0 f. J , Stuart, 
LBteteEL^,& SL  .MvI.SbMUMB# p. 499.
2
Tha Qnlusi vara 1 ansdlate followers of Cetshvayo and Dinusulu, out 
o f f  ffcon their chief by the Boar 'Maw Bapubllcf in  1884. Sea above, 
Chapter XX, p.
3AA 29, C.lf.A# to Acting P.M., 9.9.07*
*00 179/242/4494, 2n d . 8, desp. Sccr.Oov. to See. S t ., 30.11.07t 
t d .  P.M. to Ckft. 29.11.07.
*Sce bdow. Chapter 7,
Boers in the Northern Provinces apart, the post-Boer War 
depression exacerbated the tendons In th# rest o f Xatal also, 
and whites who fe lt  insseure eoonoaioally tended to express ex­
cessive fears about the hostile intentions o f the African popu­
lation* It  ia  a coeaonplaoe among social psychologists that 
In a situation o f eoonoaio insecurity, the aeebers o f the group 
which finds it s e lf  threatened try to find a no re t m ediate ob­
je ct for their anger than abstract eoonoaio forces, md turn i t  
against a socia lly  aoocpted scapegoat ia  their ■Idst*^ In order 
to ju stify  their own aggressive md largely irrational fears 
and fssliags, ths oolonists found good reason in ths 'insolence9 
sad 9insubordination* o f ths Afrioaa population, #10 were said 
to be seething with sedition and rebellion*
At the sane tins, Afyiosns were also cxpcrlmaing ths 
eoonoaio depression, and ware expressing their discontent in a 
boat o f a lllm ia l, or p rm illm ia l, fantasies, which in turn 
strengthened and ooaflrm d white susplelons* Amongst Africans 
two broad categories of rumour ean be distinguish e&s ths f ir s t  
expressed their longing fo r  a messianlo-type saviour, who would
^See e .g . Donald Doob, K iller at s i* , op .Pit* , p* 44* <*• V* A llport, 
Th* o f PwdadAo*. Ch»pt«r 15, pp. 235-249 md ChapUr*
21-24. A Richmond, The Colour Problem A Study o f Raolal Reletloaa
(P lU lB  1955), PP. 19-X .
rescue then Ison tholr vote, tho oooond tholr ooaviotion that 
tho whites vere planning action against than -  tho converse o f 
tho 'native uprising* rumour. Ratal's m ilitary preparations 
a ftor tho Boor Vgr to aako good tho removal of tho Imperial 
forces; tho oospulsory oonaorlptlon introduced under tho M ilitia 
lo t  o f 1903,* and Its oonooatttents o f annual military camps; 
tho ca ll tug up o f tho reserves and tholr patrols through tho 
African locations -  a ll theae led to a spate o f nervous rumours.
In 1902 i t  vac believed by Africans In Durban that they vers 
going to bo turned out before Christmas because o f an trending 
struggle between black and white* r&e b elie f was apparently 
related to the scheme under discussion by the Town Council top 
erect barracks for Togt (day) Labourers. A similar rumour arose 
In the following year ae a result o f the plague that had broken 
out in Hatal, end the measures taken to oombat it.'*
Hew legislation  md government proclamations affecting 
Africans, so many o f which were transmitted only accidentally,
*See below, Chapter T.
2SHA 1/ 4/IO 0102/02, Report Special no. 4 md Special no. 3»<^2«
"*SHA l/4 /l2  0^4 U.S.H.A. 31.5.03, Report o f two natives v isitin g  
Dbn, md U.S.H.A. 5.6.03, Information o f native dootor,
■3KC 03
mo 124/ 144/ 03, p .55 (Correspondence book), P.H. to Xayor of Durban, 
11.8.03.
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sim ilarly lad to much anxiety. As forty-sight new lavs and 
several new regulations affecting Afrloaas vere passed between 
1895 and 1906,1 and native policy  vae a constant source o f dis­
cussion in ths newspapers and amongst E lites In general, i t  is  
not surprising that these formed the subject o f innumerable
rumours amongst a sem i-literate population to whom they were
2o f intense importance and considerable ambiguity. The 1904 
oensus vas of eepeoial concerns according to a report by a 
native polio# sergeant, "The Africans say that the Census is  fo r  
an evil purpose md ths Volunteer Force formed fo r  the purpose 
o f exterminating or making slaves of the blacks end thus the 
blaok races must cohere against a common foe ." The Africans 
appeared more susceptible to this kind of rumour after ths Boer 
Vari Sir Charles Saunders attributed this to ths faot that far 
mors Africans vers now reading ths newspapers from vhioh so many 
o f ths rumours emanated  ^ -  but ths soomomio factors noted above,
1N.N.A.C., Rept. 1906-7, pp. 3 and 11.
2Aeo. A llport, The Psychology of Rumour, p.15, one o f the dominant 
factors pausing tha spread of rumour amongst a particular group 
on any topic ia  its  importance and its  ambiguity.
Z^A 54 Report Native Folios Sergeant to Magi s . Nqutu, 29.6.04.
See also TR.O.A. Ssmuslson, Loam. Iona Amo (Dbn, 1929;, pp. 18^-90.
4S*A I /4/14 o||t C.*.A. to H.K.A., 7.12.05.
as ve il as a certain disappointment that their position had not
been improved at the mad of the Boer War, may have been equally
significant factors.
At the centre of the prenlllsnial rumours amongst the
Africans aid of the 'native uprising* rumours amongst the whites
vas Dinusulu, o ffic ia lly  only a patty ohief, but In the minds
end hearts of many, both black and white, s t i l l  the 'Child*, son
and heir of Cetshvsyo, King o f the Zulu, a d  solan of the house
of Shake and Dlngan*.
The traditional h ostility  end fear fa it  by tha majority
o f Natal colonists for the Zulu Royal House were amongst the
reasons why "the ever-lasting bug-bsar about Dinusulu inciting
or being associated vith a supposed native rising"1 shouldhsve
been disseminated long before the outbreak o f 1906. Deep suspicion
2o f this "spoilt native" vas fa it  by most Bataliana, who wars 
sure that the effects o f the fam iliarity vith vhleh Dinusulu had 
been treated by the Governor of St. Helena and of tha JBuropeea 
tastes he had acquired while in exile oouldxnt fa ll  to be de­
leteriou s. The fact that he vaa responsible fo r  arresting a oouple 
o f whites fo r  i l l i c i t  trading vith the Boors during the Boer var
l Zl 34 C8^2i, to 1 .1 .4 ., 19.12.09.
2Cf Stuart, Hia to nr o f aula tobdLllon. p. 110. Stuart'a T i m  m r. 
probably more generous then those of most Nataliansj he wrote of 
Mmisulu's treatment in St. Helena, "The Qovemof o f the island, 
vith no sense of the fitness of things, treatsd him just m he 
might have done Napoleon. The result vas he vas neither savage nor 
o lv llleed . He vas 'sp o ilt* ."
vaa said to have antagonised a ll settlers and traders in the
area* whether pro- or anti-Boer.1 Immediately after the war
reports were circulated that he had hidden the gins and oattle
captured during the Dhlake expedition and was going to fight
rather than give then up. A stockade built quite legitim ately
during the war as a defen oe, and huts built to house the men
used by the British troops were also the objects o f such sue-
2pieion on the part of whitea, and perhaps wishful thinking 
on the part o f blacks.
The activ ities o f the Zululand Delimitation Commission in 
the years immediatdy after the war increased the feeling of
3
tension in Zululand and contributed to the unrest. Even the 
Cape newspaper Ianro. which did not generally treat Batal-Zululaad 
a ffa irs in any detail9 remarked on the grossly exaggerated reports 
o f unrest from Zululand, which it  fe lt  could only end in disaster.^
1Col. Col 98, Statements Samuelson, pp. 157-8, Samsonl alias 
Hklpo ka Kbatahaswa.
2oNA l/4 /lO  C1902, Numerous intelligence reports.
34th id . Ia t.r ia  deport o f Z.D.O., to o l, la  00 179/227/1068. 
48.7.03.
Sir Charles Saunders, the Commissioner fo r  Native A ffairs,
protested several tines at the persistent exploitatinn of xunours
of unrest associated with Dinusulu*s name, a ll of whloh emanated
from Natal, and especially froa the Natal press. He maintained
there was not an lota of truth in soy o f them,^
Nevertheless the allegations went on, S a u n d ers 's  view that
they a ll emanated from Natal is  probably too simple, as indeed
was Harriett Colenao's opinion that they were part o f a Natal
conspiracy to get rid of Dinusulu. It seems far more lik ely
that Europeans were picking up and misinterpreting the m lllenial
fantasies current amongst the Zulu people. Thus there were reports
of the hundreds of messengers Dinusulu was supposed to be sending
2
to every part of Natal and Zululand, According to sjy reports, 
their purpose vas to foment unrest and enlist aid for Dinusulu'e 
b oh ernes of an uprising, ^  Three men vere arrested in the Veenen 
d istrict at the beginning of 1906 fo r  spreading m ordezpurporting 
to oome from Dinusulu that a ll Africans should destroy European 
manufactured utensils and k ill  their white animals| otherwise few
XSHA 1/4/13 o2J, C.N.A. to P.M., 14.6.04. ZA 34 CB j^| C.H.A. to 
H.N.A. 19.12.05. Bat s o t , also C.H.A. to Admin. ’ latal In 
which he stated that He oonfidenoe In Dinusulu was absolutely misplaced 
Tor  this change in view, see below, Chapter T il, p,
S'o r  a fu ll catalogue of a ll the rumours see I , Perrett, Dinusulu 
and the Bambata Rebellion, H.A. thesis (unpubl.) Univ. Natal, I960, pp 
15-38,
^E.g, ZA 34 CS^, Rept, Nat, polios sergeant to aagis, Nqutu, 29.6.04*. 
Also CO 179/233/12465, In te ll. Rept. Snol. 1, 2.5.06 in desp. 41f 
16.3.06.
«>f*V
of those messengers were ever traced*^ According to the evidence 
la id  at the tr ia l o f these three sen, none of them had been any­
where near the Usuthu, Dinusulu's headquarters.^
Fears of Dinusulu's influence were not lim ited to Natal-  
Zululand. In 1903 he was alleged to be Inciting the Zulu in the 
Piet Retief d istrict o f the Transvaal to refuse to pay their £2 
Poll Tax on pain of death. Although he rigorously denied the charge, 
and was supported in this by the Commissioner o f  Retire Affairs 
in Zululand, the Natal goremment vas wt as firm ly oonvinoed of 
his innocence. Despite the lack of any substantiating evidence,
Prime Minister Geage aitton declared there must hare been a good 
deal of truth in the charge.
There vere also frequent rumours that Dinusulu vas in league 
with the Basuto, Swazi and Pondo -  and even on ocoasion the Boers.* 
In these instanoes, the most innocuous r is it  of a trader could 
gire rise to dusters of rumours. Fear cf a combination cf the 
Afrioan peoples in Southern Africa is  a thread whloh runs through
1stuw t, A History of Zulu a.b^-lion . p .106.
2Cd 2905 2nd. 3 in dssp. 21, Report in case o f Rex r . Sikosaaa, 
Makabakaba and Mdopa, p. 11 f f .
30H 575 ca||, Klnut. 51.10.05.
^Stuart, Z J l., pp. 115-4.
mu oh of her nineteenth century history, usually vith a somewhat 
slender foundation.1 During the actual disturbances in 1906 
Lord Selbome, British High Commissioner in South Afrioa, con­
stantly recalled reports of DinuZulu's being in league with the 
2Swazi, and affidavits vere forwarded to the Commissioner of 
Native Affairs in Pretoria of the inflammatory messages purporting 
to have oome from Dinuzulu to Ngwanase, a chief in Tongaland.
If true, they would have disclosed Dinuzulu as the instigator o f 
a 3widespread conspiracy amongst the native xaoee of South Afriea".^ 
Natural phenomena, traditionally associated with the Zulu 
Royal family were now interpreted by Africans as signs from Dinu­
zulu either of imminent deliverance from the Natal government or 
of further disaster. Dinuzulu was believed to appear before them
4in different forms.- -  and indeed even John Dube and his uncle, 
the Chief Mqawe, vere given similar powers in the popular mind.^
This kind of interpretation was a>t unusual amongst a people ac­
customed to easing the forces o f nature in personal or semi-personal
1See e.g. The Zulu Invasion Scare of 1861 by 0. B. Novfee (unpubl.
K.A. thesis, 1948, Natal), p .32, who remarks on the rumours o f 
"vast combination directed by Mosheeh whose members were alleged to 
inolude the Basutos, the Zulus, the Swazis, . . .  flondos end Kadi's 
. . .k a f f ir s .. .  for  a concerted attack on the Europeans in S.E. A frica .” 
The ware o f 1S78-1879 in Southern Afrioa vere sim ilarly thought to 
have a single imspirer in Cetehwayo.
2<3H 585 S w r t  ca^|, o||, i m n l  im port..
3SXA 1/4/16 0 ^ ,  Records o f Cases of Rem v . Singaha Cum de and 4 others 
(Barbetton) cud Rex v. Ngasena, (Pieters burg)
^Stuart, Z.R.. p .114.
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terms.* Thus the disease which in 1905 attacked one of the Zulu
staple crops, aid the extremely severe hailstorm which h it the
entire colony on Hay 31st o f that year, vere regarded as important
omens and indications that Dinusulu had something portentous ia  
2hand.
One of the most important of the rumours associated with 
Dinusulu1 s name was an order that Africans k ill  a ll white goats, 
pigs aid fowl, and destroy implements of European manufacture.
This was particularly prevalent in the vary hot months at the end 
o f 1905 and beginning of 1906. Many and varied explantione vere 
offered lay the non-white population for this k illin g  of white 
animals, and ths destruction of European-made implements. The
most frequent vas that there vas an order from Dinusulu that emy-
3one not oarrying out the order would be struck by light&lgg.
Tet another vaa that on Christmas day Dinusulu was going to per­
form a miracle or divination by which a ll vhite people would be 
k illed  and the railways torn up. then any Africans having pigs or 
"c iv ilised  clothing" would be instantly k illed .*  Several chiefs in
^See A. V. HoenJLe, "Magio and Xedioine", p. 222 in The Bantu 
Speaking tribes o f S. Afrloa. ed. I . 3 chap era (London 1950).
2Stuart, Z.R .. pp. 102-3.
^Cd 2905, p .11 f f ,  a id . 3 in desp. Seoret 21, op .p it.
*SNA 1/4/14 0Q5* Report Magis., Estoourt, 20.12.05.
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Natal In fact sent to Dinuzulu to find out whether he was behind 
the order* In Zululand proper, the moat prevalent explanation 
appears to hare been that pigs and lard attract lightning) i f  
when an attempt was made to o d le c t  the 1905 Poll Tax, the people 
deposited lard on the h ills id es, lightning would strike those at­
tempting to co llect the tax.1 As the Zulu king was believed to 
have power over the elements, this had a particularly ominous 
sound* According to Stuart however
"the underlying intention of the order to k il l  pigs 
and white fowls and to discard utensils o f European 
manufacture was that the natives of Natal and Zulu­
land should rise against the ifcite man* Its purpose,
was to warn aa wall as to unite by use of a threat."
That this was the generally accepted interpretation amongst
whites oan be gauged from the fact that farmers in the Newoastle,
Estcourt, Weenen and Lion's River divisions, where these rumours
were particularly prevalent, were said to be leaving their farms
and trekking with their ca ttle , either to the nearest town or to
a
the Transvaal or Orange Free State* According to magistrate
1SNA 1/4/14 0$|, Kinute C*N*A. to H.N.A. 27.12.05.
2Stuart, Z*R* * p .105.
5Ib id ., p .108.
S^NA l / l l / l 4  Magistrates of above divisions to TJ.3.N.A*,
end o f 1905.
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Devitt, writing considerably later, rumours that Dinusulu "had 
said that every living white thing . . .  was to disappear" immersed 
the Piet Retief d istrict o f the Transvaal which bordered on 
Zululand, and had a large Zulu population, "in  blood red fantasies"
In many areas, whiteb were requesting arms and ammunition, and 
preparing to go into laager. Tet the magistrates in a ll these re­
gions reported that nothing unusual oould be detected in African 
behaviour, and, indeed, vhen the disturbances actually broke out, 
they did not take place primarily in these divisions. Nor do 
portions of the tribes most affected by these particular rumours 
appear to have broken away to join  the rebels elsewhere in the 
colony.
While the white animal k illin g  was an extremely frightening 
phenomenon for -the whites, who anild not help feeling that after 
pigs, white fowls and white goats, white people would be k illed , 
this conclusion was by no means inevitable. The white animal 
k illin g  undoubtedly represented an expression o f h ostility  
against whites and idiite rule, but it  did not necessarily mean 
that further action was contemplated. It was a 'reaction to conquest9 
very similar in e ffect to the great ca ttle -k illin g  Jh the Eastern 
Gape in 1857, following the Nonqause prophecy. In Basutoland too,
Memories of a Magistrate (London, 1934)» p .63*
2See £• Roux, Time Longer than Rope.(le t  edition, 1948, London) pp. 44*52.
Nonqause was a Xhosa maiden who prophesied that i f  the Xhosa k illed
when, In 1876, a ware of * ant d-European propaganda* swept -Hie
country "the unrest worked it s e lf  out by the destruction o f
articles of European manufacture and went no further".  ^ Animal
k illin g  appears to hare been a fa irly  frequent occurrence In
Matal. According to the magistrate at Dundee, the Africans
2regularly disposed of their pigs at planting time. In 1904 
an Intelligence Report told o f the sacrifice of white goats to 
the Goddess of Plenty, Inkosaaana Nkonbulwana, who was confused 
by b o b ,  Africans with H arriett, Coleneo.'5 In 1 9 0 0  there had 
been similar animal k illings In the Umlasi and Lower Tug el a divi­
sions in Natal,* while in 1898 in the Ingwavuma division, Zulu­
land, "a deformed and shrivelled doctor, a Tonga, suddenly sprang 
into prominence by spreading a report amongst the natives that 
unless they k illed  their goats o ff, calamities of a dire sort 
would overtake them and their crops would rot In the ground,"
a ll thalr oattla, destroyed their crops md fa iled  to eow ooro, 
the vhite man would miraculously be driven into the sea. Thousands 
o f Xhosa tribesmen obeyed the order which waa fir s t  supported by 
the Ge&leka ch ief, S a rili, Needless to say, on the appointed day, 
nothing happened, md the tribesmen faced starvation md poverty. 
Many streamed across the frontiers o f the Cape oolony to seek work 
and protection. The social structure of the Xheaa was very severely 
damaged and overnight the people more reduced than they had been 
by over seventy years o f frontier warfare, E, Roux o&lls Nonqause 
the "Xhosa national prophet" and compares her in some ways to Joan 
o f Arc, No fu ll scale analysis o f this fascinating md extremely 
important event in the history of the Eastern Cape peoples has yet 
been written,
*0. Tyldan, Th, ala , of tha 3a<wto (C.T., 1950). p.126.
2SHA 1/4/14 Minute Maynard Matthews, magistrate to U,S,N,A, 6,12,05,
Hundreds of goats vere killed before the doctor's deportation 
ended the episode.1 The k illing  of pigs by the government to 
oombat swine fever in 1905» and of oattle to oombat Hast Coast 
fever in 1905-7$ may veil have been a factor in spreading these 
millenial fantasies, vhich Continued into 1907.
Although i t  vas this vhite animal k illing and the rumours 
vhich vere associated vith i t  vhich lay behind the Natal govern­
ment's decision to declare Martial less over the entire colony 
after the k illing of the two police o fficers , i t  may veil be 
that, far from being a declaration of war, these vere in fact 
safety valves, ways of letting o ff  steam without the punishment 
that would assuredly fo llov  vere vhite people to be touched* It 
can be argued that by a process of sympathetic magic or 'trans­
ferred aggression' the vhite animals vere vhite people, people
2who vere themselves in too powerful a position to be touched*
•^ SNA l /4 /l5  C ^ , Report Intelligence Officer no* 1, n*d*
4SNA 1/ 4/14 Orf, Asst. Magis. Umlasi division to K.H.A. 10.12.00, 
and Stuart, - p .105.
B^* Colenbrander, The Bambata Rebellion, unpubl* typeacript, c.1906, 
p*2, (K#C*L.)
2 xSee Dollard, Boob, M iller et ml* Frustration and Aggression •
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In spit* o f the veiy great h ostility  shown against white rule 
in hoth ttie rumours and the white animal k illin g , i t  is signi­
ficant that only about half a do sen white civ ilians were k illed  
during the disturbances.1 One o f these was a highly unpopular 
magistrate, another a sub-overseer o f a forced labour working 
party whose position was lik ely  to hare aroused antagonism* Had 
there been any real intention o f "driving the white man Into the 
sea" as the oolonlsts alleged, one would have expected a far 
higher incidence of acts o f violence against white men and their 
property. It is , however, a remarkable feature of the disturb­
ances that both in the Hapumulo and IfkandLa divisions where 
emotions had reached fever-pltoh, there was no indiscriminate 
damage to white property, or the singling out of government and 
mission buildings, as happened during the Port E li sabeth riots 
of 1949. Even a stock-inspector, who had been engaged in the 
greatly disliked task of culling diseased oattle, though wounded 
by rebels in the Hapumulo division, had his l i f e  saved by other
These vere H* H* Stain bank, Magistrate^EaMatatim ^ Valters, a sub ovej>- 
seer o f a road party; Siegried a storekeeper; 0* E. Veal, a 
postal o ffic ia l believed to be a spy* H* Smith, a farmer o f TJmlaas 
Road, murdered in January 1906 may or mqrnot have been murdered
because of his insistence that his employees pay the Poll Tax*
Stuart includes hia in the l is t  o f those murdered as part of the 
rebellion; in fact the evidence is  far from conclusive*
One could also include K* Hunt and G* Armstrong, members of the
police foroe in this l is t , though this w ill be discussed mors fully 
below* See Stuart, Zulu Rebellion* pp. 120, 125# 233, 240, 343-9# 
377.
rebels vho recognised him*1 Ndlovu ka Tiauni, one of the
leaders in this phase o f  the rebellion, personally saved the
l i f e  of a missionary vith whom he had had no previous connect Ion*
At the time he stated that ttxe African quarrel vas only vith
2the magistrates and the troops. In Mapumulo and Nkandla-Nqtxtu, 
the only areas to see aotive opposition to the troops, mission­
aries o f the Norwegian Mission Society and the Hermennsburg 
Lutheran Mission Society vere to remark that their stations 
had been, vith one or two exceptions le ft  untouched by the rebel 
forces -  only to be looted by the European troops. Similarly 
Anglican Mission buildings in the Nkandl&r-Nqutu area -  the 
scene of the rebellion "proper” -  vere untouohed by African 
combatants -  though an outstation ms "knocked to pieces by 
European troops in wanton destruction".* For Africans then, 
antagonism against white rule and the Natal government, which 
was regarded aa respaieible for a ll their voes, had not yet
S tu art, Z.R .. pp. 349-50.
^Norsk Mis*6natidende • 1906 pp. 542-7* le tter from Rev.
J. Tvedt Otimati, 16.10.06 (pp. 542-7).
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See Norsk Misjonatddende Sept. 1906, le tter from Rev. Tittestad 
2.7.06 and 360. 1906, le tte r  froa  Rev. Tvedt, op .c it.
Report,Bishop Zululand, 1906, S.P.0. Reports '07* no.34.
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generalised orer to a ll vhite people.
Despite the fact that so few Europeans were k illed  during 
the disturbanoes, rumour also played an important part in ex­
aggerating the atrocities vhioh took plaoe. The further away from 
the soene of action, the more lurid the details became. Whites, 
vith their stereotypes of uncontrolled African savagery, talked 
in almost hysterical terms about the danger to their women and 
ohildren.1 Not a single white woman or child vas touched during 
the disturbances* On two occasions the body of a European vas 
used fo r  ritual 'doctoring1 fo r  war, and this caused a sensation 
in the colony. To the small, tightly-knit vhite community, the 
death of every white man was far more than the loss o f one in­
dividual* It  struck at the very foundations upon which white 
rule vas based* It is  only when this is taken into account that 
tha measures against the rebels in 1906 and the ferocity o f the 
European reaction can be understood*
ose e.g . rf. Bosnian, Th. Natal R .b«lllon of 1906 (London, 1907), p .133, 
f .  S. Tatha*, Tiaoe 5T *ata l. 31.3.06.
2Stuajrt, ZjH., Pp. 176, 378.
The role played by rumour during the actual disturbances, 
when both sides tended to act as i f  myth were »a lity , cannot be 
overstressed* Nevertheless, precisely for this reason i t  is  
not always possible to s ift  the com from the ohflff. Nor is it  
always important so to do: the fiction  that Bambatha had a charm
which would turn the idiite man’ s bullet3 into water was strong 
enough to induce a large number of people to join him, despite 
the fact that we know it  to be baseless* Similarly while the dhole 
question of Dinuzuluvs oomplicityin the disturbances is an ex­
tremely complex one which w ill be discussed in greater deta il,1 
whether or no he was behind the rebels is  less Important than 1he 
fact that a large number of Bambatha* s followers were convinced 
o f his support, and that eventually he would oome to their aid*
In the years immediately following the disturbances, when 
poverty and despair were even more marked than before amongst the 
Africans who had undergone a very severe upheaval, 'messianio' 
and * pipe-dr earn* rumours were, i f  anything, even more marked than 
before* Once again their intensity appears to reach a peak in 
the lean,hot months of the planting season* Most of them were 
associated with Dinuzulu’ s name, especially after the sporadic 
acts o f terrorism in Zululand, and the known disagreement between
^See below, Chapter VII.
the British government and Natal on the subject of his arrest 
and tr ia l. There vere however also persistent reports that such 
prominent leaders during the rebellion as Bambatha, Mteli, and 
Hehlokasulu had come alive and were »ady to march on the colony, 
assisted by "black abelun/ru* from America wiiii modem weapons", 
that a great mountain had sprung up in the north which vas send­
ing forth many warriors, or that a mighty lion  had appeared,
2which was devouring all white men.
At the time o f his arrest and tr ia l, the various rumours
associated with Dinusulu's name were Interpreted by the Natal
government as part of a deliberate attempt on his part to obtain
p o litica l concessions, and to gpt himself reinstated in the role
of his forebears as King of the Zulu. This view has recently
found support in an unpublished Natal If .A. thesis, which maintains
that Dinusulu U B e d  the various rumours associated with his name
quite deliberately for this purpose, and that had he so desired,
3he could have put a stop to them. The writer, Nias I , Perrett,
1
"B la ck  abeluagu" is  presumably the African equivalent of the vhite 
South African 'foreign native' meaning a black man from outside South 
Africa. An umlungu is the Zulu term for 'a  vhite man'; a black
ualungu is  an American negro.1
2Sae e.g. SNA 1/4/17 , «ep. Minut. C.N.A. 22.3.07 and « — Report
Intelligence no. 1 Krantakop, March '07* CL§fi 8.3.07# C.N.A. to K.N.A.
* e.g. SNA 1/4/22 C ~  Ma$is. Nkandla to Bfe^Jict Native Commissioner, 
SNA 1/4/170,4 Report Special detectives 3.1.07. SNA 2/4/22 Q28 
Statement cS&ldi ka Oigasa, 15.11.10.
^1. Pecrett, Dinusulu and the Bambata Rebellion (Nniv. c f Natal, I960).
states categorically that had Dinusulu made it  quite plain to 
the would-be insurgents "that he would have neither a part nor 
lo t  in the rebellion, the rising would not have taken plaoe 
Dinusulu fostered the rumours of a general rising by his action".1 
While this may in part be true, there are other possible inter­
pretations o f the many rumours associated with Dinusulu* s name.
One of them was given by Dinusulu himself when he accused the
Kandlakazi people, his traditional enemies, o f being behind a ll
2the tales of his unrest. It is  Interesting that the Handlakasl 
had close ties with the Shepstone fam ily, and i t  le possible fo r  
example that the zumour noted at the head of his ohapter trans- 
mi tted by 'O ffy ', son of Sir Theophilus iJhepstone, came from 
this source originally.^ It  would not be unreasonable to imagine 
people who had been such b itter opponents of the Usutbu to con­
tinue the feud by using this informat inn against him, aioh in 
the same way as in the past people oould get their enemies removed 
from the tribe by accusing them of witchcraft to the king. This, 
however, while possibly the origin of some of the xumours, by no 
means accounts for a ll of than, though the technique was defin itely
1p.41.
®The Trial of Dinusulu, Address of ¥. P. Schreiner p .51*
3For this feud, see Above., Chapter H .
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used in other parts o f Natal, and indeed of colonial Africa.^
On several occasions Dinuzulu did request an enquiry into the
rumours about him and was supported in these demands by the
Commissioner for Native A ffairs, who fe lt ,  until the aeoond
half of 1907» that Dinuzulu*s conduct Justified '*a publio re-
2futation o f the numerous oalumnies against him” . It  is d ifficu lt  
to know how else the rumours associated with his name oould have 
been convincingly quashed, as it  certainly appears that he bk&self 
denied a ll knowledge of their validity to African as well as Euro­
pean questioners.
Quite apart from the machinations, real or imagined, of 
either Dinuzulu or his enemies, there was a deeper basis to these 
many rumours. It is a fa irly  widespread phenomenon for an op­
pressed and poverty stricken people to invent a Messianic figure 
who w ill rescue them from all their woes, or to invest an historioal 
personality with Messianic qualities. In Germany In medieval 
times, though the monarchy ”was fa lling  into ever greater impotence 
and discredit” , millenial fantasies centred on the ooming of ”a 
supernatural German emperor, a poverty loving monarch sent by God
*For a somewhat analogous situation on the Kilimanjaro, see K, Stahl, 
The Chagga of Kilimanjaro (London 1964).
2 ZA 34 ca^ | , C.N.A. to M.N.A., 19.12.05.
to institute * wo rid-wide Nessianlo ampire".1 What more natural 
than, that tha Afrioans o f Zululand and Natal should, at tha tu n  
o f tha oantury, larast tha 9 Child' vfith tha supanatural qualities 
ha was traditionally supposad to poasaes aad to ball are that ha 
alona could laad than against tha all-powerful whites. Tha dis­
a b ilities  thay vara ouffaring, their poverty aad tha stresses in - 
posed by European penetration o f Zululand, md tha Zulu contact 
vith tha labour markets o f Southern A frica, lad to thaaa many 
rumours expressing a yeaning fo r  a saviour mid a nessiah. As
Professor Oeorge Shepperson has pointed out, this kind of "pre-
2
m illenial fantasy*, aad tha "naaaiah mechanism" operates vhmre
there is  a "deep distrust o f tha orthodox forces o f raforn open 
%to a society".
Cohn, "H.dlwr.1 R U lta u r ln ln ', p. 36 la  HlUeni.1 P m w  
ia <-cUon. i t .  S. Thjrupp (Hagu., 1962). S .. « l .o  S. Cohn, Pursuit 
of tho Hi 1.Ionian ( London, 1,62) and P, Moral.y, The Trunp.t ahull 
Sound (uondoa 1997).
2This happy phrase oocurs on p. 47 o f St. Thrupp, Spsclt. in Pr >f.
Shapparaon * s "Tha Comparative Study of Kllleaarian. Ho Tenants".
^"Nyaaaland aad tha Hiiianiun", p. 146 in S. Thrupp, Millanlai
B t f L  fa  te&S&x
Chapter V
THE
"As regards the xeoent rebellion he did not think 
there me any one epeoial cause, bat a combination 
o f causes, mong which were the attitude of the 
white man towards the bleok and the gradually grow­
ing antipathy of the black towards the white •••• 
he thought the last straw wea the way In which 
the Government had commenced to deal with the 
fir e t  indications of disaffection , He considered 
that the measures which were adopted were nothing 
more than an invitation to people who were ir r i­
tated to go to worse."
N.N.A.C. Evidence Archdeacon 
Johnson, p .91.
??
Although runours of uprising ware a recurrent
feature o f Natal M oiety, i t  was the Poll Tax which set o ff  the 
last batch of xumours at the end of 1905 and led to a apate 
of white animal k illin g  in the most .densely populated rural 
d istricts of the colony.
I f ,  as has been suggested in Chapter III , land and labour 
were the underlying and predisposing causes of the disturbances, 
the Poll Tax of 1905 can be considered in the three categories 
of underlying, predisposing and precipitating cause t in its  
relationship to the entire struoture o f land md labour policies 
i t  is  part of the underlying causation) in imposing a new aad 
heary burden of taxation on the shoulders of an indigent popu­
lation , not a ll o f whom howevsr rebelled against i t ,  i t  can 
be seen as a predisposing oause; and fin a lly  in providing the 
oooasion for certain groups to defy government authority and 
in leading to the declaration of martial lav i t  can be seen as 
a precipitating oause of the 1906 disturbances. Despits Stuart's 
dismissal of the Poll Tax as "merely a con tributary oause and 
not the moat important of those that have been c ite d "m o a t
# p .520.
Africans attributed the disturbances to the imposition of the 
Poll Tax. It was at that point that "things began to go wrong".1
So closely  linked was the reaction to the tax to the 1906 
disturbances, that they hare frequently been called the Poll 
Tax rebellion , aad most seoondary sources haws regarded the 
Poll Tax as the single most important cause* While the disturb­
ances arose out of a number o f oomplax oauses which varied from 
tribe to tribe, and indeed froa group to group within the Afri­
can population, there can be l it t le  doubt o f the importance of 
the 1909 Poll Tax aad the Natal government handling of it .
Many Africans linked the tax with the unpopular 1904 Census 
vhioh magistrates had promised would hare no sin ister reper-
ouselonsi i t  was thus regarded aa a distinct breaohof faith
z.
on the part of the goTemment. The translation o f Poll Tax 
into Zulu aa a "head tax" waa rather unfortunate, and led to 
wry remarks amongst the Afrloaas that a laga and area tax would 
follow . The Minister o f *ativs A ffairs, i t  is  true, in intro­
ducing the Poll Tax b ill  In th# Natal Legislative Assembly as­
serted that " . . .  tha natives of this Colony w ill hail the present 
B ill, i f  i t  is  made law, with pleasure •••• I can assure /members/ 
• ••• that i f  this b ill  is  mads law there w ill be no d ifficu ltie s
Hj.N.A'C. Bvid. e .g . p .711, Nkantolo, Lower Umsinkulu Division.
^N.V.A.C. Report, p .54*
as far aa the natives are concerned"1 1 magistrates in many
parts o f the colony vere also in itia lly  sanguine aa to the eaae
2vith vhich the tax vould be collected. Nevertheless, when 
they actually attempted to co llect the tax at the «id of January 
and February 1906, they found they vere generally set vith 
passive resistance and even, on oooaaian, by open defiance*
Thus cm the 22nd January, the Aoting Magistrate o f Kapunulo vaa 
met by angry, gesticulating mencf Mgobisembe's tribe, many of 
them brandishing weapons; in the same d istrict the tribesmen 
of Svaimana and Xeseni also refused to pay the tax. Although 
in the previous September, the magistrate o f Hkandla had stated 
that the reports of the forthcoming tax had not roused "the 
slightest sign o f disloyalty" in  any o f the ohiefs or headmen 
to idiom it  had been announced, in January, Sigananda's tribe 
in that division maintained that they could not afford to pay 
the tax, apparently shouted their var cry and did a var-danoe 
in front of the magistrate.
le t  while these chiefs md their tribes vere later involved
^ .L .A . Debates, Tol. 39, pp. 704-5# 25.7.05.
2SNA 1 /i /3252q-2~» Summary o f reports o f magistrates on Afrloan 
reaction to Poll Tax, xud. c. 11.9.05.
3m d . . SHA l / l /3 2 5 ^ p  .
in the disturbances and fought against the ^ lite forces, 
several others, who also protested against the tax and at 
f ir s t  refused to pay i t ,  later remained neutral, or indeed, 
like Sibindi and his tribe, were conspicuously loyal to the 
goTernment and provided men to fight on ita  side*1 It  is  
d ifficu lt  to know how to interpret this form of passive re­
sistance to the tax in the early days of its  co llection , or 
indeed even the more violent expressions o f hostility* Al­
though the tax was due at the beginning of 1906, i t  was not 
legally  enforceable until 31st May, 3906; at the same time 
as the Africans were voicing their protests against the tax,
its  white opponents were holding several very noisy meetings
2in Pietermaritabu zg and Durban. fo r  Africans however there 
vere few ways o f expressing opposition other than by passive 
resistance* Much depended on Individual magistrates as to 
whether Afrioans vere allowed to express their views or not -  
or indeed whether a ll tribes vere adequately informed when and 
by whoa the tax had to ha paid* In Zululand, tihare the Gom- 
BdsataSr for Native Affaire was a oap&ble and not unsympathetic 
paternalist, the following circular was issued to magistrates
S^HA l/l/357^7ji^9 Report Magi s. Krantzkop; see aleo B. Colenbrander 
'The Bamb&ta Rebellion, unpubl. MSS, KCL 30513*
^See evld* N.N.A.C., passim, e .g . H* Baseley, p .462 and H* A. Smith
p .506.
in December, 190$. Whether i t  was on hie own authority or that
of the Minister for Native A ffairs is  not dears
are
"ChiefVaov d istinctly  warned that no excuse w ill 
be aooepted and any oppositon to the Tax w ill be 
most severely dealt with* that the ohiafa then- 
selves as the government *s representatives amongst 
their people w ill be held personally responsible 
that the tax is  proapty paid on the dates fix e d .•• 
that any negleot in this reepeot w ill be regarded 
as an indication that they are not fitted  fo r  their 
positions and responsibilities as Chiefs and render 
i t  incumbent upon the government to seriously con­
sider whether they should not be deprived of their 
positions and the status attached thereto.
No disousslon in connection with the matter should 
be entered into, the chiefs merely being informed 
that the foregoing are the Government's fin a l words 
of warning and the sooner any people liab le  fo r  the 
tax prepare to meet i t ,  the better i t  w ill be for 
a ll conoemed.1*^
Partly as a result of the failure of the government to listen
to their complaints, averal chiefs sent messages to Dinusulu
to find out what he vas gdhg to do about the tax* Nor were
these ohiefs only froa Zululand; messengers were sent froa
prominent ohiefs as far south as Tilonko and Sikukuku in ths
Ixopo division. Dinusulu*s reply to these messages would qppear
to have been invariably properi he pointed out that his tribe
had been the f ir s t  to pay the tax, and completely discountenanced
the rumour which was supposed to have emanated from hia, that
a ll vhite animals should be k illed . More than one witness at
1SHA l/l/335^|. Circular 22.12.05
•>7?
Dinusulu** subsequent tr ia l affirmed that " I f  Dinusulu had 
refused to pay the Poll Tax we would hare fought and died1* 
and that ’’Dinusulu was the Peacemaker between us and the Oomm- 
ment. He stopped shat might hare taken place####"^ Sir Charles 
Saunders maintained throughout the disturbances that Dinusulu' s
example In paying the tax had prevented the disturbances froa
2qpreading throughout Zululand, although his view as to Dinusulu*s
3participation In the disturbances became less favourable later# 
Even the overt signs of defiance vere not taken equally 
seriously by a ll the magistrates! Chief Ngokwana* s tribe vere 
in itia lly  reported disrespectful and insolent* Two weeks later 
they were apparently "paying v e il" simply having been reprimanded 
by the Commissioner for Native A ffa irs^  A# J# 3. Merits, the 
magistrate of Entonjaneni who tried Sigananda*s men for their 
breach of the peace, thought su fficiently  l i t t le  of that episode 
to dismiss the men with a caution# Thia con flict in magisterial
1Col. Col# 98# Trial o f Dinusulu.Precognitions, Renaud.
Sibhamu ka Kboro (Chief Matuta, Babanango D ivision), Ndabankulu 
lea Lukwari (Chief Lubudlungu), Madikane ka Kfigneli (Chief 
Mnyombe), MJinji ka ffiitahwayo (Chief Sigananda}•
2N.A.Dept# Animal Report 1906, C.N.A.,p#14#
^For Dinusulu1 s part in the disturbances see below, Chapter Til# 
*ZA 54, Report Magis. Unrlasi division, 24.1.06 aad 5.2.06#
5U  54 Ch||, 7.4.06.
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views as to what constituted ’ rebelliousness9 was to persist 
throughout the disturbances, and became even more marked once 
the troops vere in the field*
The Government vere clearly in a d ifficu lt  position over 
the collection of the taxi having imposed i t  with l i t t le  con­
sultation even with those magistrates vho wore closest to Afrloan 
public opinion, and despite those ilio had pointed out its  effects 
in undermining African family l i f e  and aggravating their poverty, 
they vere nov faced vith widespread opposition. Apart from 
military preparations -  and even here, the Aotive K ilitia  vas
reduced and the H ilitia  Reserves s t i l l  disorganised at the be­
ginning of 1906 -  there is  l i t t le  indication that the government 
considered what i t  would do i^ its  authority were challenged over 
the collection of the tax* James Stuart, at that time First 
Criminal Magistrate in Durban, responsible for convening meetings 
o f African urban workers to announce the tax, vaa one of the few 
people to faoe the issue squarely. After a couple of turbulent 
meetings at which the Africans had vigorously voioed their oppo­
sition to the tax he wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs 1
"On getting refusal, compulsion In some form or 
other may have to be resorted to, but ie i t  de­
sirable to resort to force when, aa I think, ths
whole people are not only opposed to the tax, but 
regard it  as opprsssive and as calculated to disturb 
their social system*••• I as one whose duties bring
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hla into olose contact vith tha natlvas venture 
to think that tha passing of this act brings the 
Oolony ••• faoe to faoa vith a grave risk vhioh 
cannot ba too vail considered beforehand.wl
Far from considering tha risk hovever, the sola response of tha
M.N.A. vas to reprimand Stuart for holding meetings of Africans
and alloving them to get out of hands his not proceeding through
the traditional chieftainly authority (non-existent in the urban
oentres) vas regarded as a far greater threat to the security
2o f the colony, than a possible explosion over the Tax.
For the small vhite minority in Hatal, there could, in 
any case, have been l i t t le  question of retracting and repealing 
the tax in response to African opposition. Almost a ll vhites 
even those vho themselves opposed the tax, fe lt  this vould be an 
extremely dangerous precedent, undermining their authority and 
prestige. It vould in their viev have spelt the beginning of the 
end of vhite rule. On the other hand, there could not be much 
hope of relying on -the polioe force in the event of videspread 
resistance to the taxs in the firs t plaoe, as has been already 
mentioned it  vas not legally  enforceable before May 51st; in 
the second, the policy force, which had been reconstituted in
XSHA 1/4/14 Ct||, 8.11.05. 
gIbid. . Minute, M.N.A.
3
See e .g , Speech made by Col. Greene, m.L.A. ** Wart burg reported 
in Greytovn Gasette. 10.3.06.
9<? *
1894, just after the grant of Reeponalble Government, then
consisted of between two hundred and three hundred Europeans,
and one hundred Africans j by 1906 the European section had
risen to 40 o fficers and 1,126 of other ranks v iih  143 police
stations to man.1 Even so, the European section was small.
According to Assistant Commissioner Hardall o f Natal Police
the number of European police in eaoh d istrict was Mso limited
that they cannot be sent from one division to another" j in
Umsinga division, for example, which had a native population of
approximately 40,000, there vere six European polios o fficers
and twenty native constables. The proportion in Kapumulo was 
2sim ilar. There vas moreover considerable nervousness on the 
part o f the ^atal authorities about placing their confidence in 
African police. Aooording to Hardall again, native polloe were 
reluctant to serve out of their own d istricts and wars always 
subject to tribal influences mad the control o f their own ch iefs. 
During the disturbances ha complained that several o f them "openly
3joined the rebels". African polloe in Natal were extremely 
poorly paid, and both because of this and because the Polloe Force
Hlajor A. A. Wood, Natal Past and Present (Devon, 1962), pp. 37-40. 
2N.N.A.C. Annex., pp. 1021-2.
3ib id .
insisted on a minimi* oontraot o f three years, there vere con­
stant d ifficu ltie s  in the way of recruiting the requisite number*  ^
The change made in 1894 in handing over the control of the African
polios from magistrates to the vhite Police o fficers had, according
2to many observers, not had a beneficial effect* The M ilitia 
Aot o f 1903 had made provision for the establishment tf a pezmanent 
M ilitia to deal vith just this kind of contingency) but this 
foroe which could be ordered to any part of the oolony to act "in
aid of or as the polios force” had never been created because of
3lack o f finanoial support*
Most Natali an s however probably realised that in the final 
analysis they oould resort to the Active M ilitia , and that the 
Maxim gun and dum-dum ballet oould save then from the effect of 
most internal disturbances* It vas this assurance that enabled 
Natal politioians to face the possib ility  of 9native trouble9 
vith equanimity* This appears to be borne out by the views of 
Marshall Campbell, an influential sugar farmer vho vas one of 
the Natal representatives on the South African Native Affairs Com­
mission. On his return from serving the Commission, he apparently
1Report of Chief Commissioner of P olice ,1902, p. 6, 16, 26* Sim. 
Report 1903, p-4, Report 1904, p*4, and Report 1908, p .30.
o
e.g. M* S* Evans, The Native Problem (Prntg, 1906), p .25.
3Stu*rt, 2 .E .. p.134.
brought up th* danger of allowing the subject of native affaire 
to elide and suggested the formulation of a more liberal policy 
for Hatal baaed on the recommendations o f the Commission Report.
At this he "was told by one cabinet minister with heat to le t 
the danger come and we vould settle it  once and for a l l " .1 There 
was l i t t le  room for compromise vith such a view.
Natal had begun to build up her permanent armed forces with 
the implementation of the M ilitia Aot of 1903. Until that time, 
she had been defended by Imperial troops. These should have been 
withdrawn within five  years o f the grant of Responsible Covexnment, 
but Anglo-Boer rivalry in South Afrioa in the nineties and the out­
break o f the Anglo-Boer tfar led to their re ten t i  chi in Natal until 
1904-3* XiVen after their withdrawal, which was faced with re­
luctance by Natal ministers, the Natal Defenoe Force vas accustomed 
to draw on Imperial supplies. Nevertheless much emphasis vas 
placed on the importance of building up a purely oolonial force, 
vhioh would be free of any outside interference. Indeed a major 
cause of controversy between Natal md the British government in 
the 1902-3 discussions on the Natal's defenoe proposals vas over 
who should command the Natal M ilitia . The Assembly were adamantly 
opposed in 1902-4 to placing the army under the command of the O fficer
1KCL Marshall Campbell Papers, Bantu Section. Draft of letter 
to the Natal Advertiser. April 1907.
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in Command o f His Majesty's Regular Forces, unless he vere of
the substantive rank of Major General. I t  vas stated by
several members in the Natal Legislative Assembly that the Natal
M ilitia  would probably never have to meet a European enemy in
the fie ld  and that *•in Native warfare Colonials would have more
confidence in Colonial O fficers than in Junior O fficers of H.K.
Regular Forces".1 While the original M ilitia Aet o f 1903
embodied oolonial vievs on the subject, it  vas amended by Aot
30 o f 1905 which enabled a Colonel in the British army to take
oommandof the Natal forces. In the event the ohange made l it t le
2differences in August 1905 Col. Bru-de-Wold, a Norwegian bom 
Natalian, became Commandant of the Natal M ilitia  to be followed 
in 1907 by Sir Duncan MoKensia  ^ vho vas Natal bom and bred.
The conviction that colonials knew best how to deal vith 
native unrest vas deeprooted in South Africa as a whole, and in 
Natal vas doubtless strengthened by painful memories of the dis­
asters o f the Zulu War. In Natal the 'volunteering' tradition
1C0 179/230/30229, Conf. 1 Acting Admin. H. Bale to S .o . St. 2.8.04.
2Col. H.T. Bru-de-Wold of Norwegian origins served under Col. W.
Royston in the Boer War, vas Commandant of Natal M ilitia  1902-7.
(H. C. Lugg, H istoric Zululand and Natal, pp. 1-2, Pmbg, 1948}
^Sir Duncan MoKensie, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., V.B. Bom Fort Nottingham, 
Natal, 1859. Educated Hilton College, Natal; farmer and transport 
rider, served in Kdebele Rebellion 1896,in Boer War. In oommmd of 
Field Foroes 1906, Commandant M ilitia  1907, 1914-18 Commanded Field Foxces 
in German Vest A frica; served on Union Defence Council Died 1932.
(.H.C. Lugg, H istorlo Zululand and Natal Fhibg, 1948).
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o f the frontiersman and Voortrekker also ran deep. From the 
earliest days of the oolony, whites had been "accustomed to 
trust In their sk ill as shottists and horsemen" and volunteering 
for m ilitary service had beoome part of the way of l i f e  o f the 
colonial farmer. Vith the passing away of the more rugged 
frontier conditions and wllh the advent of Responsible Govern­
ment, Natal ministries tried to turn the somewhat haphasard 
volunteer foroes into a method of defence for the colony. The 
fir s t  step in this direction was the Volunteer Act o f 1B95* 
after the Boer War however i t  was realised that that Act only 
attracted a very small number into the colony's active m ilitia ,
and legislation  vas framed to provide for a larger, permanently
x
organised and trained m ilita. The attempts at compulsory oon- 
soripticn and training were much opposed, many settlers feeling 
that the old burgher system was in fin ite ly  preferable to th is 
new-fangled m ilitia , the very embodiment of militarism and the 
antithesis of the ideal of the hardy, Independent and adventurous 
pioneer.^
^A. F. Hattersley, Carbineer. The History o f the Royal Natal 
Carbineers (Aldershot, 1950), p .29.
2Greytown Gasette, 14.7.06 and 21.7.06, 28.7.06, 18.8.06, 25.8.06. 
deplored amended M ilitia  Aot which fcave increased power to offioers 
of reserves. It maintained the bulk of Hie work in the rebellion 
was done by irregu la rs?^ !. F. Hattersley, Carbineer, pp. 29-50. ,
The M ilitia  Act o f 3903 vaa in fact an attempt to reconcile 
the two ideals. Under i t ,  the Natal M ilitia  vas divided into four 
sections t the predominantly volunteer, permanent Active M ilitia  
which could be supplemented by ballot froa members of the First 
M ilitia  Reserve to reach its  maximum peacetime strength o f 4,000 
and three compulsory Reserve forces. At the time of the disturb­
ances these three reserve forces vere however not properly organised 
and could not be ealled upon for active servioe very readily) in 
addition, the ballot ay stem, which vas highly unpopular, was not 
invoked eith er.1 Nevertheless, Natal vas able to ca ll on the 
aid of volunteers from a ll over South Afrioa, very many of them 
men who had not really settled down after the Boer War or vere 
unemployed as a result o f  the post-Boer War depression. They 
vere not unwilling to Join a new 'Skiet^Kommando' for further 
adventure. These volunteers -  who made up such groups as Royston* s 
Horse and the Natal Rangers -  enabled Natal to handle the disturb­
ances without calling for direct Imperial aid, although at the 
very beginning o f  the trouble a garrison of the Queen's Cameron
Highlanders was stationed at Pietermaritzburg, more as a gesture
2of moral support than anything else.
^Stuart, Z .R .. p .42.
2Cd 2905, no. 6, Qov. to Sec. S t., 10.2.06.
W ithin th# Natal m i l i t ia  the •burgher* p r in c ip le  vas em­
bodied in  th# clau se  whloh enabled C hief Leaders and ^ ib -le a d e rs  
o f  the Reserves in  each area to  be appointed by the Commandant 
" in  pursuance o f  a v o te  passed by the m a jority  o f  the members 
of such M il i t ia  R eserves". As Stuart r ig h t ly  p o in ts  out t h i s  
meant th at in  many cases the o f f i c e r s  so s e le c te d  were not p a r t i­
c u la r ly  s u ita b le  through th e ir  m ilita ry  knowledge or e x p er ien ce* 
but sim ply happened to  be the most popular o r  the w ea lth ies t  
man in  the d i s t r i c t . 1 I t  oould a lso  lea d  to  u n fortu n ate  r e s u lts  
for the A fr ica n  population* because the most popu lar candidate 
amongst the w hite farm ers might w e ll be the one w ith  extrem ist 
view s on the "n a tiv e  q u e s tio n "• I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t  that tho
a g ita t io n  f o r  the removal o f  T ilonko and M sik o fe li from th e ir  
wards oame not on ly  from the Farmers A ssoc ia tion s  o f  Richmond
and Ix op o , but a lso* aa p e rs is te n t ly *  from the C h ief Leader o f  
2
the R eserves. In the Umsinga d iv is io n  too* the fa rt  p layed by
the Leaders o f  the Reserves in  secu ring  the a r re s t  o f  C h ief Kills*
d e sp ite  the orders from MIhtary headquarters* i l lu s t r a t e s  th is
3
p a r t ic u la r  aspect o f  popular e le c t io n .  A gainst th is*  on the
^ . a . . p .43.
2w. 5 8 ^ ,  J .  Marvick* C h ief lea d er  o f  Reserves to  P.M. 24.3*06 and
20.3.0b* and SNA 1 /4 /5  C§£, Magis. F. E. Foxon 2 6 .3 .0 6  forw arding
re s o lu t io n  o f  Bronk V le i06 F.A. f o r  removal o f  M a ik o fe ll
and P.M. 58= ^ *  Ixopo Farmers* A ssocia tion *  2 0 .3 *0 6 .
3
•'see below* pp. s o  t
other hand i t  should also be borne in mind that cxi occasion 
local reservists.might be more likely  to avoid acting pro­
vocatively than outside volunteers vith no stake in the d istrict. 
During the disturbances, the M ilitia Reserves vere generally 
alerted to serve in their ovn d istrictsi
Although prior to 1906, most members of the M ilitia Re­
serves had had l i t t l e  formal military training, a large pro­
portion of the able-bodied vhite males vere enrolled either as 
Cadets or in R ifle  Associations. Under the Cadet system, lade 
between the age of ten and fourteen vere drilled vithout arms 
and instructed in musketry; at a later age they vere also taught 
marching, firing exercises, simple parade and fie ld  movements.
This institution founded in 1869 vas upheld by most of the schools 
of the colony. The R ifle Associations fu lfilled  a largely social 
function in the rural areas, during peaoetime but duriz^ war or 
in an emergency could act as a reservoir of able riflemen vho 
could be called out oompulaorily for service by the Governor.
Through membership of a R ifle Association whites oould obtain 
arms and ammunition at very favourable ratee, subsidised by the 
government. The number of R ifle as so cl at inns grew to such an extent 
from the end of 1905 onwards, and vere dearly  regarded as so 
valuable an adjunct to the M ilitia during the disturbances ^that 
their 1906-7 budget shoved 100°/o  increase over that of the previous
year.1 Even before 1906 however these Associations had gone a 
long way towards inducing every liiits male in Ratal to become, 
in M.N.A. Vinter's phrase, "a sh ottlst".2 Nor was Vinter alone 
in feeling that in view of the sparseness of the European popu­
lation of Ratal a ll whites should beoome proficient marksmens 
in a speech to the Annual encampment of the Ratal Volunteer Force 
in 1903, the Gov amor, Sir Henry KcCallum, urged that it  was the 
duty of everyone "in such a country as this where you are surrounded 
by a large coloured population” to learn to shoot. Indeed he vent
even further and stated that i f  he had his way he would also "lik e
3to see every woman in the country learn how to shoot” •
The other m ilitary preparations of Natal consisted in the 
purchase of ammunition end especially expanding bullets, the co­
ordinating of plans with the general O fficer Commanding the British
4forces in South A frica, and, at the loca l lev e l, preparations 
for the building of stockades and laagers at the various magis­
tracies at the end of 1903 on the instruction o f the new Commandant
^Hatal Govt. G&sette, 12.6.06, p.391» Supply B ill 1906-7.
Debates
iT.L.A.7 v o l. 22, p .40, 1894, Reply to Address.
^Reported in Natal Witness. 16.4.03.
*See esp. GH 584, Secret 1904-5 passim.
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of tho m ilitia . Col. Bru-de-Wold, as a "precautionary measure".1
That these preparations were being made to fight a black foe
was quite explicitly  stated by members of the government aad
2of the armed forces. The importance of dum-dum bullets vith 
their greater stopping poser when fighting"members of savage 
races fifha/ i t  must be remembered are not creatures of nerves" 
was also stressed more than onoe, and not only by H a ta lia n s .^
While however the whites were making their military arrange­
ments, the provisions under which Africans could obt&ine fir e ­
arms were also being tightened up considerably. Various Firearms 
Laws restricting the supply of arms and ammunition to Africans 
and Asians had been passed in Natal since 1859} ttie last of these 
vas Act No. 1 of 1906. This made the permission of the S.N.A. 
necessary before any non-white be allowed to possess firearms.
Onoe given this permission, chiefs were to be allowed two pounds 
of gunpowder and two hundred rounds of ammunition, ordinary 
Africans, half a pound of gunpowder and f if ty  rounds.^ At the
1ZA 34 Copy M ilitia Conf. Circular no. 5# 1905.
^N.L.A. Debates vol 31# P*59, e.g. S.N.A. speaking on Natal Defence 
Force B ill 6.3*02. See also vol. 33,pp*100, 103, 118-9.
3S*. e.g. CO 179/238/22382 V.O. to U.Seo.St. 21.6.06. Thi. phru*
2s Sir Henry HoCaUum'e in CO 179/236/30630 , 26.7.06.
4 $44 of Aot 1, 1906.
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turn of tho century# there were M id to he some fire  thousand 
r if le s  in Zululand alone#3, nest of these being "old# obsolete 
aad of very l i t t l e  use"# vainly relies o f the gun-selling days 
on the diamond fie lds and the Zulu her of i£79, During the 
Boer War i t  vas believed that the Zulu had captured many more 
guns from tha Boers# vhioh they had failed to register or hand 
over to the aagiatrates. One o f the reasons given for HqCmsIo's 
drives in Zululand after the surrender of Dinuaulu vaa the ferret­
ing out of the thousands of guns vhioh vere thought to have been 
hidden there and in the Vryheid d istrict. Although a oonslderabls 
number of unregistered guns vere found at the Ueuthu# thirteen 
or fourteen o f vhioh Dinusulu admitted vere hie personal possessions#
ths Chief Justice at his tria l rebooted aa unsetabllahed that these
2vere oolleoted vith any treasonable Intent, Bor vaa there evi- 
denoe that these guns had beeausedin the rebellion in 1906,
Natal caution over allowing Africans to possess firearms 
vas extended even to the loyal levies employed during the disturb­
ances, When one thousand men of Sllvane'a tribe vere called out 
to assist the troops they asked to be provided vith r ifle s  and 
blankets# both of vhioh requests vere apparently regarded as equally
N,L,A, Debates# vol, j>8# pol4*  Also otuart# p«90«
Aco. to Stuart there vere not nore than 200 guns south of the Tugela,
Trial of Dinuaulu . . .  (Pmbg # 1910), Judgment Rex vs Dinuaulu# 
p.xix.
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outrageous and neither of which was granted.^ Col* Bru—de­
void though he was over-ruled by Maydon was also reluctant 
to allow the recruits from Eden dale Mission Reserve organised 
by a*C. Samuelson to arm, despite the fact that they had aided 
the government <a several previous occasions. This failure 
on the part of the government to trust them with weapons was a 
source of considerable bitterness -  and is interesting paralleled 
by the position of the equally 'loya l' Indians, who during the 
1906 disturbances also fe lt  the failure of the government to 
trust them was a slight on their loyalty* In the oase of the
Indians this obstacle was overcome by the government's accepting
3their services as stretcher-bearers* On "the other handt it  
should be noted the Chief Sibindi* whose loyalty was ^>parently 
undoubted and who therefore repeatedly expressed fears that he 
would be assassinated, was granted a supply of r ifle s  and a 
thousand pounds of ammunition while the disturbances vere in fu ll 
flow .6
^Stuart, Z.R.. pp. 327-0.
2R.C.A. Samuelson, Long Long Ago* pp. 194-6.
3See above, Chapter I, p. A-^ - 
^See below, Chapter VI, p. “SA'S-5
5C0 179/234/16341, Gov. to Seo. St. 20.4.06 (Cd 3027).
None of this for one moment implies that Natal was doing
anything more than taking justifiab le precautions against what
was to her mind -  and indeed to that of the War Office as late
as 1909 -  a very real danger.* It certainly does not mean
that these preparations were made deliberately so that the
Natal whites could goad the Africans into rebellion and then
wipe them out. On the contrary, a ll these preparations are
more an indication of Natal fears than their confidence. Under
the stress of the financial position in Natal between 1904
and 1906 expenditure on the m ilitia also f e l l  -  as did the
2membership of the armed forces. This also argues against too 
glib  a theory of deliberate provocation. Nevertheless.) once 
Natal had complete control over her armed forces, ministers 
could be lass cautious about the policies they adopted and 
soldiers could think of "preventive action” and "teaching the 
natives a lesson"7 relatively secure in the knowledge of their 
superior arms and organisation.
Despite Stuart’ s interesting chapter^ on the Zulu military 
system in his History of the Zulu Rebellion , i t  is significant
*See CO 179/255/21046 ¥.0. to C.O. 24*6.09. "The Army Council 
are of the opinion that Zululand is , of all the territories of 
South Africa, that in which there is  the greatest likelihood 
of native disturbances."
S tu art, Z .& .. p .49. Defenoe Corresp. 52 n.d. Statement to acooifciany
J-etter A .J.w ase, Durban, ly in g  lo o se  in  f i l e .
2
■^ Chapter IV.
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that twenty-two of hia pages relate to the heyday of Zulu 
military glory, two to rebel organisation of 1906. In 1906 
the highly disciplined, drilled and swift regiments o f 1879 
were conspicuous by their absence. The Zulu military tradition 
had never had much reality in Natal, and in Zululand the 
regimental system had been outlawed after 1879* Although chiefs 
undoubtedly continued to form regiments, their military functions 
had virtually atrophied by 1906, only being exercised in the 
occasional faction fight. Stuart himself remarks that the 
Government probably gained more froa loyal chiefs who were semi- 
organised than they suffered from those who were in open re- 
bellion. These military functions in the past had been so closely 
tied to the Zulu Royal family, that once its  independent position 
had gone, they were bound to disappear. Apart from his subject 
condition, Dinusulu showed lit t le  real inclination to follow In 
the Shaka-Cetshwayo tradition. It is true that before his exile 
in 1889 he had organised a couple of regiments, and that during 
the Boer ^&r the •Nkomindala* regiment had been formed. But this 
vas really very small fry. The worst that witnesses against 
Dinusulu could maintain in 1907-9 was that the Nkomindala had 
continued drilling In secret after the B©er War -  and that i t
S tuart, Z.R.. p .90.
?<>■ •
contained about f i f t y  men vith rifles.*^ Even this vas not 
proven at his tr ia l. I f  it  vere so, the best that one can 
say of this regiment is that R itter's conjecture as to the 
meaning of the regimental t it le , vhioh Shaka earlier had be­
stowed on one of his regiments -  "the toothless cattle" -  is
pvery apt! By and large7the regiments which did exist, existed 
for the purpose of carrying out labour duties fo r  their chiefs, 
such as hoeing and weeding his gardens, and to some extent for 
hunting purposes. During the actual disturbances, -foe numbers 
of fragments of tribes involved in the disturbances and the 
incoherent nature of the response of Africans to the rebellion 
makes it  very d ifficu lt  to discern much in the nature of mili­
tary organisation. In so far as the Africans engaged in any­
thing more than defensive operations, i t  consisted of doctoring 
themselves for war along traditional lines (which may hare been 
as much a defensive as an aggressive act) and guerilla warfare.
It  is true that there vas an attempt to return to older military 
practices by Bambatha's armyin the Nkandla forests but this 
hardly got o ff its  feet. The numbers of casualties on either side 
bear out this analysis of the respective military organisations.
1C0 179/244/3802, Evidence Pobia ka Fogoti, End. In desp. Sec. 
11.1.08.
^E. A. Ritter, Shaka Zulu: The Rise of the &ilu Empire (London, 
1956),pp. 144-5. i .e .  "The Old Contemptibles". Dinusulu'»  ex­
planation of the name Is less lmaginatives he said It derived 
froa the Afrikaans "Vis koa dasr" (Vho goes there?), Natal Witness. 
20.1.09.
295
The o ffic ia l figures given in mid-July vere 3>500 Africans 
k illed , vith 2,000 wounded or surrendered.1 European armed 
dead amounted to twenty-four altogether with six others who 
died from causes other than the enemy (e.g . heart disease, 
se lf-in flic ted  bullet wounds e tc .) Thirty-seven white soldiers 
were wounded and about half a dozen civilians were killed from 
January to September, including a Post Office messenger, a roads 
works overseer and a highly unpopular magistrate. The number of 
loyal ( i .e .  African) levies killed was six and thirty were 
wounded. 2
Whether m ilitarily organised or not, however, the Zulu 
were judged by many Nat aliens to be in dangerous and threatening 
mood in 1905-6. Most prominent among these believers in an "in­
evitable and widespread rebellion" were two key-flgures in the 
Hatal M ilitia, Col. Bru-de-Wold and Col. Duncan MoKensie. Even 
before the Boer War Bru-de-Wold recorded hia view that 1here waa 
a growing disrespect for the white man amongst Africans and as 
D istrict Commander in Weenen, he
"observed.•• that there was a certain restlessness 
and disregard for authority among the younger section 
of the natives in his d is tr ic t .•••• He made a point 
of v isiting the European homesteads In various parts 
where he found his suspicions corroborated . . .  By
1C0 179/236/26169, <>ov. to Seo. St. 17.7.06, n o .l.
2Stuart, Z.R.. pp. 541-2.
^Hatal Blue Book 1893* ?  12 Defence Report.
degrees there grew up in his mind the idea that 
an open rupture between the blaok and vhite races
would occur in the near future
He began to prepare for that contingency in his own area. 
Bru-de-tfold became Commandant of the Natal M ilitia in 1905, 
and immediately stepped up the order of Mark V and Vi ammu­
nition and issued the directive about laagers to magistrates 
which has already been mentioned.
McKenzie of the Natal Carbineers was a more ambitious 
and forceful man than Bru^e-Wold. During the 1906 disturbances 
he was placed in charge of air~the Field Forces to be mobilised to 
deal with the situation in the Midlands and Southern port inn of 
the colony at the outset of the disturbances. On the 1st June 
he was placed in charge of all the Field Forces in Natal and in 
the following year he became Commandant of the M ilitia. At the 
end of that year he again headed the Natal forces in the fie ld , 
this time despatched under oover of Martial Law to arrest Dinuzulu 
and hunt out rebels and witnesses for the ch ief's  tr ia l. He was 
then largely responsible for the continuation of Martial Law long 
after the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, and the Commissioner for 
Native Affairs In Zululand, considered it  necessary; Nathan 
described McKenzie vith whom he had had several brushes,
K.C.L. Stuart Papers, Col. Bru-de-Wold to J. -tuart, 22.1.13.
1
as a man who held "in its  utmost development the idea of govern-
at the beginning of 1908 attacked him in no uncertain terms,
for his handling of the situation both in 1906 and in 1907-81
"In thie oolony we have two points of view with 
regard to the native population. On the one hand 
we have the negro-phile fanatic and sentimentalist 
as Kiss Colenso...: on -the other we have a fanatic
of another sort, of whom Col. XoKensie may be taken 
as the type, whose sole idea is of ‘keeping top dog* 
and whose simple cure for most native trouble is 
systematic and wholesale ‘walloping the nigger*."
It is  d ifficu lt  to say exactly how accurate and fair this
newspaper assessment of Sir Duncan McKensie was; significantly
4enough he was called Shaka by the Africans* Despite the some­
what emotive language of the newspaper, i t  is  undoubtedly true 
that from the very outset of the disturbances McKensie was convinced 
that only the most drastic punishment would deter the whole 
African population of Natal from rebelling -  and he was in a 
sufficiently powerful position to give effeot to this conviction.
Nathan M^ S 368 to High Commissioner, 21.1.08.
^8.1.08.
Bosnian, The Natal Rebellion of 1906 (London 1907), p .124.
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Bru-de-Wold and McKenzie vere not singular in their
views either as Natalians or military men. The existence of
this kind of sp irit in the Transvaal at the time is  revealed
by a letter written hy Smuts to J. X . Herriman, then Prime
Minister at the Cape, on the 3rd April, 1906 when he referred
to " . . .  a strong party on the Rand (among idiom is  our friend
Woolls-Sampson) who pray ardently for a Kafir war, which will
mean a relieving of the great pressure at the Rand, military
contracts galore, and probably the forcing of -the natives to
go and work on the m i n e s . . . .L i e u t .  Col. Sir Aubrey Woolls
Sampson "was associated with leading figures in tho gold-mining
industry” and was a politica l opponent of both %uts and Merri-
man, becoming a Progressive member o f the Transvaal Legislative 
2Assembly j according to the C.N.A. in June he was largely
responsible for the widespread scare in the Melmoth division
3that a ll whites wore going to be killed at fu ll moon. Equally 
forceful opinions were held by such men as Mgalloping Jack” ,
Col. J. R. ^oyston who was in charge of a voluntary troop of 
horsemen largely recruited in the Transvaal.or W. V. Barker who
Smuts Papers ed. K. HancocklNJ. v.d. P03I (Cambridge 1966),
Vol. I I , no. 295* pp* 253-4*
2Smuts Papers. Vol. IV, Bibliographical Notes, p.401.
Z^A 28 Papers re Zulu Rebellion, Letter to R. M. Addison, 16.6.06 
see above Chapter IV, p. 2.5^-a.il■
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remarked at a luncheon held in honour of the Transvaal M ilitia
Reserve, whose commander he vas, thats
"War was a fight to the bitter end. 'flhey Aid not 
start i t ,  the other man did and it  was for the 
white man to say when the 'cease fire* should sound.
So long as a single native was in the fie ld  and 
did not put up both his hands with his assegais on 
the ground he was their enemy to be shot. H1
It is  undoubtedly the duty of the military man to act decisively 
in moments of cr is is  and, when called upon by the c iv il authority, 
to in flic t  sufficient punishment to act as a deterrent to law­
breakers. Chly the naivo would argue against the use of force by 
society whatever the circumstances. Nevertheless in the divided 
and easily charged atmosphere in Natal where so much of what 
passed as information among both black and vhite was rumour and 
half-truth, once the armed forces were called out a new dimension 
was added to any situation.
For those military men who had,Uke Bru-de-Wold, been pro­
phesying an inevitable rebellion.,the incident which led to the 
declaration of Martial lawfmoreover7undoubtedly represented a 
"golden opportunity" to in flic t  "the most drastic punishment oa
all leading natives found guilty of treason", disarming them and
2"in stillin g  a proper respect for the white man".
^Natal witness. 23*7.06.
2C0 179/233/12460, Encl. 2 in desp. 9.3*06, MaKensie to H. of Defenoe 
and Cd 3027 *101 Encl. 4 in desp. 97* MoKensie to Dept, of M ilitia, 
15.6.06.
In what followed therefore, the declaration of Martial law 
on the 9th of February played an important role, for Martial law 
is in some ways the very abrogation of law. Under i t ,  any acts 
carried out "in good faith” by the governor, the Commandant of 
the M ilitia or their subordinates in an attempt to put down the 
disturbances would be indemnified thereafter by an Act of Parlia­
ment. Once there was "no law" in Natal, the normal restraints of 
society could be loosened, ilie element of foroe took on a new 
significance. As well as being a response to aggression whether 
overt or covert i t  could in turn become its  cause. It was not of 
course the only cause. Many tribes who experienced troops march­
ing through their locations took the government’ s advice and re­
mained quiet -  or even responded to the appeals for aid from 
the whites. And the same was true of those tribes which found them­
selves attacked by the "rebel force# in the second phase of the
disturbances, when the men under Bambatha attempted to foroe other
1peoples to join them. Some responded positively, others fled to 
the nearest magistracy or to the bush. Nevertheless where there 
was a background of tension and conflict with white authority, 
administration, police or settlers, fears were aroused simply 
by the appearanoe of tho white troops on the seen?f: Africans
would arm and doctor themselves for war, sometimes i t  would appear
^Stuajrt 2L ^  •
purely in self-defence, and this on the other side would rouse 
fresh apprehensions and forces would be sent to deal vith a new 
outbreak of "rebellion” . In much of what follows there is some­
thing in the nature of a se lf-fu lfillin g  prophecyi fearing, 
perhaps half wanting, rebellion the oolonists and their leaders 
by their actions, gave substance to their fears. It is there­
fore necessary to trace in some detail the inoident antecedent 
to the declaration of Martial Law.
II
Ono of the most important of the in itia l incidents of de­
fiance over the collection of the Poll Tax occurred on the 7th 
February, when Chief Mveli of the Funzi tribe brought his people 
to pay their tax to the magistrate of the Umgeni division, T.R. 
Bennet, at Henly. On hearing from the ahief that some twenty- 
seven armed members of his tribe had taken up a position almost 
two miles away, the magistrate sent a European trooper,who spoke 
no Zulu and two African messengers to find out the reason fo r  
their behaviour. Both the African messengers were relatives 
of the chief, one of them his brother, called Jobe.
On arrival the emissaries addressed themselves to the leaders 
of the group* Makanda and M^ ongo and asked what vas going on. Accord­
ing to Jobe their reply was "we have come to the Chief or magistrate
who is collecting the money. We shall refuse our money for 
the Poll Tax". They were then asked why they were carrying 
assegais and answered "These assegais, i t  is  our day today.
There will be Mood today". At this point the rest of the 
men came forward suddenly -  whether to hear what was being 
said, whether for some less innocent purpose, is  not clear -  
and the messengers turned ta il and fled . 1
Mjongo and his men then went o ff  to their kraals on 
Henry Hosking's farm Trewirgie near Byrnetown. The following 
day a detachment of fifteen policemen including two Africans 
was sent to arrest the twenty-seven men accused of being in 
unlawful possession of arms. The police, under Sub-Inspector 
S. K. Hunt,arrived at dusk, having lost their way earlier in 
the day, and, despite Hosking's advice, deoided to proceed 
with the arrest. At the kreals, about a mile away from the 
homestead, they asked fo r  the wanted men and Mjongo and two 
others were found immediately, and were handcuffed. The police 
then began their search for the others who were some way away 
from the kraals in the bushes. According to the Court Martial 
evidence of Mbadi, one of the accused:
"After Mjongo had gone we decided to follow him.
Then one police trooper saw us and turning round
C^O 179/284/19935* find, in desp. Conf. Gov. to Seo. St. 11.5*06 
ia the evidence and judgment in the Richmond Court Martial. 
Henceforth cited as Richmond C.H. Evidence Jobe 12.3*06, and 
Mant&zi ka Mjongo, 17*3*06.
O '
‘1
called the others. The polloe oame and • ••«
B a ld  'go home, go home*.
Ve noticed that they had drawn their revolvers, 
they were in front of us, so we drew back to the 
rocks, saying that we had done no harm in the 
location. They said* 'You have been carrying 
assegais'. We said 'There is no harm in that.
Kveli sent us back.' We said ' Let Mveli come 
here we w ill talk to him. It is no good your
coming here armed'  They told us to lay down
our assegais and we said, 'How can we do bo when
you have drawn your firearms ' The others
then shouted 'you have come for our money; you 
can shoot us. We won't pay*, and 'We would 
rather die than pay'."*
When Mjongo was released by the police to try and quieten 
the men who were flourishing small shields and assegais, he 
was pulled down amongst them. The police then apparently rode 
in on their horses amongst the g*oup, who believed that they
were trying to trample them down; this did nothing to improve
2their temper.
Eventually the police returned to the kraal, followed 
by the men, some of whom, according to their evidence had agreed 
to discuss matters there or at Soaking's farm, others of whom
3wished either to join or rescue the two men already arrested.
^Richmond C.M. Similar evidence was given by the other accused, 17.5*06. 
^Ibid. Evid. Manibuka and Ubuwini, 17*3*06.
3Ibld. Evid. Mbadi and Mjaja, 17.3.06.
T&ey trooped down after the police in twos and threes, 
according to Stuart "jeering and taunting . . .  ^hea^ in the 
most insolent manner", according to some African witnesses singing 
and praying as they had done outside Henly. ^  Suddenly one of 
the Africans grabbed hold of the bridle of the polioeman In 
charge of the prisoner, Ngcuba. Sub-Inspector Hunt immediately 
fired his r i f le  and the other police followed suit. In the en­
suing scuffle, four Africans were wounded and two of the police, 
Sub-Inspector Hunt and Trooper Armstrong, were stabbed to death.
The following day, Martial law was declared throughout the colony.
although the picture which emerges from the Court Martial 
evidence is not absolutely clear, and there are obviously great 
d ifficu lties  in interpz»eting the evidence of the accused, i t  would 
appear from this incident that no premeditated murder of the magistrate 
or the police o fficers was intended#let alone a widespread massacre of 
whites. Even i f  one follows the o ffic ia l account of what occurred.
or Stuart, despite the jeers and gesturing, the Africans did not
2strike f ir s t . Th8 f ir s t  shot was fired by Hunt at a handcuffed
3prisoner. On the 7th February, the three messengers from the 
magistrate to the armed men, escaped unscathed; nor, 
i f  as was alleged, the group intended murdering the magistrate,
^Richmond C.M. Svid. passim 15*3.06 and 16.3.06.
2S.R.. p .122-126 gives an account of the ’ Trewirgie* affray.
5Cf S.N.A. l/S /204^?6, Petition of Ngcuba undergoing 20 year sentence and
30 lashes, Minute assistant Commissioner of Polloe, Kardall to S.N.A. 
"Trooper van Aardt informa me that ha believes that tha prlaonar vaa 
shot by Sub-Inspector Hunt. This vould be the first shot fired .
is  i t  dear why they should have taken up a position two miles 
away frcm the magistracy. Indeed some of them maintained they 
had been ordered to stop there by Kveli himself -  presumably 
because they were carrying assegais, although this was not 
illega l, and because he wished to stop them from voicing 
their opposition to the Poll Tax before the magistrate. Accord­
ing to both Nomkuba, the sister o f Makanda, and of Mhntayl ka 
Mjongo, himself one of the accused, they were on their way to 
paying their taxes when they were ordered to stop.”*- Had they 
gone on to the magistracy i t  is conceivable that an incident 
no more serious than those already described as having taken 
place in Mapumulo and Nkandla might have occurred. Once it was 
reported, however, the magistrate could not ignore the faot that 
these men vere armed, but his sending as the only Zulu speaking 
messengers relatives of the ohief was perhaps unfortunate. Tha 
crucial mistake however would appear to have been the sending 
of so small a detachment of police to arrest them the following
day, under a man like 3ub-Inspector Hunt. Hunt himself, who knew
2no Zulu, was not well sulked to his task. Apparently oonvinoed 
beforehand that this was going to be the start of a widespread
^Richmond C.M., £vid. 15 . 5*06.
uprising, he ftolt that ha had bean selected aa "halt" by tha 
government.^" While there la noevidenoe to suggest that ha had
been selected as a victim by the Africans involved In tha in­
cident, his own somewhat extreme views on the "native problem" 
may have influenced his behaviour. Thus in a letter to his 
family shortly after his arrival in Natal in the early nineties 
he wrote in terms of "licking the niggers into shape" and "knocking
hell out of them". It is  possible that ten years in Natal had
2mellowed ^ub-Inspector Hunt’ s approach to Africans. The tradition 
however that lives on in his family of an autocratic, overbearing 
man is larne cut by the African evidence at 1he Court Martial.
hatever the truth of the police handling of the matter, 
on the other hand, i t  can be argued that after a ll twenty-seven 
men had appeared armed in defiance of the Poll Tax and this in 
it s e lf  was sufficient indication of their hostility  to the govern­
ment.
Here again the picture is more complicated. While i t  would 
appear that the immediate reason for the group* a defiance was 
their Chief's order to join other members of the tribe in paying 
the tax, the fact that they were a ll members of an independent
^Personal communication from Mr. K. Hunt, grandson of Sub-Inspector 
Exuit, and drawn from enl^ites in his unpublished diary which I have
not been able to see.
Letter from S. Hunt to his parents in Dorset, 15.2.96 kindly shown 
me by Mr. K. Hunt, Rhodes University.
2
churoh was significant. It Tlot naan that they vara nec­
essarily anti-white (though th«y probably ware in this instance),
but that they ware estranged from their chief and his pagan
L
follow ers.
There was a fa irly  long history of antagonism in the Funsi 
tribe between Christian converts and pagans. Thus in 1896 a case 
was taken from the Native High Court to the Supreme Court in which 
Christian members of the tribe alleged that they had been victimised 
by their Chief (at that time Hemuhemu, M veli's father). Apparently 
as a resu lt of the complaints of some of the older members of his 
tribe that their wives and daughters stayed out late when they 
had been attending services, Hemuhemu forbade the holding of ser­
vices in public or the saying o f prayers inprivate. The penalty 
for infringing this command was a £2 fine or a beast and when the 
local missionary came to hold servioes in his location , tho chief 
actually sent his private policeman to note down the names of 
those who attended. The complainants at this time were orthodox 
members of the European controlled Wesleyan Methodist Church.
While Chief Justice Sir Walter WVagg of the Supreme Court found
2in favour o f the Christians in this instance, the complaint
^See ay article  "Christian African Participation in the 1906 Zulu 
Rebellion", Bulletin o f the Society for African Churoh History.
Vol. I I , no. 1, 1965, pp. 55-72.
^Reported in the Proceedings of the Natal Missionary Conference.
July 1896.
of the chief that the Christians of his tribe were disrespectful 
o f his authority le  a fam iliar theme in missionary history.
That ths con flict did not die down in 1896 is  borne out by a 
le tter written by Joeeph Baynes, M.l*A. to ths Magistrate of 
Richmond in tie middle o f 1904 transmitting ths complaints o f  
"respectable kraalheads" in the areadtout the disruptive effects 
especially on the women of a Christian sect operating froa 
Trewirgie under Mjongo, at that time a sawyer with Makanda in 
the Eaon forests.'1’ By this time however ths Christians complained 
of would appear to have become independent of the European mission- 
ary.
The 1906 episode in some ways also suggests a continuance 
o f this aspect o f ths co n flic t , and it  is  d ifficu lt  to say how 
far antagonism was directed against ths Chief as representative 
of ths government, how far as representative of rejected tribal 
tradition. Kbadi's statement "Let Mvell come here we w ill talk 
with hia" suggests that the defiance was primarily directed 
againet the Chief and not the government. ltveli's  own prompt 
reporting of the incident to the magistrate — unlike Bam ba tha1 s 
subsequent behaviour -  and his a lacrity  and seal in hunting out 
the rebels,as well as his expressed wish to rid himself of their
X00 179/234/19938, Brid. Richmond O.K.; Sim. O.D.Alexandar} H .l's  *-«*•. 
to Magis. Richmond, 13«7*04.
wonen md children,'*' «ay w a ll hapt represents* m attempt aa 
hla part to consolidate hla hold orer the tribe md rid hiaaalf 
o f m unruly aad undermining alaamt In ita midst.
Whoever tha complex!tits o f tha Incident, tha fact that 
i t  involved members o f a aaparatiat aaot aid that two poliaa 
o fficers  had ham k illed  undoubtedly increased white fears md 
aada the incident appear particularly ominous. Taken a g a in s t 
the background o f rumours and isolated incidents of resistance 
to the *o ll Tax this was the last straw. Xt led to the swift 
declaration o f Martial Law over the entire colony within hours 
o f an event which in normal cirswmstmces would hardly have war­
ranted mors than the reinforcement of the loca l police force.
She participants in tha shooting o f Bunt md Armstrong were 
soon to su ffer dearly fo r  their actions. On the day Martial Law 
was declared troops were mobilised md a column under Col. Dunoan 
Hdensie despatched to the Midlands. Together with Mveli md 
fir e  hundred o f his men, they searched the Bymetown area and the 
Kaon forest. On the 15th February, Just a week after the in itia l 
incident, two o f Mjoago's am were oaptured md, after tria l by 
Drumhead Court Martial, were shot in tho precedes of Mreli md
1PMC 101/88 MoEwui. to F.X. 15.2.06.
women and children,'*' may v e il have represented an attempt on 
his part to consolidate his hold over the tribe and rid himself 
o f an unruly and undermining element in its  midst.
Whoever the complexities o f the incident, the fact that 
i t  involved members of a separatist seot mad that two polios 
offloers had been k illed  undoubtedly increased white fears and 
made the incident appear particularly ominous. Taken gain st 
the background o f rumours and isolated incidents of resistance 
to the Poll Tax this was the last straw. It led to the swift 
declaration of Martial Lav over the entire colony within hours 
of an event which in normal clroumstanoes would hardly have war- 
ranted more than the reinforcement of the looal police force.
The participants in the shooting of Hunt aad Armstrong vere 
soon to suffer dearly for their actions. On the day Martial Lav 
vas declared troops vere mobilised and § column under Col. Duncan 
MoKensle despatched to the Midlands. Together vith Mveli and 
five  hundred of his men, they searched the Byrne town area and the 
Enon forest. On the 15th February, just a week after the in itia l 
incident, tro o f Mjongo's men vere captured and, after tria l by 
Drumhead Court Martial, vere shot in the presence of Mveli and
1FMO 101/88 KoK.n.1. to P.M. 13.2.06.
his men*1 Ths remaining participants vere rounded up in ths
weeks that followed md vere tried by Court Martial vhioh sat
froa 12th to 17th Mar oh* A further twelve vere sentenced to
death end were, tfter some delay as a result o f protests froa
the Colonial O ffice, shot before assembled tribesmen and chiefs
froa the Midlands and Southern d istricts of the colony, on
the 2nd April. Several others vere sentenced to twenty years
imprisonaent vith hard labour, confiscation of property and 
2lashes. Finally, three remaining participants vho had been 
too badly wounded after a brush vith the troops hunting thea out 
in February to be shot by Court Martial lik e the rest, vere put 
to death after a tr ia l by the Katal Supreme Court, in September
•x
1906. Mjongo vas hanged on this occasion.
When the news of the Court Martial sentences f ir s t  reached 
London, i t  Is brought into sharp re lie f the con flict o f interests 
and ideals vhioh constantly faoed the Colonial O ffioe in South 
Africat the olaias o f the non-white population on its  humanitarian 
impulses, its  own b e lie f in  the inviolate nature o f self-governing
1Stuart, Z.R .. p .138.
2C0 179/234/19938, Santana, o f Riofcnond C.M., 19.3.06. 
C^d 3247, no. 46, Got. to S t., no. 2, 7.9.06.
institutions and the repercussions in the rest o f South Africa 
i f  any "Downing Street interference" was suspected. Aa Sir 
Matthew Nathan, who was Governor of Natal, 1907-9* put i t i  "It 
is  when a ruling democracy cones into close relationship with a 
subject race that the inconsistencies of democracy and Sap ire 
become apparent."1 The problea of resolving the differences be­
tween the "Hone idea of what is  right. •• in the interests of 
the natives, aid the Colonial view of what i t  is  possible to 
/pade?7 without danger to the safety of the Europeans"^ was one 
which faced, i f  i t  did not baffle , the Colonial Offioe throughout 
the dieturbancea and their aftermath.
The In itia l co llis ion  between the ^atal Government and the 
Colonial Offioe over the Richmond Courts Martial waa not an 
auapioiouB one fo r  the Imperial power. Already disquieted by 
the news of the imposition and continuance of Martial Law, the 
Colonial Offioe fe lt  that the presence of Imperial troops in 
Natal and the faot that the British Parliament would later hnre
to sanction an Indemnity Act, rendered then "morally responsible"
4fo r  the executions. On the 28th March a cable was sent to Natal
1Nathan Papers, MS 368, p .60 f f .
2ib ia .
*5For a fu ll discussion of the Imperial response to the Natal 
disturbances see R. Hyam, The African Policy of the Liberal 
Government 1905-1909 (Unpublished Cambridge Ph.P. 1963).
4C0 179/233/10712, Kinut* A.B. Keith, 23.3.06, Sla. H. W. Just 
and F. Graham.
pointing oat that the executions vere likely  to cause strong
criticism  in Britain, and that pending the receipt by the
Colonial O ffice of the Governor's "farther observations on the
matter" the executions should be susp«ided*^ There oan be
l i t t le  doubt that the able vas Intended as one of friendly
advice* Nevertheless i t  caused a furore* Vhen the Natal cabinet
refused to comply vith the request of the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Lord Elgin, the Governor, Sir Henry MoCallum
suspended them vithout further oomaunication vith  London* The
Natal ministry, also vithout further ado, resigned* Protest
meetings vere held In every corner of Natal, and messages of
sympathy poured In from a ll over South Afrioa* Tha Australian
Government objected to this interference vith the affairs o f a
self-governing oolony, vhile Nev Zealand, more prudently perhaps,
ooablsd fo r  further information*
In the fhoe of this uproar, Elgin retracted, maintaining 
that further information from Sir Henry KoOallum had reassured 
him as to the justice of the men's tria l and sentences* He assured 
hia eritios that even i f  the Natal ministers had not resigned he 
vould have acquiesced in the asntenoes on receipt of additional
1Cd 2905, no. 35, S*o. st . to Oov. 28.3.06.
o
A* B. Keith* Responsible Government In the Dominions (3rd ed. 
Oxford 1928), vol* 1* p *216* Stuart* **B. * p *1S5T
information from the Governor.1 Although Winston Chuxchill,
Colonial Under-Secretary, defended the Colonial O ffice’ s stand
before a highly charged House of Commons along these lines, he
summed up the incident in the Colonial Office f i le s  by minuting
2"This is a complete surrender"• I t  may have been complete 
surrender, although in the face of the excited situation in Hatal, 
vhere i t  vas claimed that the intervention vas endangering vhite 
lives, i t  vas d ifficu lt  for the Colonial Office to press their 
point. The fact hovetfer that the ^atal government had fe lt  it 
possible to resign at such a time and that it  vas their resignation 
vhich led to the publicity surrounding the clash, did not escape 
the attention of the Colonial O ffice.3
The most outspoken member of the Colonial Office staff vas 
A. B. Keith, vho held vievs vhioh vere far more extreme than most 
of his colleagues. He maintained that the nevs that HcKensie's 
forces vere demobilising on **aroh and that the Richmond tria l 
had lasted more then meweek and examined nearly thirty witnesses, 
shoved that executions under Martial Lav vere not justifiab le , 
especially as the ordinary oourts of the colony vere functioning
XCd 2905, no. 38, Sec. St. to Gov. 30.3.06.
2C0 179/233/10712, Minute on draft reply (n.d. c. 29.3.06).
3C0 179/233/14033, Minute F. Graham, 23?4.06.
perfectly normally,1 Keith* s views were denounced by his
colleagues at the time as "an outrage on a population vhich
is  qpite as humane ae Mr. Keith and has more knowledge of the 
2circumstances". Nevertheless by the end o f the disturbances,
Winston Churchill had privately stigmatised Natal as "the
3
hooligan of the British Etopire", and his successor as Under­
secretary confessed that he had "not an atom of confidence 
in the Natal m in is tr y "w h ile  the Colonial Secretaries, Lords 
Elgin and Crew were moire restrained in their language, there is  
every indication that they too had l i t t le  confidence in Natal's 
ab ility  to handle her affairs either rationally or humanely.
On the surrounding tribes the events o f March, 1906, and 
their culmination in the Court Martial sentenoes undoubtedly had 
a profound e ffect. According to Stuart, news of the drumhead 
Court Martial on the 13th February, "which was regarded as just 
and proper by every loyal Native spread at onoe far and wide".**
^ 0  179/233/11321, Klnut. 31.3.06.
2Ibld. H. B. Cox, Six. T. (htwham,W- Churohill m i Elgin.
3C0 179/243/21853, Mlnut. 27.6.07.
*C0 179/245/2833, Klnut. 3.2.09. Thi. m i or*r th .lr  haadliqg o f 
the Dinuaulu tr ia l aad proposed reforms of native administration.
5Z .a .. p.138.
Haring dealt vith these rebels, McKensie found it  necessary to
turn his attention to other chiefs md tribes in the d istrict
concerning whom there had been many adverse reports*1 Interviews
vere held vith chiefs regarded as defiant in some way, or vho
vere reported reluctant to pay the Poll Tax or to hare doctored
their tribes for var. KoKenzie vas convinced from the evidence
he had received froa settlers and military spies that he vas
nipping in the bud a videspread conspiracy of the black man to
2rise against the vhite. Ultimatums vere delivered to various 
chiefs to hand over their "rebellious" subjects md search their 
tribes for assegais* The tone adopted at these interviews vas 
hardly calculated to reassure the chiefs as to the pacific in­
tentions of the vhite man, whatever the proclamations in the 
Government Gasette or the reassurances from magistrates that 
"the quarrel o f the Government is  only vith rebels". Thus in his 
interview vith Chief ?aku9 whose tribe vas reported to have assegais 
in their possession9 Mo&ensie vas reported to hare stated>
"I want fifteen  head of oattle md a ll the assegais 
at Hlghflats. This is the last ohanee* / faku had 
just brought in eleven assegais in response to a 
previous demand^ He need not come to me vith a
1Z.B .. p. 145, Od. 2905, Qov. te Sm. S t., 16.5.06, p.56.
2Co.179/253/12460, Enel. 2 in deep. 41, 16.3.06, Col. MoKaniia to 
Col. Bru-de-Wold, 11.3.06.
*17
few assegais | I w ill go and oolleot them i f  he 
does not bring them a ll end I w ill take every 
beast ha has got and bum his kraals i f  tha 
oattle and assegais are not there. He baa to oome
to the store at Highflats tomorrow at this time.
Has he heard?1,1
Failure to comply meant the oohf5.toation o f oattle , and not
infrequently tha burning of crops aad kraals. Courts Martial
wars held before special courts act up by MoKensie, and sentences
of death, twenty-five years* imprisonment and f if t y  lashes were
2not uncommon. On more than one ooeasion, the Covamor^in-Couneil 
found i t  necessary to mitigate the harshness o f these Court 
Martial decisions. Thus in March, when a Court Martial sentenced 
seven members o f Makofeli’ s people to death fo r  "sedition", a ll 
the etntenoes were commuted to Imprisonment and forfeiture of
3oattle aa there had been no violence on the part of the accused.
4At this point MaAenaie handed hie resignation to the government. 
What happened neat ia not entirely oleari the resignation waa 
not accepted, MoKensie demanded that he be given a free hand in  
future -  and the sentences were not carried out. Some weeks later
1SHA 1/ 4/16 Report o f McKenzie*a interviews with Faku,
Mskofeli and Mnyamana, 12.3.06.
2S«« e.g. Report in Hntad iltneaa. 17-3.06 and 00 179/234/16020, 
End. in desp. 60, 11.4.06, sentences of Uatvalumi Court
Martial and Governor* s modifications.
. 2905, no. 37. Gov. to Sec. S t., 9*3.06.
*Cd 2905, no. 57, Gov. to Seo. S t., 16.3.06.
when he sentenced five memtfrs of Chief Charlie Fynn'a people
at Umtvalumi to death for similar of fences, these sentences as
v e il as some of his lesser ones, vere also modified.1 The
government decisions caused conriderable dissatisfaction both
amongst the troops and amongst local residents In the areas of
the Courts Martial -  and Indeed It may veil have been partly
the fear of repercussions from MoKensle and the troops vhlch
led the Government to take so adamant a stand on the Richmond
2Courts Martial •
tfhile the government oould mitigate the effect of the Court 
Martial sentenoes, i t  vas more d ifficu lt for them to supervise Mo- 
Kensie's handling of the situation In the fie ld . Although Stuart 
quotes an order from Col. Bru-de-Vold to MoKensle Instructing 
him to exercise restraint In his dealings vith chiefs and to srold 
provocation,^ he fa lls  to point out that the Instruction added 
the proviso "until you have advised me In order that I may have 
time to prepare reinforcements by mobilising the rest of the Active
*Cd 2905, no. 75» ®ov. to Sec. St* 31.3*06. A number of sentenoes 
for example of 15 years Hard Labour vith 30 lashes vere commuted 
to 1 year Hard Labour md 23 lashes, 90 179/234/16020, desp.
Gov. to See. S t., 11.4*06 and end* Others of 20 years, 50 lashes 
and confiscation of property vere ohangsd to 20 years, 25 lashes 
and no confiscation, CO 179/234/14990 , 9ov* to Sec* St*, 6.4*06.
2See above, p. 3 11 -3 1 5
*Zulu Rebellion, p .141.
M ilitia  and possibly tho First Military Reserve."3" At the
same time, M&Censie's view of what constituted provocation 
and what constituted rebellion, may well have differed froa 
that o f a less high-handed individual*
While some of the magistrates would appear to have con­
sidered these proceedings essential to combat the growing rest­
lessness of the tribes in their d is tr ic t , some were less sure*
Thus in a private le tter to the U.S.H.A* the magistrate of 
Richmond, J. T* Gibson, who was scan forced to resign from 
this position fo r  being too sympathetically inclined towards the
Africans in general, and for opposing the Richmond Court Martial
2
in particular, wrotei
"Men are s t i l l  being continually arretted under 
Martial Law, but I have no idea what the charges 
are against them* I have discovered the sp irit 
o f Titus Oates prevailing to a certain extent 
and it  is  not possible at present to determine 
the extent •••• A large number of men were taken 
away from my division I hear and tried at Ixopo.2 
I have not been informed who they vere or what 
they had done* Only occasional information reached 
this o ffice  in regard to some individual said to 
have been seen vith one or more assegais. •. • There 
is  a general b e lie f*•• to that is  is  intended to 
send the force to deal vith Tilonko* In the meantime, 
complete peace appears to reign, the people being a ll 
most amenable and anxioua to do right* •• They are 
a ll poor people in this division and heavy fines 
and exactions are ruining them completely. •• "3
p . M)i ■BasAi 1 -A* 38 , 1 7 rS.^ , .................... - ........................ ..
2
T^he Times (London), 4.4.06.
The magistrate of neighbouring Ixopo vaa F* £• Foxon, a man whose 
harshness and unpopularity have already been noted* In this instance, 
the oontraet between what did and what did not constitute rebellion 
in tiie eyes of the magistrate was of great importance* When in
Ae the troop movements vere extended throughout the Mid-
Ian de and Southern portions of the oolony, many chiefs and tribes 
began to feel apprehensive. These fears were perhaps most marked 
amongst members of Tilenko'a end Msikofelivs tribes in the 
Ixopo-Riohmond divisions. Both these ohiefs were at the head 
of large and important peoples, and both were extremely unpopular 
with their white neighbours. Thus from the very outset of his 
career as head of the Kune tribe, in 1897, Msikofeli was faced 
by the opposition of the magistrate and looal settlers who had 
been agitating for some years for the breaking up of his tribe.1 
In the Richmond area, suggestions for deposing Tilonko over re- 
luotanoe to pay the poll Tax oame from white residents even be­
fore the declaration of Martial Law and before there was any 
evidence of his or his tribe making any hostile moves against
November 1906, Ilanga laae Natal asked to be relieved of magistrates 
such as Foxon, the le tte r 's  rejoinder was swift and typical: unless
this "seditious paper were suppressed" he feared there would be 
another "bloody and expensive rebellion**. SNA l/l/335&i£!2 Foxon 
to Prime M inister's Secretary, 12.11.06. 06
aSHA 1/1/338 940/06, 24.3.06.
^See e.g. SMA 1 /1 /3 0 2 ^ ,  Minute C.E.Foxon.
tho On tho UNA M n tfy  tttw  w »  xoport* that
M sW fi af Kalfcofall « 4  Tiloafc©** tilkM  had takce «p «im  •
 ^ a— trading to ataari Md m i  HeKastalo, haeaoaa thagr ttend
tho a m »t of tholr ohlof•« tho moving of o il Sk o in m  la
tho m t  into o loagsr fcurthor Increased tholr opprohonoloaot
according to tho ono looal m idm t Oho Aid not jola  tho fligh t
froa tho foooo# tho ifrlooa  popalatloa sow "ooonod to hsva ooo
lioa  oad that oaa that tho troops woo cosing to k ill than a ll*.
too that tho whites hoi aawsd oatv Chiof Molkofoli opoaiy os-
pressed tho foor that t e  troops had ooao to wipe hla atd hia
people oat.** 8a oaa t e  gsandsaa of Chi of hcagaUfcalaiV oa
hla aatssaal s ih »  oo that aooh a foor at? haw had ita origins
la tha fcarioaa h iitoxf af Mm f  sa lly .6
haaplta t e  reports that t e a a  trihaa had cm sd  th m a a lw #
am ovir» oa tha following dsy# tha M nlstsr far Active Affairs
■ — 1    ■   m i —  h i m i l IMWI     II— — — — — w y i m i .  ■■■■ ■     —
B *f*nc 51 Corr*ap. H P ® * V  h j l ,  Hr. *<r—T, Mid-Itiovo, to M X  
25-5.0*- 3U  1/1/555 i p ,  MS U aeU oa, IM m ort to I.I.A .51 .1 .06 . 
S ^ e ls o  pom ? or ^  trm  nfcff* ToaUoata la SKA lA /54 li^ jg l, 1/1/559 
2g -« - . p.159.
3Ci 2905, p.23. *ael. X In no. 51- M toU t to Ba»>d»*tol* 25.2.06. 
Cltod aloo Bosnian, »•■>*
3^B£ X/4/16 E. A.. Qstrlsnd to. F..J5 .Pozon, TxopO.
5Stuart, Z . R . . p .141.
^Langalibalele, chief of the Hlubi people, came into Natal from Zululand 
in 1849. In 1873 he had d ifficu lty  in getting his people to comply 
with a government demand that they register their firearms. On twice
and Under Secretary for dative Affairs risked meeting these 
chiefs to reprimand them for their unruly conduet before the 
magistrate collecting the Poll Tax.1 The meeting passed without 
incident and both tha tribes bsgaa to pay tha tax without further 
ado. Early la April tha Bmbo people, including Tllonko' sv had 
paid nearly a ll their taxes*2 1st though Tllonko end Maikofeli 
played no further part In the disturbenoee, there wee constant 
agitation through the months that followed to break up their 
tribes. Fiws months later, when virtually a ll tha troops had 
been demobilised and the disturbances were at an and, Tllonko 
was summoned before the Minister o f dative A ffa irs. Ka voluntarily
wsat to Fietermaritnburg where he vas triad by Court Martial
•5behind dosed doorc for sedition and public violence. Me was 
found gu ilty , fined five  hundred head of oattle (la ter reduced by 
the Governor who thought the original sentence would in flic t  the 
punishment on his tribe to two hundred and fifty )#  deposed from
being aunmoned before the SKA Sir Theophllus Shops tone, he failed 
to appear and triad to flee  with members of his tribe across the 
Drakensberg* Colonial troops sent in pursuit were fired  on, where­
upon the incident took on the aspect of a rebellion* Langalibalele 
aad hie followers were defeated, the ohief deposed and exiled vith 
many of his followers* Their lands vers ooafisoated. In his tr ia l 
which was the f ir s t  but not the last of Fatal* a great p olitioa l 
tria ls  he vas defended by Bishop Colenso and his daughter Harrietts* 
See W. Bees, Letters from Natal* p. 259 f f  J Brookes and Webb,
A History o f M»t*l, ________
vd <*J05. p .14. bo. 25, Oot. to .'3*0. S t., 16.2.06.
*S*A l / l / 3 67 Sept. Megie* H.C. Colenbrander*
5C0 179/236/31497, Gov* to Sec* S t., 3.8.06. Cd 3247# nos. 9 sad 10. 
Gov. to Sac* St. 24.7.06 and 30.7.06, nos. 21 sad 25, 39.
his position and deported vith the ringleaders of the disturbances 
to St. Helena.1 Xsikofeli vho had handed over a ll the men van ted 
by the military in the early days of the disturbances, was not 
dealt vith as harshly, merely being fined in cattle and haring 
his tribe divided into three. Tet much of the Natal oase of a 
dangerous conspiracy which oould only be dealt vith by Martial 
Law and armed forces, rested on the oases of Tilonko and Xsikofeli. 
There vas much agitation from the Colensos for a reduction of 
Tilonko*s sentence and several appeals were addressed to the
Supreme Court, Natal, the Colonial Office and the Judicial Committee
2of the Privy Council. The Natal government's reasons for not 
being able to consider these appeals for a reduction of hie sentence 
vere thats he vas an important chief and "located in the heart of
Natal, near to the eeat of the government" j he was recognised as
one of the prinoipal leaders in the rebel movement in Natal and i f
he did not actually fight, the operations of the armed foroe he
*00 179/236/28634. Gov. to Seo. St. Cd 3247, no. 42, d.sp. 193,
11.8.06, Gov. to Sec. *^ t.
2Se« e.g. CO 179/237/44376, *Snol. in d*sp. 267 Af f id  writ, H.E. 
Colenso with "Tilonkwe's petition" of 6.9.06. See also The Trial 
and Conviotion by Court Martial of a Natal Qhief for sedition 
and public violence, n.d. and no author, ®ript marked at top 
"Strictly  Confidential, not to be published, F.E.C. ^.K.Colanso/ 
encl. in above. CO 179/244/6495, End. 5 in Gov. to Seo. S t., 
Secret 1.2.0Q; CO 179/241/21336, Oov. to Seo. &t., 23.5*07, no.
79I CO 179/243/36484 and other despatches in CO 179/245 contain 
long correspondence on Tilonko*s position between the Colonial 
Office, Natal and Tilonko's Council. CO 179/243/36484 22.4.07.
Winston Churchill was to call the tria l mid deportation of Tilonko 
"a hateful business" though in fact the C.0. did sot intervene.
summoned to him and which marched through the countryside armed, 
"were only repressed by reason of the prompt appearance of the 
troops" in his locatinn and by his precipitate flig h t when he found 
that his plans had been forestalled; he vae In direct communication 
with Dinuzulu in connection with a proposed general rising; he 
was defiant and insolent to the c iv il authorities in Natal prior 
to the actual rebellion; end fin a lly  he assumed end maintained to 
the last his attitude of defiance after arrest and enlisted on his 
side fo r  the purpose of appeal to the Privy Council "the small but 
active section of English-speaking persons regard rebellious 
end dangerous characters as useful instruments for the furtherance 
of p o litica l animosities" (presumably the Colensos are being re­
ferred to here)*1 It is  an interesting footnote to Tilonko'e 
rebellious and dangerous character that cn the day following the 
arming of his men and their assembling at his kraal, he sent an 
apology to the neighbouring white farmer lest his tribesmen had
2inadvertently trampled his tobacco during the night's a ctiv ities .
In the fir s t  phase of the disturbances when there was no 
overt resistance to the activ ities of the ihite forces, the fears 
of punishment may well have ooved would-be rebels. It has been
1C0 179/240/4452, Cov. to Seo. St. 20.1.07, Pte aad personal.
2C0 179/257/44376, Evidence in Court Martial o f Tilonka 30.7*06, 
p .37, G. Pople (Resident overseer of tobaooo farm.)
stated aa a psychological 'law ' that vith "the strength of 
frustration held constant, the greater the anticipation of 
punishment for a given act, the less apt that act le  to ooour".1 
And certainly this would appear to have been borne out in the 
early weeks of the 'rebellion 1 when for nearly two months vhite 
forces vere able vith impunity to march through locations, 
fine end depose chiefs without tr ia l, confiscate large numbers 
of sheep end oattle , bum crops and kraals and flog  a ll Africans 
who were considered • in solen t'. Trials were held under martial 
lav for offences as vague as those of "insubordination or content
or defianoe of public authorities or menaces or seditious language
2or acts inciting to insurrection"• All this time the ordinary 
oourts of the colony were functioning normally* By the end of 
March, MoKensie considered he had su fficiently  "impressed" the 
Africans in the Midlands and South Coast to be able to demobilise 
hie column*
From the point of view of the subsequent history of the dis­
turbances however, McKensie's operations end those of Leucharls 
column which was operating in the Mapumnlo area mainly against 
Chief Ngobisembe and hia tribe, may well have been converting
^Dollard, Doob, Millar et al, Frustration and Aggression * p .38.
C^d 2905, p .24, Encl. 2 in no* 3°, Bru-de-^old to Leuchars, 23.2*06*
la ten t h o s t i l i t y  Into open aggression.1 There appears to be a
poin t at vhioh punishment intended to deter aggressive action
can actu a lly  become i t s  cause where the punishment f o r  minor
o ffen ces  i s  so disproportionate people fe e l  they may as w ell
commit major ones. Moreover fo r  punishment to  act as deterrent
people must f e e l  they hare something to lo se  -  whether i t  be
property, status or fam ily comfort and happiness. In the case
o f  the next phase o f  the disturbances, when, f o r  the f i r s t  time
there was open defiance o f  tiie government, there is  an element
o f  despair and desperation, so w ell expressed before  the Natal
Native Af fa ir s  Commission by one Mvinjwa -  not h im self a rebel -
when he talked o f  Bambatha, Chief o f  the Zondi people and the
leader o f the re b e llio n :
"They were lik e i Bambata. He went to extreme 
simply because he vas t ied  hand and fo o t  by the 
network o f  troubles in  which he found h im self.
He then strayed o f f  in  r e v o lt . He was very 
much l ik e  a beast which on being stabbed rushes 
about in  despair, charges backwards and forwards 
and, i t  may be, k i l l s  someone that happens to be 
in h is  path. "2
To modern A frican  n a tion a lis ts  Bambatha has become a great 
national hero, and o f  course, in the simple sense that he M is te d  
oppressive European ru le and attempted to un ite  behind him the
^See below, p.
^ .i i .A .C . Hvid., p .713.
chiefs and people of many tribes he is  rightly so regarded.^
Unfortunately however Bambatha himself has le ft  no reoord of
what he was trying to do and we are dependent therefore in
analysing his motives and aims on the very imperfect assessments
of administrative o ffic ia ls  and the less imperfect but s t i l l
inadequate views of his induna and followers as to what prompted
him to take the fateful decision of taking up arms against the
white man. From these records one gets no idea of a man with a
clear plan of action, a plan for example o f ousting the whites
from Natal and re-establishing a Zulu kingdom there and in
Zululand. Despite the widespread use of Dinusulu*b name, war-
cry and war-badge and an attempt to bring the ex-King of the Zulu
into rebellion, one's predominant impression is  that of a man
gbadedc beyond endurance who was using the. King's name as a
centralising devioe and making an appeal to Zulu national feeling,
but who was prepared to die fighting probably knowing that hia
chances of success were slender in the extreme. Already extremely
2unpopular with his white neighbours who called him "Bellicose
•5Bambata the Chief of Misrule", Bambatha was involved in two
^Por a discussion of the problem of defining "nationalist" see 
e.g. T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London, 1956) 
pp. 20-24.
2For details of Bambatha'a early l i fe  see Stuart, £ .R .. p .157 f f .  
For his poverty and landleesnese as well as the law suits he was 
involved in with his whits neighbours, Chapter III , p. ; 
above.
^Greytown Gasette. 27.1.06. See aleo that of 10.2.06.
faction fights in ths course of 1905, and, on being brought 
before the U.S .N.A. at the end of 1905, vas warned that any 
future misbehaviour would probably lead to his deposition.* 
Bambatha* s suspicions of white intentions were revealed in 
1904 when he questioned the ulterior motives of the Census.
At the time of the promulgation of the Poll Tax, no open com­
plaint was made to the magistrate of the division, but con­
siderable discontent was expressed by the Zondi tribesmen led
2by one of their induna. Nhlonhlo. The murmurings of 1hose 
people living on private lands and like Bambatha himself heavily 
in debt weret not surprisingly, the loudest. As a result at this 
opposition, Bambatha'a people were the last to be called upon to 
pay the tax in the Umvoti division, and the magistrate, J. V. 
Gross, decided to make the magistracy its e lf , Grey town, the centre 
of collection. On the 22nd February, the day appointed for the 
collection of the tax, Bambatha arranged to meet his men outside 
Grey town as vas customary amongst many tribes, but found at the 
rendezvous that some of the younger men, suspicious of the change 
of venue, arrived armed vith assegais and shields. S t ill  others 
had failed to bring the money or were likely to contravene borough
1SHA l/l/324^ | ^  , Memo U.S.H.A. 3.11.05.
Stuart, Z.R .. p .160.2
.329
regulations by being Inadequately clothed.* Apparently
swayed by the fears of those who thought that If he went to
2Grey town he would be arrested, and perhaps by the thought 
that he had better eontrol the wilder elements In the tribe 
by remaining with them, Bambatha Bent on those manbers of the 
tribe who were prepared to pay the tax* about ninety-seven 
men paid tax and fifty  three were exempted on this occasion."*
He himself remained about two miles away with those men who had 
refused to lay down their arms, and sent an apology of i l l -  
health to the magistrate.
According to Stuart, Bambatha's mistake at this point was 
in not reporting to the magistrate what had occurred, as Hveli 
had done under similar circumstances.^ From this time he became 
more and more closely linked with that section of his tribe that 
had armed, and it became more and more difficult for him to 
respond to messages from the white authorities instructing him 
to report to the magistrate. That Bambatha failed to hare much 
confidence in the assurances of his local magistrate may in part
*Stuart, Z .it.. pp. 161-4•
2C0 179/241/33767t desp. 29-3.07, Encl. 1, Report no. 2, Evid. 
Folekile (Bambatha's daughter) before J. Stuart, 18.7*07.
%Greytown Gazette. 3.J.06.
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have been related to the personality of the looa l magistrate,
J. W. Cross. Although Cross had been in the colony some forty 
years, and by 1906 had been in government employ for over thirty 
o f these, he was something of an alarmist and himself tended to 
believe exaggerated stories of African unrest. It  was apparently 
for this reason that he had had to be temporarily removed from 
a magistracy near the Pondoland border in 1897*  ^ Despite the 
fact that he was an excellent Zulu speaker, in 1904 his taotleas 
remarks to the Africans assembled to welcome him to his new post 
at Grey town, when he informed them that the land was the lhite 
man's and not theirs, had even led to a private reprimand from
pministers. In the same year the Governor expressed doubts as 
to the wisdom of his deposing of Acting Chief Njengabantu.^
Like many magistrates of his generation, he believed that a freer 
use of the lash for infringement of beer-drinking regulations, the 
Masters and Servants Acts and to prevent faction fighting, would
4vastly improve native affairs in Natal. He is  unlikely to have
1C0 179/200/25628 desp. Cojf. Gov. to S.c. St. 9.10.97, and 
CO 179/200/24495, desp. Conf. 2, Gov. to S.o. S t., 23.10.97.
2C0 179/229/19920, Gov. to S.o. S t., Conf. 2, 2.5.04.
3SNA 1 /1 /3 1 4 -^  Minute McCallun, 28.10.04.
B^NA l/l/3 6 7 , Reports of Magistrates 11.1.07, SNA l/l/546^|i
27.5.06 and N.N.A.C. Evid. J.W. Cross, p, 627 f f .
viewed vith sympathy Bambatha'e troubles with his tribe or his
own past history of unruliness, whatever their economic causes.
The Chief's troubles veze increased by the fact that on
the night o f Hie tax collection a whoHy false rumour spread that
hi8 tribe had surrounded Greytovn and intended attacking i t . 1
A ll the whites spent the night in  laager and extra p o lic e  were
sent to the area to deal vith the emergency. At the same time
the Umvoti M ilitia Reserve were called out. Members of Bambatha'a
tribe now became even more determined to prevent their chief
giving himself up. The way the members of the tribe fe lt  about
it  was expressed by one of them before the Greytown Court Martial
vhen he saids
"The white people should they want the Chief must
take him froa our hands... our wish is  that the
Chief should not be shot as a buck nor/ as a 
beast or an ox driven to the slaughter house." 2
Bambatha's position became more d ifficu lt not only because 
of his own action, or inacticn, and beoause his previous friction  
with the authorities made him fear punishment, but also because 
as the days passed i t  became dearer exactly what punitive action 
amounted to in different parts of the colony. His f ir s t  re ­
luctance to report the presence of armed men in his tribe occurred
^Stuart, Z.R.. p .162.
2SNA 1/6/28, Evidence of Greytown Court Martial, 4.7.06, p .21* 
evid. Gadupi; Sim. Nhlonhlo?Saka and Manise.
but a week after two of Mjongo's followers had been ehot for
their part In the Trewirgie affray; troops were s t i l l  in the
Midlands hunting out the rest of that armed band and burning
their crops and k r a a l s W h i l e  Mveli had reported the defiance
of this group in his tribe end had later apparently welcomed
the opportunity of ridding himself of a dissident element in
his location, this course may well have appeared more and more
impossible to Bambatha as the troop movements continued and came
2closer to Grey town. The proceedings against Ngoblsembe in nelgh- 
touring Mapumulo on the 5th March may also have increased Bambatha'8 
determination to evade the olutohes of the police and armed forces 
sent to arrest him on the 9th, On the 11th, he made his way into 
Zululand, and ultimately to Dinusulu's kraal.^
Much was made of this last fact by the Natalgovemment in 
1907-8 when it  was discovered that Bambatha had le ft  his wife and
children there for safe-keeping. It was widely believed at the time
of the disturbances and after that he had been given arms and 
ammunition by Dinusulu and had been actively encouraged by him
to start a rebellion in Natal being assured of Dinusulu's support.
cr&i... q__________
*See above, p. *309 
2Stuart, Z.R .. p .164, suggests the comparison.
•^Ibid. , p. 166.
The evidence for aid against such a view -  which was rejected 
by the majority of members of the Special Court which tried 
Dinuzulu -  will be considered below.1 Whatever happened at 
the Usuthu kraal however, at the end of March Bambatha returned 
to Natal, accompanied by l f c g g , one of Dinusulu'e messengers, 
and Cakijana ka Gesindaka, who was believed to be one of Dinusuluvs
in dun a. Cakijana was soon to become a key figure in Ihe rebellion
2as Bambatha's right hand man.
It is d ifficu lt  to know at exactly what point Bambatha
3made his momentous decision to oppose the white man with force.
The evidence of both Nqgengengqe and Cakijana seems to suggest 
that the decisive moment came when he returned back to his tribe 
and discovered that Magwababa>his 7uncle had boen appointed regent
4in his place. It was at this point that N^gert^entgge, who had 
ostensibly been sent by Dinuzulu to find a doctor for him in the 
Greytown d istrict, returned to Zululand -  without„ the doctor -  
as he feared trouble. On this, the evidence of Ng e^ng%anq i^ is 
consistent and straightforward. There are many variants of Caki-
5jana's evidence. In his very fir s t  deposition before R.C.Sanuelaon
1Jee below, Chapter VII.
^Stuart, Z. R .» pp. 166-7.
^Stuart, assumes i t  oame when Bambatha was at the Usuthu,
acoepting the evidence of Bambatha's wife and family im plicitly, p. 166
4C0 179/244/3062, Conf. A. in deep secret 5-1*08.
3S«. below, Chapter T il
which he subsequenUy repudiated, he stated that on the fourth day 
after accompanying Bambatha from his father's kraal -  also to 
look for Dinuzulu's doctor -  he came upon Bambatha talking to some 
members of his tribe. At this point he was told "Go back, we are 
s t i l l  talking. I have found that the white people have placed 
some other person in my place".1 It was only after this that 
Bambatha appeared with guns. This would suggest that it  was not 
until he heard of Magwababa's appointment that he decided to take 
up arms -  although Cakijana* s later evidence given both while he 
was detained at Nkandla gaol after his arrest and at hfe own and 
Dinuzulu's tria l stated that he had been instructed to join Bam­
batha in order to start a rebellion by Dinuzulu and thiB was his
2motive in joining Bambatha in the fir s t  place. The d ifficu lties  
of interpretation will be appreciated when it is considered how 
in both instanoes Cakijana, an extraordinarily shrewd character, 
was giving the evidence he expected his audience to want -  in the 
f ir s t  instance he was talking to Dinuzulu's defendants (Harriett#
Colenso wae also present), in the seoond to his prosecutors, ( i t  
is  interesting that Cakijana*s father reported to Dinuzulu's defence 
team that Cakijana said he joined bambatha when he was surrounded
1Col. Col. 93, Statements, Samuelson.
2 AGO 1/7/68, Cakijana's Evidence at Krantzkop, 20.5.08.
Natal Witness. 7.11.08, Report of Cakijana'a evidsnoe in Hex v. Cakijana.
SC 111/3/7, Motes of evidence in Rex v. Dinuzulu -  Cakijana9a evidence.
n o ' *
•: i ^
by white troops after he had attacked Magwababa and he "could not
escape"; this was also Cakijana^ fir s t  version of his evidence).^
Bambatha^ f ir s t  openly hostile move was on the evening of 2nd
April, when he attacked Magwababa, whose l i f e  was only saved by
2C^kijana's intervention.
There had long been a r i f t  between that section of the tribe
which now supported Magwababa as regent and the younger followers
of Bambatha, a r i f t  which was in fact revealed at the time o f the
Poll Tax collection when Bambatha identified himself with the
more turbulent members of his tribe and which one o f  his followers
expressed by saying!
"We dogs o f Bambata had no quarrel with the government*
Bambata's quarrel was with his father Magwababa because
Bambata alleged that Magwababa was the means of getting 
him deposed* "3
Onoe Bambatha attacked Magwababa, a government appointee, 
it  was inevitable that his quarrel would be vith the government, 
aad he must have been aware o f this* Whan Magwababa vas captured, 
Bambatha was reportsd as saying "Where are your white friends now?
tfe do not acknowledge a Natal king, but a black one*"^ His
1Col* Col* 98* Mankulumana and Kgwaqo Prosecutions, p .38*
Evid. Gezindaka ka Nomaqonqota*
2C0 179/234/11743, Gov. to Sec. S t., no. 49, 3.4.06.
S^NA 1/6/27, Evidence Gwazi Zulu, Greytown Court Martial, 3*8»06, p .138. 
^Stuart, Z.R,. p .168.
final decision to oppose the white man with force by attacking 
the magistrate and police sent out to arrest him on the 4th 
April may have been further prompted by a feeling that he might 
as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb, or die fighting. He 
followed this up by looting a hotel and the house of a Mr. Varty 
in -the search for arms.1 Two days earlier the shooting before 
the assembled Midlands tribesmen of twelve of Mjongo's men stood 
as an awful example of the white man's punishment, an example 
which could have acted as a spur to a man who fe lt  lhat by this 
time he had nothing to lose. By the 3rd April, Bambatha may 
have fe lt  that he had already so blotted his copy-book there 
was no other alternative to taking up arms. Although the timelag 
between the Richmond shootings and Bambatha* s open rebellion waa 
so small the sentences had been announced several days earlier 
and had received very widespread publicity as a result of the cabinet 
resignation over Imperial intervention on this issue.
On the 3th April Bambatha fled to the dense Nkandla forests 
on the borders of Natal and Zululand, an area vhich had more than 
once in the past served as a Royal sanctuary. **rom the tactical 
point of view, for defensive warfare this area could hardly have
^Stuart, Z.R.. pp. 168^169, Col, 2905, no. 84, Gov. to Sbo. St.,
6.4.06. '
2See above, p. 311.
Bryant, O.T.. p .415.3
been bettered. After a few days in hiding he began to build
up a rebel army. Here apparently his plan was to keep to the
forest, sending messengers to chiefs to come and join him,
and using Dinuzulu's name as his authority and maintaining he
had his support.^
There seems to have been l i t t le  intention of attacking
the Europeans in the open, but simply of waiting for them to
2come into the bush and then taking them unawares. For the 
f ir s t  time since the declaration of Martial Law on the 8th February 
a resistance movement was being built up. For this reason 
the disturbances are frequently referred to as the'Bambatha He­
bei lion. Despite an attempt by Bambatha to foroe the Africans in 
the area to join him, however, he met with l i t t l e  success until 
Sigananda and his Cube tribes, one of the largest in the Nkandla 
d istrict and guardians of the Royal grave of Cetshwayo, decided to 
throw in their lo t  with the Zondi. At f ir s t  accompanied only 
by his own Zondi followers -  they were reported to be about two 
or three hundred strong -  Bambatha now quickly began to attract 
individuals from the Nkandla chiefdoms.
C^O 179/234/16019# Encl. in desp. 60, 11.4.06. Statements V&va 
and Hlangabesa, Bambatha's messengers, 7*4*06 (publ. Col. 3)27 
pp. 4-6).
^K.C.L. Stuart Papers "Native Habits and Customs in Tine of War"* 
Kvid. Nzuse ka Mfelafuti (ex chief Sigananda).
Sigananda*s tribe had already signified ttieir opposition
to the Poll Tax at the beginning of the year, as has been
mentioned.^ shortly thereafter his chief son was fined for
failing to find eight men for compulsory labour for the Public
2Works Department. When Bambatha fled to this area, Sigananda, 
together with the other ohiefs in the neighbourhood, was ordered 
by the Commissioner of Native Affairs to am his men and hunt
out the rebels, and cm the 8th April Sigananda's messenger re-
3ported that Bambatha had entered his ward. After an apparently 
half-hearted attempt to look for Bambatha fo r  a few days, the 
attitude of the tribe changed. One of Sigananda's sons, vho had 
given information to the government that Bambatha had been seen, 
was victimised by the tribe, and on the 13th April Saunders began 
to suspect that Sigananda had joined the rebels. By the 16th 
Bambatha vas apparently moving about freely amongst the Cube 
who had a ll been doctored for war by Bambatha's Basuto war doctor, 
the whole force then consisting of twelve to fourteen companies 
according to one estimate -  700 to 1,000 men. Sigananda sent 
messages to the men of the surrounding chiefs, Ndube, Mpumela,
•^oee above, p. 2.74
2C0 179/234/18854, End. 9, desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M. 28.4.06. 
publ. Cd 3027, 4 d .  9, pp. 31-34. For the African dislike of this 
compulsory labour -  Isibalo as it was called -  see above, p.^-s"
3C0 179/234/18854, iind. 9 , desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M., 28.4.06.
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Makubalo aad others, and vhile thaaa chiefs did not Join,
members of their tribes began to f ilt e r  towards the rebel army**’
Despite Stuart and Bosnian's statements to the contrary,
poverty appears to have been among the root causes of the Cube 
2discontent. Sir Charles Saunders who discounted the rumours 
that i t  was Dinuzulu's messages vhich had led Slgananda's people 
to rebel, also pointed out that both Sigananda and his chief son 
and heir, Ndabaningl were paupers.^ As In the case of Bambatha 
exceptional poverty is one of the clues to the above-average 
frustration being fe lt  toy the Cube people and its  leaders, and 
therefore their low resistance in the face of an appeal tothea 
to take up arms. The high correlation between low economic status 
and criminality both because of the higher level of frustration 
and because of the lesser "inhibiting influence of anticipated 
punishment" has frequently been noted. At the same time people 
who have been ground down by poverty for generations do not 
usually rebel against their lo t . It is the recently poor and 
the recently conquered who are most prone to "do something about it " .
It should be remembered that the Ifcandla-Nqutu area of Southern
1C0 179/234/18854, &10I . 9 desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M. 26.4.06.
2Bosnian, p .48, Stuart, 2,R., p .202.
5C0 179/234/18854, ihcl. 9, desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M., 2B.4.06.
Bollard, Doob and M iller , t  a l, Frustration «nd Aggression. pp.112-113.
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Zululand had only relatively recently come under colonial rule.
Unlike the ^atal Africans, the Zululanders had more recent
memories of a glorious past very different to their present
humiliation. That they should in so many oases therefore have
responded to Bambatha* s call is  hardly surprising. In Ike case
of Sigananda especially these memories mist have been a potent
spur to action.
Sigananda, a venerable old man reputed to be about ninety-
seven years old, had been an udlbi or mat-carrier in 1he last
days of ohaka's army. He vas also said to have witnessed the
k illing  of Retief at Dingane*s kraal.1 Be that as it  may, he
had had a more recent history of loyalty to the Zulu Royal family,
having been closely involved in the troubles of the eighties.
He it  was who granted Cetshvayo sanctuary in his flight from
Zibhebhu in 1883. In 1888 hems held in Eshowe gaol on a charge
2of treason during the disturbances of that year. In a sense he 
was amongst the oldest living representatives of ancient Zulu
military pride and tradition. Ritter for example in his account
3
of the Rise of the Zulu &npire apparently relied very heavily on 
the oral traditions and memories of that time conserved by Sigananda.
1 Bosnian, p .109*
2
CO 879/30/370, Encl. in no. 50, p.86. Return of untried prisoners 
3.9*06 (African Conf. Prints.)
3Shaka Zulu, The Rise of the .^ulu empire.
For such a man it  must Indeed have been d ifficu lt  to become re­
conciled to European rule. Certainly a message lie is reported 
to have sent to Dinuzulu in reply to his instruction that he pay 
the Poll Tax f it s  in with this interpretation. He is reported 
to have accused him of cowardice in not openly fighting against 
theihite man -  a message which Dinuzulu, & younger but perhaps 
wiser man, rejected with the words ,!Ho is 'bodaring* ta lk in g  
nonsense/ when he says I am afraid. Who can fight the white man?
I have been sent over the seas by *them*. I do not want my children 
to suffer."^
On the other hand, Stuart maintains that i t  was secret
messages from Dinuzulu to Sigananda instructing him to look out
2for Bambatha which led to his change in attitude. While in fact 
Dinuzulu admitted to having sent such a message he maintained it 
was before the outbreak of violence -  before he knew that Bambatha 
intended starting up a rebellion. He thought he was simply 
looking for land cn which to settle. At the Court Martial o f Siga- 
nanda and his sons, evidencewas led which suggested that the claims
by C&kijana that he had been tent by Dinuzulu made considerable im-
3pact on the Cube. How important this faotor is in the light o f
1Natal Mercury . 2.6.0Q, Evidence Maliba Sijulana (Chief Dubudlungu) 
at Dinuzulu *s Preliminary Examination.
p .202.
E -N ici .
9SNA 1/6/26, Nkandla Court Martial, ^Polomba, 29*6.06, pp. 11-12.
Dinuzulu’ s chief adviser Kankulum ana’ s subsequent v is it  to the
Cube in an attempt to disillusion them is d ifficu lt  to gauge*
On the 23rd %>ril Manlculumana arrived at the Nkandla stronghold
and, according to his version of what happened, was given a very
hostile reception by the tribe who refused to le t him see Siga-
nanda.1 While there were those who considered this v is it simply
part of Dinuzulu’ s double-dealing, and that he had sent other
2more sinister messengers simultaneously, at the time the Com­
missioner for Native Affairs was sure that Kankulumana* s v is it 
whilst not affecting the Cube decision to rebel, materially 
affected the decisinn of the tribes in the division and that 
"rebels from other tribes at least are melting away”.
Another interpretation was given to iheir actions by 
some members of the Cube tribe at the time of the court martial*
Thus Polomba, the induna of the tribe stated that the tribe was 
only recognised to be in open rebellion after the arrival of the 
troops, and that when hey did not report Bambatha*s trail (which 
Sigananda maintained had beoome imperceptible) they were treated
1C0 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, desp.79, C.N.A. to P.M. 28.4.06.
pSee o*g* The Trial of Dinuzulu* Address of Attorney General, pp. 19-20. 
500 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, C.N.A. to M.N.A., 28.4.06.
.
forthwith as rebels.1 Cakijana, a highly unreliable witness but
one vho in every other way tended to implicate Dinusulu in the
disturbances maintained in May 3908 that when Mankuluaana addressed
Sigananda's tribe they said:
Mtfe have no answer for you only that we have bem 
armed by Matshiqele ^5aunders7 •ad we are now armed
for good and intend fighting for he fired  on us while
we were s t i l l  looking for B a m b a ta . "2
Several other defence witnesses in the Dinusulu trial gave sladlar
evidence, and at the court martial of Sigananda and his sons even
the Counsel for the Prosecution maintained that their fault lay in
their attempt to remain neutral (instead of actively assisting
the European forces) for Hof course Jin war/ there is no suoh
4.thing as neutrality". Although Stuart denies that the tribe were
5f ir s t  fired upon by the white forces, i t  does appear as i f  i t  
was simply assumed that they were in rebellion onoe they failed  
to hand Bambatha over and the evidence of some of the tribesmen
that they were fired upon by the troops when they were s t il l  looking
S^HA 1/6/26, MSS Evidence of Ekand la  Court Martial, p.9* Evidence 
29-6.06.
A
AGO 1 / 7/ 6 8 , Statement Cakijana,Krantzkop, 20.5.06.
3 eg. Col. Co. 98, Samuels^pn Precognitions*Ndabambi ka Lumungu and 
Nkamnanga ka Tshibutshihu.
S^NA 1/6/26, op .c it . p .59, Prosecutor Major v. der Plank's address
to the Court.
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*for the rebels does have to be taken into consideration. To 
expeot a man with the background of Sigananda to relish handing 
Bambatha over to the white forces was probably to expect too 
much -  or too l i t t le  -  especially when one considers that in 
the days of Mpande -igananda had fled to Natal in fear of his 
l i f e  and was succoured, according to Boaman, by Jangeni, Bambatha*0 
grandfather.^
It would thus appear that at fir s t  Sigananda did try to 
remain neutral; his poverty, the tribe 's opposition to the Boll 
Tax and his own memories of past glory and the laws of hospitality 
made him reluctant to pursue Bambatha in any very enthusiastic 
fashion. When he and his people realised that i f  they did not 
hand over Bambatha ihey would be regarded as rebels -  perhaps were 
so regarded already- they decided to throw in their le t with the 
rebels, though some of the outlying sections of the tribe may not 
have been fu lly  aware of the decision.
After Sigananda, perhaps the most important chief to join 
Bambatha lias Mehlokazulu of the Qungebe people, another man with 
his roots deep in the Zulu past. In many ways, however, the motives 
which Induced him to throw in hia lo t  with the rebels In the Nkandla 
forests appear to have been similar to those which In itia lly  spuxred
•‘•p.ios.
Bambatha into action. Once again, Mehlokazulu had a long history 
of past conflict with the authorities, both British and colonial.
He had f ir s t  gained notoriety at the time of the Zulu War, when 
he crossed the Natal border to kidnap two of the wives of his 
father, Sirayo’ s wives who had fled to the colony. This incident 
had provided Sir Bartle Frere with one of hie pretexts for war 
against Cetshwayo in 1 8 7 9 Prominent in the Zulu War and in the 
tussles between the Zulu Royal Family both against the British 
and against Zibhebhu, Dinuzulu’ s arch-rival, Mehlokazulu*s exist­
ence during the 1880*e and early 90*s was turbulent and harried.
He was driven from district to d istrict, as now one loyal chief, 
now another accused him of offenses such as cattlo-stealing froa 
their white neighbours. He settled in the New Republic for some 
time, in Faku’ s location, but ran into trouble there tdien a Boer
Parmer accused him of insulting his wife; he was imprisoned at
2Vryheid for the offence. Finally he returned to Nqutu district 
where his father’ s people lived, and in 1893, when Sir Marshal 
Clarke became Resident Commissioner in Zululand and British attitudes 
towards the Zulu Royal Family and their adherents became less un-
^ e o  above, Chapter II , p.S^v
O Q
ZA §2 R Vo'q-i t Information from Majolo k& Sirayo. (According to the 
magistrate, Ha very hostile witness” to Mehlokazulu. He waa
Mehlokazulu * s bro ther.)
compromising, he was appointed as Chief of his father's tribe*
It was fe lt  that restoring him to a position of responsibility
might ensure his loyalty*1 Prom that time Indeed Mehlokazulu
does appear to have led a peaceful, law-abiding l i f e  -  though
he betrayed considerable anxiety over the delimitation of Nqutu
for white settlement in 1904* writing to Dinuzulu:
r-?urtLer Ndabeziua, be careful and loolc out for 
the English, for the white people are well pre­
pared. They are looking for a pretext toy which 
they can catch you. See the country is looking 
to you as one man, do not forget. The chief of 
the land should be wide-awake. Por the whole 
land is  looking for your w ord . ” 2
On the day appointed to pay the Poll Tax in 1906, he failed to
appear before the magistrate with his men, and the magistrate
3was disposed to take a serious view of the matter. Nevertheless 
for the f ir s t  three months of Martial Law Mehlokazulu made no 
openly hostile move, despite many rumours that he was planning 
to do so. As the aimed forces drew nearer to his d istrict however, 
Mehlokazulu apparently became apprehensive of white intentions 
towards him. These apprehensions increased as rumours spread 
amongst the whites that he had been sending messages to Chief
XZA 22 .
? A60 1/7/53, Letter.tp Dinusulu, 12 .5 ,04,.translated A. I . Jaokoon.
3SNA 1/4/15 o|| , 25.1.06, Kagis. to U.S.N.A.
Rula in Umsinga division and that they were planning joint action 
against the whites.* There were close ties of kinship and friendship 
between these two chiefs, and i t  is true that Mehlokasulu had sent 
messages both to Kula and Dinusulu about the Poll Tax,2 It isl: 
not unlikely that these messages tried to find out whether joint 
opposition to the Tax was possible. It must therefore have been 
with considerable fear and trembling that Mehlokasulu saw the 
arrest of his friend and ineighbour by the white forces on the 8th 
Hay.
Kula, one of the most important of the government appointed 
ohief Beheaded an amalgam of tribal fragments formed into a 'new 
tribe' by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1869• ^  Conspicuous in 
their loyalty to the government both in 1879 and during the Boer 
War, the tribe had always considered itse lf the "government's 
tribe" -  a fact which tended to draw on it  the enmity of its  
neighbours, both of other tribes and of the Boers. At the end 
of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, there were several reports 
of pending faction fights amongst the many tribes of tho very 
densely populated Umsinga d istriot, where Kula's was by far the
1C0 179/235/20725, Gov. to  Sec. S t., desp. 95, 18.5.06, publ. in 
Cd 3027, no. 49, pp. 44-46.
‘‘Tiiaos of ^atal, Evidence Magadisa 29.2.08. Report of Dinusulu*s Pre­
liminary Examination.
■^SNA 1/ 4/12 ■q^ *, Boport U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 18.6.03.
largost. Pe&aps as a result of the arming of young men for 
these faotion fights, aad also because this was an area of # iite  
anisal k illing  froa October,1905 onwards, shite farmers In the 
area, predominantly of German and Dutoh desoent, began to ezpreas 
their fears of being wiped out.1 At the beginning of March there 
was a ’panic* amongst the white settlers in Kula's division 
over "nothing definite", \hich was followed in turn tor the arming
of one o f  the sections of Kula* s tribe under the imfon* Kabulawa
2"who feared arrest". At the seme time, the magistrate of Umsinga 
division, with whoa Kola's relationship was of the worst, was 
sending frequent complaints about the chief 'a  behaviour to the
Minister for Native Affaire, although "he furnished no specific
3charges". In part hie suspicions may have been roused by hie 
chief informant who wae a mm from Sibindi's tribe, a tribe which 
had been involved in many boundary disputes with Kola's people.* 
fin a lly  Kula wae summoned before the minister at the end of March, 
and was warned that i f  he did not mend his ways, his fa te  would 
be similar to that of the chiefs the government had already dealt with.
*SNA l /4 /l4  Magistrate ttnsnnga (A. J5. Harrington) to U.S.M.A, 
22.10.05. 0
2SNA l / l / 3 » Lt. Sergt. C.J.V. Stringer N.P. to Sub-Inspec. 
Maxwell, N.PT, Dundee, 8.3*06.
35NA l/l/337^§§, Magi s. to  0.S.N.A. *<*■
4SNA l/l/33aH ^, Interview of Bile with H.H.A. 26.3.06.
5M4.
Apparently awed by this earning, Kula returned to hie tribe 
and handed orer Kabulawa, despite the obriouB dissatisfaction 
of the rest of the tribe at this action* At this point in fact 
his uncle, Mtele, led the dissidents into open rebellion, being 
joined by another small tribe in the diTision* K^la, however, 
though with some reluctance, continued to do his duty as a govern­
ment servant, and, on the 4th May, reported Mtele's rebellion*
A few days later, when the looal magistracy had been reinforced 
with M ilitia Reserves from Helpmekaar and by the Natal Mounted 
R ifles, because tribes were e jected  to come in to pay their taxes, 
Kula with several of his loading men, once mere made his way to
the magistracy to te ll of further developments in his t r ib e , Oh
2the advice of the magistrate, the officers decided to transfer 
him to the °ffio e r  Commanding the troops at Helpmeka&r, where, 
after being questioned, Kula vas detained in custody* Despite 
orders from the head of the Defence Headquarters in Pietermaritz­
burg to the Chief Leader of the Reserves in Helpmekaar that Kula 
should be released immediately as he had been arrested while
visiting a magistrate, and should have been regarded as holding
4a safe-conduct, the Leaders of the Reserves at Helpmekaar, Uys,
^Stuart, Z*R«* p.322*
2 he magistrate, A. E. Harrington, believed many rumours brough to 
him that Kula Intended murdering him. He was apparently prone to 
accepting rumours at their face value as MoCallum's remark on hearing 
that Harrington believed Bambatha to be alive at Hie end of 1906 in­
dicates i he laconically commented "He would",
^Stuart, Z.R.. p .323*
4sHA l/l/341 j o§2. 9.3.06.
0 ,f .\
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Adendorff, Muller and Henderson, telegraphed to headquarters 
that the release of the chief would oause the qpread of re­
bellion amongst adjoining tribes and would "oause grave condition 
amongst our men which we w ill not hold ourselves responsible 
fo r " .1 Aooording to the Resident magistrate in the neighbouring 
magistracy of Ladysmith, the Boers (and the names of the leaders 
of the Reserves at Helpmekaar bear out his interpretation) vere
seeking to avenge themselves on Kula for his services to the
2British during the Boer War.
In the face of this threat of mutiny frcm the Reserves,
Kula vas removed to Pie te marl tsbuzg, vheze he was held for the 
duration of the disturbances. A few days later another portion
of his tribe under his brother Manuka joined Mtele and Nondubela
3in open rebellion. This may have been the result of resentment 
at the government action in removing their ohief or lack o f  ade­
quate control onoe Kula had.been detained; to the local settlers 
i t  vas evidence that Kula himself had been fomenting rebellion 
a ll along. The government however considered that there was in­
1Tiaes of Hatal. 12.9*06.
2SNA 1 /1 /3 4 3 ^  , Pte letter to KNA, 29.5*06 
^Stuart, Z.R.. p .264.
sufficient evidence to prove Ibis, for although Kula was de­
posed and removed from his tribe at the mid of the disturbances,
he was not brought before either a c iv il or a military tribunal.1
Other chiefs, and Hehlokasulu in particular, were le ft  
however to draw their own conclusions from Kula'e v is it  to the 
magistrate and his consequent arrest. Mehlokazulu1 s followers 
feared that his would be a likB fate and almost immediately after 
Kula*a arrest, when Mackay*s Column marched through the Nqutu
d istrict, urged him to hide in the fbrests to save his l i fe  and
2cattle. When he was instructed by the Officer Commanding to 
provide men to fight that portion of Kula'a tribe which had re­
belled and crossed the Buffalo River, he refused, end fled with 
his wives, oattle and a few followers to the bush. The ma5ority 
of his tribe apparently took no further action on either side.
The magistrate of Nqutu tried his best to keep vq negotiations
with Mehlokazulu and persuade him to return to his tribe, but
\
according to one witness, Mehlokazulu's reply was "I can't go
back now, I have been surrounded by troops. I do not know what
4harm I have done". It was at this time tiiat the government found
cl. 3247, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 60, 28.9*06.
Stuart, p .319 ff*
2J0 179/ 251/ 10868, C de B. Perssa to Seo. S t., 27.3.08.
3C0 179/235/20725, O o t .  to Sac. St., 18.5.06, d e s p .  95.
4Col. Col. 98, Mankulumana and Mgwaqo Prosecutions, p. 83 ff*
Evid. Magadisa. See also Times of Natal. 29*2.08 and CO 179/235/
22649, Bnol. in desp. 106, CNA to P.M. 26.5*06.
I t  necessary to Bond a circular to tho magistrates cf Dundee, 
Ladysmith,Eetcourt, Oreytown and Kradhkop to assure Chiefs in 
their divisions that they need have no fear o f being interfered 
withf^ in Nqutu division where the magistrate asked permission 
of the government to hold a Meting to allay the fears of 
the chiefs, Col. Maokay in charge of the troops in the d istrict 
instructed the Commissioner for Hative Affairs to "discontinue
any further diplomatic negotiations" with Mehlokasulu and the
2conference of chiefs was apparently not held either* fina lly  
after a few days in the bush, Mehlokasulu decided on 18th *•3r 
to throw in his lo t  with Bambatha mid made his way to the Mkandla 
stronghold* It is  possible too that his motion was partly in­
fluenced by the burning of Cetshwayo'a grave by ihite troops on 
the previous day* There he vas joined by members o f  jpaku's tribe 
under Lubudlungu who had originally been armed in accordance 
with the instructions of the magistrate to watch the drifts when 
Mtele and Mavugutu had crossed into Zululand* Their story vas 
that after Mehlokasulu*s fligh t, they saw their kraals burning, 
and thinking that it  vas being done by the rebels vent to see what
3was happening, but vere fired on by the ihite troops* They therefore
P^HC 102/231« 16.5.06.
2fKC 102/226, C.I.A. to P .H ., 25.5.06, no. 143.
3S*. also Oot. to S*o. S t., 18.5.06 (CO 179/233/20725, deep. 95)»
"Ho more huts are to be destroyed on the #atal side of the Tugela 
unless the troops are fired on froa them* In Hkandhla however where 
our ohief weapon. •• is  cutting o ff supplies, a ll kraals w ill be de­
stroyed as well aa crops wherever this is  possible so as to oompel 
natives to leave the close shelter in which they axe now concealed."
"ran away and .... joined Mehlokazulu and vent to Nkandhla vith 
him, without Faku* s ordors".1 This may of oourae hare been a
convenient excuse on the part of men who had already decided to 
rebel against the government; that most of the tribes of Zulu­
land were reluctant to fight against their fellows in Natal, 
despite previous tribal enmities, vas an undoubted fact. Whether 
this in itBelf constituted rebellion depends an one's viewpoint.
Their situation is  reminisoent of that of Boers in the Cape at 
the beginning of the Boer War./ The plaint of Faku's men that 
they were fired on by the vhite troops when they were in fact 
assisting them is  to some extent supported by a very interesting 
correspondence between the commissioner for Native Affairs in 
Nkandla and the magistrate of Nqutu, in vhioh reference is made 
to the white troops "trying to goad the lfcole population" into
rebellion and of the d ifficu lties  of magistrates in protecting
2"people vho one knew perfectly well were faithful to us".
Hignett's words are strikingly supported by a long, mid for him, 
unusual letter sent by Archdeacon Johnson, S.P.O. missicnaryat 
St. Augustines in the Nqutu d istrict to the secretary of that 
organisation in London. He wrotet
^Col. Col. 98, Precog. Samuelson Ndumo ka Ziniqgo, brother of Paku.
See also Tines of Natal. 29.2.08, Svid. Hagadlsa in Dinusulu9s Prelim. 
Examination.
2ZA 28 Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion C.N.A. to Hignett
14.6.06 agreeing vith these sentiments, apparently originally
expressed by Hignett. I have not seen the original letter.
''Many thinking people have been asking themselves 
'What are we going to do with this teeming native 
population?'• Some strongfranded men have thou git 
that the time was ripe for the solving of the great 
question. They knew that -there was a general wide­
spread spirit of dissatisfaction amongst the natives 
o f  Natal, Freestate and Transvaal, but especially 
in Natal, and they commenced the suppression of 
the rebellion in the fierce hope that the spirit of 
rebellion might so spread throughout the land and 
engender a war of practical extermination. I fully 
believe -that they vere imbued wilh the conviction 
that this was the only safe way of dealing with 
the native question, and they are greatly disappointed 
that the spi r it  of rebelling was not strong enough 
to bring more than a moiety of the native peoples 
under the influence of the r ifle . Over and over 
again it  was said, 'they are only sitting on the 
fence, i t  shall be our endeavour to push them oveij' 
and again speaking of the big chiefs, 'We must en­
deavour to bring hii in i f  possib le '• Yes, they have 
been honest and outspoken enough -  the wish being 
father to the thought, they prophesied the rebellion 
would spread throughout South Africa; had they been 
true prophets, no doubt the necessity of solving 
the native question would have been solved for this 
generation at least.
Archdeacon Johnson was a highly respected member of the Natal
community. He was one of the four non-official members on the
Native Affairs Council set up by the government after the disturb- 
2anoes. Here no wide-eyed novice or fiery philanthropist. Johnson 
had been in Natal sinoe the age of seven, and Justly described 
himself as "no nagrophilist in its  narrow rabid sense.••
^S.P.G. Archives, Letters 1906, no. 71, 24.7.06.
oe below, Chapter IX2
a colonist and proud of that position".*
It  could also however be argued that it  vas only the
already disaffected and guilty vho vculd allow themselves to
be provoked into aggressive action by the troops. The oase
of Chief Matshana ka Mondisa would appear to illustrate both
the degree of military provooaticn and this latter point.
Although the majority of his tribe assisted the government
forces at Nkandla and the ohief himself remained in touoh with
the authorities ever since Bambatha had fled to the d istrict,
some members of the tribe broke away under five  of his sons vith
whom Matshana had been having considerable d ifficu lty  for several 
2years. During the third week in June the tribe was fined five 
head of oattle per rebel. These were promptly paid by Matshana
to Col. Mackay vho was in charge of the column operating in the
area, and he was given a "complete discharge"• A week later, a 
further column under Col. Roys ton swept through Matshana* a ward, 
gathering up "almost ©very beast i t  could find". Aooording to 
the Commissioner of Hative Affairs in Zululand, Roy ston'a 
"handling of the matter in view of what had already happened 
under Col. Mackay and Leu chars, (to whom Matshana had rendered every
*3.P.O. Archives, Letters 1906, no. 71, 24.7.06.
2sna iA /5 2 31^ 1 , Interview between magistrate and members of 
Matshana* s people.
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assistance) was, to say the least, extraordinary." The c iv il 
authorities immediately reassured Katshana and his people
not been done by December 1906, no further m e o b e iB  of the tribe
In the midst of offensive operations i t  must have been 
very d ifficu lt  in any case for the troops to distinguish between 
black friend and black foe, even had they been willing to make 
the e ffort, Vith many of the columns, especially those of volunteers 
from outside the colony, there was often only one European who 
knew any ^ulu. For them i t  must frequently have seemed impossible 
to draw the distinction between "goading into rebellion" and 
"taking the necessary precautions". In the Nkandla-Nqutu area 
where there was undoubtedly open rebellion, whatever the in itia l 
reasons for its outbreak, from the European point of view that 
rebellion had to be stamped out as swiftly as possible. The terrain 
was extremely d ifficu lt  to operate in, the Home forests and tha 
Nkandla mountains constituting a natural stronghold, with steep 
c l i f f s ,  deep gorges and dense bush. If in the course of the oon-
. w . .. .. w .___   . , . . .____    T_______ aa
tr~!:now any Zulu.
that their cattle would be restored to them.1 Although this had
joined the rebels 2
?'• 7
verging movements considered necessary for surrounding the rebels 
and hunting them out, other, more-or-less innooent?chiefs and 
tribes vere dragged into the h ostilities , i t  could be held that 
this vas an unfortunate, but unavoidable oonoommitant of warfare.
It  is  however more d ifficu lt  to aeoept these arguments in 
the case o f the third phase of the disturbances, the outbreak 
o f 'rebellion* in the Hapumulo division. On the 10th June KoKenaie 
in flicted a crushing and decisive defeat on Baabatha mud his 
followers at the battle o f Home Gorge. Host of the leaders of 
this phase of the disturbances, including Bambatha himself, who 
had his head out off for identification purposes, and Xehlokaaulu; 
vere killed. The Governor believed that this blow had brought the 
rebellion in Zululand to an end, and that there vas "no chanoe 
whatever of the rebellion spreading into Natal".1 On the 18th 
June the tribesmen of Hapumulo attacked Thring's Store k illin g  a 
trooper as veil as destroying some wagons at Otimati River; i t  
vas reported that hundreds of tribesmen had taken up arms. The 
timing of this vas the more surprising es Hapumulo, a very densely 
populated almost entirely African area, had been amongst the f ir s t  
of the districts reported to be disturbed over the Poll Tax. 2
1Cd 179/235/24596, Co t .  to S k . St., d«ep. 161, 16.6.06. 
abov., p. 2.7-4-
9 sr 9
*• • ♦ » J
^After the in itia l refusal on the part of the followers of Ngo­
bizembe, Swaimana and Meseni to pay the tax and a subsequent 
meeting of the Minister for Native Affairs with chiefs In the 
area, a strong body of police was sent there at the beginning 
of February, Following further adverse reports frcm the division, 
where tribes had doctored themselves for war, a second column cf 
the Field Forces was mobilised under Col, George Leuchars 
especially to deal with than. At the aid of February Leuchars de­
livered an ultimatum to Ngobizembe to hand over within six days 
three hundred men who had "giya-ed” in front of the magistrate 
in January,^ Ngobizembe protested that after the lapse of nearly 
six weeks it  would be impossible to find a ll the offenders in 
the allotted time. He only handed over twenty o f  the culprits
and,as a result, on the 5th March, Leuohars bombarded his kraal
2with artillery  fire  from a distance of two hundred yards. Thia 
was reported to have had a "splendid effect". Leuchars, who had 
been Secretary to Native Affairs, was congratulated on his superb 
understanding of the "native mind” and all over the natives were 
reported to have "changed their attitude of studied insolence to 
one of thorough submission” . '^Ngobizembe immediately surrendered
C^d 2905, Gov.to £©c. St., desp. no. 3D, 2.3*C6.
2Ibid ., no. 37, 9.3.06.
3Cd 2905, G o t .  to See. S t., 9.3.06.
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vith a large portion of hia tribe aid plana vere aade to and 
him to northern Zululand. Half hia lande vere oonfieoated and 
the people thereon jiaced under adjacent chief a. He vaa further 
fined 1200 head of oattle9 and 3*500 aheep and goate.1 A 
mounted column 1 drove* the country for further * rebels* aad 
cattle. No opposition vaa ahovn to these disciplinary actions* 
although Bambatha at this time deposed from hia chieftainship 
vaa in the neighbouring tfevoti bush* watching id doubt vith some 
interest.
While Ngobiseabe'a vaa the moat drastic fate in Mapumulo 
at this time* Leuohara also demanded the 'rebels9 from Haaeni and 
Svaimana*a tribes to be given up. HaaeniMLmself had not actually 
been p resent at the time of the alleged defiance of hia tribe 
over the Poll Tax. He had been attending a tria l at the St anger 
magistracy for a faction fight vhioh had Involved hia tribesmen* 
at the end of 1903* Nevertheless for not handing over more than 
f ifty -f iv e  of the hundred men demanded by Leuohars for trial by 
Court Martial for their participation In the defiance of the
2Mapumulo magistracy he vaa imprisoned without tria l for six weeks.
1Stuart* Z.R. .  p .149.
2l t n . . pp. 544 tt.
Tho opportunity vas also taken of limiting his jurisdiction to 
tho Mapumulo-Ndvedve divisions of his tribe ostensibly ss punish­
ment for his p art in the 1905 faction fight.
In March, Ndlovu ka Timuni, another chief in the Mapumulo 
division, was summoned to St anger for haring failed to appear 
before the magistrate on two previous occasions and vas "owing 
to a mistake" detained for more than a month before he too vas 
released vithout tr ia l .1 The arbitrary nature of these proceedings 
vas further illustrated by the case of Acting Chief Oevesa o f 
the Cele tribe. Arrested for failing to obey a command to report 
himself to Leuchars, vho apparently van ted his presence vhen the 
proclamation of Ngobisembe's deposition was read out, he vas sen­
tenced under Martial lav to three months imprisonment. Oevesa's 
tribe vas in faot divided between the Krantskop and Mapusulo 
divisions, and i t  vould appear that the original summons to hear 
the proclamation had gone to the in dun a of the Hapumulo section 
of hia tribe, Gevesa himself residing at Krantskop. The Krantskop 
magistrate himself thought this the most likely account of his
behaviour. The induna in charge of the Cele people in Mapumulo
2had actually been present at Leu char'a command. This episode took
S^NA I /4/ I 6 Col. Leuchars to Commandant of M ilitia, 20.3*06
and Memo. Magis. T. Maxwell, Mapumulo, 2.4*06.
2SNA 1/ 1/ 371^ ^ -  Magic. Maxwell and U.S.H.A. 11.5.06 
Magis. Leslie (Krantskop) 4*5a06.
place in Hay.
Although the bulk of Leuchars* column which had been operating
in the Mapumulo-Lover Tugela area vae demobilised in the middle of
March, wmaii numbers of troops, especially the Tinvoti Mounted Rif lea
vere retained there* These vere later supplemented by a garrison
of the Natal Mounted Rifles and the Durban Light Infantry, who
vere sent there on account of the rumours of rebelliousness amongst
the tribesmen, although nothing of a definite nature vas proven
at this stage.1 At the end of April some of Kgobizembe^ men
2joined Bambatha in the Nkandla forests.
Bjy the middle of April there vere indications that the 
presence of the troops vas not entirely beneficial. The magistrate 
of the neighbouring Kradtekop division wrote to the Under Secretary 
of Native Affairs on the 39th April that the Chief Tshutshutshu, 
vho had men in both divisions like Geveaa above, had complained 
that several members of his tribe had been unjustly flogged by
the troops at Mapumulo and that he (the magistrate) had heard
3several other complaints of a similar nature. The young men of
1Stuart, Z.R ..p .344.
2Ibld. .  p .313.
3SNA l/l/34C)i||4- , Magi a. A.'rf. Leslie, 19.4.06.
Tshutshutshu's tribe vere later deaoribed aa haring been 
"insolent and Insubordinate" during the in itia l Poll Tax 
collection , but, during the aotual outbreak of violence in 
the division, to hare been "loyal and sealous” in 1 hunting 
out rebels.1
On being asked for an explanation of these allegations
against the troops of unjust flogging, tie head of the Itavoti
Mounted Rifles replied to the Commandant of the M ilitia tbati
"The natives in question vere punished for insolent 
behaviour and for not shoving 1he required respect 
for the King's uniform. Strong measures had tc be 
resorted to to teach the natives who had utterly 
got out of hand... to pay their respects to the vhite 
man."2
This action vas fu lly  approved by the Commandant of the M ilitia 
and apparently roused no further comment at the time. le t  a few 
veeks later Sir James liege Hulett, a man vho had held various 
responsible positions in the colony, having been a member of 
the Natal Parliament sin os Responsible Government and Secretary 
for Native Affairs in 1899, as mil as being one of the lazgeet 
sugar fazmers in the colony vith considerable Interests in Zululand, 
vaa to write earnestly and urgently to the Prime Minister from his
1SHA r Report Magle. Krsntskop 27.8.06.
2SHA Minute Capt. Moe to Com an dent of M ilitia,
30.4.06.
' ' ib id . . Commandant of M ilitia to Minister of Justice, 1.3.06.
sugar estates in the neighbourhood of Mapumulo of the serious 
state of affairs there. Once again these words cannot be dis­
missed as those of an attention seeking negrophile and have to 
be quoted at some length:
"The native population is absolutely docile and quiet 
throughout the d istrict, /though/ kow long they w ill 
remain so depends upon the government; i f  they are to 
be harried by irresponsible men who aot as dend-Gods 
and who, armed with a kind of self-imposed authority 
think i t  the correct tiling to flog unoffending people 
. . .  then the area will be drawn into the area of dis­
affected with the result that the ^Suropean7 people 
/T iers/... v i l l  have to leave their homes, wives and 
plantations to the mercy of an outraged fo e .. .  Fray 
let us have a level-headed man at the head of affairs 
at Mapumulo and put a stop to this nonsense of laving 
every man in uniform requiring every native to conform 
to his idea of what salutation consists of. This 
^ i l le g ib le /  people is being driven into rebellion 
and it  speaks volumes fo r /th e ix / good sense... 
that they have not risen."*
A few days later ministers heard from another source that the troops
were using their leather stirrups to impress upon the natives "due
respect" and for obtaining information, and gave as their un-
2animous opinion that this " should immediately be pul a stop to"* 
Even in peace-time, the extent to tfiich Natal magistrates 
resorted to the lash was greater than in any of tiie South African 
colonies at this time. As Professor de Kiewiet has remarked, tiie
Xm  6 0 2 0 . 5 . 0 6 .
C^O 179/235/22649, Gov. to -ec. St. desp. 106, I . 6 . 0 6 , publ. Cd, 3027, 
p*54.
temptation for a small, insecure white population to resort
to rule by terroriaation was immense.1 The government of the
natives of Natal, was In the absence of consent, by a thinly veiled
2use of force even In peacetime.
In a ll the South African colonies except Natal, sentences 
involving flogging had to be reviewed by a Judge of the Supreme 
Court. In 1907 i^n Natal, where there was no such check, one in 
every four hundred of the total male population was flogged, 
exolusive of young boys sentenced to birching) while during
Athe disturbances according to the Tim as of Natal seven hundred 
Africans had their backs lashed to ribbons aid four thousand seven 
hundred sentenoes including lashes vere carried out, before the
5government it s e lf  put an end to this "judicial violence". The 
paper continued: "We vodder i f  any o ffic ia l record exists of 
the number flogged so to say on sight, during the . . .  expedition 
. . .  in that year” . 6
T^he Imperial Factor in aouth Africa, p .36.
2See e.g . Supplement to the Government Gazette, 5*6.05, Report 
of Prison Reform Commission, p.317, which talks of "the cult 
of the lash".
^Nathan Papers MSS 401, p«247, oopy Minutes Nathan to S.B.A. 23*10.07 
and p .255 to P.M. 6.1.08 and 25*1*08, p. 258 to Attorney General 
31*12.08 and Nathan MSS 368 Nathan to Sal borne, 11.12.08. The 
comparative figures in 1907 vere, for the Cape, one in 850 of 1he adult
male non-white population,in the Transvaal, one in 680 and In Vatal, 
one in 400 of the total male adult population. As the number of
whites flogged vas very small, the Cape's figures are more favourable
violence which has characterised so much o f  race relations In 
the Southern states of the United States; nevertheless this 
form of legalised brutality appears to have constituted an adequate 
substitute and was, in many ways probably the outcome of the same 
psychological faotors. I t  is  beyond the scope of this thesis 
to explore this aspect of settler mentality, nevertheless as a 
final spur prompting into action those Africans who had already 
watched their cattle confiscated and their kraals destroyed it  
cannot be ignored. It would also go a long way to explaining 
the 'puzaling*~ feature of this last phase of the disturbances -
In Natal there vas l i t t le  of the lynching and public
v
than the figures show. In addition one in thirty-seven of the 
whole African population were in prison during some part of the 
year and one in nineteen cf the whole male population. Nathan
MSS 368, Nathan to Selborne 11.12.08.
428.1.08.
*5Stuart, Z .R .. p.404.
°Flogging had become such a scandal in the colony that Sir Matthew 
Nathan personally headed a crusade for its abolition. Even the 
Attorney General of Natal, T.F.Carter, oertainly no negropMle, 
was shocked by the evidence of its savagery. He sent some photographs 
of lacerated men to Nathan in December 1909 with the covering note 
that these were not special oases. He added: tfI should be sorry
for the sake cf the colony that anyone but yourself or Lord Sel borne
should see these photographs." ^Nathan MSS 401, p .266, Carter to 
Nathan 2 .12.09.) It stands to Carter's credit that he tried to 
pass an act abolishing flogging altogether, 'though he failed, he 
did secure some modifications In the type of cane used. In the 
debate before the Natal Legislative Assembly, Carter stated that 
i f  he told all he knew on the misuse of the lash in Natal Hhe would 
bo giving the colony a bad name.” See N.L.A. Debates 11.11.09*
1ABN m / l / 3 ,  p .348 f f .  J.D. Taylor of A.Z.M. to Rev. D.W.Drew, editor 
of The friend » Bloemfontein, 30*6.06.
why i t  was that after the rebellion vas so dearly  a hopeless 
and dying cause the chiefs in the Kapumul o-Lo wo r Tug el a area should 
suddenly have taken up arms, especially after many of them had 
already paid their Poll Tax and had paid also for their previous 
reoaloitranoe. I f the doctoring of tribes in January and February 
regarded by Stuart as revealing the most hostile intentions to 
the vhite man1 vere intended as a preliminary to war, i t  is  d iffi­
cult to explain why more of the Mapumulo men did not either join 
the Kcandla army or rise at the same time when the bulk o f the 
forces vere engaged there* Stuart's explanation of this very 
odd course of action is  that messengers had been sent from Dinu-
buIu' s uncle Siteku to Keeeni, Matshvili and Ndlovu km Timuni
2inciting them to rise* le t this hardly seems a sufficient reason 
for their curious course of actios, especially as the Commissioner 
of Native Affairs himself found these allegations "most unsatis­
factory"; he had had a long interview with Meseni and Ndlovu 
ka Timuni vhen they surrendered and despite the most careful
examination on the question of whether they had been encouraged
„ 3from Zululand they gave not the slightest hint that that was so"*
^ .R .,  p.347.
2Ibld. .  pp. 347-8.
A^QO 1/7/52, Minute C.N.A. oa statements mad* by Ndlovu md 
Meseni before J* Stuart, 20-21*7.06.
Many may hara bean induced to taka up arm® by 'tha rumour that 
tha Africans had bean successful at Home Gorge md a l l  the 
vhite soldiers had been killed vhioh vas apparently circulated 
in the Mapumulo area by survivors of the Moma Gaw^ ge battle.1 
That this rumour oould long1 have lasted in faoe of the overwhelming 
disaster in flicted on 10th June however seams most unlikely. le t 
a member of Chief Ngobisembe's tribe in this division would appear 
to be putting the situation as it  appeared to many Africans whan 
he stated:
"Before they had an opportunity of making any reply 
and stating that they thought the taxes already 
existing were heavy enough, they were threatened 
with being shot. They thereupm paid, but vhilo
they were s t i l l  paying, hostilities broke out.
It vas a matter of curiosity on their side as to 
whether the government really wanted this tax or 
whether they wanted their liv e s ."2
The Kapulumo rebels vere to pay dearly for their uprising.
In that division, about 1,500 Africans vere k illed , ]£00 prisoners 
taken and thousands of people rendered homeless md starving
3by the burningcf their crops md kraals. Bven after Hie surrender
of the ehief leaders of the rebellion here, md long after the
^Hermannsburger Missionsblatt, Oct. 1907, Report Br. Etrauel, pp. 294-5 
2N.N.A.C., Evidenoe Maraud la , p .698.
'SNA 1/1/571^11^ , Report Farrer Mapuaulo to K.N.A. 28.6.07.
government considered suoh action to be necessary, theee
"punitive measures?: continued,1 It was to the "sweeping actions'*
and "mopping up operations" in this division and the neighbouring
Lower Tugela that the Governor referred to as "continued 
2slaughter" and 5*red Graham at the Colonial Office, a man not
3given to hyperbole, as "the massacre". While many atrocities 
had been alleged on the part of the troops in other areas it  
could be argued that these were generally in the heat of battle.
In this area they continued long after the heat of battle had 
departed and was only eventually stopped after several oomplaLnts 
had been lodged and the Government stepped in.^
There were those, even at the time, who saw the entire re­
bellion as deliberately contrived by the government, tho white 
settlers or, indeed, by that bogey of left-wing thought in the 
early twentieth century, the Transvaal mine-owners, for the purpose 
cf grabbing the Africans' land and forcing them out to labour.
There is l it t le  evidence to support these views. Both government 
and settlers feared rebellion as mu oh as they were determined to
1PH a oP* •• Armstrong M.L.A. and M.S. Evans M.L.A. to P#H« 13*7*06
2PM 61^ | , G o t .  t o  P.M. 10.7.06.
3C0 179/256/24787, Minute 10.7.06 on ML. Got. to Seo. St. 9.7.06 no.
.s  Above. Proclamation, Govt. C&xatt. no. 3552, 
12.7.06? SeS also ABM l u / l / 3 ,  Letterbook J. D. Taylor to M.H.A.
9.9.06 to Judson Smith 13.7.06, to ? .  Churchill 13.7.06, to 
Marshall Campbell 21.7.06.
369
stamp i t  out completely onoe it  occurred. Their blundering, 
misunderstanding and insensitivity must however be accounted 
amongst the factors vhioh led to the flare up of violence in 
1906; there is more evidence, although even this, perhaps in 
the very nature of things, is  not absolute, that onoe the military 
men were in the fie ld  they exacerbated the situation considerably. 
While i t  ia true that in the long run the mineowners profitted 
from the 1906 disturbances as the number of Africans forced on 
to the labour market of the mines increased from 17,900 in 1906 
to 34,200 in 19101 i t  was certainly not only 'tiie rebellion which 
caused this. Nor of course can one in any way argue from this 
that the mineowners were in any way directly or indirectly re­
sponsible for this result^ however much they had wanted an increase 
in their labour supply. Amongst neither blacks nor whites 
is  there much evidence of a conspiracy, although mu oh of "cross 
purposes rampant on a saa of rumour".
Nevertheless the o ffic ia l Natal view that the campaigns were 
conduoted with the utmost humanity and that only their swift action
saved thousands of white women and children from being murdered
2by black hordes also does not bear much scrutiny. Of both extreme
■^Axelson, Taxation In Natal, p.160.
2See Stuart, Z.R. passim for this view.
views i t  can be said "not proven"* The words o f  the veteran Cape 
politician John X* Herriman summed up the feeling of the more 
liberal element in South Africa when he wrote to Goldwln Smith
in September 1906;
"We have had a horrible business in Natal with the 
natives* I suppose theifcole truth w ill never be 
known, but enough comes out to make us see how thin 
the crust is  that keeps our Christian o iv ilisa ti on 
from the old-fashioned savagery -  machine guns and 
modern r ifle s  against knob-sticks and assegais are 
heavy odds and do not add much to the glory of tiie 
superior races*"1
Herriman Papers No* 202, 16*9*06.
Chapter VI
W M k  a  a oolohial g g m
"Although there la some foundation for the taunt 
that the Government is without a native policy 
because of the absence of consistent purpose, 
high aim or dear principles, i t  would be an in­
justice to pronounce it  non-existent or wholly 
featureless. I tars leading features appear to 
have been the preservation of peace, in reducing 
the size of tribes and curtailing the powers of 
chiefs••••"
Report of the Natal Native 
Affairs Commission,
1906-7$ p.8.
in Hinviting a people who vere already irritated to go on to
i
worse” has been traced in some detail. Tet this is  not the 
whole story. Even amongst those people who were probably finally  
spurred into action by the appearance of th© troops on th© 
scene, a whole complex of frustrations and motives were necessary 
before an individual chief took the dangerous decision to oppose 
them. Moreover what was traced there was mainly th© attitude 
of the major chiefs who carried the bulk of their tribesmen with 
them. This chapter, i t  is  hoped, will show a rather different 
aspect of motivations why i t  was that certain individuals saw 
it  in their p o litica l in terest to join in th© rebellion, while 
others decided to remain neutral, and yet others aotually took 
up arms in support of the government. This question appears es­
pecially pressing in the case of those chiefdoms that sp lit in 
two on the question o f participatLon or non-partiolpatlcn In 
the rebellion. In answering it  moreover i t  is hoped that light 
w ill be shed on the working of traditional polltlos within a 
colonial framework. It cannot be claimed in what follows that
In the previous chapter, th© rol© of th© military factor
^See above, Chapter v
the answers given are final | in  working from ad m in istra tive  
records one is  necessarily dependent on those aspects o f  the
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  the A fr ican  which impinged on the consciousness 
o f  the xu lers . N evertheless in the afterm ath o f  the d isturbances 
e s p e c ia l ly ,  many o f  the fea tu res  o f the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  tho 
A frioans did come to  the a tte n tio n  o f  the m ag istra tes , although 
in  many instances they were on ly  dimly aware o f  what was actually 
happening. One i s  not able to  be dogmatic in  o n e 's  in te rp re ta tio n  
o f  these even ts, e s p e c ia l ly  as i t  was im possib le  to  trace  and 
c o r r e la te  the o ra l memories and tra d it io n s  of a l l  the groups and 
sub-groups in v o lv ed . N evertheless i f  the l im ita t io n s  of what 
fo llo w s  are realised end even i f  the p ic tu re  i s  o f  n e ce s s ity  
somewhat hazy and incom plete , s u f f ic ie n t  d e ta i l  o f  th is  substratum 
o f  p o l i t i c s  can be garnered from 1he documentary sources alone 
to  make the endeavour worthwhile.
I t  was a popular theory at the time o f the d isturbances 
that the p a rt ic ip a n ts  ai the A frican  s id e  were the younger gener­
a t io n , the w ild young b lood s , who had had no memory o f  war against 
the Europeans and who, in  ad d ition , had experienced the dem oralising 
in flu en ce  of the towns. Thus (even b e fore  the outbreak o f  open 
rebellion ) the M in ister f o r  Native A ffa ir s  poin ted  out that the
disaffection over the Poll Tax In Zululand was not in the re­
moter districts where the tribesmen were as yet l i t t le  affected 
by the white man and his ways, but in those d istricts olosest 
to Natal and its  railway lin e .1 Many witnesses before the
Natal Native Affairs Commission noted the part played by young
2men in the disturbances, and the Rev. J. D. Taylor tf the 
A.Z.M. stated that the rebellion was started by the " r if f -r a f f” 
of the native population, although others were later drawn in.**
It was tenpting for Natalians to regard the 1906 disturb­
ances in these terms, to point to the disintegrating effects 
of urban l i fe  on the pristine simplicity of the tribal way of 
l i f e  and to suggest that i t  was only the foolish young men, 
thirsting for traditional milltaxy glory, or those who had been 
demoralised on the Rand, who woild think of taking up arms against 
the white man. Natal, they believed, had been distinguished froa 
a ll the other oolonies in her attempt to allow "the natives to 
develop along their own lines” and the inherent superiority of 
their method of native administration was rarely doubted. In
^ d  2905, p .10, Encl. 2 in desp. 21 and K.N.A. to Gov. 50.1.06.
2See Evid. passim. See also SNA l/l/5 67 1ffi-' Rept. Assist. Kagla. 
H. C. Colenbrander who thought the direct cause of the Rebellion 
was the dissolute l i fe  led by the younger generation -  the 
Amarusu and Isigebengu - ( teddyboys and gangsters)- "The centres 
they inhabit do not come under tribal or kraal head control and 
are practioally infected by Native foreigners, the scum of other 
oolonies and states•"
3ABM U l / l /3  p .348, Lattarbook to Hrr. V. D. Draw, 30.6.06.
1904# P. R. Moor made the remark to the South African Native
Affairs Commission whose irony must have been recalled in 1906
by many of his contemporaries that
wtfe rather congratulate ourselves that our Natives 
are the best-mannered, and the best-behaved, and 
the most law abiding people that we have got in 
South A frica.W1
The great belief in the docility  of the tribal African who
had the right kind of respect for the white man and who would
never have risen against his rule, led the colonists to look
for the sinister external influence, whether of the American-
inspired Ethiopian rjrc£ the white man's towns, with
their liquor and loose women. This also led Natal authorities 
to underamphasise the fact that the disturbances were basically 
tribal in origin and organisation. Par more attention was paid 
to the handful of black preachers^ attached to the tribal forces 
than to the fact that they were a ll doctored for war in the 
traditional way by traditional war doctors; greater concern 
was aroused by the fact that a number of the men captured or 
found dead on tho fie ld  wore artioles of European clothing, 
than that the majority did not, but wore instead the tshokobesi
1S.A.N.A.C. I l l ,  p .233, c f. also S.A.N.A.C. I l l ,  p .78, Evid 
E. C. Shepstone.
Ethiopianism on the rebellion see above 
Chapter VIII.
See below, Chapter V£ji
< i k)
badge -  a bushy shite or red and ifcite ox or cow-tail bound 
round their heads , the traditional Zulu war symbol -  and tribal 
dress ./s im ila r ly  great play was made of the fact that i t  was 
the younger man who defied the government and broke away from 
their chiefs, although the leaders of the disturbances oould 
hardly be described in the same terms s Sigananda was in his 
nineties, Mehlokazulu must have been about f i f ty  and Bambatha 
himself was at least forty .1 It was of course true that the 
younger men were most truculent over the Poll Tax which was 
going to fa ll  as an additional burden on their shoulders; more­
over in any society, it  is the young men who bear the brunt o f  
battle. Nevertheless in July, 1906 the Christian Express was 
to remark on the large proportion of "middle-aged and older men" 
surrendering after the operations in Mapumulo, men "who oould 
not have entered lightly upon the oampaign". At the same time the 
magistrate of Ndwedwe division, one of the most densely populated 
African areas close to both Pietermaritzburg and Durban wrote 
that of two hundred and fifteen  rebels of that division whom he 
tried
"many were grey-headed kraal heads, many were old
trusted servants • The usual explanation was that they
1 — ■ _Bosnian, p.87 and 109, Stuart,^p. 157 and p .198.
21.7.06.
were ’ dogs* and that their chief had called them
out.*l
It ia a notable feature of the disturbances that the only time 
that there was a noticeable movement from Pietermaritzburg and 
Durban was in late June and early July when the disturbances 
spread to the Hapumulo-Lower Tugela area. When the urban workers 
were asked why they were leaving, they replied that they feared 
for the safety of their women, children and cattle -  and that 
they had been called upon by their chiefb to return home.1 This 
reason was clearly taken seriously by the government, for when 
these same men returned to their jobs in town some weeks later 
i t  was decided to take no punitive action against them on this 
account.2
That the town workers should have responded to the call 
from their chiefs to help them in the struggle is not surprising. 
Urbanisation in the true sense of the word was a reality  for
a minute number of Africans at that time -  and indeed they would
3have had the most to lose had they come out in rebellion.
For most migrant workers in the towns the primary ties were 
bade home to the chief and the tribe; as yet no widespread
13NA l /l /3 6 ? ^ ~ -  Uept. Chief Kagis. i. Binns (Durban) 19.1.09. U / •
2C0 179/236/27677, desp. 150, Gov. to dec. Ot. 5.7.06.
33ee below, Chapter VIII and above, Chapter I.
African urban organisation was in existence* If Africans were 
to defy the white man, the cnly way it  oould be done was on 
their homeground and through their traditional authoritiee*
There vere the usual rumours that Africans had come to the towns 
armed with assegais which they had hidden in their compounds, 
and that they vould all rise once the troops had departed for 
the troubled areas, but these vere completely unfounded.1 A few 
youths were fined for seditious utterances in the towns and 
Assistant Magistrate Stuart's meetings with the town workers 
were extremely unruly vhen he announced the Poll Tax -  bat that 
vas about a ll . Although in both Durban and Pietermaritzburg 
the African and European male population were almost equally 
balanced no outbreak of violence took place in the towns.
with a ll the attention that was paid to the ffcct that a 
large number of chiefs were unable to control their followers, 
and the tendency to blame i t  on the Ethiopian preacher and the 
urban r i f f -r a f f ,  what was overlooked vas that the fundamental
^See e.g. CO 179/235/22656, Ends. 1 and 2, T. Shepstona (Pretoria) 
to P.M. Natal, 16.4*06 and 22*4*06* E* Roux, Time Longer than Rope.
PP* 90-91*
2 ee above, Chapter V, p. 2.7 8
7t
Acc* to the 1904 Census (p .14) there were 8,134 white males and 
8,060 African males in the municipality of Pietermaritzburg and 
18,777 white males and 18,286 African males in Durban. As most, 
i f  not a ll , the Africans were in towns seeking work the number 
of Africans of 'fighting age' was probably higher than that of 
the Europeans, which included old men aid children.
pattern of allegiances during the disturbances s t i l l  ran along
lines of kinship and lineage. Even many of the menbers of the
African Presbyterian Church group under Makanda and Mjongo
responsible for the in itia l outbreak appear to have been closely
related as fathers and sons, brothers and brothers-in-law.'*'
tfhile it  is true •that a great number of people did break away
from their chiefs, by and large they s t i l l  followed the lead of
traditional authorities in the tribe: either another member of
2the chiefly family, a prominent induna or their own umnumaane.
Thus of the thirteen prominent rebels of the Nkandla division 
who were s t i l l  wanted by the government at the end of 1907 and who 
were specifically  exempted "in the event a£ a proclamation of 
amnesty", seven were the sons of chiefs and six were kraalheada, 
or abenumzane. One of these kraalheads was also the son of a 
chief, and another was also an induna, or approved headman.  ^ The 
only one who did not have any hereditaiy rank appears to hare been 
Cakijana ka Gezinuaka who acted as Bambatha*s right-hand man, and 
held his position reputedly as Dinuzulu*s induna and personal 
emissary.
^See evid. passim Richmond Court Martial, encl. in CO 179/234/19958*
pe.g. The rebels amongst Kburo*s people were led by Fogoti the 
brother of the chief and a kraalhead; the rebels from Mapoisa*s 
people were led by the chief*s son Uwohlo, whilst tho rebels 
from Ndube*8 people were lead by the ch ief’ s maternal cousin 
Nomadindem ia Qetuka whose father Qetuka in the Lower Lnifoloai 
division also rebelled, and the chief induna. SNA l/l/345  
Report B. Colenbrander 27.9*06. ,J^
?C0 179/243/41176, Encl. 4 in Oov. to Sec. St. desp. Secret., 
3•H •07 0 no• 1•
In Hatal and Zululaad tha attrapt aada In othar parts 
of iifrloa to taka tha hereditary ohlafa into government oonfldraoa 
had rarer really been aada* Indeed/ it  was tha stated intention 
of the administration to undermine tha position of tha hereditary 
heads of tribes* Unlike the appointed chiefs, the hereditary 
chief a had no a priori reason to feel, loyalty or gratitude to a 
government vhioh made lit t le  effort to engage their loyalty aad 
gratitude. More than one hereditary ohief complained of the 
eoomful and humiliating vay in vhioh they vere treated in the 
magistrate?' courts by the humblest officia l, blaok or shite.
Aa early aa 1893 Sir Marshal Clarke remarked in Zululand that 
the main olsavage in the territory vas betveen those people sho
folloved their hereditary ohief a and those vho supported the
2appointed chiefs. Bren at the purely looal level there seemed 
to be an increasing division betveen the appointed in duns or head­
men, vho vere In general commoners appointed by the ohief and 
the magistrate, and the heredlta^r descent group heads or MbfiBHBttBl*
While in the esse of both the hereditary chiefs rad the sbenumssne 
the mainsprings of their authority vere dr&vn as of right rad froa 
the amount of popular support thsy could achieve, the appointed
^Cf. e.g. SHA 1/4/12^4, Report U.S.H.A. to Commandant of Volunteers,
18.6.03. *
2C0 427/17/417, End. in desp. 16.2.93 Marshal Clarice's Confidential 
Report on Zululand, 8.12.93.
chiefs and induna vere responsible to an alien government. The 
former vere therefore on the whole more responsive to the popular 
opposition and indignation against the government and had their 
own source of grievance against the government In the weakening 
of their power.1
In the early days of the disturbances, for many chiefs the 
conflicting demands of the government and the desires of their 
people led to ambivalent and ambiguous actions. This has been 
particularly veil analysed reoently in a study by D. II. Reader 
of the Kanya people of Natal. Reader shows very clearly hov the 
various pressures on the Chief Mtambo operated and hov he, his 
Immediate council of relatives, and his appointed Induna vere 
opposed to taking up arms over the Poll Tax, whilst the ordinary 
tribesmen and their descent group heads were strongly against 
paying the tax and insisted on being doctored for war. Mtambo * s 
course was to temporise. -  to try to dissuade the tribe from arming,
allowing them to be 'dootored* when they became adamant?but in
2fact preventing them from going any further. With many other of 
the peoples who were reported to be seditious in the f ir s t  phase
1See D. E. Reader; , £ulu Tribe in Transition (Manchester U.P. 1966} 
p. 264 f f • for an excellent analysis of the present situation. That 
the abenumaane were already feeling ousted from their posit!ax at 
the turn of the century is  shown by evidence before the S.A.N.A.C. 
1903-5. See e.g. Vol.. I l l ,  p-41,, Evid. J, Y. Qibson.
22u1vl Tribe in Transition, p. 230 f f .  See also SNA l / l /3 5 1 ^ ^  • Lt. 
Col. Lugg to Ct. of M ilitia, 7*9*06 aad Minutes esp. of Acting Magis. 
Umlazi, 9.2.07, which show dearly  i t  vas the strong stand of the 
magistrate H. C. Colecxbrander against the military which prevented 
further action being taken gainst Mtambo for the arming and doctor** 
of hia tribe.
of the disturbances the process appears to have been the same: 
the young men and their descent group heads eager to take arms, 
their chiefs and ward induna in opposition. This seems to have 
been true both of appointed and hereditary ch iefs.1
In the second and third phases of the disturbances however, 
when the opposition to the Natal troops had become open and 
violent, i t  is remarkable how many of the leaders were hereditary 
chiefs, or important abenumzane cf prestigious clans. In the 
Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area, the leaders of the last phase of the 
disturbances were Meseni, ilatshwili and Ndlovu ka Timuni, whilst
the last to lay down his arms was the induna Sambela, the brother
2 __of Chief Ngobizambe and his chief induna. Both ilatshwili and 
Ndlovu were hereditary chiefs of famous people: the latter was
a Zulu of the Royal House, being the grandson of Mudhll, brother 
of Senzengakhona, Shaka* a father, whilst the former, Hatshwili, 
was a Mthethwa and a grandson of Dingiswayo.^ Their influence 
over their followers as well as over neighbouring chiefs and tribes­
men may well have been related to their historical pre-eminence. 
Moreover their resistance to the humiliating behaviour of the troops
^See e.g. Court Kartijl of Tilonko, Evidence of T^aiicana, "My Chief 
was willing for the tar to be paid. It was not he, it  was his 
subjects who spoke about i t . ’1, p .146. Sim. avid. Waite, kraalhead 
and Tilonko1s uncle, p.158 encl. in CO 179/237/44376. Also
SNA l/l /3 6 7 iii^  Report Acting Kagis. Colenbrander of Umlazi division.
06
2Bosnan, p .162. SNA l/l/3 45 “ p  , Kept. Magis. Maxwell, 26.1.07.
3
R . C . A,Samuelson, Long. Long A g o ,  p.257.
may have been related to national pride and memories of their
proud preconquest tradition. It is tenpting to go even farther
than this and suggest, as Stuart has done, that the Bambatha
rebellion represented an attempt to return to this paat, to turn
away ft  cm the new system of government brought by the white man
and return to their old way of l i fe .*  There may have been an
element of atavism amongst some of the rebels* Nevertheless
in Ndlovu* s own case this seems a misleading simplification: his
intervention to save the l i f e  of the missionary, Bev. Tvedt, has
already been mentioned. It is noteworthy that after the disturb^-
ances, while he was undergoing sentence in Eshowe gaol, he strongly
urged his people and sons to became Christians and exhorted them
2to acquire a western education. While it  can be argued that 1his 
was the wisdom bom of hindsight, i t  none the less argues against 
his having an atavistic approach in 1906*
Meseni1s participation in the disturbances has to be explained 
on slightly different grounds. He also headed an extremely important 
people -  the Qwabe -  whose founder, Qwabe was the older brother of 
Zulu himself according to tradition, and who always p rlded themselves 
on their superiority to the Zulu. Meseni however only headed half
*See above p.
^Norskmis.j oust i d  end e. nr. 7 . April 1907, Report Rev* J. Tvedt 
from Ctimati, 16*1*07, p.154.
the tribe, which had been divided cn the death of the previous 
ohief in 1897 by a Supreme Court decision as a result of a very 
complex succession dispute.1 The heir in the chiefly line was 
s t i l l  very young at this time, and his section of the tribe was 
under the 'regency* of the local magistrate, P. P. Shuter. Biere 
was constant friction  between the two sections of the tribe, la ig e lj
pover the question of a boundary between them. It may well be
that i t  was this dispute which led to threats against the magistrate*a
l i f e  at the time of the poll Tax collection in this division.
In the Ukandla phase of the disturbances, Bambatha, ^igananda, 
and Mehlokasulu were a ll hereditary chiefs, whilst Kangati ka Godide 
and Mtele, both of whom led large sections of their chiefs' people 
to join the rebels, were men of considerable rank. Thus Mtele waa the 
Chief Kula's uncle and his chief induna and an eminent descent group 
head; Kangati was the oldest son of tho previous chief of the 
Ntuli people, Godide, and grandson of Ndhlela, Dingane's Prime 
Minister who wa3 the "most important personage in the Zulu nation" 
e f his time. Mangati himself was closely related by marriage to
•»See N.L.A. Debates 1900. Debate on Native Code Amendment Bill no. 29#
1900* See also Bosman, pp. 159-160.
SNA l/4 /l2*~  Report U.S.N.A. on strength and combination of tribes in 
Natal, to Commandant of Volunteers, 15.6.03. SNA l /4 /l4  cdl» c42 
Minutes -*agis.
*Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, pp. 59-60.
* *  < v  1
Dinudulu * s chief induna. Mankulumana,1 and according to one report 
had himself acted as induna for Cetshvayo. The appointed acting 
chief o f the Ntuli people in 1906, Mpumela, vas Godide's younger 
brother. Whilst Mangati vas championing the cause of the heir 
to Oodide's chief house, Ntulisve, Mpumela and his supporters favoured 
a rival candidate. While Mpumela apparently remained loyal to the 
government, the supporters of the heir to the Chief House in the 
succession dispute folloved Mangati into battle.
In pre-colonial times, i t  is dear that many succession disputes 
led to the splitting up of tribes, and a man in Mpumela1 s position may 
ve il have been able to become regent of a tribe and exert pressure for 
his ovn candidate to the throne, so that cue should not be led from 
this into making fa c ile  generalisations about the inviolability  of the 
hereditary principle. What seems to be illustrated here, hovever, is  
that the Batal government Intervention on one side or the other in a 
succession dispute of this nature seems to hare determined the stenoe 
people took up during the anti-government disturbances and the way In 
which a people would sp lit . A similar example is provided by the sucoeeeion 
dispute in the X&nylle tribe, also in the Nkandla division, between 
Acting Chief Makubalo end Baleni ka Mbayimbayi, the heir, vho vented
C^O 179/242/'2162. i2nd.l in desp. Seoret. Deposition of Mangati ka 
Godide, 28.12.07.
23NA l/l/345^25g^# Report B. Colenbrander 27.9.06.
to be made ohief on attaining his majority.* He agitated to this 
effect in 1905* but to no avail. In 1906 he joined the rebellion 
whilst Makubalo the Regent sought refuge vith the loyal section 
of the bribe at Fort Tolland. The defeated or frustrated candidate 
in a succession dispute did not only have a grievance against 
the Natal government • This in some cases though night have provided 
the final spur to action at the time of the disturbances, and 
the disappointed candidate may have hoped through the rebellion to 
overturn the existing leadership in the tribe. Because they had 
claims to the chieftainship however, these candidates also had the 
necessary rank and following to make rebellion appear more worthwhile 
and indeed possible.
In Zululand, the process of breaking down hereditary chiefs 
and promoting government appointees had gone furthest in the south* 
Archdeacon Roach's remarks before the ^atal Native Affairs Commission 
that the tribal system had broken down in Zululand and that the 
'tr ib es ' under most o f the Chief "were nothing more or less than
agglomerations o f people from different tribes" applied most to this
2 B area. As we have seen after the Zulu War and under British rule
1SNA l / l / 5 4 R e p o r t  o f magis. 27*9*06, o p .c it . A similar example 
was provided in the case of Inkosana, heir to a chieftaincy in 
Mapumulo division, who joined the rebels, whilst the regent, Mahlube, 
was "exceptionally active" on the European side. Inkosana vas arrested 
and deposed. Mahlube became fu ll chief over this tribe end also 
over a section of Xegvana's Nyuswa. SNA 1/1/5452262. Rept. Maxwell,
26.1.07. 06
S m . a.c. ,  m d . p.574.
this area had been regarded as a buffer between Natal and Zululand.^
It had acted as a reserve fo r  those chiefs who were unwilling to 
return to the rule of Cetshwayo and had also served as a sanctuary 
for  Cetshwayo himself* In Nkandla, Nqutu and Bshove districts 
especially, a number of Natal chiefs had been introduced, also as 
part of the policy of "divide and rule" which the Shepstones and 
their disciple. Sir Melmoth Osborn^advocated for Zululand. The 
intense rivalries of Zululand in the eighties s t i l l  had their re­
percussions in this area, and in addition to the old rivalry between 
Zibhebhu and Dinuzulu a new dividing factor was arising with the 
attainment of his majority by Dinuzulu's younger brother, Manzol- 
wandle ^ Although Man zol wan die had been bom shortly after Cetshwayo1 s 
death, there were those who regarded him as the true heir to the 
Zulu king, as he was believed by many to be the eldest son of 
Cetshwayo's Chief Wife* Although Manzolwandle's position was only 
recognised by the government after the disturbances when he was 
made chief over Faku's, Mehlokazulu*s and the latellkukwana' s people
i t  seems clear that already the pattern of a l l e g i a n c e s  in Zululand
2were being affected by his claims. It is  thus not surprising that 
^See above, Chapter IX, p. Ilk.
2ZA 35 CH§7, Magis. Hignett, Nqutu to C.N.A. 19.12.06. Cd 3027, 
pp* 63-4,'Encl. in desp. 106, CNA to P.M., 29*5.06. Even before 
this, Cetshwayo'a brother ZLv0m and Siteku supported Hanzolwandle 
against Dinuzulu. In 1904 Dinuzulu was cautioned against the holding 
of meetings of headmen and ohiefs from Zululand and Tkyheid to
discuss the succession to Cetshwayo aa proposed by Zuvedu. Col* Col. 171 
Xagis. A.V/.Leshe to Dinuzulu, 1.2.04.
southern Zululand presented a chequerboard of participants and
non-participants in 1906, and that the old feud between the
Ueuthu and Handlakazi had some bearing on the situation even
in the ostensibly anti-government rebellion. It is significant
for example that the war-cry of the Zululand Mounted Rifles which
was shouted in answer to the •Usutbu* cry of the rebels was
•Watshetsha* -  the war-cry of Zibhebhu's Handlakazi.^Though the
feud had ostensibly been patched up on Dinuzulu* s return from exile
there was s t i l l  considerable tension between members o f  the two
chief dome. In the middle of 1906 Dinuzulu complained it  was the
Handlakazi people who produced rumours that he supported the rebels
and this may not have been unconnected with the fact that in the
Vryheid division a larrre number of the Handlakazi were recruited 
2as policemen. While the government regarded the fact that a
number of Dinusulu*s old supporters who turned rebel in 1906 ae 
evidence that he had instructed them to rebel, this is not the 
only possible explanation. By and large, those people who had actively 
profited from British rule in the eighties at the expense of the 
Zulu Royal Family wore less likely to Jeopardise their position
^Bosman, pp. 133-9.
*Wa. 1/ 4/7 OS—,Haeis. A. Boast, Hlabisa to 3.N.A. 10.9.99. AGO/ l/7/79 
F 13 Dinuzulu to magis, Armstrong, 2.6.&6, N.N.a.C. Zvid. p.295* Sub. 
Inspec. A.w. Lewis, N.P.
by taking up arms against the Natal government In 1906.1 In 
the Nqutu division it  is  hardly surprising that KLubi's people 
who had been settled after the Boer War should have assisted 
the government forces, or that Mehlokazulu,whose father, Sirayo, 
had been ousted fromnsny of his lands by Hlubi ^should be die*
2 Msatisfied: that these "Basuto , as the Zulu called then, s t i l l
fe lt  very vulnerable was indicated by Mayime ka Hlubi• b remark 
that they were "a mere handful amongst a vast people. I f  aoything 
cropped up they were bound to be mi zed up in i t .  The natives now 
said that they ^^Blubi'a followers/ were ’white men1. . . . " .  Mayime 
returned the compliment by referring to the Zulu as ”savages” .
By far the most bitterly torn area in 1906 was Nkandla, 
and while this was partly because it was the scene of military 
operations chosen because of the fortress like <$ialities it  offered 
the rebels, this must also be related to the whole policy of the 
government in introducing "loyal” appointed chiefs into the division* 
Through the nineties for example the number of faction fights there
^But note the position of Khamfei, son of the loyal TJhamu, vho vas suffering 
very considerably as a result of white expansion by 1he turn of the 
century. He nevertheless remains ”loyal” to the government and seeks 
redress and help from It. In turn the government hope to benefit 
from finding him land because be is a supporter of Manzolwandle.
See e.g. Nathan MSS 401, no. 226, Confidential Report on Native Affairs 
n.d. unsigned (prob. MoCallum).
2See above, Chapter II, p . ^
^N.N.A.C. Evid. Mayime, p.868.
and in  Nqutu was fa r  h igher than elsewhere in  Zu luland ,1 and this
was re la ted  d ir e c t ly  to  the government p o l ic y .  C h iefs "there were
con sta n tly  com plaining about in te r —t r ib a l  boundaries, and according
to the Governor in  1894 the trou b le  was due to "th e  la rge  number
of petty c h ie fs  / who/ have sprung up and are asserting themselves".
2Hany o f  these were simply court induna or p o l ic e  co n sta b le s . Lang 
before Bambatha appeared on the scene th i3 was an i r r i t a t e d  and 
d isturbed  area.
In Eshowe d i s t r i c t  however where th is  p rocess  had probably 
gone fu rth e s t  and vhere S ir  Kelmoth Osborne had esta b lish ed  h is  
most devoted servant, Yaaela, with three la rg e  tra c ts  o f land, a 
c h ie fta in c y  and many fo llo w e rs  and c a t t le ,  and in the Umlalazi 
d i s t r i c t  where the headmen o f  the la te  Chief John Dunn held sway, 
there were but few brealc-away re b e ls . Yet both these divisions 
bordered immediately on the most d isturbed  d iv is io n s  in  Sululand 
aad N ata l. Perhaps the rewards o f c o lla b o ra t io n  there had been so 
conspicuous, perhaps in  these d iv is io n s  tho government had been 
most su cce ss fu l in  o b l it e r a t in g  o ld er  l o y a l t i e s .  Eshcwe moreover 
was the seat o f  the Zululand government and th ere fo re  more directly
*See e.g. CO 427/17/4241, Enel J in  desp. 61, 24.7.93 Res. Cner’ s 
Report for June. CO 427/12/18284 Encl. in desp. 94, 13*8.91, Rept.
A. Res. Com. Cardew fo r  J u ly , 2391. Sim. Report fo r  o fc. encl. in
co 427/ 12/ 22107.
2C0 427/ 19/ 17655, Gov. to °ec. St. 13.9.94. See also CO 427/17/417 
Encl. in  desp. 16.12.93 Karshal C larke’ s Confidential Report 8.12.93.
B^y 1906 Yamela had died leaving a number of equally compliant successors.
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under the control of Sir Charles Saunders who 'was ahle to assure 
troubled chiefs in the division of his protection and support.
The peacefulness of Eshowe nay have been a tribute to Sir Charles 
Saunders* personal hold over the division.1 Nevertheless from 
these two examples, and the fact that so many of the hereditary 
chiefs and abenumzane had participated in the disturbances, 
the Natal government could argue, from its  point of view that 
the disturbances themselves had shown how wise Shepstone's policy 
had been and the main trouble was that it  had not been taken fhr 
enough.
This contention however would probably have been mistaken
as has already been suggested in the case of the Ntuli people
cited above. Even where they had appointed a •loyal* chief, though
he might personally remain loyal and keep his personal following
intact there was always the possibility that the section o f Its
tribe which fe lt  i t s e lf  aggrieved 'would try to h ive o ff  under
2another rival candidate to the chieftaincy or try to join another 
chief altogether in the absence of such a candidate. During the 
disturbances, quite apart from the particular succession disputes 
amongst members of the chiefs' family, it  could be that the "loyal"
*See e.g. the flattering remarks made about him by the Eshowe chief a 
in their interview with the Gov. 5.6.07 end, CO 179/241/23101.
^For the prevalence of this pattern in traditional po litics  see 
M. Gluckman, Politics. Law and Ritual in Tribal Soejaty (Oxford, 1965)» 
p. 136 f f .
chiefs whose people broke away were not in tune vith the true 
wishes and desires of their followers vis-a-vis the administration
and had becomo too dependent an the government. In the words o f 
the -Africans themselves, they had become the government's "boys"#^ 
tfhen this happened, and when it  was fe lt  that the chief had gone 
too far to the white man's side, the Africans appear to have 
followed the lead of the next most suitable traditional leaders, 
whether a member of the ch ief's  family or their own descent group 
head.
This appears to have been what happened in tho cose of those 
chiefs who ’offered to aid the vhite forces, without determining 
f ir s t  the attitude of their people. In some cases, tiie response 
of tho tribesmen to their chiefs' wishes war decidedly lukewarm*
Thus acting Chief Nqgamuzana of the Tenbu, who offered the govern­
ment six hundred men to assist the troops was only able to raise 
two hundred men. Certain headmen, including his brothers, refused
to fight Kula's people "although... long-standing animosity existed
2between them in consequence of an old boundary dispute". In an 
interview with the Governor, Nqgamuzana attempted to excuse his tribes­
men on the grounds that they were too ill-prepared to fight, as
■^ See A. Vila':asi, ,'3ulu Transformations (Pietemaritzbuig 1962), p.106.
2C0 179/235/21497, Gov. to Cec. St. deep. 102 , 26.5.06.
they were no longer allowed to d r ill in regiments. To this 
MoCallum retorted drily "He who excuses himself, accuses himself 
There was a similar reaction to having to fight the rebels 
on the part of nil wane’ s Cunu people. The Cunu were one of the 
largest ohiefdoms in Natal at the turn of the century. Although 
Silwane was closely related to Bambatha, there had been a number 
of faction fights between tribes.2 At the beginning of April, 1906 
when Bambatha sent two messengers to Silvane asking him to join
3the rebellion, Silwane promptly handed them over to the magistrate.
On the other hand, when members of the Cunu people were actually
instructed to aim and fight vith the white troops, they were most
unenthusiastic. Whether because they resented being refused the
r ifle s  and blankets they had requested, or whether they disliked
the idea o f  fighting their fellow-Africans, six hundred of the
thousand men Silwane had promised to send to them and of the govern^
4ment decamped on the eve of the battle.
Remaining "loyal" to the government did not invariably mean 
the alienation of the chief from his tribe. There were chiefs -  both
1C0 179/241/23101, a id .  1 In desp. 86, 5.6.07, p.22.
S^NA l / l /3 0 2 ^ p  , U.S.N.A. to Kagis. New Eanonr RUrut., 30.5.03.
^Stuart, 2R, p .178.
4lbid. .  p . 3 2 8 .
hereditary and appointed -  who were able to remain "loyal" 
to the government and to carry almost all their followers behind 
them. Tho most outstanding example of this was Acting Chief
Sibindi of the Bomvu people. Sibindi was a oourt induna who
hao acted aa a servant to Major Maxwell, the local magistrate 
of Umsinga division where the Bomvu people lived .1 During the
Boer War he had served with R.C.A. Samuelson with forty of his
2men as scouts. As Major Maxwell wrote to the Secretary for 
Native Affairs Sibindi could be "absolutely depended on to take 
an active part in suppressing tiie rebels" -  and he did. Accord­
ing to the Greytown Gazette, which did not bestow such praise 
lightly , he was "the moot loyal chief in the country".^ He sent 
a thousand men to aid the Umvoti Mounted Rifles and several times
acted upon his own in itiative in capturing and killing rebels. On
being thanked by ^ol. Leuchars for his aid, Sibindi remarked:
"VTe original^ came from Zululand where we were being killed o ff
5and found shelter in Natal under the British government";* this
1Greytown Gazette. 24.3-06.
2Long. Long A/to. pp. 170-1.
3 m o  102/231, Magis. to S.H.A. 5.4.06.
4Greytown Gazette. 24.3-06.
5Ibid.
an
vas not7 atypical reason for loyalty In 1906, though i t  vaa 
perhaps less frequently given than it  had heen for example in 
1879.
Sibindi, for a ll hia ardour in suppressing tho rebellion, 
vaa at tha asms tine a am vho vas veil avare of the grievances
hia peopls vere complaining o f, aad prepared to ape* his fcdnd 
to those in authority. Unlike many of the other loyal ohiafa 
vho vere summoned to a farevall interview to the Governor,
Sir Henry XoCallum, in the middle of 1907, Slbindi vaa quite 
outspoken about the Governor1# previous inaccessibility md 
his anxiety that nothing would come of the Natal Native Affairs 
Commission of 1906-7.1 While himself not a Christian, during 
tha rebellion he had allowed the Kolya in hia tribe to be 
preached to daily, md had himself remarked that he thought God 
m et be on their aide. After ihe disturbances ha vaa to give con­
siderable support to the Hermannabuxg Lutheran missionaries in 
2his midstf In the eye of his people, however, Sibindi did not 
beooae "a government boy" -  md hia remarks to the Natal Native 
Affairs Commission show that while he realised the d ifficu lties  
of his people, his solution vaa to requeet representation md the
1C0 179/241/23101, End. In In dsap. 86, 5.6.07,p .3-4.
^Hermannaburg Mlaalonablatt. "Our Zulu Hiaaion'. Ehlanaanl", Kay 1907.
franchise.1 Sibindi's loyalty vas no sere kowtowing to tha 
white man| he saw the advantages in politioa l terms of the 
path he took. Aa early as 1903 the Uhder Secretary for Native 
Affairs remarked on the implacable enmity between Sibindi's people
and Bambatha, and i t  would appear that relations between the
oBomvu and the Qamu under Kula vere also very strained.
In 1906 therefore he could probfcbly present his stand to 
hia people not simply in pro-government terns, but also aa part 
of a continuation of traditional politioa l rivalry* He was re­
warded by the government for hie loyalty by haring h is  acting 
chieftainship made into a permanent fu ll chieftaincy, md by haring 
his jurisdiction considerably extended over portions of tribes 
in the Kapumulo d istrict whose former chiefs had rebelled.^
Sibindi's approach contrasted dramatically vith that of chief a 
like S itshltshili or Kapolsa of Nkandla whose evidence before the 
Commission consisted in giving thanks to the Government for its  
bounty and stating that they had no grievances. S itsh ltsh ili vas
^n.K.A.C., p. 843 f f .
2SKA l/4/l2^|. Report o f U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 15*6.03. 
SNA I /I /290 -=*22. U.S.N.A. Memorandum on Bambata.
5Cf C. H ill, Bantustans (i.R .R. London, 1964)» p .91* "Some Chiefs have 
been able to co-operate with the Government and at the same time 
make it  olear to their people that they are playing a double game."
This comment is  of course on the contemporary situation but refers 
esp. to Natal.
C^O 179/241/23101, End. in desp. 5*6.07* Gov.'a interview with chiefs, 
p .21. It was suggested that he be made ahief over the newly constituted 
'Ngubane Tribd made up of fragments of Ndlovu ka Ti-muni,
Ngobibembe Mrtshwili Meseni and Ngqokvana1 s people. CO 179/240/7986, Gov. 
to Seo. St. 7*2.07 (see aleo Cd 3888).
later murdered for his attitude to the rebellion and the ferocity 
vith which he hunted out the rebels in his own tribe, while an 
attempt vas also mads on Kapoisa's life*
Apart from succession disputes sad differences o f opinion 
betveen tribesmen and their chiefs over whether or not to parti­
cipate in the disturbances actively on the side of the Europeans, 
there seems to hare been mother line of olsavage in some of the 
ohief dome which was opsaed wide during the disturbances, and which 
seems to be mother facet of why it  vas that in certain tribes 
only some o f  the tribesmen rebelled, while in others small groups 
remained loyal md the chief md the bulk of his followers fought 
against the government*
Under Responsible Government in Natal, effort had been made 
to give ohief s purely territoria l juried! at inn* Thus under section 
six of Act 40 o f 1896, vhioh gave the supreme Ohief the power to 
redefine intertribal boundaries,
"All natives shall be deemed to be under the chi on 
whose side of the boundary they may reside | provided 
that when any boundanr may separate a Ifctlve from his 
own tribe or ohief, /ne7""••• may ••• remove to the other 
side o f the boundary within two years of such boundary 
being defined.N
Of course Nguni ohiefdoms have always had a territoria l md
p o litica l, rather than a purely kinship basis*1 Neverthelsss, in
^See e.g. t>. H* Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition* p .93*
precolonial times, this territorial definition depended on other 
factors than the arbitrary redrawing of boundary lines by a re­
mote Supreme Chief. And presumably too in the prooolonial period 
the stranger within the gate oould be a souroo of weakness and
i t  would appear that in some instances a recently redrawn juris­
diction putting people o f one dhief under another was a source 
of division. Thus in the case of Tulwana in the Nkandla d istrict 
some members of his tribe joined the rebels, although the Chief 
personally assisted the vhite forcesi the rebels, seem to hm/S
been Cube -  members of Sigananda1 s tribe -  who had been placed
2under Tulwana when their boundary had been defined. Similarly, 
but illustrating the principle in reverse, so to speak, a small 
section of Kesani's people^ under their headman Haoala, refused 
to join their chief in his fight against the whites. These people 
although also Qwabe, had been under Chief Jemusi who had le ft  
the divisions on being ordered at that time to join some ohlef, 
they had gone under Meseni, "more or less under compulsion".^
*Cf D. H. Reader, op .oit. on the ooncept of "the stranger" in 
Zulu society.
2ZA 21 R ^ , Copy of evidence against Tulwana from Nkand ila divisn
In Natal and Zululand, every magistrate had an induna or
headman, vho was frequently considered to have great influenoe
vith him. According to both the Governor of Zululand and its
Resident Commissioner in 1395* these induna Ha ll grow rich in
oattle and other property".1 A number of them also acquired a
2large following md vere given the position of ohief s. Bven
vhen they vere not rewarded for their conspicuous loyaltyand 
good servioe to government o ffic ia ls  by actually being made 
ohiefs they could greatly in flu x es  the position and destiny 
of other ohiefs in the d istrict through the information they 
gave the magistrates. The disturbances gave these ambitious 
individuals the chance of furthering their ambitions towards
XC0 427/22/19122 Oov. to Sk . St. 9.10.95 Conf.
2It is  significant for example that Mcjteki who vas appointed acting 
chief of the Mandlakazi on the death of Zibhebhu was the personal 
servant of Sir Charles Saunders. (Nathan 1£S 360, p .26, Information 
from S. 0. Samuelson 30.12.07.) Equally significantly, tie rival 
candidate to the auooessian, Msenteli, appealed to Dinusulu for  his 
support. It vas the old game of rival candidates seeking the 
support of the head of a higher segment in the society in  their 
disputes, the one to Sir Charles Saunders, the other to the ex- 
Zulu king.
^See e.g. the accusations of Chief S&Awane o f the Cunu people vho 
vas deposed in 3909 (below Chapter \* p.s^7 ) vho alleged
that this vas brought about by his induna Dhlayise^vho repeated 
rumours about him to the magistrate in the hope of himself gaining 
the chieftainship. CO 179/253/26470, Gov. to S*o. St. Secret, 
15.7.09.
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chieftainship, n ils iH ts  to ba shat fo r  example tha aourt 
induna at Richmond* ilalwakenl Tahaai contrived.J According 
to tha magistrate of Ixopo* F. S. Foxon,2 Malwakeni vaa a b it 
of a martinet, but a vary uaaful aaa vho baft given tha vitaaia 
( i .e .  tha magistrate) "moat valuable Information in ao mention 
vith tha raoant Hcbellion".^ Other vitnaaaaa had rather different 
versions o f Haivakeai'e behaviour. Thus according te farmers in 
tha diet riot ha vaa tha oause o f aa iamanaa amount of friction  
aad dissatisfaction* deliberately insulting ehiafs sad keeping 
people waiting. Mo~one vas allowed to enter the aourt at a ll 
unless he had f ir s t  been intexvieved by the and i f  he vas
"unfriendly to the man or his tribe, the d ifficu lty  o f ssoess 
to the Court was greatly inoreaaed.••••"* It appears to hare 
been largely on thia nan1 a information however that Foxon became 
convinced of Ohief Melkofell9e "rebelliousness” * ead i t  may v e il 
be that the unfriendliness of the induna tovarda XsiJcofeli vaa a
*Cf. also evidanee given in the Court Martial o f Charlie Fynn's 
am by Knyovu aad othere t "There is  i l l  feeling betveen the ehief 
end Tehveai9e eeetion ^ahweai van headman over the defiant ma7
Tshvesl applied to be made ehief of hie eeetion /J ij/ • • helped 
control theee men aad got them to put dovn their sticks aad aaluts 
the magistrate which Fynn could not do." SKA 1/6/27* £vld. Court 
Martial* p .22.
^For F. M. Foxon see abovs, p.m.s , ‘2lA4».) ^
5H.H.A.C. Srid ., p .365.
arid. 0. I .  Hanooolc, f t n t r  Ixopo, p .371 u d  Col. U.
Vlbholson* Ixopo* p.339»
1
factor in Foxon*s views about that chief long before the disturb­
ances. Certainly the magistrate of the neighbouring division,
anoes however, H sikofeli's tribe was divided into three, one 
seotion remained under the chief, one was transferred to his 
brother Pata and the third was handed ever to Kslvakenl together
was achieved was also interesting.
Acoordlng to Col. ¥• Nicholson, a farmer at Richmond, the 
tribesmen involved in itia lly  elected another brother of the Chief 
Haikofeli as their head. On the same day, however, a prominent 
settler called together a meeting of whites in Richmond md they 
nominated the court induna. Kslvakenl,as chief. After that meeting, 
Marwiok "got together some Africans at the magistrate's court to 
support his nomination, "most of them being hia tenants” .^
Msiwakeni vas confirmed in the appointment by the government.
One wonders in this situation vho was making use of whom.
While Kslvakenl's is  a particularly illuminating ease because 
he started so to speak from scratch, loyalty during the disturbances
^Por Gibson's views see above, p.
J. T. Gibson, disagreed with Foxon*s views.1 After the disturb-
not unnaturally paid dividends to other ohief a, aad this nay vail 
have formed part of their calculation. In general, i t  probably 
paid those chiefs vho had a close relationship vith the local 
magistrate beforehand particularly veil*
While, then, ambitious individuals could, through playing 
the right cards, become chiefs, i t  could be argued that this vaa 
at tha expense of the tribesmen themselves vho got l i t t le  of the 
spoils. They vere simply "put" under a chief loyal to a government 
vhioh they found generally oppressive. This is  only partly true.
In the early days of the colony there vas a certain prsstlge and 
status attached to those chiefs vho vers "in" vith important Euro­
pean o ffic ia ls  and this seems to have provided a certain satis­
faction for followers in the same vay as close attachment to the 
Zulu kings had done. With the extensions md the greater pervasiveness 
of European rule this vas probably lsaa trues nevertheless as 
late as 1903 Rule's people apparently called themselves "the 
government's tr ibe",1 md while Sibindi fe lt  hia l i f e  in danger 
from other tribesmen for the conspicuous part he had played vith 
the European levies, the large addition of territory md followers 
he received after the disturbances doubtless acted in some measure 
as compensation, even to hie f o i l  overs.
1SHA 1 Report U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Yolunteers, IB.6.03.
Nor vere dissatisfied sections of tribes completely barred 
from breaking away from their chiefs. Indeed the dual process 
of chief and tribe "making" can be seen olearly in the creation 
of the new ’’Mapumulo tribe" in 1905.
In the Ifiagsnl division a number o f kraals under Chief 
Svaimana ka Hanyosl claimed that they had been members of Bambatha1 s 
father's people originally and wanted to be transferred back, 
though Svaimana denied the validity of the claim.1 T. R. Bennet, 
the magistrate in the Utageni division, however, backed up their 
claim for separation froa the chief on the grounds that he had 
heard several complaints about Svaimana' s behaviour. This was 
corroborated by the previous magistrate, Captain Ritter, o f New 
Hanover division where Svaimana had the bulk of hie followers7 
vho maintained that Svaimana vas partial and unjust and that even 
members of his own ffcmily wanted to leave him. This view vas 
not upheld by the magistrate of New Hanover at the tin#.* Never­
theless in November, 1905 a meeting of dissatisfied kraalheads 
was held and they apparently elected to go under the induna. Migusu
XSNA l/l/32o2i| , Statement Svaimana before U.S.N.A., 17.4.05.
S^NA l / l /310 ^ Nagis. T.R. Bennet, 16.5*05 (Umgeni Division).
^Ibid. Minute Capt. A. S. R itter, 16.9.05 (The father of E. A. R itter, 
author of Shake Zulu).
4Ibld. Magis. Maxwell, 3.10.05.
ka Mganu who vas thus appointed ohief orer the new Mapumulo 
"tribe"• Significantly enough, Magusu was the sergeant attached 
to the Ungeni magistracy -  from whom no doubt the magistrate had 
reoeired much o f his information about Swalmaaa'e misdeeds.1
As we hare seen the disturbances themselves gave many people 
the opportunity o f breaking away from chiefs whom they found un­
satisfactory -  although the experience in the oaee of those who 
Joined rebel ohiefs oan hardly be said to have been rewarding. 
Many instances of this have already been el ted In different oon- 
texts -  Kangatl ka Qodide and the followers of Ktullswe in the 
Ntuli tribe, Jenuslfs followers nongst Meseni's people, the 
Cube people under Tulwana'e jurisdiction. In the oaee of 
Tilonko, also, elements within the tribe may have been trying 
to arouse the suspicions of the magistrate against him on the 
grounds of "rebellion" in an attempt to get him out of the way
and so win their oaae in a succession dispute. The baokground to
3this story has already been given. Amongst hie own people it  
was said that his trouble arose out of family dissensions. "Those 
who were against him had got him into trouble with a view to
13MA l/l/3 1 8 ^ | , Mlmit*. T. R. Bsnnet 6.11.05, M.N.A. 20.11.05, 
Letter o f Appointment 16.12.05.
2See above, pp.
^See above, p. ^*.0 -
carrying out their own notions as to the succession
At the same time some chiefs appear to hare used the 
disturbances as a useful opportunity of ridding themselves of dis­
sentient elements in their tribes* Thus Hveli's attitude to
Hjongo and his followers may well have been activated by tills 
2motive* Another, though less successful, example of tills vas 
provided by acting ohief Sigungu of the Hlaba people* In this 
tribe there vas a b itter dispute between Sigungu, the acting 
chief recognised by the government, and Kakaukane, the chief 
son of the previous head of the tribe who had died in 3JB95.*5 
Both parties to the dispute seem to here regarded the rebellion 
as a useful opportunity for forwarding their claims* While it  
waa actually in progress, although they did not actively parti­
cipate, the supporters of Kakaukane thought i t  would enable them 
to open the dispute again i f  the abels were successful. When 
the extremely unpopular magistrate of Xahlabatlni, H* M. Stainbaak, 
waa murdered in their ward, i t  is  dear that Sigungu hoped to 
fasten the blame on these dissidents in his tribe tiio were making 
his U fa a misery* He even bribed his brother to confess to being 
one of the conspirators* At tha tr ia l o f theaa men Sigungu went
1SNA 1/4/16 C^§|, Rept. Intelligence O fficer, Mid. I llo ro , 7.6.06.
See also SNA 1/6/27, £nd* in Court Martial of Slkuku, 16*8*06
aad Evid. Court Martial Tilemko, 50*7.06, p*18, CO 179/257/44376.
"See above, p. 5o<&-
5C0 179/240/17830, Oct. to S*c. St. *-• ^  * ° n
so far as to admit under orosa-examination that he was prompted 
in his accusation by a desire to gpt rid of them* The accused 
were a ll acquitted.*
During the actual disturbances it  ia not always possible to 
see how far magistrates and troops allowed themselTes to be used 
-  albeit unconsciously -  to further the p o litica l ambitions of 
individuals or sections within a tribe* Clearly these "machinations" 
on the part of Africans were most successful when their ambitions 
coincided with the desires of the magistrate and the European 
population, as the examp lee of Kslvakenl and Tilonko both show 
in opposite ways* In the Immediate aftermath of the disturbances 
where tiSbal relatinshlps had been so strained and mabi ttered in 
many areas, the attempts . made to dispose of unpopular chiefs were 
greatly increased. Many ex-rebals fe lt  that the way to get rid 
of the ohiefs who had betrayed them both by reporting their de­
fection and by not coming to their aid, was to accuse them in 
turn o f being secret rebels* It may of course be that many of 
these accusations were true, though they generally follow natural 
lines of revenge and rivalry* '^ hua the accuser became the aocueed, 
the former accused the accuser* Inpart the philosophy of the new
~ZA 28 Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion, Minute (copy) C.N.A. 
to Attorney General, 1*2*07) Natal Witness* 15.7*07, Repts. of 
murder trial*
accusers also appears to have had something of the element of 
" i f  you can't beat 'em, join  'em" in i t .  Thus a number of parti­
cipants in the rebellion vere in turn to become polios infbrmaatss 
the most outstanding example of this vas cafc&gaaa, Bambatha'a 
right-hand man and supposedly Dinuaulu's emissary. This vas a 
rather later development, hovever, and more olosely connected 
vith the accusations made against Dinusulu in 1907-6, vhioh v i l l  
be discussed in greater length. 1 It should hovever be noted in 
passing that the accusations made against Dinusulu fa ll into 
muoh the same category and deserve the same prefatory remarks as 
many o f the oases vhioh fo llov , despite the far greater oomplexity 
of his aitm&tion.
It 5 s necessary here hovever to turn to a simpler example, 
that of Acting Chief Xegvana of those Nyusva people living in 
the Vdvedve division. A large number of his people, including 
the heir to the chieftaincy, vho vas s t i l l  a minor, joined Meseni's
army in the third phase of the disturbances in the Mapumulo-Lover
2Tugela area. At the time there vas no evidence that they had 
been instructed to do so by Xegvana vho did not accompany them. 
Immediately after the disturbances, hovever, accusations vere made
1See Chapter VII.
2SKA 1/1/367^7^ , R.port Jtagis. J. J. Field (Hdvedva), 10.1.07 
and C. tfheelvright (inanda) 14.1.07.
by the tribe that Xegvana had Incited them to rebel. They also 
accused him o f cattle-stealing. The most prominent of his 
accusers vas Gobosl, the man idiom Xegvana had replaced at the 
beginning of 1906 as Acting Chief of the t r ib e .  Gobosl, vho vas 
the most influential member of the tribe and of higher rank 
than Xegvana, vas himself a convicted rebel vho had been doctored 
for var vith Keseni's impi. As a result of this testimony as 
ve il as that o f the heir vho maintained that Xegvana had ordered 
him to arm (this may have been in fact in response to a magisterial 
order that he be prepared to assist against the rebels) the Acting 
Chief himself vas deposed at the beginning of 1907 and this 
section o f  the tyusva people together vith Svaimana's rebels vere 
placed under the loyal chief Kahlube.’*’
In the Hkandla division these accusations vere particularly 
rampant. Here ex-rebels maintained that Katshana ka Mondisa,
Tulvana, Ndube, Kbuso and Hpumela vere a ll secret rebels, despite 
the fact that a ll of then had either openly aided the Baropean 
levies or had fled to the nearest magistracy at the beginning of
13MA Minute K*gis. Maxmll, 26.1.07. SOU. l /l /3 3 0 ^ P ^
Minutes, Magistrate, U.S.N.A. and J. Stuarts Papers on Zulu Rebellion* 
Native Habits and Customs of Var (K.C.L.). Evidence Kslme ka Beje,
2 6 .1 2 .0 6 . A similar attempt vas made to implicate Ksolva of the 
Lover Tugela division in  the rebellion by men of Meseni, Tshinguanai 
and Sobantu* s chief dome vho vere ordered under hia Jurisdiction.
This attempt hovever vas seen through by 7 . R# Moor, K.N.A. SKA l/l/jJO 
IgLl Minutes and enclosures 1907-8 and eap. Moor1 a minute 6.1.08.
the fighting in the division^
Mat oh an a ka Hondisa headed a tribe of about three hundred 
on the Qudeni mountains. He iras a Natal chief vho had fled to 
Zululand after a skirmish with John Shepstone and vas regarded 
In the early days o f British Intervention in Zululand aa anti-vhite 
and likely  to be disaffected, though by 1884 he vaa reported a 
"loyalist*. In 1906 fir e  or six of hia sons joined the rebels 
vith a large number of the rest of his tribe. Nevertheless 
there is every proof that Katshana not only remained loyal, but 
aided Leu chars* column and personally reported the desertion of 
his sons. The discord betveen father and sons predated the disturb­
ances. Thus in 1909 the Magistrate of Nkandla acting at Katshana'a 
request ordered one of his sons, TJgudhla, to remove his kraal from 
Katshana's vard. Katshana disinherited Ugudhla and the feeling 
betveen the tvo vas very strong. The father fe lt  his son vas trying 
to claim his inheritance before his death and that he vas inciting
hr
his other sons against him.
^Stuart, Papers on Zulu Rebellion, Native Habits and Customs of tfar,
Bvld. Nsuze ka Mfelafuti and Dunjva, SNA 1/1/34.5-2305 f Hept. B. Colen- 
brander, Hagis. NkandMa 27*9*06, ZA r25 copy of°&vidance against 
Tulvana, NkandMa division. '
^ ee  D. H. Morris, The Washing of the Spears.p .n ^ ? .  E. Colenso, Ths Rain 
of Zululand. Vol. I I , p.169.
5C 4214* No. 28, Osborne to Oov., 6.8.84, Encl. 4*
S^NA l/l/3 23 ^ | ^ , Minute, Hagis. B. Colenbrander to C. Commissioner, 
26.6.05. D
In July 1906, the magistrate of Nkandla wired the Commissioner 
for Hative Affaire
"I have strong evidenoe of acts of disloyalty against 
/ ?  h27 Matshana ka Mondisa and reoommend his imediate 
tria l by Court Hartisl . . . .  A number of his people joined 
the rebels. Hvidenee against him is  being given by these 
including some of his sons." *
The case against Katshana ka Hondisa -  as that against Tulsan a
-  sas heard before the C*H.A. Neither of them vaa found guilty*
Had i t  zested solely vith the looal magistrate hovever, i t  is
possible that their enemies vould have triumphed*
Acting Chief Hpumela's case is as interesting -  and in its
outcome more tragic. Hpumela vas the appointed acting ohief of
the very important Ntuli tribe In the Nkandla division* M the
time of the disturbances, being both old and infirm, he fled to
the Xranzkop magistracy* A large section of hie tribe vho even
prior to the disturbances had supported the candidature of Itulisve
to the chieftaincy followed Kaagati into battle* The matter did
not hovever rest there*
^Tfcer the disturbances, a considerable attempt vas made to
incriminate Hpumela in the actions of the rebels* In the trial
of rebels of the Ntuli tribe accusations that Kpumela had caused
the people to aim and then deserted them vere made by most of
1IWJ 102/229 Enel. In C.H.A. to P.M., 29.7.06, no.143. 
liftg ** Hondisa
ZA 31 CR-gg-  , Cases against IKatsham^md Tulvana*
those tried . 1 In 1907 members of his tribe, Kakolwa ka Marelana
and Kgcindesi, maintained that on receipt of a message froa
Sigananda Hpumela had sent them to order his d istrict to arm. He
vas also said to hare sent messengers to Mbuzu's d istrict vith
a similar message. According to them, Mpumela vas angry over the
Poll Tax, especially as he bad sent some members of his tribe to
request exemption at the magistracy and they had been arrested.
According to these same two witnesses, Ntulizve had met them coming
Hdube's d istrict and had opposed their going to fight the ih ites.
It  should hoverer be noted that these witnesses probably supported
Ntuli ewe* 3 candidature for the chieftaincy, and the fact that
Marelana, the father of one of them, had been Godide's induna makes
2this a not unlikely supposition.
Several other participants in the disturbances however made 
similar accusations about Mpumela'o rebellious intentional according 
to Somaica ka Codide -  another rival candidate tot he chieftaincy 
-  and Febana ka Nomaqonqota -  a very prominent rebel -  Mpufeela had 
actually encouraged them in their fighting and his own sons had 
taken part until after the Bobe Ridge fight when they had deserted
1SMA 1/6/26, Trial of Mpumela*s man, pp. 75-6, 28.7.06.
2Col. Col. 98, Statements Samuelson, 74 and 77.
and joined the white troops. 1 To some extent this is  borne 
out by the remark made by Sir Charles Saunders that after this 
fight the ourious spectaole was observed of former participants
on the rebels' side offering their services to the European
2  ^ 4levies. Cakijana and Kangati ka Godide made similar accusations
against Hpumela and his sons. His double-dealing would have 
been a potent reason for the bitter hatred with which he was 
regarded. All this therefore may well havd been true9 aid Hpumela 
may have been trying to use the disturbances to get rid of 
Godide*s people as was alleged at the time. On tha other hand 
the motives for Hpumela's opponents giving this evidence were 
extremely strong. If the government could be convinced of 
Mpumela's disloyalty and Ntulizwe'a loyalty, despite the dis­
asters in flicted  during the disturbances on the sons of Godidef 
they would be able to avenge themselves on Hpumela and his sons.
xCol. Col. 989 Statements Samuelson9 124b.
^.H .A.C., Erid., p .133.
3A00 1/7/66, Cakijana*8 statement at Krantekop aagietraoy. 20.5.08.
^Hangati evidence 25*11.07 in CO 179/242/4454, End. 4 in deep. 
Secret 30.11.07 9 and at Dinuzulu's Trial reported in Natal Vfitnees. 
7.1.09.
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In this instance also the atteept failed. The hitter 
feeling hovever did not die dovn, and Kpumela vaa Bordered oa 
the 20th November, the day oa vhioh he seat vitneaaea to 
the magistracy against Eangati, vho prophesied the event a 
couple of hours before i t  happened.1 Even 3. O* Saameleon
thought his snrdsr vaa tha result o f hishsriag taken over the
2property belonging to the ohief.
tfaehaga vere as b itter against two other chiefs in the 
Nkandla division, Mapoiaa and S itsh itahili. The lattor vas shot 
in August, and an attenpt vas aade to take the former's l i f e  on
*00 179/242/45350 2nd. 7 in dasp. Seer. 7.12.07, Hagis. Nkandla 
to " C.N.A. 26.11.07.
2Nathan MSS 360, p .26. Iafornatioa 30.12.07.
7th October, 1907. Mapoisa was the chief son of Chief Mbuso,
who, at that tine, though s t i l l  head of the tribe, was wery old,
deaf and almost blind* Baring the disturbances, he fled with
many of his followers to Sibindi.^ His son however worked closely
with the white levies and was very much hated ty the rebel members
of his tribe who said that "he was the one who told the authorities
who were rebels"* S itshitshili who was Osborn's messenger as 
2
early as 1882 was responsible for hunting out the rebels in 
Nkandla with great ferocity , and there was said to be great jubi­
lation amongst the fugitive rebels at the TJsuthu when he was 
nurdered.^ f .. Dinusulu was said to hare deplored his murder
for S itsh itsh ili had granted him refuge during his struggles with 
Zibhebhu in the '80s.^ He had feared for his l i f e  long before 
he was actually shot. Thus in mid 1907, in a farewell interview 
with Sir Henry McCallum, S itsh itsh ili remarked revealinglyx
"We cannot understand how matters stand at present.
Although we are British subjects we s t i l l  seem to 
be subject to danger* We do not seem to be protected 
in the way we ought to be ••• There s t i l l  seem clouds
SNA l / l /5 9 5 Rept* B* Colenbrander, Hagis. 27.9.06, Hbuso was 
a 'lo y a lis t ' in the Dinusulu-Zibhebhu struggle in 1884* C 4214,
Osborn to Gov. 6.8*54, no* 28, Encl. 4*
3466 (1882) End* 1, no. 27» p.54, J. Dunn to Osborn 15*6*82*
5C0 179/242/45176 Encl. 1, Oov* to Seo* St. 3*11.06, undated Report 
by Coenraad Meyer to General L* Botha, CO 179/244/3062, Ehd* in 
desp* seer* 5*1*08, &vid* Nankdkowana ka Bedja*
4C0 174/242/45176* Undated Report by Coenraad Meyer, on.oit*
Times of Natal* 13*5*08* Deposition Masawnsela, Nkandla, 11*4*08 (publ. 
Cd 4194).
over us which cause us to leave our kraals aad 
nake us go and liv e  in the bush* *e are chased
into the country..
The murders of S itsh ltsh ili aad Kpuaela and the attempted 
murder of Mapoisa aa well as three or four other attempted 
murders in Zululand at about the same time Immediately aroused 
the fears o f other chiefs who had been conspicuously loyal in 
1906. Many Africans immediate? associated the murders with 
Dinusulu. Stuart as late as 1913 vas s t i l l  convinced that Dinu­
sulu or "his immediate attendants /presumably on Dinusulu1 s In­
structions/ were causing loyalists to be shot down In oold blood". 
As we have seen the evidence for tills viewpoint is  not fu lly  con­
vincing. The Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand however 
put a very prevalentf perhaps understandable, opinion when he 
wrote at the beginning of Ootober to the £44ggs Minister 1
"Whether he has actually instigated these murders or 
not, the palpable faot remains that i f  he had not 
aottw ly sympathised in the way he has done by har­
bouring rebels •.•. creating a belief that he is  be­
yond thi reach of lav no-one would have been em­
boldened to perpetrate these outrages in the manner 
in which they have been perpetrated. "3
1C0 179/241/23101, Encl. 1, desp. 86, 5.6.07, p .12.
2Stuart, Z.R.. p.455.
3SNA 1/4/18 C ^ i, C.N.A. to P.M., 1.10.07.
That these acts of terrorism did not happen in Natal proper 
can be accounted for on several grounds, quite apart from that 
of Dinuzulu's influence. The recent establishment of colonial 
rule in Zululand as compared vith Natal, its  far sparser adminlatrative 
sta ff and polioe force, and, probably most important of a ll , tha 
fact that many desperate and embittered rebels had taken refuge in 
Zululand itse lf , were a ll cogent reasons for  these acts o f terror­
ism. The failure of the government to declare a general amnesty 
perpetuated the existence of this class of fugitive leading a 
rootless l i f e  and plotting revenge on those chiefs who had failed 
"the Black House". It is  in fact surprising that there was not 
more violence in ^tluland in 1906 and 3907.
The government view ' /  v jp was that there was no motive fo r  
these acts of terrorism apart from the orders of Dinuzulu. They 
were hovever unable to bring these charges against him, as there 
was insufficient evidence, although murder charges formed part of 
the indictment at the time of his Preliminary Examination. They 
were a major reason for his arrest as well as for the changed and 
rathar uncontrolled attitude o f the Commissioner of ^ative Affairs 
towards him.1 The murders of three medicine men in the Usuthu 
division in 1906-7 further strengthened the Government ia their
3998, no. 8 , Oot. to S .0. S t . ,  n o .2 , 31*1>08. „
V I I ,  p . ^  _  * * *  Se*
conviction that Dinusulu vas behind the p o litica l murders.
While the murders of tvo of these medicine men, Mnqandi1
on Hay 4th, 1906, and Tshigana in February of the same year
vere never satisfactorily  explained, that of the third, Genoa,
2in April, 1907, vas traced to Cakijana, Kayatana and KJiJi.
Gence vas one of Dinusulu's many medical attendants; at the 
beginning of 1907 he vas accused by Dinusulu of adultery vith 
one of the Chief*s vivas, and brought before the local magistrate. 
The magistrate hovever dismissed the oase, and shortly thereafter 
Gence vas found shot. He died about a week later of his vounds, 
vhich turned septic. After his capture, Cakijana, vho turned 
Crovn Witness for the series of cases heard before tha Special 
Court in connection vith Dinusulu and the rebellion, admitted 
that he had k illed  Gence together vith Kayatana. Both Kayatana 
and Cakijana maintained adamantly that their sole motive vas 
that they had been ordered to commit the murder by Dinusulu^ 
and the Judges of the Special Court, Dove Wilson, J. c . Bosh01- 
and K. C. Shepstone, vho heard the oase, accepted this plea.^
Despite Kiss Perrett’ s assertion to the contrary (Dinuzulu 
and the Bambatha Rebellion, p.148). Lokohvayo vas acquitted 
on this charge. Even Judge Boahoff, vhile dissatisfied vith 
the nature of the defence evidence agreed to his acquittal.
Lokobwayo vas one of Dinusulu'e personal attendants. Judges 
Summing Up, Hex. v. Lokobvayo 21.4.09. SC 111/3/8. Also cited 
Col. Col. 109, Reports in Natal Witness. April 1909.
Slayatana vas sentenced to death but later reprieved; HJiJi 
to tvo years with Hard Labour.
111/3/8, Hex v . Kayatana end HJiJi, Evidence Kayatana, Cakijana and 
H Jlji. Also Od 3998 en d . 2, no. 10, fitid. 1, no. 63 (Depositions 
in Dinusulu1 s Preliminary Enquiry).
Certainly in this instance there are good prime facie grounds 
for  suspecting Dinuzulu's complicity at least, and possibly 
even his command. After a ll in tribal law, death is the penalty 
for adultery with the ch ie f's  wives. That Dinuzulu fe lt  very 
strongly about adultery with his wives was shown in 1900 when 
one of his wives had her teeth knocked out and an eare removed 
for a similar act of unfaithfulness.1 In 1907, the wife accused 
of adultery was maltreated by the other Royal women at the Ueuthu 
and became one of Dinuzulu's most implacable enemies. In addition 
to  his a ffa ir with Dinuzulu's wife, Gance vas reported to have 
been thinking of becoming Manzolwandle's doctor: Kanzolv&ndle
was Dinuzulu's rival as head of the Zulu Royal family, being Cetsh- 
wayo's posthumous eldest son of his Chief Vife. As.such bebad' 
large following in Zululand as the true heir to the throne* Further 
than this however one cannot go: neither Dinuzulu, nor Cakijana
himself was brought to tria l for the murder of Cence, nor was 
Dinuzulu brought as a witness in the case against May at an a, M jiji 
and Cakijana. Cakijana may have had other motives for wanting to 
get rid of Gence, as there was a very real possib ility  that he 
would reveal the presence of the rebels, including Cakijana, to
1SHA 1/ 4/ 8C—^  , C.N.A. to S.N.A. 16.1.00.
See Evidence, Mahayihayi at Dinuzulu's Tmlal. Natal Witness. 2.12.06*2
the local magistrate.* Cakijana was, as we shall see, a most
unreliable witness, and certainly in this and other cases was
interested in drawing blame on to Dinuzulu in order to shield
himself. It is  even conceivable that the very murder of Genoa
was part of a scheme of Cakijana* s to draw Dinuzulu into his
plan of further rebellion by pushing him into an inescapable
position vis-ar-vic the government.
In the oase of the murders of the Nkandla chiefs the evidence
implicating Dinuzulu is  even less satisfactory, and, although
it  is  impossible to be dogmatic, appear far more satisfactorily
explained as the acts of rebels against those chiefs who they fe lt
*had been Amambuka -  betrayers.*' I f  there was a single master 
mind behind them, it  seems more likely to have been Cakijana than 
Dinuzulu, although it  is  impossible to assess how far Dinusulu 
knew or approved of these schemes. The incentive both for Cakijana 
and the other accused to throw the blame cm Dinuzulu was considerable, 
and there appears to have been positive inducement to do so. Thus 
at his tr ia l, Hjombolwana, who was accused and found guilty of 
the murder of S itsh itsh ili, stated that at the Nkandla police
^Evid. M jiji to Magistrate, End. 2 in desp. no. 10, 12.1.08, C d . 3998.
2
See below, Chapter VII, p.
5C0 179/242/45350, o f. evid. spy Encl. 9 in desp. Secret of 7*12.07 
that the "young men" at the Usuthu say "Even i f  the vhite men fight 
end beat us . . .  there w ill s t i l l  be a few of us le ft  to revenge our­
selves on the Amambuka .. . 11
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station he was told by the "o ffic ia ls " : "Tou give Dinuzulu
away and you w ill save y o u r s e l f I t  was W illie Calverley 
(who was one of the detectives securing evidence against 
Dinuzulu for his tr ia l, and vas also a shopkeeper in Zululand) 
vho came to his cell in company with a native policeman and 
said "even i f  you did not murder Sitshit&hili you w ill establish 
your own safety by incriminating Dinuzulu". For five  days he 
vas "troubled toy the authorities in this way". When he was 
found guilty and sentenced to death, Hjombolwana*s final words 
were "I am glad I have not been compelled to make any false 
statements about Dinuzulu".^ It may of course be that Hjombolwana1■ 
attachment to the Zulu king was so great that even i f  he vere able 
to mitigate his own punishment, he would go to the gallows rather 
than betray him. Nevertheless the procedure he describes, which
took place under Martial Law and which is  borne out by very many
2other examples, does not leave one vith much confidence about
the evidence which was obtained against Dinuzulu. Hjombolwana
vas said to have been wounded during the disturbances by S itshitshili
3and to have known Cakijana.
^Natal Witness. 18.18.08* "Report of Jombolvana^ tria l before 
the Special Court. Also in SC l l l /3 / l#  Rex v. Hjombolwana.
^See below, Chapter VII, p. 4 ^ -  4^5
^Col. Col. 98* Statements Samuelson 114* Bvid. Maxana ka P iti.
In the case of Hap&isaf Rolela ka Fogoti admi tted that he 
and Tobela ka Mkilikafci had attempted the murder.* As Rolela 
turned Crown Witness he was not brought to tr ia l however, so there 
is l i t t l e  way of testing his evidence. He maintained that they had 
been despatched by Cakijana who gave them orders coming from Dinusulu» 
which however he^checked, to k ill  both Mapoisa and Chief J^janji.
Rolela was Mapoisa*s f ir s t  cousin and they wore said to hate one 
another "very b itterly". As late as 1910 Mapoisa fe lt  his l i fe  
in danger from Fogotifs descendants. Fogoti -  Rolela*s father -
had been an important man in the tribe who rebelled and was killed
3 1-  i t  was alleged -  by Mapoisa or through his actions. Certainly 
Cakijana may have given Rolela and Tobela the final orders to 
k il l  the ch ie f’ s son -  but clearly also Rolela needed l i t t l e  urging. 
The evidence that Dinuzulu was behind the murders cannot be sub­
stantiated. Thus according to Mazauzela ka Vovo,also of Kbuzo’ s 
tribe, Cakijana originally approached him to do the k illin g . When 
he said he was going to Dinuzulu however to find out whether they 
were really his orders, Cakijana apparently became very angry.
*In his evidence in Rex. v. Hkipeni*tNzolo, SC ll l /3 /8 «
20ol. Col. 9£, Statements Samuel son 141 (o) Nembe ka Mlinde.
■^SHA l/l/4 5 6 , Statement to T. A. Jackson, Nkandla, 11.2.10.
While Hazauzela stated before C, KoKenzie, the oleik at Hkandla, 
that Dinuzulu actually admitted knowledge of the plot to him, 
he retracted this at Dinuzulu*s preliminary examination* On 
this occasion he maintained that he said it  was Cakijana who sent 
him i  though he was pressed for six days at Hkandla to say that the 
Chief had also sent him, and he had been too timid to go and find 
out.^
Similarly Rolela who stated that he did not check on whether 
the orders really were Dinuzulu*s, maintained later that he sus-
2 ,rpected they were not. »vhile in one variant of his evidence he 
said that Dinuzulu enquired how he had managed on his return, in 
another he said he had fe lt  some surprise at not being punished 
for his failure to complete the mission.
The evidence in the murder of Hpumela is even more d ifficu lt 
to interpret. Here the accused were Mkipenl and Nzolo. They too 
were supplied to have received orders via Cakijana from Dinuzulu, 
in this instance to get two guns o f  Dinuzulu*s which were said to 
have been bidden by one Hqalamba ka Febana in Hpumela* s ward, and 
to use them to k il l  the chief. Their departure on this mission was
^Col. Col. 99t Prosecution Dinuzulu ( i i i ) ,  p .13 f f .
Bvid. Rolela in Rex, v. Mkipeni and Kzolo, SC l l l /3 /8 .
^Judges Summing Up in Rex v. Nzolo and RSApani re arid. Rolela,SC H l/3 /8  
30.3.09 and reported in Hatal Witness. 2.4.09*
further confirmed hy the evidence of Rolela ka Fogoti. WdLpeni
was the son of sister and according to the prosecution
a rebel?' The other main witness against them was Nqalamba ka
Febana who maintained that he gave them the gun and that they
then disappeared on their mission. As however he was the firs t
suspect in the case, his evidence is hardly conclusive. His
father Febona, also a rebel, had been expelled from the division
by Mpumela. 'tfhile Kkipeni and Nzolo wore found guilty and sen ten oad 
2to death, there were considerable doubts expressed at the time
wabout the management of the case. According to the Chief Justice 
the only motive which could be found was order from Dinuzulu.^
The man who was defending the two accused, R. C. Samuelson, was 
at the time exhausted from the work he tad Just completed in the 
Dinuzulu case, and apparently in no f i t  state to conduct the defenoe. 
Hpumela’ s people said that the murderer had been hired by Godidefa 
people and Mpumela's heir and successor, Mlokotwa believed Nqalamba
^He maintained that he had been i l l  during the disturbances and
had simply remained in hiding in the bush. (Hatal Witness Report 
of tria l before Special Court, 30.3.09.)
2See Reports of tria l in Natal Witness. 30.3.09» 31.3.09, 1.4.09.
^Letter H. E# Colenso to Gov. 29.11.09, encl. CO 179/253/17431 (copy).
^Chief Justice in Judgment Rex v. Mkiponi and Nzolo, 30.3.09.
Reports Ratal Witness. 2.4.09. But see views of Sir William Smith on 
this plea, below, p.
^Col. Col. 140/ Vol. I l l ,  Correspondence, H.B.Colenso to 
W.P. Schtmer, 23.5.09, ^
and Somzika ka Godide had been responsible.1
I f  this has been a somewhat long digression on the 1907 Zululand 
murders -  a subject which in some ways belongs to the Dinusulu 
story yet to be related^ i t  is because it  also f it s  into this dis­
cussion of the working of inter-tribal p o litics , and the ways udiich 
were adopted when pushed to extremes, of getting rid of an unpopular 
chief. afhile the government accounted for the d ifficu lty  of getting 
evidence against the murderers in these eases by maintaining that
it  was fear of Dinusulu, who was deliberately prompting the murders
2in order to terrorise the African population into supporting hia, 
a more satisfactory explanation lies  in the fact that in killing
these "loyal" ohiefs, the assassins were acting in acoord with
3popular feeling.
Not a ll the tribesmen of ^atal-hululand rebelled in 1906.
Indeed it  was only a very small number of the whole who did. That 
a far larger number would have done so had they thought there was 
any oh&nce o f success seems undoubtedly true. Their passivity, as 
the Natal government realised and feared, vas not through love or
^Col. Col. 140/ Vol. I l l ,  Correspondence, H. E, Colenso to V.P. 
Schtenor, 19*6.09*
2See below, Chapter TIT, •*.
- I  ' ' v ' .k
3Cf. the views of Rev. 0. Staves! o f Eshowe who wrote on 27*1*08 
to the Norskmisjonstidende dji 6 March 1908 (p .l27)i "these crimes 
have been the outcome of personal revenge, they did not necessarily 
hare anything to do vith  planned revolt. •• The murdered ohiefs 
seem to have been guilty of notions which had to cause revenge, even 
in people as unvengeful as the Zulu." (Kindly trans. by Rev. I.E.
Hodine;•
loyalty to a government they had l it t la  ration to love or ba
loyal to* Under these circumstances, while it  was necessary 
for them to find a scapegoat in Dinuzulu, on a more objective 
reading of the situation this hardly seems necessary as part of 
the explanatinn either for the murders or the rebellion. / “  
has been suggested that under indirect rule in Sast Africa the 
position of the chief vas actually strengthened v is-a -vis his 
subjects* Once he became a government servant, traditional curbs 
on his powers vere removed, and his actions sanctioned by a more 
formidable acternal agent* There is a certain validity in this view 
in Natal too, where chiefs were expected to be ^obeyed implicitly" 
whether the people liked i t  or not* Thus in mid 1907# the Governor 
of Natal informed Acting Chief Mciteki who had replaced Zibhebbu at 
the head o f  the Mandlakani people that by opposing his (Kcitski’ s) 
succession, the Hsentell faction "put themselves •••• amongst the 
category of rebels” Under colonial rule, it  is true that once 
a dhief was firmly entrenched in government favour, it  became 
d ifficu lt  for his followers to find an alternative chief and simply 
break away to form a new chiefdom, as had been Nguni custom in the 
past* The argument however cannot be stretched too far: as we have
seen i t  vas not impossible for breaks to occur, or for dissatisfied
l-CO 179/241/23101, Encl. 1 desp. 5.6.07, Got. ' s interriew with 
Chiefs, p*50*
tribesmen to use the government* 3 desire to "divide and rule" 
to their advantage. With Government permission Africans could 
even move to another chief. The room for manoeuvre was undoubtedly 
more limited, but i t  s t i l l  existed. Dissatisfied individuals 
could, i f  they found their chiefs unsatisfactory, make their way 
to the towns, mission stations, farms and mines which the whites 
brought in their wake. During the disturbances, for instance, people 
who found that their chiefs provided l i t t l e  or no protection against 
the violence of the times did seek protection from white employers,* 
though for the majority of Africans, with deep roots in their tribal 
area, these options hardly existed. There was however another alter­
natives to attempt to play the game according to the colonial rules, 
and, where possible, touse the colonial administrative officers as 
instruments of a policy which was not very different to that of 
pre-colonial times. This can be illustrated by examples before, 
during and after the disturbances. Very frequently, as has been 
shown to a certain extent already, attitudes taken up during the 
disturbances reflected earlier inter and intra-tribal relations 
as much as they reflected attitudes towards European Rule.
While in many o f the examples cited above, the old rivalries, 
the old inter and intra-tribal feuds, continued through the disturb-
*See N.N.A.C. Evid. Mavandhla and Joji (idem), p .698.
anoee and determined men’ s attitudes, i t  was the many examples 
of in ter-tribai cooperation, the unity of the rebels from many 
different groupings which caused the government, so used to rely­
ing on inter-tribal feuds for its  security, ihe gravest concern.*
In 1903 Samuelson wrote a long memorandum on the feuds and factions 
s t i l l  prevalent amongst Natal Africans, while at the same time 
pointing out somewhat ominously that as a result of improved 
communications, missionary conferences, newspapers, "eommunity of 
interests and so forth", the Africans might well agree on some con­
certed action against the government in the future, "notwithstanding 
alleged tribal disunions and Jealousies". The events o f 1906 
were to prove these fears partly Justified, Thus while traditionally 
the Government bad been able to rely on the rivalries between 
certain tribes to prevent them from combining, and to count on 
the loyalty of other chiefs and tribes who would f i^ it  on their 
side, on this occasion some of the traditional feuds appeared 
to break down and there was noticeable reluctance on the part of 
many tribes, i f  not their chiefs, to actually fight on the government 
sido.3^ 0 f  the reasons given by Samuelson for this state of affairs
 roT rr r r -------------------------
■^ See e.g. Evidence before S.A.N.A.C./ p .222.
S^NA l / 4/ l U.S.N.A. to Commandant o f Volunteers, 18.6.03.
3See e.g. the comment of the magistrate of Ndwedwe on the parti­
cipation of a section of the Nyuswa people in the disturbances1
"community of interests and so forth*1 vas probably the most 
important. The many and heavy grievances vhich Africans stated 
they vere suffering from before the Natal Native Affairs Commission 
differed but l i t t le  from area to area in the colony. 'Hiere vas 
also a greater interchange of vievs betveen tribal Africans perhaps 
as a result of the migrant labour system, although the importance 
of this can be overestimated.^* It should also be noted that the 
earlier divisions between tribes vere probably overestimated and 
exaggerated by the colonistsJf./hether one can ca ll the inter­
tribal co-operation at this stage "nationalism" to some extent de-
2pends upon one’ s definition of 1hat word. Theree of Dinuzulu*s 
name, war-cry and var badge seems to indicate a "pan-Zulu feeling* 
and -though this vas not anything new, i t  is significant that even 
peoples who had previously seen themselves as refugees from the 
Zulu kingdom and regarded its  king as their enemy were now pre­
pared to look towards the Zulu Royal Family for their inspiration. 
Whether or not Dinuzulu was behind the disturbances or approved 
of them was immaterial. Some centralising figure was absolutely
"Uhat induced the Nyusva to throw in their lo t with Meseni they 
themselves cannot say, especially as there was a long standing feud 
between the two tribes." SNA 1 (lfa6 7  ^ aepCrt to J .J .Field, 10.1.07* 
Similarly Stuart Papers on the Zulu Rebellion, evidence Hsime ka Beje,
26.12.06. (K.C.L.)
On the mines Africans tended to be grouped together aoe. to tribe, 
and even in the towns clan members and fellow tribesmen tended to keep 
together.
2 At the time o f the 1888 disturbances ( i f  not before) H.B. Colenso vas 
referring to the supporters of the Zulu Royal Family as the "Rational 
Party".
essential i f  the disparate tribes of Natal-Zululand vers to 
unite for common r^rroses. No sufficiently strong new-type 
leader had yet emerged out of the traditional structure of 
African l i f e  In the territory. The leaders of the rebellion 
therefore chose a figure who had had such power and authority 
in the past in order to overcome their present divisions. Ircui4- 
eally enough it  was the Matal government i t s e l f  hovever with its  
insensitive handling of administration, its  innumerable demands 
for land, labour and taxation, *id its  own policy o f dividing 
and sub-dividing the tribes ?which must be regarded as the greatest 
unifying factor. It is both significant and ironical that the 
rebellion broke out not only in two very densely populated areas* 
-  Nkandla and Wapumula -  Lower Tugela hut also in areas where this 
process of "divide and role" had gone farthest.
^ e e  o .c . sm  l / l / 5 4 M i n u t e  Major Harwell (Mapuaulo) \? ' 1S)
and above,pp.\i2_,w& onJNkandla  ^ For population density in these 
d istricts.
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Ch»P*.r VII 
ZPLP HAMLET
•I aa guilty only of bsing Cstshvaro's son. I 
hsrs dons nothing against Hulunsni  ^ of Vatal. 
Ths rssl ohargs against as . . .  ia kspt in ths 
ahadov... Baabata la aads a prstsxt, vhsrsaa 
i t  la ths old ohargs . . . "
Dinuaulu to V. P. Sohrsinsr,
Greytown, 24.2.1909. Col.Col. 172.
^ h . GoTsmasnt.
For many in Hatal, both black aad vhite, thara vaa l l t t la
doubt that tha maater-mind bahind tha dlaturbanoaa and 1heir in-
atigator-in-ohief vaa Dinusulu, son of Catahvayo, haad of tha
Zulu Royal family aad hair to tha great military tradition of
tha Zulu people*^ So tangled arm tha atraada of auapioioa aad
rumour ch a rge  aad couatar charga, that i t  ia a t i l l  d ifficu lt  to
unravel vith complete certainty tha exact role played by Dinusulu
ia tha eventa of 1906-7*
We have already aaaa how from tha moment of hia return to
tha newly aaaaxad Zululand, Dinusulu*a name vaa asaooiated vith a
ho at of rumours which reached thair peak towards tha and of 1905
2and tha beginning of 1906, aad how at tha time o f 1he promulgation 
of tha Poll Tax, several Hatal aad Zululand chiefs seat to Dinusulu
to find out what ha intended doing about it.*^ Throughout tha
disturbances, tha rumours that ha vaa tha *head and font" of tha 
whole movement oontinued* Cakijana, Bambatha* a second in command, 
claimed to have bean sent specifica lly  by Dinusulu and used hia name
^Saa e.g. Timas of Hatal* 2.5*06* Hatal Mercury* 25.4.06.
2Sea above, Chapter IV, j
^See above, Chapter V, p. hnu-7
Very widely in order to gain support for the movement. Throughout
the fighting in the Hkandla forests, Dinusulu*s war-cry "Usuthu"
waa used,1 and the traditional Zulu war emblem the tshokobesl was
2also worn by the rebel fighters. Throughout Dinusulu protested 
his loyalty, and maintained that the rebels were uelng hia name 
without either his permission or approval. The fh ll ambiguity of 
his position was shown in April, 1906 when he waa appealed to by 
the Vatal authorities, to prove his loyalty onoe and for a ll . Hia 
response was to o ffer to raise a levy to aid the lata l forces aad 
to send a ? r message expressing his loyalty to the King.'* The 
levy was refused on the grounds that i t  would result in hundreds of 
young men flocking to his standard from a ll over Zululand, with 
the danger that they would get out of control and fight for Dinusulu 
instead o f for the government.* The letter o f thanks sent to Dinu­
sulu on behalf of the King for hia expression of loyalty was not
delivered on the grounds that i t  would lead hia to think that he
5had a different position to other chiefs.
S tuart, Z.E.. p .171.
2n>ld,. p.198.
5Cd 5027» Enel, in no. 15. Oot. to Sea. S t.. 20.4.06, Dinusulu to 
C.H.A., 18.4.06.
^Ibld. . Oot. to S.o. S t., 20.4.06, quoting Saunters'. Tiers.
Stuart, Z.E.. p .215.
5C0 179/254/14522, Oot. to S*e. S t., 26.4.06, no. 2, tel.
Despite the feet that the government suspected that 
Dinusulu had a good deal more to do vith the rebels than he 
vas v illin g  to admitv and the many rumours that Bambatha, Mangati 
and Cakijana had a ll at some time or mother made their way to 
the Usuthu kraal 9 the military took no action against him during 
the actual disturbances, apart frea aceumulatxxig evidence. This 
vas partly no doubt because of tiie calm attitude of Sir Charles 
Saunders vho pointed out the soothing effect Dinusulu vas having 
on surrounding tribes 9 and partly because so long as he took no 
overt action against the government 9 it  vas far safer to take no 
motion against him. Despite their pugnaolousness in la ta l9 the 
military, vho vere convinced of Dinusulu9 e complicity in the re­
bellion by June, 1906, vere probably avare that to take action
against Dinusulu would need far greater reeouroee than they needed
2deploy against the lesser chiefs o f Zululand and la ta l. Proceed­
ings against Dinusulu in the inflamed atmosphere of 1906 vould have 
given far wider scope to the entire rebellion end vould have brought 
in a ll Dinusulu *a supporters vho had ao ffcr fa iled  to rise . Had 
the Vatal government sanctioned military proceedings again* Dinu­
sulu i t  vould have given the rebels that uniting factor vhioh they
Stuart, 2.R.. p.21j.
2C0 179/257/46359, Got. to Soo. St., 20.11.06.
H <\r$ -
in fact triad to areata for themselves by using his name, war-
cry and badge.1 Vithout him, as the rebels themselves realised,
they were lo s t . It is  in faot because of this realisation that
the various v is its  to find out his intentions were made by Mangati,
2Baabatha aid others. They may well hare hoped moreover that by 
using his name they would be able to draw him into the actual 
h ostilit ie s . The restraint of the military authorities could have 
been one of the reasons for their ultimate failure in this regard. 
It  cou Id also be that throughout the disturbances, Dinusulu 
never fu lly  made up his mind what to do. There were those amongst 
his following who would dearly have liked to join  the rebels in 
one final effort to win back his old position. By and large wiser 
counsels held sway. He may have been waiting to  see what would 
happen to the rebel cause without committing himself fu lly  to any 
one side. In maintaining this ambivalent attitude he was helped 
by the government attitude towards him. They were never able to 
deal with Dinusulu rationally. On the one hand, the government 
wanted his help -  and in certain instances they received i t  -  cn 
the other they were afraid that by utilising i t ,  they would in 
some way thus reoognise his "special position11. I f  he proffered
1S», *boT«, Chapters.V, p. 33c., v l , m i, m-i-8 
2 . p.313.
help It vas rejected, leet i t  enoourage hie "pretensions"} i f  -y 
he failed to five  i t ,  he erne regarded aa disloyal, aa failing 
to exert hia natural authority over the Zulu in the interests 
of law and order. Even hia undoubtedly proper replies to those 
chiefs vho sent to hia in the early days of the Poll Tax,* vere 
later oonstrued to Stuart2 as a mere shov of loyalty, md he
vas biased at his trial for not inaediately reporting these ohiefs
3vho sent his to the looal magistrate, a step vhioh, as the de­
fence teas pointed out, would have lost hia vhatever influeroe
4for the good he sight hare had*
II She Trial
After the actual disturbances vere over the distrust between 
Dinusulu and the Natal G o v e r n m e n t  grew,.worse.. Far froa subsiding, 
the unrest in the country intensified. In the area of the military 
operations, crops and kraals had been destroyed and the sale bread­
winners had in many instances been killed or imprisoned. The 
government failed to declare a general amnesty on the grounds that
1The Trial of Dinusulu. Sussing up of Ohief Justioe Sir Vs* Smith, 
p* xii*
2Z*R*. pp. 408-9.
3See The Trial of Dinusulu. Address of Attorney General, p. 12. 
^Ibid. .  Address of V. P. Schreiner, p.49*
i t  would disappoint those Africans vho had remained loyal, al­
though a very different viewpoint vas expressed by the Acting 
Magistrate of Mapumulo, J. B. K. P&rrer. He maintained that the 
punishment in flicted  during the disturbances had been quite su ffi­
cient as a deterrent, md that it vas a mistake to imprison the 
rank aid f i l e  afterwards.^ At ths beginning of 1907 there vere 
about 4,000 rebels s t i l l  in prison end the Imperial Government 
in June 1907 assisted vith the deportation of twenty-five of 
the "ringleaders” .?  According to Tarrer, the methcd adopted by 
the government simply kept the Africans
"in a constant state of unrest aad fostered dis­
content, as it  is impossible for them to settle 
down when one half of their friends md relatives 
ia in goal and tha other half ia wandering about 
trying to evade arrest..."3
His further comments that far too much time vaa spent cn pondering
"what the natives vould think" and that "ve should try to see things
as they ere and deal vith them on that basis" vere equally apt.
When Sir Matthew Nathan came to the oolony as Governor in
the middle of 1907 a general amnesty had s t i l l  not been declared
end i t  vas hia constant endeavour to impress upon ministers that
S^HA 1 /3 /3 7 2 ^ 2  f Minute 7.6.07.
2Stuart, Zjl. .  pp. 404-5.
5SHA 1/3/372^221 , Hinut*. Aast. Hagle., 7.6.07.
*  *> *
the failure to declare an amnesty was vh&t lay behind most of
the tension aad unrest especially in Zululand. One of the main
reasons however for not declaring a general amnesty vas the fa c t
that several o f the leading rebels vere s t i l l  at large.*
Increasingly i t  came to the government's attention -that these
2men had sought refuge vith Dinusulu at the Uauthu. Prom the end 
of 1906 the government received disturbing reports that Dinusulu9 s 
activ ities during mad after the rebellion  vere not as innocent as 
they had in it ia lly  appeared to Sir Charles Saunders. Neverthe­
less although in September and December, 1906 and January mid 
February 1907 either Sir Charles or Dinusulu asked the government 
for an independent enquiry to be made into the allegations being 
made against the Chief, none vas undertaken.^ In January 1907 
Winston Churchill vas to comment "It is a vonder a ll these constant
Asuspicions do not drive Dinusulu mad".
By far the most important of these reports against Dinusulu
5
came at the end o f 1906 from one A. G. Daniels, an "exempted”
*See e.g. Natham MSS 366, pp. 39-60, Nathan to Elgin, 19.1.08.
CO 179/242/37900, Bnol. 2 in desp. 174, 5.10.07. Minute, Gov. 
to Prime Minister, 3.10.0J. CO 179/242/44534, Gov. to Sec. S t., 30.11.07, 
Secret. CO 179/242/40263, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret, 26.10.07. (See 
extracts in Cd 3668).
2See e.g . CO 179/240/52B6, Extract publ. Cd 3888, Gov. to Sec. S t., Secret 
1, 18,1.07.
3S*A 1/4/16 SNA 1/4/17 < $ .
4C0 179/237/47424, Minute 18.1.07, on deep. S*0r .t  1, 26.11.06.
hi* vaa chosen for Dinusulu as his interpreter ty the Native Affaire 
Department in Natal In 1890. Aco. to H. C. Shepstone he vaa educated at
African who had served as Dinuzulu's secretary while he was in 
exile in St. Helena and again on his return to Natal. On both 
occasions he had been dismissed from Dinusulu' s service being 
accused of fraud, and at the the time of his present deposition 
was involved in suing Dinusulu for his unpaid salary- a oase 
which he was to lose in the following April.* Clearly there 
was considerable i l l -w il l  between the two men, and Daniels's 
report to the S.N.A. on the Usuthu was calculated to rouse the 
greatest possible suspicion. Aooording to Daniels, Dinusulu and 
his entourage had been intriguing with the tribes o f fa ta l, Zulu­
land and, indeed, the rest o f South Africa, in order to have his 
position as King recognised. The rebellion of 1906 vas prematura,
but Dinuzulu had actually planned to join Bambatha latar in the
2year, as his sheltering Bambathu' s family *<evoaled. There vas 
a large number of unregistered guns at the Usuthu and the Nkomindala. 
a military regiment which had been formed during the Boer War, 
had been kept on and drilled afterwards. He further stated that 
Dinusulu had been involved in the murder of the two medicine men
at Lovedale and had a second class teachers osrtlfioate aad had 
passed the Cape University Examination (2nd Class), CO 427/8/7095# 
Copy S.N.A. to Gov. End. in desp. Conf. 15#3#90.
1C0 427/26/4410, H. E. Colaaao to Vlleon, C.O. 21.2.96. Col. Col. 98, 
Statements Samuelson, p.3&, Dinusulu.
2Col. 3888, no. 5, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret, 29#12.06. His evidence 
before Speoial Court vaa given, Natal Witness. 9th, 10th-12.08.
For his evidence before the Prelim. Enquiry see Times of Natal.
26.3.08.
in his d istrict in 1906 -  Knqandi and Tshigane, as ve il as that 
of tiie magistrate, H. M. Stainbank.
While Saunders pointed out that Daniels vas hardly a dis­
interested witness,1 a few weeks later the evidence of a government 
spy, Hgunguluso, vho had been employed at Port Tolland by the 
M ilitia during the rebellion, corroborated at least some of vhat
Daniels had said. He also stated that he bad seen several rebel aa
at the Usuthu, and named as many as twenty-eight, amongst them
2some very prominent individuals. At the same time, the enquiries
being made in the Mahlabatini d istrict neighbouring Dinusulu* s
territory had resulted in considerable evidence that Dinusulu knew
wmore of the murder than he vas prepared to disclose. The murder, 
in April 1907, of a third medicine men, Gence, vho had been in 
attendance on Dinusulu end accused of adultery by him, began to 
shake even Sir Charles Saunders*s faith in the Chief
Nevertheless in May, 1907 vhen Dinusulu came to Pietermarits- 
burg, ostensibly to bid farewell to the Governor, Sir Henry MoCallum 
it  seemed as though an attempt oould be made by both sides to come
*Cd 3888, no. 9, Gov. to Sec. S t., Secret, 1, 29.12.06.
2Stu«rt, Z.R .. p .426, Sriience in Enel. 2, CO 179/241/33767, 
desp. Conf., 29.8.07, Report mo. 3*
5Cd 3688, Enol. 1 in no. 1. C.H.A. to P.M. 11.9.06. CO 179/240/9666 
Encl. in desp. Seer. Att. General to Min. Justice, 20.2.07.
A
See above, Chapter TI, pp. V s ~
nearer to one another*1 KcCallum at aiy rate le ft  the Interview
2feeling he had handled Dinusulu tactfully and firmly, and convinced 
that Dinusulu had played no part in 12ie actual disturbances, even 
though i t  was necessary to warn him that the government knew that 
Bambatha*s family had found shelter vith him md that he had also 
sheltered several other rebels* He also took the opportunity of 
informing Dinusulu what kind of behaviour warn exp acted from a 
loyal servant of the government* Dinusulu*s own preoccupations 
vere somewhat different* He had come to Ftetexmarltsburg despite 
the very deep misgivings of his people that he would be arrested 
as kula and Tllonko had been.* nevertheless he fe lt  i t  h is dity 
to speak out to the governor about the need fe lt  by the Zulu for 
a spokesman who could represent their grievances to the Government, 
a kind of Paramount Chief. While denying that he would necessarily 
be the one chosen, he added "I do not wish to conceal ••• that 
the whole o f the Zulus like me as the son of my father vho was
5thair Sing formerly". The Zulu, he said, fe lt  unfairly treated 
by comparison vith the Boers who had just been granted Responsible
100 179/241/21367, Enol. d*sp. Conf. 2, 25.5.07, Int*iri*w 21.5.07.
oCf* KcCallum*s letter to Nathan 7*1*08 after Dinusulu* s arrest: 
"Dinusulu has been an infarnal fool not to take ay advice and waning 
to heart; he has been spoilt hy Kiss Colenso, who is  a most 
dangerous woman and whoa I had such pleasure In keeping In her proper
place and not allowing her to interfere" fj& sl Nathan MSS 375, p*24.
5C0 179/241/21367, C O T . to S*o. S t., Conf. 25.5.07.
*00 179/241/21367, Int*rrl*w with Oor.rnor, pp. 6-8, 35-6.
■’ib id ., p.29.
government, though they had so recently fought against the
t.' *' _ ’ , ’ / «r ; \
British. He was not used as Government induna. despite the
he
stipulation in the conditions of his return and/continued -  
"I feel that i t  is hard that I should be blamed for the conduct 
of people outside of ay own d istrict over whom I had no control 
or direction*.1
At the same time he denied a ll knowledge of Bambatha' b 
family being at the TJsuthu and promised to hand oier any rebels 
he should find to the magistrate at Hongoma. On his return to 
the TJsuthu, six rebels were handed over to the magistrate.
By far the most sensational and damaging evidence against 
Dinusulu came hovever in July, 1907 when Bambatha'a with and two 
children suddenly surrendered themselves to the magistrate at 
Nahlabatini, stating that they had spent the last seventeen months 
at Dinusulu's kraal. Dinusulu, apprehensive that the authorities 
would find them at hia kraal, had wanted to send them across the 
Pongola into Svasiland, and they had fled .
By the 12th August, Sir Charles Saunders had completely 
swung round from his previous views about Dinusulu's innocence and
C^O 179/241/21367, Interview with Governor, p. 28.
2Cd 3888, Officer Administering the Government, to Sec. S t., 9*7*07 
no. 1.
3C0 179/241/33767* Enel. In d.sp. Conf. 39.8.07. Krld.no. Baab.th*' 
wife, Sdyekiwe, before James Stuart, 12.7*0.7, 18.7*07* For this 
evidenoe, sse below, p. zj.~iz-3
wished the Natal government would "go for him bald-headad” .*
The government, fearful that this would lead to another uprising,
vere, however, s t i l l  reluctant to smbark on this course of action*
Saunders hiss e l f  was now fu lly  convinoed that Dinusulu vas guilty
and had to be removed for the peace of Zululand. The unrest there
had s t i l l  not died down, loyal chiefs reported themselves in
fear of their lives , and their anxiety was enormously increased
by the murder of the "loyal” chief S itshitshili at the beginning 
2of August and b7 the failure of the government to capture the
remaining rebels* They vere convinced that a ll the unrest emanated
from Dinuzulu. The fact that the Commissioner fo r  Native Affaixm,
Sir Charles Saunders, had staked so mu oh o f his personal trust
in Dinusulu made him particularly bitter against the Chlef^. In
addition, by August Saunders fe lt  particularly disillusioned by
the Natal government "policy of d r ift” in Zululand, and lacked a ll
4faith in his po litica l masters. Ee admitted to the Officer Ad­
ministering the Government before the arrival of Sir Hatthew Nathan
M 5
that he fe lt  perfectly sick” of his position In Zululand.
1C0 179/241/33767, Enel. 3, Rept. Conf. C.H.A. to P.K., 12.8.07.
SHA 1/6/29, C.H.A. to Admin. Beaumont, Hinate 20.8.07. PH C 103^44 
Admin, to P.H. 15*8.07 and minute.
^See above, Chapter Vi , p. if 12_- 4-vH-
^Nathan MSS 568, Nathan to Luoas, 17.11.07, p*33*
S^NA 1/6/29, C.N.A. to Admin* Beaumont, 20.8.07, Pte.
5SNA 1/6/29* C.N.A. to Sir V* H* Beaumont, Private, 20.8.07* See aleo 
CO 179/241/53767* Sad. 5* Report Conf. C.N.A. to P.M* 12.8.07.
From believing in Dinuzulu's innocence Saunders now believed 
that Dinuzulu vas keeping the rebels at the TJsuthu for a set purpose 
and vas bent on "a course of self-aggrandisement, of cool defiance 
or indifference to the vishes of the government and of open hostility  
to those natives vho had been loy a l..."*  The b e lie f that Dinusulu 
had Instigated a ll the murders in Zululand vas widespread and 
Saunders feared that Dinusulu "would win over the allegiance of 
heretofore loyal natives, increase his pover and Independence 
and so bring on another rebellion" i f  matters allowed to oontinue 
as they were.’1'
Shortly after his arrival in Natal, Sir Matthew Nathan was
9thus persuaded that for the safety of Zululand Dinusulu vould
*
have to be removed. Despite the extra tvo hundred police drafted
into Zululand at the end of September, and who vere patrolling
the country, on the Tth o f October attempts vere made to k i l l  Chief
4Hpumela and one of his favourites, Ndlelase.
At the same time i t  vas clear that Dinusulu vas getting 
increasingly apprehensive that the government vere going to direct 
force against him. In August at his annual hunt in the Black
XC0 179/241/55767, End. 5, Report Conf. C.N.A. to P.M. 12.0.07.
2"by Beaumont 9the level headed judge9, by Moor /P.M. and K.N.Aj
by Kaydon /ex Minister/ by Saunders, and by various members of tha 
House of Shepstone..." Nathan MSS 568, pp. 16-19, Nathan to Luoas,
5.10.07.
3C0 179/241/32547, Gcnr. to Soo.Sfc.
4CO 179/242/38806, D ..p. S .or.t, Oot. to SM . St. 12.10.07.
*
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Umfoloei Valley he held an inspection of arms and according to 
one informant practically the whole Nkomindala  ^ produced breach- 
loeading riflea« The report was that there mere one hundred and 
f i f ty  r ifle s  including a number of amall-bore r if le s  of modem 
pattern. He vas supposed to be getting ammunition from Portuguese
agents at Delagoa Bay and to be expecting a further two thousand
2rounds in the near future. rfhen, at the beginning of October, 
a police patrol came unexpectedly to the Usuthu kraal, it  occasioned
i
a minor panic, end there vere apparently those vho vanted to take
3up arms against the polioe. Shortly after this his tribe was 
reported to have doctored it s e lf  fo r  var • Clearly the extra 
police movements end the constant spy reports -  of vhioh he com­
plained to Harrietts Colenso tovards the end of 1907 -  made
ADinusulu fearful and anxious. On the 27th October he wrote to
both the Governor and the U.S.N.A. To the f ir s t  he pleaded that
5the Governor not I.listen "with one ear only* and that opportunity
should be given to the person complained of to make a reply; to
6Samuelson he stated:
hpor the Nkomindala see above, p. 2-SA-
2C0 179/241/337671 End. 4, deep. Conf. 29.8.07. C.H.A. to P.M.
23.8.07.
C^O 179/242/38806, iSnol. 2 in desp. Sec. 12.10.07# &spt. Inspeot.
0. Piamiok, Hatal Police, to C.V.A.
*4G0 1/7/62, 10.10.07.
C^0 179/242/41993t transl. copy a id  1 in desp. Secret# 8.11.07. 
Ibid.# End. 2.
"However mu oh the/ me/ sa/ against me, i t  w ill be 
you people who w ill fight. For mj pert I w ill 
never fight against the Government because the 
Government / s i c .  He probably meant Cetehwayo/
fought and vas beaten by the Queen.
Rumours about Dinuaulu *s intentions reached fever pitch 
again in October and November, 1907* Various spy reporta sug­
gested he was contacting different tribes, but especially his 
very loyal followers in the Yryheid d istrict to arm and ooae to 
his support in the event of his being arrested by the Natal 
government. A report, forwarded by Lieut. Hedges of 1he Zululand 
Mounted R ifles, stated that i f  a small force were sent to arrest 
Dinuaulu the Usuthu vould be assisted by five  Zulu regiments vho 
had been given orders to beamady. The arrest of Dinusulu vould be 
& signal for every man in Zululand aad elsewhere to rise.*
Both in September and at the beginning of October, Natal 
requested Imperial aid in order to effect Dinuaulu's arrest.2 
Lord Bigin,vho fe lt  that the evidence so far led against Dinuaulu 
amounted to very l i t t l e  and did not provide adequate grounds for 
his arrest, refused to give it .^  At the same time, General
1« .g . CO 179/242/39532, too l. 1 ia d.ap. Seo. 19.10.07, CO 179/242/ 
45350, too l. 4 in desp. tooret, 7.12.07, CO 179/242/45350, too l. 10 
desp. Seo. 7.12.07. Unsigned Report 24.11.07 forwarded by In­
telligence Qffioer, General Staff, Pretoria. Nnel. U  similar, 
Rept. Hagis. Umvotl, 1.12.07 (see Cd 3688, Encl. 7 in 101).
2Sse e.g. 30 179/241/32533, Cot. to  See. St. 10.9.07, Conf. Points 
African . ./(South), Memo no. 887* P. Hopwood 2.10.07 (Secret).
3Cd 3888, Elgin to le t  hen, 14.10.07. See also Elgin to l.than
31.10.07, Ketton ESS 371, p.123.
f  , f 1
Botha1 , than Prime Minister of the Transvaal, offered to mediate
between Dinusulu and the Natal government, and sent a personal
emissary,Coenraad Meyer, vho knev Dinuzulu from the old days of
2the "New Republic". Even ihis v is it  by Coenraad Mayor found its 
vay into a spy report as evidence of an intended Boer-Zulu combination 
against Natal/ Meyer returned from his six day v is it  to Dinuzulu* a 
kraal convinced that he "vas a man of rank without following"; 
there vere few men at the Usuthu and those there vere employed in 
weeding the Chief's gardens. He vas sure that Dinuzulu vas loyal 
to the government and that the misunderstanding vith the Natal 
government vas due to the failure of the ministers to meet Dinusulu 
personally. ^
This was the most encouraging report that the government had
received for some time, and to a certain extent the agitation died
dovn.^ With the murder on the 20th November of another loyal ch ief,
Mpumela, a ll the old rumours revived, and a ll members cf the govem-
5ment became convinced that they would have to take action. On the
t
Botha knev Dinusulu from the old days of the lev Republic and had been
part of the expedition in 1884 against Zibhebhu. From 1886-1894 he 
had been vsld-komet and collector of taxes in Ubombo, see H. Spender, 
General Botha, pp. 57-40 (London, 1919), 2nd ed.
O yC->VC*y3V«' X  ,  F ^
See above,/Chapter II, p.io*- for the "New Republic".
^00 179/242/41176, Encl. 1 in desp. Secret, 3.11.07, undated Conf.
Rept. Coenraad Meyer to General Botha.
4C0 179/242/40263, Gov. to Sec. St. 26.10.07 (Extraet printed Cd 3888).
^Nathan MSS 368, pp. 59-60, Nathan to Elgin, 19.1.08.
the 25th November, Sir Matthew Nathan, while keeping the other
South African governments informed of his actions and The reasons
for them, issued a proclamation strengthening the forces for the
protection of chiefs in Zululand** The m ilitia  wan mobilised,
a step which caused dismay at the TJsuthu* Cn the 3rd December
Dinusulu expressed surprise that troops vere being sent against
him, and was Instructed to surrender himself to the magistrate
at Nongoma forthwith* When he tried to procrastinate, the Governor,
2much gainst his w ill, and on the advice of 1he Colonial Office,
vas forced by his ministry to declare Martial law on the 7th
*
December over the whole of Zululand." This was extended to the 
Vryheid-Paulpietersberg Districts of Natal on the 9th. Making 
use of the opportunity, Nathan tried to extract a promise from 
ministers that with the arrest of Dinusulu the rank and f i le  
prisoners of the 1906 disturbances be released^ -  there were 
s t i l l  over 2,000 at the end of 1907 -  and that Martial Lav be
XCd 3888 (extract) Got. *> S*c. S t., 30.11.07.
2Cd 3888, Elgin to Hathan, 2.12.07| CO 179/242/42410, Kinute 
R. V. Vernon, 4*12.07*
C^d 3888, Extract no* 104, Gov* to Seo* S t., 13*12*07 and no* 106, 
Gov. to See* S t., 28.12.07. fo r  fu ll text, CO 179/242/2X62, Secret 
Gov* to See* St.
4C0 179/242/2162, Got. to S*o. S t., t* l. 28.12.07.
lifted  as soon as possible. On neither of these two issues
were his wishes complied with.^ His only resort was to insist
he be allowed to publish his opinion that the declaration of
Martial Law before there had been any breach of the peace or
armed resistance to the state was premature. In a private letter
to Lord Selborne, Nathan wrote justifying his stand:
"It seemed to me that the time had come when the
welfare of the oolony required a public protest*
and that, feeling as I did, i t  vas for me to make
i t  by allowing my views to be published. I sug­
gested to Moor that I should be allowed to resign 
when the HLue Book appears, but he was strongly 
averse to i t . " 2
Under the circumstances, one vould have esg>eoted either Sir Matthew 
or his ministers to have resigned.
Nathan did not resign. This was probably not so much because 
the Prime Minister of Natal vas averse to his resignation as because 
i t  vas highly unlikely that the Earl of Elgin would have accepted 
the resignation of a man he lad personally pressed into taking
3the position and In vhom the Colonial Office had every confidence. 
That the Moor ministry did not resign can only be attributed to 
its  thick skin. It  vas, on the other hand, d ifficu lt  for Nathan
CO 179/242/2162, Gov. to S*0. S t., 3.12.07, publ. Cd 3888 no. 106.
See also the long wrangle betveen Nathan and Minister of Justice* Carter* 
when Nathan accused ministers of a breach of faith  cn the issue of 
release of prisoners In GH 381 cS.4§. * Mixxutes.
2 07 Nathan MSS 368* 11.1.08.
^Nathan MSS 371* no. 103-4* Elgin to Nathan 27*4*08. References to 
Nathan's able handling of the situation ara frequent both in CO f ile s  
and in letters to Nathan from Elgin and Sir Charles Lucas.
to dismiss them as Sir Bartle Frere had dismissed his ministry
in the Cape in 1878.* Nathan's choice of alternative ministers
was extremely limited — as he pointed out there were not enough
men in the Natal Parliament of sufficient calibre to form a
2Government and an Opposition. In addition, weak a Prime Minister 
as Moor vas, he was s t i l l  widely regarded as the most sympathetic 
of the available Ministers of Native Affairs towards the African 
population.^ Sir Duncan McKenzie now Commandant of the M ilitia 
proceeded to Zululand with nearly 3,000 members o f the Active 
M ilitia. Despite the apprehensions he expressed about the in­
tentions of the M ilitia towards him and the fear that he would 
be tried by Martial law, Dinuzulu surrendered himself for tria l 
on the 7th December vith l i t t le  further ado, having been promised 
a fa ir  tr ia l in a letter from Frank Colenso forwarded fcy the C.O.
5as well as by ihe representations of C.E. Henaud. He was brought 
to Pietermaritzburg and lodged in the women's quarters of the gaol
i 0ver their handling of tha Nqgika-Goaleka War. See E. A. Walker, A
History of Southern Africa, p .370 (3rd edition, London, 1957).
^Nathan MSS 368, p .126 to Sir Charles Lucas, 12.7.08.
5See above, Chapter I I I , p.£ps-fe, below Chapter
4Cd 3888, Gov. to See. St. 4.12.07f n o .l.
C^d 3998, no. 33, Sec. St. to Gov. 20.2 of no. 1. Cd 3888, no. 104 
Encl. 4, Ann. B., Henaud to Dinusulu, 7.12.07.
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with his induna Hgwa^ o and Mankulumana and attendants. On the 
2?£d December his Preliminary Examination before the magistrate 
of Umgeni Division, T. R. L. Bennet, began behind closed doors.* 
Dinusulu and the tvo induna vere charged vith high treason, 
murder, the incitement to murder, Hie incitement to sedition aid 
rebellion, being an accessory to murder, sheltering rebels and 
contravening the Firearms and Ammunitions Act of 1905# vith his 
arrest and the imposition of Martial Lav over Zululand and its  
extension to the Northern Districts the previous trickle of wit­
nesses against the Chief became a flood. In a ll, one hundred 
and twenty-nine witnesses appeared, end the examination lasted
two hundred and twenty-one days. Of these, fifty -three were evsn-
etually examined before the Special Court. An appeal by Dinusulu 
to the Supreme Court for an interdict against Bennet on grounds 
that he was biassed vas rejected. The Court xuled that mere in­
firm ities of temper vere not evidence of bias.^ It  is unlikely 
that any other Natal magistrate, vith perhaps one or tvo exceptions, 
would have handled the case any differently. The Preliminary
^Stuart, Z.R. . p .460.
2C0 179/252/5463, Gov. to 9*o. S t., S«or.t d.sp. 23.1.09.
^See Report in Ratal Wltn.aa. 3.4.08. also in Cd 3996 Baal. 2
in no. 65*
Examination may have been within the limits of Natal law;
Sir Francis Hopwood, Under Secretary of State at the Colonial
Office, was not, however, alone when he minuted that while this
may have been true, Natal's legal code was then unlike any
other in the civ ilised  w r ld .1 As late as the end of April,
1908 he remarked of the evidence so far led in the Preliminary
Examination that
"In this country no judicial o fficer would commit 
Dinusulu for  tria l on any of tha evidence we have 
seen. But the colonial magistrates are not in­
dependent of the Government of fatal aad where 
vould Moor and his colleagues be i f  after Martial 
Lav, troops, great expense aad flood shed there 
was nothing to ju stify  such drastic and unhappy 
action? "2
Largely because of the way in vhioh this Preliminary Exam­
ination vaa handled aad the mmaj doubts vhioh vere expressed 
about i t  both in Britain and la South Africa it s e l f  -  the Attorney 
General of the Transvaal eohoed the views of many area in South 
Africa when he called i t  "a fishing enquiry"^ -  the Colonial 
Offioe vaa to make it  their ootnoem to eee that Dinusulu received 
a fa ir  tr ia l. They were, under the terms of Ms return to Zululand
In June 1906 Lambert in the Colonial Offioe oalled the prolongation 
of the Preliminary tria l scandalous (Minute on CO 179/245/22739) 
whilst Lord Elgin had already called the procedure "provocative" 
{fathan MSS 371, pp. 103-4, Elgin to Nathan, 27.4,08).
2CC 179/244/13875, 31*. Kinut# 14. Crave Ibid aa d.sp. of 28.3.08. 
Sim. Nathan MSS 371, no. 123# Elgin to fathan 31.10.07 on the nature 
of depositions taken before Dinusulu's arrest.
^Schreiner Papers, 1280. Richard Solomon to V. P. Schreiner, 4.6.08.
in part responsible for him, vhich made their position stronger 
than i t  would otherwise have been. There had been a major dash 
between the two governments on the question of the arrest of 
Dinuzulu and the declaration of Martial Law In which the Natal 
government gained its  way. Thereafter the events of 1908 con­
stituted a series of minor brushes between the Colonial Office 
and Natal ministers over the defence and tria l of Dinuzulu, In 
which the fom er not infrequently triumphed.* It would be tedious
to relate here a ll the obstacles placed in the way of the defence
2by a Minister of Justice, T. F. Carter, who must hold the record 
for obstinacy and narrow mindedness oven in the annals of Natal.
As Sir Charles Lucas, who had replaced Just on Natal Affairs at 
the Colonial Office remarked, "I f  the Natal Government had de­
liberately intended to set public feeling in . . .  Britain against 
them, they could not have done it  more effectively  than has been 
the case.?
The most important successes of the Colonial Office were 
over tho T.*aymfent of Dinuzulu*s salary, the appointment of eminent
4
defence Counsel -  tf. P. Schreiner was a Colonial Office suggestion -
1 '2L R- •For a defence of the Natal Ministry*a actions see Stuart, p. 460 f f .
M inister o f Justice ISO 6-7 and Attorney General 1908-10.
Nathan MSS 374 no. 81, 5.6.08.
4
The other members of the defence team were latelieas -  
C. S. Renaud and &• C. A. Samuel son.
aad tha astabliahaant o f a Special Court undar a Judea from outaida 
Natal to haar tha Chiaf'a oaaa.^ Oa tha quaation of Dinusulu'a
salary, which the Natal government suspended on his arrest, the 
Secretary of State was on particularly firm ground: undar tha
conditions of his return in 1897 i t  was stipulated that tha salary 
could only be suspended with the prior agreement o f  tha Secretary 
of State. Natal's failure to comply vith this condition, as vail 
as their assumption that Dinusulu vas guilty before he bad been 
tried, led to a long wrangle between the two governments. Even­
tually the Natal government agreed to pay the £500 owing hia to
phis defenoe counsel. That the Colonial o ffice  had been "in 
honour bound" to see that the salary vas paid in order to sustain 
his defence vas unanimously agreed to by both sides in the Imperial 
Parliament. It must have been a rare occasion of unanimity in 
the l i f e  of *he 1906-11 British Parliament.' Ia Natal its e lf  more­
over there was some public support for the Imperial view and a re­
action against Carter's attempt to portray the fight as one betveen 
defenceless l i t t le  Natal and a despotic and tyrannical Colonial
1See Nathan MSS 371, 115, Elgin to Nathan 14.2.08,and Cd 3998, no.18, 
Sec. St. to Nathan, 11.2.08 vhere he suggests Nathan select an 
"eminent barrister" from the Cape Bar, and CO 179/244/5489, Sec. St. 
to Gov. 15*2.08 (draft te l .)  Cd 3888, Sec. St. to Gov. 14.10.06.
2See Cd 3998, CO /179/245 and passim and esp. 246. Cd 3998 no. 7# 
Sec. St. to Gov. 30.1.08, no. 2, and 4.2.06.
3C0 179/246/30824, Saol. 5 no. 2 (Report of NJ..A. . debat.)
Sec. St. to Gov. (copy), 27.7.08.
O ffice .1 JAt the in itiative and on the firm insistence of the 
Colonial Office, V. P. ^ohreiner vas engaged to defend Dinuzulu.2 
Schreiner5 vho vas amongst the most brilliant South African ad­
vocates of his day and had played a prominent and distinguished 
part in the politioa l l i f e  of the Cape Colony, having been Prime 
Minister there during the Boer War, vas a far viser choice than 
the original counsel engaged by the Colensos, E# 6. Jellicoe; 
fortunately, Jellicoe threw in his brief after three veeks in
Natal in January-F ebruaiy, 1908, b o  convinced vas he that Dinuzulu
Kvould not get a fa ir  trial in that colony. That Jellicoe vas 
proved wrong, however, vas in large measure due to Imperial insist­
ence on a fa irly  constituted Special Court, along the lines of the
5
impartial tribunal fira t suggested by lord Elgin in October, 19C7. ‘
It vas headed by Sir William Smith, Chief Justice of the Transvaal, 
and although the other tvo members o f  the court, B. C. ^hepstone, 
brother of s ir  Theophilus, and J. C. Boshoff ,a  Natal bora judge,
1See e.g. Speech by M. S. Evans reported in Natal Advertiser. 1.8.06.
Editorials in Natal Heronry. 2.6.08 and 5.6.08. Sim. Natal Witness.
3.6.08, 5.6.08.
Nathan MSS 371, p .115, Elgin to Nathan, 14.2.08.
^Born 1857 Wittebergen Native Reserve, Hershel District Cape Colony; 
son of a German missionary; educated U.C.T. Cambridge end London, 
Advocate of Cape Supreme Crt, Attorney General In Rhodes's 1893 
ministry;' P.M. 1898-1900. One of four Senators representing African 
interests in the Union Senate. See B. A. Walker, W. P. Ephreineg.
A South African (O.U.P. 1937).
A
Stuart, 2.R .. p .465. Walkert Sohnlner. p .278.
^See Cd 3888, Elgin to Nathan, 14.10.07 end Memorandum, Hopvood to Elgin 
in Confidential Printa African (south) no. 867 Secret. This advice
vere objected to by the defence end vere not particularly idee
ehoioee,1 there ie  no doubt that vhen be ereataalfcr appeared before
the Special Court Dinusulu received a fair and Impartial tr ia l by
a ll standards* That ha vaa found guilty on only two and a half of
the tventy three oounta of his final indictment (the murder charges
vere dropped) vaa undoubtedly the result of Imperial intervention*
Before hearing the Dinusulu case, the Special Court heard md sen-
2tenoed the oases of Cakijana, Hangati md Kjombolvana.
After Dinusulu had been tried, his tvo induna* Hgvago md 
Hsnkuijniaaa. vere tried on the charges Dinusulu vas fbund guilty 
o f , md sentenced to minor terms of imprisonment md fines* The 
judicia l proceedings against Dinusulu, md against the various 
captured rebel "ring-leaders" md murderers, in 1906-9 throv an 
interesting light on the nature o f these proceedings in a racially 
divided society* For the historian the numerous allegations md 
counter-allegations by defenoe and prosecution against one m other's 
methods of procuring evidence, tend la the md to Invalidate 
almost a ll evidence qua evidence. Its ohief use is  not to i l ­
luminate the course of events In the past so much as the interests
vas repeated in Elgin to Nathan, 14*2.08 (Nathan MSS 371, pp. 112-3) 
having been echoed in The Times of that date.
£ee e.g. The Dinuzulu special Court by F. 5. Colenso (pamphlet) 
1908. Walkert Schreiner, pp. 287-9. H. C. Shepstone had been 
one of the Transvaal npresentatlves on the memorable Boundary 
Commission of 1878 vhich led Cetshvayo to identify the Shepstonee 
vith his enemies.
2jee «iakc»4e, Jhapter VI,p.-41s - 4a<=\
and rivalries in the present* The d ifficu lties  in the way 
of interpretation are enormous. The fir s t  consideration is  
tlxfc almost a ll the evidence was in itia lly  given in lulu and 
translated by men who were not neoessarily very competent lin ­
guists. In his evidence before the fatal Native Affairs Commission, 
the magistrate of Umvoti division, J. *• Cross, who was himself 
to aot as interpreter for the bpeoial Court, remarked that de­
fective translations at preliminary examinations frequently led 
to in justice. Evidence was discredited in the Higher Court be­
cause " it  was found th a t... .  .statements at the trial differed 
from what was contained in •••• depositions at the preliminary 
enquiry, whereas the witness had told the same story in both 
courts.1,1 This may well account for different versions often 
quite contradictory, given before the magistrate, at the Preliminary 
Examination and in the different cases before the Special Court. 
%uite apart from defeotive translations, however, in the case of 
the Dinuzulu enquiries, there may have been different reasons for 
the many variants of the same man's evidence* In the case of 
Cakijana, for example, one of the main witnesses against Dinuzulu, 
there are at least five versions given under differeing eiroum-
^N.N.A.C. Eyid. p .635.
stances -  and they do not a ll tally even on very material issues.**
It vas only before the Special Court and so long ae W* P. Schreiner 
acted ae defence and Sir William Smith was Judge President, that 
witnesses were subjected to any searching cross-examination, and 
the inconsistencies in their evidence drawn out* During the Pre­
liminary Examination according to the defence -  and this vould 
seem to be borne out by the collapse of the Prosecution case in 
the Special Court -  long typed statements of many pages were read
out to witnesses by the Crown Prosecutor* When they gave signs of
2disapproval or dissent, they were told to Tula" and wait until
the entire statement had been read through* In this way many
xcorrections material to the defence had been lost*
The circumstances under which an individual gave his in itia l 
deposition to the police or magistrate differed materially also 
from both the circumstances of the Preliminary Examination and 
those of the Special Court* Host of these depositions were gathered 
in Eululand whilst Martial Law was in force* Indeed it  vas admitted 
quite openly by the government that Martial Law was retained so that
■^ Por Cakijana*s part in the disturbances, see above, Chapter ^ ANri 
pp.T.M^and below, Chapter '35 , p. 4  ft.
^"Shat up"* 
x
Natal Witness* 3*4.08. Report of Dinusulu*s Appeal to the Latal
Supreme Court against R. Bennet*
■
that this evidence could be gathered, to arrest criminals 
and search for guns. Thus although there was no state of var 
or rebellion in Zululand, Martial (Law was maintained there for 
eight months, "pending the completion of the case for the Pro­
secution at the Preliminary Examinetion".^' The constant pleas 
of the Governor and the Secretary for State that Martial
vas totally  unjustified and unjustifiable were ignored by the
2Natal government. It was equally convinced that the ends of
justice would be defeated i f  Dinuzulu1 s defence counsel were
3 nallowed into Zululand to "tamper" vith their witnesses. ^ven 
when the defence teams vere eventually allowed into Zululand,
4they were constantly followed by police spies. There were fre­
quent allegations on the part of the government that the defence 
was "interfering" with its  witnesses, and Harriett© Colenso was 
a special object of suspicion. At one point, through ministerial 
injunction, she waa forbidden to act as translator for Saauelson 
and Renaud in their v is its  to Dinuzulu. The Minister of Justice
Nathan MSS 368, p. 131# Nathan to Selbome, 18.7.08.
2e.g. 00 179/246/28960, Oot. to See. St. 18.7.08. C4 3888, Ho. 100, 
o6C• St. to Cov. 27*12,07•
of. Stuart, Z,R, . p,466,
A^GC 1/7/63# B, Colenbrander, nagis, Rhandla to V, S, Blgby.
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alleged she was likely  to defeat the ends of juetlee and was
totally  unsuitable to see the prisoner except in the presence
of a member of the police force or some other o ffic ia l who
understood Zulu**
Despite -  or perhaps because of -  the maintenance of
Martial Law, the government found i t  d ifficu lt  to get people to
give evidence* This they fe lt  was yet further evidence of the
"enormous influence" Dinusulu had over the minds of his f t l lo v
2Zulu, even when in captivity. The evident conetraint of pro­
secution witnesses and the contradictions in their stories 
vere also attributed to this cause* In part this was undoubtedly 
true* To betray tho. Xing in times past would have meant death. 
There may hovever have been other reasons* Qolte apart ffcom 
whether their stories were true or not, witnesses giving widenoe 
against their King, could be expected to feel a osrtain amount 
of guilt and disloyalty. Their motives for giving evidence in 
the f ir s t  place may hot have/been disinterested. I t  vas therefor# 
far easier to do this before a magistrate and black policemen 
and induna eager for this information to be given, than to do i t  
in Dinusulu1 s presence* Moreover the government's d ifficu lty  vas
*Latal Witness* 14.5.08, Report of Appeal before Supreme Court,
Natal against this injunction*
Jhe Trial of Dinusulu * p. 10* Address of Attorney General, Stuart, 
ZR, P.464.
2
not simply ths result of Dinusulu1 s power* Ia the fir s t  instance 
the reason was its  osa grievous unpopularity with the Zulu people* 
fo r  many silenoe must have been the one way they had of shoving 
h ostility  end "passive resistance" to a government they had l i t t l e  
reaeon to love end suoh cause to fear*
Tet many witnesses were found* After aB, great as Dinusulu1# 
power over the minds o f his followers ney have been, the power of 
the authorities, so recently shown during the disturbances, was 
far far greater* The faot that there was Martial Lew in Zululand 
was of wonutas importance* I t  did not matter whether or not there 
were glaring sots of in justice under i t f 1 the fears which It aroused 
may sell hare induced people to talk -  aad indeed to say whatever 
the person vho was noting down the deposition seated* There vere 
numerous examples o f depositions unfavourable to Dinuaulu being 
modified before the Preliminary Examination or even before the 
Speoial Court Judges in very material ways* This may be accounted 
for by tho faot that people vere afraid to t o l l  tho truth in front 
of Dinusulu. On the other hand, during the Preliminary Examination 
witnesses vere not allowed to look at the Chief, hut eat facing 
three magistrates f generally one of these magistrates was involved
*?or sets o f brutality under Martial Law see above, Chapter ¥• 
end CO 179/251/34191# Bnal. H. S. Coleneo to f .  E* Colenso, 15.5.08, 
CO 179/251A998, Encl. f* E. Coleneo to Sir f .  Hopwood, 1.6*03.
CO 179/246/29939# fed *  7 in deep* Seer* 25*7.08, Copy of proceedings 
v* Haboko at Hongoma, 31.12.07.
In the original noting down of thair depositions. Thera is
l i t t la  doubt that witnesses ware frequently bullied into making
thair original depositions and the tactics used vara not <. f
2tha most savoury. As tha Natal Witness of 5*3*09 remarked, 
i t  is  an unpleasant reflection upon tha oase that out of twenty-
1
1Sea Natal Witness, 3*4.08, R. C. Saauelson's affidavit in Dinusulu 
T. T. R# Bennet.
2Cf. V. P. Schreiner's vievs, cited in S. A. Walker: Schreiner. p*295* 
In the nature o f the oase this is  d ifficu lt  to document from the 
Prosecution side, but of this letter from J. P. Hedges employed 
to get evitanoe from Africans together vith ViiUam Calverley, 
a Zululand storekeeper and member of the Intelligence In 1906:
”1 had a wire from Calverley urging me to oome at 
once as things arc right as he puts i t .  I take i t  
the result of our combined labours vith c/ak±janj7 
are bearing good fru it and I consider i t  d—d hard 
that I should not share in some of the pleasures of 
eating i t .  There may be many reasons for ay being 
knee-haltered at this place, but I reckon they weigh 
as nothing compared vith the issues at stake in the 
Dinusulu business. It is  not for ae to talk about 
i t  aad I don't think ay good l i t t le  ohief would under­
stand i f  I tried to explain. Calverley would not vire
me for no tiling and I am anxious to oome in at the death 
hating had nothing much more than the preliminary dirty 
work to oontend w ith ..•"
AOO 1.7*62. J. P. Hedges to W. S. Bigby, 
5*5*08, Senior member, Prosecution.
While several witnesses fo r  the defence maintained they had been brow­
beaten into making false statements this evidence also has of course 
to be treated vith great caution. I have therefore only given direct
references to those witnesses (and not a ll of them) vho have stuck to
this statement in court. The most striking example illustrating 
Prosecution tactics vas that of Kjoabolvana cited in Chapter YI 
above.
three counts of one of the more formidable Indictments with 
uhioh a prisoner vas erer confronted twenty should hare fa iled ." 
According to one Mbarulama he did not give the same evidence at 
the Nkandla magistracy aa before the Preliminary Examination 
because "ve vere not allowed to make our statements ve vere told 
certain things md told to admit them".1 Another, Sis 11a, maintained 
that
"ve vere kept at Nkandhla for six months surrounded 
by witnesses and they vere trying to oonpel us to 
say something ve kaev nothing about. They vented us 
to te ll  lie s . Hashl md Lukulwent.. . .  used to come 
vith their people as vltnesses."2
le t  mother stated that the magistrate's clerk at Ikandla did 
not conduct the eaquiry properly, "He brought witnesses against 
us vhom ve vere disputing with".** Three other witnesses vho vere 
actually tried md found guilty of perjury during the tria l for 
maintaining that their erldenoe before the Preliminary Examination 
vas incorrect, maintained that they had been told by their interro­
gator that they would "k ill themselves" i f  they did m t admit that
A
they vere at the Usuthu. In yet mother instance, one of the
of la -U l. 14.5.08, Col. Co. 99 ( i l l ) ,  pp. 56-7*
2T1b. «  of 12. 2.08.
Sri done. KLoaymi.
tfita— . 18.11.08.
vhite detectives, W illie Calverlqr • engaged cm gathering
evidence fo r  the prosecntlon, vaa charged vith assaulting one
of the witnesses. Found guilty of "an indiscretion" he vas d ie-
charged vith a caution.1
The fear generated toy the vhite Magistrate aust in aany
cases have equally i f  i t  did not surpass that roused toy Dinusulu.
One vltnees, fined for perjury during the Preliminary Examination,
vas reported toy R. C. Samuel son to hare saidt
"I have spoken, tout I am not of good hearing. I 
cannot contradict your worship • • • I do not wish 
to trouble the magistrate . . .  The magistrate gave 
me a l i s t  o f names only / o f  the rebels at the Usuth^ 
and I followed him. I f  the magistrate vants me to say 
anything I w ill say i t .  I do not vent to trouble the 
magistrate. So one should trouble the magistrate."?
Hone o f th is perhaps amounts to very much, tout i t  does east
considerable doubts on the valid ity  o f the evidence. Quite apart
froa those eases vhsre evidence vaa gathered vith d ifficu lty , i f
not actually "planted" on a witness, there vere other eases vhere
simply the inducement to incriminate Dinusulu and so lessen one's
ovn possible sentence, vas enormous. Thus Stuart's contention that
Cakijana, Kangati, Rolela, Maya tana, and others a ll give their
3evidence "voluntarily" is  besides the point. Cakijana, Kayatana
1 wNatal ^itneas, 21.11.08. Por further evidence o f ths methods used 
see Col. Col. 98 and 99* Recognitions Samuel son and Renand, The 
Trial of Dinusulu aad 400 1/7/56 and 1/7/62. Correspondence betveen 
Magistrates and mea&ers o f the Prosecution team.
2Natal Witness. 3.4.06. A ffidavit in Dinusulu vs. T.R.Bennet.
3Z»R.. p .466.
and Rolela a ll had murder tr ia l a hanging orer their heads in 
additbn to tria le  fo r  rebellion* Daring Dinusulu' b tr ia l vritten 
evidence vaa produced shoving that Cakijana had been promised 
that the surder charges against him vould be dropped provided he 
gave evidence satisfactory to the Crown.1 It is  significant that 
Hangati, whose original deposition at the Xkandla Magistracy vas 
very damaging to Dinusulu, toned i t  down very oonsidarably before 
the Preliminary Examination and the Special Court Judge*2 The
other voluntary witness, Stuart mentions by name -  Kgunguluso -
one magistrate
vaa a police spyj In oertain areas, according to at least I t
vaa child*a play” to eolleot evidsnca against Dinusulu. Thus
defending himself against the censure o f the Attorney General
fo r  not having forwarded mors evidence, C. F. Hlgnett statedt
NTou w ill notice that the hulk of the evidence already 
led haa been because the giver 'had a reason' -  hatred, 
tear or to save hia own hide I f  possible* • • In such 
pl&eoa aa Hkandhla i t  ia ch ild 's play to co lle ct evi­
dence, as almost every tribe is  sp lit as a result of 
the rebellion  and many give useful evidence through 
being animated by a sp irit o f resentment, or, es is  
common to the la tlve , vith the objeot o f 'favours to 
come' together vith the hope o f paying o ff  an odd score 
or tvo *"3
The way In vhich thia operated In the aoeusationa made by rebels 
against the other loyal chiefs haa been t raced in the previous
Mat si witness* 18*12*08*
2See Natal Witness* 7*1*09, Cross-examined by Renaud and oo spare Times of 
Ratal* 31.1*08.
3100 1/7/62, 3.3.08.
* »>' *
chapter. In Dinusulu1 e case i t  is  d ear also that the most 
damaging evidence vas given by people vith a "motive** of one 
kind or another. That of Daniels and Baabatha* s family has 
already been mentioned.1 Another very glaring example vas 
Kahayihayi. one of Dinusulu*s wives, vho had been accused of 
adultery vith the medicine man, Genoa, at the aid of 1906. Although 
ahe had been acquitted of this charge before the Magistrate's 
Court, she vas violently treated by the other women at the Usuthu 
and le ft  the kraal incensed against Dinusulu and his other vives. 
Both before the Magistrate and again at various tria ls  before 
the Special Court she gave evidence that Dinusulu was directly 
responsible fo r  Baabatha* a rebelling aa v e il aa fo r  the murder 
o f Hnqandi. She further maintained that ahe had overheard Dinusulu 
plan the mrders of the magistrate o f Hongoma and the C .I.A .2 
The im probabilities and ^ p oss ib ilities  in her eridenoe however 
vere glaring and it  vas rejected in toto by the Judge President 
o f the Special Court both in the tria l o f Dinusulu mid in the tria l 
o f Lokotvayo fo r  the murder of Hnqandi.^
^ e e  above,pp. 4-o .
2See Tinea o f Hatal. 10.2.08* fatal Witness. 16.4.09*
•jr
The Trial o f Dinusulu. The Judgement, pp. v i i i -x , end SC lU /l /8 ,  
Six v. Lokotvayo i The Judgement points out Hahaylhayi gave 
evidence o f conversations and transactions ahe could not have 
vitneaaed, having been confined at the time they vere supposed 
to have happened. They vere uncorroborated by anyone else.
Par more important however aad more Interesting than any 
o f the oases el ted above vas the evidence of Cakijana against 
Dinusulu. Cakijana i t  v i l l  be remembered vas the aaa whoa Dinu­
sulu waa supposed originally to have directed to join  Bambatha
when the la tter returned to Ratal after his f ir s t  v is it  to 2ulu-
whose
land in February ,1906, Cakijana;/ previous history reveals his
fr iction  vith whites -  he spied on the Boer s h  daring the Boer 
2War, unlike most o f Dinusulu*s other supporters and, in 1905#
was in gaol for cattle aalaing -  vaa under Chief Batata in ths Try-
xheld d is tr ic t . In Vatal he rapidly became Baabatha* s chief 
assistant, and together vith  Hangatl vas ths most prominent o f th* 
rebel leaders. He participated in a ll the major battles from 
the time o f Bambatha1 s attack an the Vegistrate at fe a ts 'e  D rift 
on the 3rd April, until the Battle o f Home Gorge, vhen he escaped 
into Zululand. Por nearly tvo years he vas a refugee in Zululand, 
spending time at tte Usuthu. After Dinusulu's arrest he took 
ones mors to the bush. Sventually, perhaps fearing arrest at the 
hands o f the m ilitary mad tria l under Martial lav in Zululand, ha 
fled  to Natal' and handed himself over to Harriet te Colenso at
^See above, Chapter Y, p .^ " 52*
2Col. Col. 98, Statements Samuel son, Svid. Cakijana.
3SHA 1/1/589^- , Minute, Inspector of Natal Folios, 20.1.08.
Bishop stove. Apparently Harrietts had constantly sent messages 
to Zululand in the hoper that they vould reach him and induce him 
to surrender -  she realised until he vas captured there vould be 
no chance of a general amnesty.1 She kept him and his companion,
Tobol a ka M sillkasl, a suspect in the attempted murder of Chief 
Hapoisa, at the house until ahe had recorded their statements
together vith R. C. Sean el eon end then drove them herself to an
2astonished Chief o f Polios.
Once arrested in Pietermartisburg, Cakijana and Tobela
vere immediately moved to Hkandla -  vhich vas under Martial Lav.**
Although six weeks later Harrietts Colenso and R. C. Samuelson
managed to obtain a Supreme Court injunction that the Chief of
Police show cause why Cakijana should not be returned to Pletermartim-
burg gaol, the prisoner then turned round and requested a govern-
4.
meat appointed lawyer for his defenoe. The Crown appointed
A. H. Hime, vho decided it  vas not in Cakijana1 s Interest to rc-
5turn to Pietermarirtsburg and he vas then moved to Kranfekop gaol.
1Col. Col. 14°, Tol. H I, Letter (copy) H. E. Colenso to Mias Vedgevood, 
5.4.08.
2Stuart,~p.465-4. Cd 5988 Extract no. 57, Gov. to Sec. St. 14.3.08.
5C0 179/245/16025, Oct. to 3m. St. 5.5.08.
^Natal Wltnaaa. 5.4.08, Report on application tgr C. 8. Senaud and 8. c . 
Samuelson and H. E. Colenso to Supreme Court 2.4.08 calling fo r  return 
of Cakijana to Central Qaol, Fmbg.
5CO 179/245/16, Oot. to Sm . S t., 9.5.08, no. 1. Cd 4194, no. 7,
Gov. to Sec. St. 2.5*06.
In an affidavit before the magistrate of Krariskop -  mho vas
presumably chosen by the government because -0x18 d istrict
though bordering on Zululand vas not under Martial Lav, Cakijana
maintained that tfxen he had given his statement to Samelson ha
had been instructed to deny the truth -  to shield Dinusulu and
to deny that he had bean to the Usuthu or received his instructions
there.1 He feared that he vaa going to ha used by Dinusulu*a
defence team "as soap” to vmah sway someone else*a ‘’ d irt". The
deposition made before the magistrate differed very considerably
2froa that made before Harrietts and Samelson.
Proa now on hia defence vaa to be very consistently that
5
he had acted throughout on the instructions o f Dinusulu* In 
a ll the oases that followed be turned State Witness -  at Dinusulu9 a
1iG0 l/T /68 , Bvid. Cakijana at Kraafekop, 20.5.08.
2Cd 4194, no. 7. Encl. in Gov. to Seo. S t., 2.5*06. Cakijana before 
B. Colenbrander and C. McKenzie. Of the statement o f XLonyoni ka 
Hbcso, Chief Zlnyongo to Hkandla magi s. 6.12.07 who stated that 
he had seen Cakijana at the Osuthu and that Cakijana said that 
"he himself vas disappointed in Dinusulu, that f t  vas Dinusulu vho 
had selected him ... to go to Satal and start the rebellion there 
aad now he, Dinusulu vaa afraid after a ll thia fighting and denied
having moything to do vith the rebellion* •• Cakijana even vent so 
far as to express hia disgust at Dlmsulm'a attitude toemrds tie
/an d /. • • said he had a mind to go to the authorities and te ll them 
about Dinusulu* a complicity In the late reb ellion ." Co 179/242/ 
1285, Enel. 1 in deep. Secret 22.12.07.
5See e.g . Hats! Mercury. 5*11.08, 6.11.08.
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Preliminary Kxarihation, at hia own tria l before tha Special Court 
in October, 1908, in Dinuaulu1a case before the Special Court, 
and in the tria l o f Xayatana and K Jiji £ Or the murder of Canoe., 
also before the Special Court, fo r  hia part in the rebellion 
he waa aentenoed by Sir William Smith to aeren years imprisonment 
with hard labour,1 in it s e lf  a reflection  on the different a tti­
tudes o f the Special Court Judges and the Court Martial judges of
2Tilonko, who was given ten years and deportation, for an offenoe 
which may well have been dismissed by the Specie! Court. That Cakijana 
waa informed in advance that he oould expect a mitigation of hia 
own sentence by turning State's witness and implicating Dinusulu 
is  d ea r. ^  Within two years he had been granted a pardon on 
licence aad waa working once more aa a government agent and spy.
4The folloving year -  1911 -  he was granted a complete pardon.
That his freedom had been held out to him es an inducement was 
clearly shown by W. P. Schreiner in the oourse of his oroaa- 
examination during Dinusulu's tr ia l. This of oourse does not nec­
essarily invalidate his evidence• Nevertheless there is  l i t t le
1Natal Witness. 11.11.08, Report of Judgement in Cakijana's case.
2See above, Chapter V, pp Chapter VI, p. 404-
A^flO 1/ 7/ 63, Letterbook, p .28. W. S. Bigby (Prosecutor) to 
B. Colenbrander, 15* 10.08.
4A00 1/ 7/ 58, Minute A.V. Leslie to Aotiac Ttodw>-3ec., Ministry of 
Justice, 29.3.1911.
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doubt that Cakijana was very shrewd and knew exactly how to
f i t  hia evidence to hia audience -  except perhaps In the case
of Sir V illian  Smith. He indeed completely dismissed Cakijana1a
plea that he had committed a ll hia treasonable actions aa well
as the murder o f Genoa, under compulsion from Dinusulut an
instruction from the Zulu king, according to Cakljana9 could only
be disobeyed on pain o f death. This defence vas used sim ilarly in
the murder tria ls of Hsolo and Kkipeni as well as that o f Kay at an a
who was tried for the murder of Gence1 and la ter that o f H. K.
Stainbank.2 While Sir William Smith however was to dismiss this
plea completely as both "unwarranted by lav and not supported by
the evidence" in Cakijana9s case, in the oases o f the other Birder
culprits, the Judge President of the Special Court in the later
oases, Judge Dove-Wiison of Hatal, was far less decided. According
to hia, the orders of Dinusulu vas the only motive shown, even
though i t  had not been proven that Dinusulu himself had Issued the
‘ 4orders personally.
Por the historian the problem is of course more d ifficu lt .
The judge can decide according to law. The historian has to try
S^C H l / l /8 ,  Rex v. Kay&tana and SC l l l /3 /S , Sex v. Kkipeni and 
Nzolo. Judge's summing up 8.4.09.
^Natal Witness. 20.6.12, 29.6.12, 3.7.12.
^Natal Witness. 11.11.08, Report of Judgement In Cakijana* s case.
*SC IU ./3/ 8, Rax v . Kkipeni and Hsolo, Judge's Summing Up. See also 
Hatal Witness. 2.4.09 for Rept.
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to reconstruct the past* Stuart solred the problem by simply 
using the evidence as i t  vas given in the depositions before 
the magistrates* Kiss Perrett in her thesis on Dinusulu's role in 
the Bambatha rebellion does the same thing* She does not appear 
to hare used the complete proceedings before the Preliminary Ex­
amination or the Special Court, or even tf* P* ^ohreiner's summing 
up for the defence.^ That she arrives at almost the same con­
clusions as the ^atal government is  therefore hardly surprising*
The evidence before the Special Court consisted o f 6,146 
fo lio  pages; i t  stood tvo foot high in the Colonial O ffioe -  
and as one o ffic ia l remarked "anybody vho reads through them v ill
be as v e il or as i l l  qualified to revise the Court' b decisionas
2he vas before he embarked on the enterprise''• Even reading through 
the nevspaper reports of the various tria ls is  a considerable task; 
a book could be vritten about the Dinusulu tr ia l alone* Despite 
the great bulk of the evidence accepted by the Speoial Court, the 
evidence rejected by i t  and not entered in the record, is  not there­
fore necessarily invalid aa h istorica l source materiel* Cakijana's 
evidence at hia ovn tr ia l that he aotsd under compulsion from Dinu­
zulu, vhile rejected on the grounds that i t  vould prejudice Dinusulu1 s
^Dinuzulu and the Baabata Rebellion, H.A* University o f Natal, 196D
(Unpubl.)
2C0 179/252/11628, Rlmit* Lambert 5.4.09.
trial may not have been proven -  but in the nature of things 
it eould not be unproven either. Stuart and Kiss Perrett can 
argue in favour of their oourse of action* that the version 
they follow which is found in the filee of the Attorney General 
and the Native Affairs Department, is the first version, and that 
by the time of the Special Court trials, people vould have had a 
chance to get cold feet and back out of their original depositions. 
Nevertheless, as has been indicated, little  confidence can be placed 
in the methods used to obtain the depositions In the first place, 
so that it  can equally be argued that in the freer atmosphere of 
the Special Court, witnesses may hare oome nearer the truth. In 
any erent, what is dear is that in a colonial society, lhere people 
hare very different concepts of justice and even more divided con­
cepts of loyalty, evidence produced has to be handled with the 
greatest amount of caution. Despite their impressive written form, 
the records of the trial are oral tradition with more than all the 
usual pitfalls! In what follows, all that can be attempted is to 
show the major lines of dispute between the two sides, ead to 
discuss the possibilities.
Ae the Judge President of the Supreme Court pointed out, the 
twenty three charges against Dinusulu can most conveniently be divided
*They do not appear however to realise the necessity for defending 
their choice!
into four groups; counts 4 to 8 and 11, 12, 13 and 13 concerned 
the visits of Bambatha and othar leading rebels to the Ueuthu 
during the disturbances, aa veil aa the harbouring of Bambatha*a 
family; counts 16-18 and 23 oonoemed tha harbouring of rebels 
at the Usuthu after the cessation of hostilities, while counts 1,
2 and 22 vere connected vith the collection of gins at tiie Usuthu.1 
The remaining counts dealt vith various isolated acta.
Of tha first group, clearly the moat important dealt with 
Bambatha'a visit to the Usuthu in March, 1906. The government 
charge, based on the evidence of Bambatha'a wife, Siyekiwe, and 
her two children, waa that at the time of Bambatha'a defiance of 
the Oreytovn magistrate, Dinuaulu seeing a "fit tool" for his plana
2of rebellion sent one Nqgeqgengge, hia mat carrier, to fetch Bambatha.
On his arrival, Dinuaulu vaa said to here accused Bambatha of 
cowardice for not fighting tha police sent against him cm tha 9th 
February and fleeing to Zululand. The folloving night, in the pre­
sence of B&mb&tha1 a wife and children, Mankulumana waa said to hara 
given Bambatha a gun and cartridges and instructed him to return to 
Natal together with Mqgenqgangge aad Cakijana (generally referred
1The Trial of Dinuaulu on Charges of High Treason. 1908-9, The Judgement 
pp. i-v iii.
The '-Trial of Dinuzulu. . . .  Address of Attorney General, p.12; also 
Stuart, ^.R.. p.166.
2
to at the Usuthu as Sukabakuluma) and start an uprising. Ha
promised him future support. At the same time he was allowed to
leave his wife aad children at the Usuthu fo r  protection and proof
o f Dinuzulu's support.
This story o f Dinuzulu actually inoiting Bambatha to rebel vaa
dismissed by Sir Villiam Smith as most improbable1 and based on
highly questionable evidence -  for there vere major inconsistencies
not only in the stories told by Siyekiwe and her children between
themselves, but also in the stories told by Ndabayake and Holekile
2to the magistrates and then before the Special Court. Nevertheless 
i t  must be further examined, i f  only because it  is repeated as fact 
by Stuart, vho vas responsible fo r  taking down the evidence from 
Bambatha's family after their escape to the magistracy in July 1907.
Dinuzulu's own story vas rather d ifferent. He maintained 
that Bambatha had oome to the Usuthu in March, looking fo r  a place 
to liv e , l i f e  having become impossible on the private farm in the 
Umvoti division vhere his tribe was. Not having miy room, hovever, 
he told Bambatha to return to Ratal, at the same time sending a 
message to Sigananda, instructing him to afford protection to 
Bambatha, should he pass that way. Aa Bambatha'a wife vas pregnant
^Sir Villiam Smith indeed vent so far as to state " I f  under the c ir ­
cumstances I find to have existed in this case, the prisoner did ineite 
him to rebel, I should be inclined to say that he deserves to be 
acquitted on the ground o f insanity. As i t  is , I think he is  entitled to > 
be acquitted upon the fa cta ." jflie Trial of Dinusulu, The Judgement, 
pp. x ii, x i i i .  I t  is  clear hovever that the E&tal Judge* J* C. Boshcff 
vas far less certain and though he reluctantly concurred in Sir Villiam
Smith's acquittal on Count 4 * . La oi .. im t he vaa far from satisfied .
H. C. Shape tone fu lly  concurred in the judgement. The Trial of
and in no f i t  state to travel, Dinuzulu agreed that die and the
children should stay in ttie hut o f his wife Cka Havele to whom
they were related, ^t the same time he took the opportunity of
sending Nqgenqgenqge to Natal to find a doctor, Simit  ^ vhcm Bambatha
had recommended, as he vas i l l .  Nqgenqgenqge was instructed to
find another messenger at Gesindaka's hut to accompany him to Natal,
as it  vas customary for two messengers to be sent on an errand.1
On the face of i t ,  this seems a far more lik e ly  story)
both Nqgenqgenqge and Cakijana maintained that tiiey had gone to find
a doctor fo r  Dinusulu, and, in fa ct, Nqgenqgenqge returned as soon
as the fighting broke out, with another doctor, as he did not want
2to become Involved in the rebellion. Cakijana's evidence though, 
as has already been noted more than once, extremely d ifficu lt  to bend).#, 
vas, that he was at his father's hut quite by chance, having just 
returned from a spell of work on the Hand when Bambatha came there 
to find another messenger.'* As the Judge President remarked,
Dinusulu. The Judgement, pp. xx-xxi.
2Ibid. . p . i i i .
•^Stuart, Z.R .. pp. 166-7» 435-4•
1SC H l /3/ 7 , Notes of Evidence, Hex. v. Dinusulu, vol. 7f Kvid.
Dinusulu. Col. Col. 172, Notes taken from Dinusulu about Bambatha 
by H. E. Colenso, 13«11*08.
2C0 179/244/3062, Oonf. A. in desp. Secret 5*1.08, evld. Nqgenqgenqge 
before Magis. Nkandla.
^Trial o f Dinuzulu, Judge's Stemming Up, p .iv .
on small details like th is, there vould be no reason for Caki­
jana to be te llin g  a falsehood.* Moreover, in several versions 
o f his evidence he maintained that he cnly became involved in
the fighting when Bambatha discovered that Magwababa had been
2appointed Chief in his place.
There was a further weakness in the Prosecution argument 
that Dinuzulu had deliberately sent for Bambatha -  several wit­
nesses vere produced who had shown Bambatha the way to the Usuthu 
kraal, s o m e t h i n g  which would hardly have been necessary had they 
been accompanied by an a gent o f  Dinuzulu.
Be this as it  may, there is  considerable foroe in Hiss 
Perrett's argument that while Dinuzulu may not have sent for 
Bambatha, once Bambatha arrived at the Usuthu he told Dinusulu 
o f his plans for an uprising, and asked for his support; she fee ls  
that Dinuzulu in fact promised him support, hoping to use the re­
bellion  for his own ends while maintaining a "loyal" front fbr 
government purposes. She maintains that Dinuzulu9s failure to 
admit to Sir Charles Saunders, who visited the Usuthu shortly after 
Bambatha1 s return to Natal, that Bambatha had been at the Usuthu
*The Trial of Dinuzulu. The Judgement, pp. iv -v .
2 -  See above, Chapter V, p .3 3 ^ -5
*The Trial o f Dinuzulu. Summing Up by ¥. P. Schreiner, pp. 60-2!
j
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and had le ft  his family there, was not the action o f an "innocent"
man.1 Dinuzulu* s own account of h is failure to speak out to
Sir Charles Saunders was that haring beard about Bambatha* s attack
on the police at Impansa he was afraid, lest he be associated with
the rebellion. Moreover he had failed to report Bambatha* s presence
in the f ir s t  place, because he had arrived without a pass and he
feared Bambatha would get into trouble wilh the magistrate. All
thia is  possible. Al farther excuse used was that Bambatha was
always referred to by the Usuthu as Karadusela -  which may in itia lly
2hare accounted for some confusion as to whom was being talked about. 
This last excuse does not really sound very plausible. It seems 
far more lik e ly  that Bambatha told Dinusulu of his troubles with 
his own magistrate, and the likelihood there was of his being 
arrested, and that Dinusulu, with the examples of Natal*s handling 
o f other recalcitrant ohiefs in February and March, 1906, very 
vivid ly  before him, decided not to hand Bambatha over to the govern­
ment1 s not so tender mercies. I t  is  not necessary to in fer from
%
this that Bambatha at this stage announoed any intention of starting 
an uprising in Natal -  although he may have done so, again without 
Dinuzulu necessarily committing himself. In general, Dinusulu*e
*1. Perrett, Dinuzulu and the Bambata Rebellion, pp. 76-79.
SC H l /3/ 7 , Notes of Evidence, Rex v. Dinusulu, vol. 7. Evidence 
Ndabankulu cross-examined T. P. Carter, 13.2.09. Sim. also End. 
Givedja, p .5619. Col. Col. 172, Notea taken from Dinusulu about 
Bambatha by H. E. Colenso, 13.11.08. Also Natal Witness. Evid. 
Kaliba, 9.1.09.
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utterances at this time seem to show fu lly  that he realised the
fo lly  of opposing the white man by foroe of arms.* Indeed the
very Sigananda whom he was supposed to hare incited to rebel chided
Dinuaulu for cowardice for refusing to do so, and fo r  haring paid 
2the Poll Tax. I f  one does conclude that Dinusulu knew of Bam- 
bath a1 s intentions aid failed to try to prevent hia feom rebelling 
fo r  his own p o litica l purposes, one implies a cynicism and dis­
regard of human l i f e  on his part, which do not seem to be borne out 
by his other actions. Moreover had he known o f Bambatha*8 plans 
beforehand, i t  seems odd that he should have allowed hb family 
to remain at the Usuthu where they would bring down suspicion on 
h is head -  and indeed Nqgenqgenqge said that when he brought back 
the news of Bambatha*s attack on the police, Dinusulu immediately 
tried to send Siyekiwe and the children to Cakijana* 3 father,
Uesindaka, who, however, refused to take thea.^ To have sent two 
men from the Usuthu with Bambatha was also a foolhardy act i f  he 
intended using Bambatha as his instrument.
All three members of Bambatha*s family maintained that Bambatha 
le f t  the Usuthu with a gun md cartridges wrapped in a white rag§
Cn the other hand the account whereby Bambatha came into possession
^Cf "The Present Situation in ^outh A frica", Report by Director Hmas 
in Bmpangweni and Missionary C. W. Dedekind in Nasareth. Hermann sburg 
Kissionsblatt. no. 5» 1906*. "I aa in the position of relating a word 
of him. I can vouch fo r . A Christian African asked him /Dinusulu/ 
whether he has been gathering a ll the Blacks In order to wage war 
on the Whites. Whereupon Dinusulu has answered 4Not very lik e ly ; 
they would exile me to St. Helena and you would stay hare aad 
fs'A  yourselves with beer.*1
See above. Chapter T, p. svi
o f the gun at the Usuthu varied as between the evidence of Siye- 
kJLwe and her children, although they were supposed to be together 
at the time; and their description of the cartridges vas also 
inconsistent* Dinusulu himself maintained that Nqgenqgenqge re­
ported back to him that Bambatha said that he had been given a 
gun at the Usuthu, but that he thought that the guns had been 
acquired at Gesindaka's*1 All the evidence on this score was
too unreliable to prove that Bambatha had been given a gun on
2Dinuzulu's authority; i t  is  oonceivable that be had in feet 
brought his own gun to the Usuthu which was the one seen by 
the children and Nqgenqgenqge, and used against the magistrate and 
police at Keate's Drift and Impansa* On both those occasions 
more firearms were captured tay the rebels*
Cotint thirteen of Dinuzulu's charge sheet alleged that be­
tveen March and May he conspired with Sigananda, Cakijana, Mangati, 
Bambatha, and Mehlokazulu and Incited them to rebellion, and this 
charge has to be considered together with the charges tbfc he haiv 
boured various rebels during the course o f  the disturbances, in­
cluding Mangati, Cakijana and Bambatha* Dinuzulu's message to 
Sigananda ^ instructing him to "look out" for  Baabatha has already
3co 179/244/3062. Conf. A. in desp. Secret, 5.1.08.
^See Reports, Natal Witness. 27*11.08, 1.12.08.
2rhe Trial of Dinuzulu. The Judgement, pp. v i f f .
Natal Witness, 9.1.09. Evid. Maliba, see above Chapter ^  , p. *4-*•3
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been noted, as well as the different interpretations put upon
it  by the government and the defence* To the Judge President of
the Special Court at any rate, the refusal of the Cube people to
allow Dinuzulu's envoy to see Sigananda when he went on his errand
of peace-making was only explicable in terms of their knowledge
that Mankulumana was against the rebellion and would chide them
for using Dinuzulu's name In their rebellion.1
The government however maintained either that Mankulumana
carried also some secret message which warned Sigananda to keep
out of the way, or that one of the three men accompanying him did 
2the same. The Special Court did not, however, acoept this> contra­
dicted as it  was by both Mankulumana himself, Lusizi (one o f  
Dinuzulu's men vho accompanied him, and later vas witness for the 
Prosecution),'5 and indeed by Sir Charles Saunders who was very 
grateful to Mankulumana at the time for dampening don  the rebellion* 
The v is its  of a number of the rebel leaders to find out Dinu­
zulu's intentions during the disturbances are rather better authen­
ticated. The problem here however is s t i l l  to decide on what hap­
pened at their various interviews. The fir s t  of these v isitors was
^The Trial of Dinuzulu. The Judgement, p .v i i i .
2I . Perrett, pp. 105-106.
^The Trial of Dinuzulu. The Judgement, p .v i i i .
Cakijana who apparently returned to the Usuthu shortly after the
Impanza fight to find out whether Dinuzulu's aid was going to
materialise. Cakijana reported hack that he had not found the
doctor, and that fighting had broken cut in Natal. Acoording to
Cakijana, Dinusulu* s in it ia l response waa one of anger that he
had remained behind in Natal and not returned to Nqgenqgenqge.^
After being questioned by Mankulumana though, he reported what
2had happened in Natal, and was finally  promised future aid.
He stayed at the Usuthu for two nights, and was given food and 
drink. Dinuzulu admitted that he saw Cakijana but maintained 
that he simply reprimanded him for not returning to Usuthu im­
mediately fighting broke out in Natal. It is not clear why Dinu­
zulu should have been angry i f  he had been behind Bambatha all 
the time -  after a ll, the rebels had been successful so far in 
their encounters with the magistrate and the police and had aug­
mented their gun supply.^ 'The length of Cakijana's stay was not 
corroborated by anyone with "the exception of Mahayihayi, Dinuzulu' s 
wife, whose unreliability has already been commented upon. Caki- 
jana's stay at the Usuthu may also possibly be explained by his 
relationship to one of Dinusulu's wives, Oka Maweli.^
^Natal Witness. 7*11*06, Evidence Cakijana, and 16.12.08, cross-
examined by Schreiner.
2 Ibid.
''The Trial of Dlnuaalu. pp. T ii-T lil. B». point v u  a id . by W illi*.
Smith.
4sn&. K m i, »atal W jtn .... 6.1.09.
Shortly after the burning of Cetshwayo's grave by the
troops, Dinuzulu was visited by a couple of members of Sigar-
nanda's tribe, who came to report the episode to him. Not
surprisingly, Dinuzulu made no effort to hand them ever to the
government as rebels.1 More important, however, was the v is it
of Mangati and Bambatha together with two others, also soon
after the burning of the grave. By this time Mangati had joined
Bambatha and Cakijana as one of the most important rebel leaders.
^tuart maintains that on this occasion, Bambatha and Mangati vere
both shown into Dinuzulu* s presence, and the Chief told them
"If you people want to fight, do so. It is  not my
doing. Go and join  Mehlokazulu. I hear ha has also
joined the rebels. After joining him, go and Join 
Sigananda and go on fighting until yon reach Natal
. . .  I te ll you now go and join Mehlokazulu and do 
what he te lls  you."3
While i t  is  perfectly true that this represents tha fir s t  version 
o f Mangati's evidence given before the magistrate o f Nkandla after 
his capture at the end of November, in his evidence both at Dinu­
zulu'*  Preliminary Examination and again before the Special Court, ha
3withdrew the seoond part o f i t .  There he stated that Dim Zulu's
reaction was one of extreme anger that the rebels should have made
A^GO l/7 /53t Dinusulu to Harriette Colenso, 2.6.06.
2Z.R.. pp. 313-4. s . .  also Encl. 2 la desp. Secret 22.12.07, CO 179/ 
242/4288, aad Encl. 1 la deap. Seoret CO 179/242/2162, 28.12.07.
See amendments made in gaol to Statements by Mangati, Times of Natal. 
31.1.08; Natal aitness. 7.1.09.
3
use o f h is name aad triad to implicate him ia their uprising.
Vhen Mangati asked him share the impi they had baan promised by
him was, Dinuzulu denied a ll knowledge of the impi, and pointed 
out that the Zulu War, which took place when his people had been 
far stronger and more united, had revealed the uselessness of 
this method of opposition to the idiite man. Dinuzulu ordered them 
from the Usuthu, but they begged to be allowed to stay as they 
were weary and had no horses. Finally this was allowed.1 As 
the Judge President pointed out in his summing up, a curious 
feature of Mangati's evidence was that though Bambatha was present 
at this interview, and a prime object of Mangati' s was to find out
whether Bambatha's allegations that the impi vas Dinuzulu's was
2true, Bambatha made no contribution to the conversation. His 
only comments were that Sigananda had destroyed their impi through 
bad generalship. While the Judge President fe lt  that this threw 
doubt on Mangati's other evidence, i t  oan be argued tnat i f  Dinu­
sulu already knew about the disturbances, as Mangati's f ir s t  
evidence implied, there would be no need for Bambatha to defend 
his actions. Thus Stuart's view could be correct, aid i t  may
^ a ta l Witness. 7.1.09. Mangati, cross examined by C. Henaud.
2The Trial nf Mmmtii. p .ix .
3Ibid.
be that Mangati's words in the moment of bitterness when he 
was captured and when he fe lt  particularly angry at Dinuzulu1 s 
failure to support the rebels adequately were nearer the truth 
than his statement later, when he had time to reconsider the 
implications of his attack on the Chief .. That he had l i t t l e  
time for Dinuzulu in November, 1907 was indicated by his remarks
"Dinuzulu is nothing but a drunkard. He is  ruining himself 9
1his family and his people by drinking grog.N Nevertheless, 
i t  may be that by the time of the Preliminary Examination, his 
patriotism and loyalty to Dinuzulu as king rather than as person, 
overcame his in itia l outspokenness. Even on that occasion however 
he remarked! ”My feelings against Dinuzulu are very strong because 
I consider I have been reduced to my present condition by Dinuzulu".
On the other hand, oven the words quoted by Stuart cannot 
be taken too far. It is  possible that the burning of Cetshwayo's 
grave- and the way in which it  was reported to him -  disinclined 
Dinuzulu to take a very firm line at that moment with the rebels; 
s t i l l  he dissociated himBelf from the rebellion, and his advioe 
that Bambatha and Hangati join  Mehlokasulu who was already known 
to be in the bush and fearful of the troop movements in his area,
■"Cd 3888, no. 95, Encl. 4. Statement Kangati, 23.11.07. Report also 
1x1 Times of Natal. 31.1.08. "Grog" is  probably a translation of 
"ugologo" which is  better rendered as ’•whiskey".
Tatal Witness. 7.1.09.
vas hardly m ilitary intelligence of the highest order, Bambatha
and Mangati had already Mjoined" Sigananda and indeed Dinuzulu
■ v ' r'’" * ~ ■ ''\
vaa really saying -  this is  all your own doing; join those vho 
have decided to rebel -  don't draw me into i t .  Mangati maintained 
at the Special Court that he knew when he le ft  the Usuthu that 
Dinuzulu was not behind the rebellion, although that did not deter 
him from rejoining the impi and telling them that they had Dinuzulu'■ 
backing."
There is l i t t l e  or no evidence that Meh lokasulu vas prompted 
into the oourse he took by secret messages from Dinuzulu. The d >
2cumstances surrounding his rebelling have been traced in some detail. 
At the time both the Commissioner for Native Affairs and the magis­
trate of Nqutu vere quite adamant that the rebels in that area did 
not associate the rebellion vith Dinuzulu, One report -  probably 
just hearsay -  was that Mehlokazulu refused to contact Dinuzulu 
though this course was suggested by the magistrate, vho hoped 
that Dinuzulu vould be able to deter him from rebelling. Mehlokazulu 
did not want to be a ccused yet again of bringing trouble on the 
Royal House as he had at the time of the Zulu War.
^Natal Witness, 7,1,09, Cross examined by Renaud,
2See above, Chapter V, pp 3 - ^ s - (=>,
■^CO 179/235/24596, Enel J. in desp. Seoret 121, 16.6.06 (Cd 3027*p*90),
4
Col. Col. 93, Hankulumana and Mgvaqo, Prosecution, p .83, Evid. 
Kag&disa ka Camela.
The remaining charges against Dinuzulu can perhaps be 
disposed of more easily. The allegations that he had collected 
firearms intending thereby to promate rebellion wae regarded 
as completely unproven by the Special Court. I t  certainly is 
true that Dinuzulu had a considerable number of guns at the TJsuthu, 
some o£ his own personal possession} others le ft  there by members 
of the Hkomindala after the Boer War.  ^ According to Ifce magis­
trate of Nongoma he had never been asked to giveup his guns at 
the end of the Boer War. Nevertheless there was no evidence at 
a ll that Dinuzulu actually contemplated using these guns against
the government, and the Special Court Judge was quite categorical
2upon this point. On the other hand, the charges of Dinuzulu’ s 
complicity in the Zululand murders of 1906-7 were not tried 
before the Special Court, and as the Judge President himself re­
marked, though evidence was led that -the gun which was supposed 
to have been used to k i l l  S itshitshili was found among the guns 
hidden by his attendant Lualzi at the time of Dinuzulu's arrest, 
i t  was not discussed. Similarly i t  was alleged that the gun which 
was used to k i l l  btainbank was also traced back to the Usuthu.^
h e  111/3/7, p. 5732 f f  et passTLm, e.g. Svid. Jjusizi.
2'"The Trial of Dinuzulu. The Judgement, p.xix.
I^dem.
S^C l i i / 3/ 7 , p. 5732 f f  et passim. Record o f Dinuzulu's tr ia l.
ykgain Sir William Smith maintained that there was no eridence
to show that Dinuzulu knew of its  presence at the Usuthu,1 It
certainly seems possible that in their searching out of guns the
troops found & number which did not belong to Dinuzulu personally
but were in the possession of various members o f his tribe,
and hidden at the same time* It vas however an allegation of
the Prosecution at the time of the fir s t  tr ia l fo r  Stainbank's
murder, that the weapon had come from the Usuthu and it  waa alleged
that Dinusulu had sent Hpeta to find the empty cartridges after
2the murder lest they incriminate him* On the other band, the 
man eventually tried  and found guilty for this murder, Kayatana,^ 
vas according to Dinuzulu, on bad terms vith him, aa he had stolen 
one of the Chief's guns and hides during his v is it  to Fietem artis- 
burg and vas later found hawking guns at the Usuthu, including
Athe stolen ones. On the face of i t ,  Sir William Smith's remark 
that had Dinuzufci known of its  existence, he would surely have seen
'S ria l of Dinusulu, p*
2C0 179/240/9666, Encl. In deep. Secret 1 o f 20.2.07, Attorney 
General (Natal) to Min* of Justice (Natal) Extract Cd 3999*
SNA 1/4/20 C.22* Report C. 6. Jaokson on Stainbank murder, 26*3*09*
3 09 v _  ^Kayatana admitted to having killed Gence but not Stainbank; i t  ia
possible that in the Stainbank tria l in 1912 31r Villiam Smith would
have assessed the eyidence rather differently* It is interesting that
Kayatana like Cakijana vas employed as a police spy in 19031 Kayatana
indeed vas used to try and track down Cakijana apparently -  and there
were reports that Cakijana was used to look for tha Stainbank murderer!
Svid. Htalalwm, Natal Witness. 7*4*09*
^Col* Col 98, Precognitions Renaud Rrid* Lokotvayo ka Zinibe* Col* Col* 
100, p .l* Notes by Dinusulu on Prosecution witnesses* Col* Col* 98
that the gun used for the S itsh itsh ili murder was destroyed 
between 3rd December when he was summoned to Nongoma and 9th 
December, when he eventually surrendered, seems to make very 
good sense. ^
Several counts in Dinuzulu*s indictment charged him with 
sheltering rebels after the rebellion with hostile intent. Un­
doubtedly, the number of rebels who sou^it shelter at the Usuthu 
after the cessation of h ostilities was large. The government inter­
preted this as a directly hostile action against the government, 
calculated to build up Dinuzulu*s power against that of 1he govern­
ment and with plans for further rebellion. Dinuzulu*s own ex­
planation, however, especially when taken together with his le tter
2to Harriett© Colenso cited below, deserve serious consideration. 
Prom his point of view, these were "his father*s dogs" whom he 
simply could not hand over for punishment and revenge.^ In granting 
sanctuary to "his father's people" Dinuzulu was clearly torn in two
98 Precognitions, Renaud. Sim. evidence Mevakonto ka Dulelu.
The defence oontention on this occasion was however again that the 
murder had been committed on Dinuzulu's order. Harriette Coleneo 
fe lt  the tria l was aimed at Dinuzulu throughout and shoved "what 
might have been at Oreytown bad Mr. Schreiner md Sir V. Smith 
not been there." Col. Col. 139* Vol. I I , Corresp. H. E. Colenso 
to Mr. Herold, R.N., 20.7.12. The tria l was reported in the Natal 
Witness, 20.6.1912, 29.6.1912 and 3.7.1912 and vas heard by J. C. 
Boshoff, T. R. Bennet and J. C. Chadwick.
1rhe Trial of Dinuzulu. The Judgement, p .xix .
2See p. ^°\o
^Dinuzulu, cross examined by T. F« Carter, Natal *itness. 30.1.09.
d ir e c t io n s ,  represented  in  fa c t  by opposing fa c t io n s  w ith in  h is
own entourage. From the evidence both b e fore  aad at h is  t r i a l ,
i t  would appear that i n i t i a l l y  his induna. and e s p e c ia l ly  Mankulunaaa,
t r ie d  th e ir  best to  d iscou rage peop le  from coming to the Usuthu,
la r g e ly  through th e ir  fe a r  o f  the consequences. S evera l witnesses
t e s t i f i e d  to  t h e ir  having been turned away by Mankulumana, who accused
them o f  endangering the C h ild . ^ ^ ^  p ressure became g re a te r ,
however, the p o l ic y  became more v a c i l la t in g ,  probably  in  response
to  those who f e l t  in  sympathy w ith the r e b e ls , and averse to simply
abandoning them. Thus sev era l w itnesses m aintained that there was
a profound s p l i t  between D in u zu lu 's  two o h ie f  induna. Mgwaqo and
Mankulumana, on th is  s co re . Some even m aintained that Mankulumana
was so d isgu sted  w ith what was going on at the Usuthu towards the
end o f  1907 that he wanted to le a v e . Kangata suggested he might
even be poison ed  because he was accused o f  s id in g  w ith the White 
2
Man. That th is  was c le a r ly  nonsense was shown by Mankulumana1 s 
q u ite  ou tstand ing  lo y a lt y  to  Dinuzulu both during h is  t r i a l  and 
subsequently , when, although i t  meant never re tu rn in g  to H atal, 
Mankulumana jo in e d  Dinuzulu in e x i le ,  and to the la s t  maintained 
h is  in n ocen ce . It may w e ll have been the p re ssu re  o f  those members
■^See e .g .  CO 179/241/3376, 2n d . 2 in  desp. Conf. 29.8.07, Beport no.3. 
CO 179/241/33248, End. 4 in deep. Seer. 27.9.07, Statement Mkoko- 
b i ka Oamdani to  C.N.A. CO 179/244/3062, End. in desp. Seer. 5.11.08, 
E vid. Mankokewana ka Bedja, also reported Times of Hatal. 24.1.08.
Also evid. Langalibomvu, Natal Witness. 6.1.09, Evid. Mazauwuzela, 
before C. McKenzie 11.4.08, reported Times of Natal. 13#5*08.
f  0 *>
of the Usuthu who had been restrained with d ifficu lty  during the 
actual disturbances as well as Dinuzulu's own very real conscious­
ness of what his responsibilities to his people were, that deter­
mined the attitude eventually taken up towards the rebels, although 
i t  was also said at the end of 1907 that many of Dinuzulu'a 
followers were bitter about the way in which the rebels had got 
their chief into trouble.
That Dinuzulu shouldhave fe lt  reluctant to hand over these 
people to the government is only too understandable in the light 
of the mood of revenge which permeated Natal society through 1907*
As late as Kay, 1907, death sentences were passed on seven of the 
nineteen Africans accused of participating in the murder of the 
postal o f f ic ia l  Veal, whose body had been used for purposes of 
doctoring for  war during the Mapumulo phase o f  the disturbances.**
No amnesty had been declared, and in that month, Harriette Colenso 
wrote a le tter -  which was to become notorious -  to Dinuzulu 
advising him to hand over the minor participants in the rebellion
but to advise the leading rebels to "take a long leap" out of
2Hululand i f  they wanted to be safe. While she attempted to put
x
an innocuous gloss on these words later, when the Natal government
1C0 179/241/18285, Coy. to Sec. S t., tel 1, 23.5.07. Winston Churchill 
called the sentences "further disgusting butchery".
2See Natal itnosa. 14.5.06, in which i t  is  cited as evidence in oase 
of H. E. Colenso vs. Attorney General.
Natal witness. 21.5*08, Report of above oase.
quoted them in an attempt to prove just what a dangerous woman 
she was, they probably meant what they said -  and A e vaa pro­
bably right. That Mangati and Cakijana in tha mid only got terms
of imprisonment -  and tsrma as abort aa they did -  is  only to ba
explained by the faot that they vere tried by Sir William Smith 
aad the Special Court, and not by an ordinary Natal court*
In Jtana, 1907 Dinuaulu waa to w its  "confidentially” to 
"his aunt" on the matter, a fter hia v is it  to tha Govern or bad led 
him to believe the net vaa dosing in on hint
"I f a parson should know of these people vho were
in A e bush; i f  he vere in a posit inn to eatoh
Aem, in A a t manner should ha bring Asm up in 
auoh a way as night bast serve them In order A at 
Aey should not be burnt up A  a fflic t io n ." !
These are not Aevorda o f a man harbouring rebels vith a set pur­
pose. There must moreover have seemed something odious to Dinuaulu
in noting aa Government informant md policeman. Aa Aa In ii proverb
2has i t  "A Chief ie  not a Policeman". Hankulumana stated it  sligh tly  
d iffsrm tly  when he remarked that he had always wanted a proper 
government enquiry into A e allegations against Dinusulu, beosuae 
ha did not vaat his Chiaf A  become "an informer" aad ao tarn a ll 
A a people against him."5 Dinusulu himself very neatly put it  when
1AG0 1/1/53, 22.5.01, tw nal. by 0. Oxland.
2H. Gluokman, o lt .d  In IitaW ) Poll t ie . •<« »  «o o l.t r .
p .46, footnote 23*
H^atal Witness. 4.2.09.
cross-examined at hla trial} ha stated that ha aaa fbllowing
tha Zulu custom of leaving a conquered people alons, In tha
hope that they would settle down md become tha people o f tha
chisf on whose land they had found refuge "It  was distasteful
fo r  aa to go catching peop le ... .  I should hare raised had feeling
1
amongst ay people"• While i t  Is true that this action can be 
construed -  as i t  Is by Hiss Perrett -  as sheer self-seeking, a 
p o litica l nanoeuYre on Dinusulu1 s part to build up his dwindling 
power -  Dinusulu himself was fu lly  aware o f the dangers he was 
running by following this course^ The o ffic ia l view lacks an 
appreciation of the degree to which a ohief was, and had to be,
influenced by the views of his tribe and the duties and obligations
2he owed then. Torn between his desire to avoid con flict with the 
gorernment and his desire to do his duty to his people, in the end 
Dinusulu was to get the want o f both worlds. On the one hand he 
was accused o f treason by the gore meant, on the other he was, to 
soae extent, accused o f betrayal by the rebels themselYes, who 
fe lt  that he had fa iled  them in 1906 and that he should hare lad a 
new uprising in 1907.^ The incompatibility o f the picture held
^a-U l W ltnw . 30.1.09.
2See aboYe, Chapters I end VI for a discussion of the smblYslant 
position of chiefs in fatal and Vatal government attitude to them.
See also K. Gluckaan, "The Kingdom of the Zulu", pp. 43-4 in 
African P olitica l Systems, ed. M. Fortes *nd£Bvana-Pritchard.
* Cjo
^Ses s.g.yStatsment Hlongeni ka Kbeso to Hkandhla magis. E ncl.l f e '2- °7  
in desp. Secret 22.12.07, * cited above, p. 4-^ 1 footnote z.
/  ■
by the African people o f Dinusulu lea Oetahvayo, eoion of Shake,
King of tha Zulu, mid father o f hia people, and tha attempt of
tha government to reduoa hia to a patty ohief tain, a servile
government "boy", moat, almost Inevitably hare lad Dinusulu in
the path ha took. It  ia not d ifficu lt  to aaa why hia actions In
these years betray Hamlet-like qualities o f indeoision,1 and that
on many oocaaions ha waa to taka refuge in procrastination and
excuses of illn ess that sore only half-feigned.
Bran bsfors the disturbances, the magistrate of Hongoma
vaa to note the odd quality of Dinusulu1 a actions -* hov on the one
hand ha vould render him extremely valuable aid oangdhg c*\t various
government instructions and lava
"and yet again I hare had reason to ba b itterly  dis­
appointed at hia apparent neglect or dllstorinses 
. . .  any such neglect haa been brought to the attention 
of the Oorcnimcnt, but haa not ao fa r  resulted in any 
investigation in .. .  vhich . . .  ba might have aatim- .  
fa ctorily  explained hia seaming neglect or apathy. *
Hare again, tha explanation seems to l ie  In tha con flictin g demands
mad# o f Dinusulu by Government and people, a con flict which the
la ta l Government, vith its  demands for absolute and im plicit obedience
vaa incapable o f recognising, 1st alone resolving.
^The phrase "Zulu Hamlet" is  Stuarts -  Z.R .. p .109.
^P.X.C. Q.V.Armstrong to C .I.A. Eshove, 6.4.07.
Behind Dinusulu's actions during Aa disturbances, the?, 
there la A la  same sp lit and undecided quality. I t  vaa therefore 
possible fo r  A e defence to contend A at had Dinuaulu thrown hia 
weight behind A e rebels, A e disturbances vould have been far more 
widespread md far no re serious than in  faot they vara.1 Dinuaulu 
not only restrained his own Immediate followers md forced Aea 
to jay A e Poll Tax with almost indecent haste (paying Aa tax 
had apparently been made A e precondition cf A e tr ib e 's  being 
allowed to attend A e wedding of Chief Haboko'a daughter in A e 
Vryh*id division)|2 according to tha Cosniasionar for Native 
A ffairs Hankulumana rendered him valuable aid cn several oooasions. 
It vaa he i t  w ill be remembered vho vent aa a messenger to Siga­
nanda's people in A e Nkandla forests. Ha also atoppad Aa peep la  
on the Upper Umfoloal from joining A e rebels;even handing over
jjChief Be j  ana to Aa auAoritisa for rebellion.* Similarly during 
A e disturbances, Dinusulu handed hia unde Sukana, a m all chief 
in A e Eahove d is tr ict, to Aa magistracy from which he had fled  
on being summoned to give evidence aglinst a member of hia triba
^Sir William SmiA fe lt  this waa "unquestionably” true. A e Trial 
o f Dinusulu. The Judgement, p .x ii.
2Ibld. .  p .v i.
3S*A 1/6/29, I « o .  C.M.A. 6.4.08, pp. 19-16.
who v m  said to have bean inciting hie people to rebellion .1
The magistrate o f Kranfekop reported that Hlangabesa and Gayede
had completely changed their atitude on h eir hearing that Dinusulu
2did not back the rebels. Kany witnesses before the Special Court 
maintained that but fo r  Dinusulu "they would hare died" -  that 
is  joined the rebels. The closest of Dinusulu*s follow ers, in 
the Tryheid d is tr ict , did not join  the rebels either, although 
there were many rumours at the e^d of 190? that they had been 
summoned to help Dinusulu resist arrest.^ The Special Court 
even rejected these allegations that Dinusulu had tried to seduce 
Maboko end Hatuta from h e ir  allegiance to the government, although 
a Natal judge earlier in 1908 had found a Tryheid ch ief, Tahibela, 
and the moat prominent member of his Hatu people, Habek&tshlya, 
who was Dinusulu1 s cousin, guilty of sending armed men to Dinusulu 
with the purpose o f defying the government.* Wherever then Dinu­
sulu had direot and strong authority it  can ba argued that ba used 
i t  in favour of restraint.
100 179/235/24396, m o l. 2, desp. 121 of 16.6.06 (Cd 3027, p .9 l).
2GH 798/282, Synopsis of wires, 27*4.06, see above. Chapter T.
^See above, p. 4 4 4
* Report in Times of Natal. 13*7*08. According to tha Times of Natal 
a marked feature of thia tr ia l was the attempt by the Prosecution 
to prove the unreliability  of their own witnesses. "Several ci 
the witnesses showed such evidences of terror when in the Box that 
the Bench had to get the interpreter to reassure them."
On the other hand, i t  has been argued by Stuart md Hies 
Perrett that this vaa simply part o f Dinusulu's p lot to mislead 
the government.1 Obviously i f  he wanted to avoid being impli­
cated in the rebellion , whilst s t i l l  using i t  for his ownpolitloal 
purposes, this was the only course to follow . Behind this facade 
he could secretly encourage the rebels and refrain from actively 
stopping them. Thus Hiss Perrett even maintains that Dinusulu's 
advioe to the various Hatal chiefs that ha had paid the tax, 
and that their peying of i t  vas their own a ffa ir , was also evi­
dence of this* had he said firmly -  "you must pay the tax",
2a ll tha chiefs vould forthwith have paid i t .  This sounds plans ib is , 
except that she singles out as the chiefs to whom Dinusulu vas sup­
posed to have given this instruct ion a ll those vho later ran foul 
o f tha Natal government. But there wars many others who at the 
time o f Dinusulu's tr ia l maintained they had bem told the same 
thing -  and that this vas what prevented then fro *  rebelling. **
It  is  true that Dinusulu had l i t t le  reason to feel any
great oonfidenoe in the Hatal government. He tad often been told
not to interfere in the a ffa irs o f tribes outside of his own juris­
d iction . He fe lt  many grievances against the o ffic ia ls  of Zululand
1 Stuart, Z .R .. pp. 493-4. Dinusulu md the Baabata Babel lion , p.43.
2Perrett, p.45*
^See e .g . Report of tr ia l, Hatal Witness. 9-10th Feb. 1909*
SC 111/5/8, Rex v. Dinusulu, Report of Bvidsnos md Trial.
and remarked that he even fe lt alienated from Sir Charles Saunders 
because of the la tter 'a  attitude towards him during the Boer War.1 
In 1903 and 1903 he complained to Harrietts Colenso that a ll his 
requests vere refused by the government, md that a ll his father's 
property had been "eaten up" by the government. He vas then re­
ferring to part of Cetshvayo'e cattle which had been slashed vith 
the Buthelesij the government refused to entertain a demand for 
their return, not unjustifiably feeling this vould open the vay 
to endless lawsuits fo r  the return of Cetshvayo'e oattle which had
been sim ilarly placed a ll over the country. There vere numerous
5other similar grievances, many o f them pin-pricks, but s t i l l  
enough to make Dinusulu complain at the end of 1907# that there 
vas no other ch ief in Natal or Zululand vith whom he had been 
made an equal who vas treated vith the degree of suspicion he vas.*
Thus i t  may veil be true that when the rebels came to him in 
the oourse o f 1906 he knew perfectly what they imre up to -  and 
that s tr ic tly  speaking he should have arrested them md handed 
them over to the magistrate# but he turned a blind eye on a ll  these
1Col» Col. 103# Remarks by Dinusulu at Greytovn to H. £. Coleneo.
2A00 1/7/53 # 4.6.03 end 22.4*05* transl. T. A. Jackson. SHA 
Dinusulu to G.V.A. ,7*4*05* Saunders to Dinuaulu, 20.4*05# Hxrate 
Attorney General, 8 .5.05.
^see e .g . AGO 1/7/78, F.13* GL. V. Armstrong (m agis.)'to Dinusulu 21.11.05# 
Dinusulu to Armstrong 22.11.05* AGO 1/7/53# Dinusulu to H. 2. Colenso, 
27*10.02.
*AG0 1/7/62 to H. E. Coleneo 10.10.07# transl. ?• A. Jackson.
goings on. It had nothing to do vith him. They could "fight 
their own fight" -  and that vaa a ll . 5y controlling hie immediate 
follow ers he had done his duty, both to the government aad to them, 
by saving them from unnecessary bloodshed. I f  the rebels vere 
going to figh t anyway -  he would point out their fo lly , but do 
nothing more active than that. It may be that the various acts 
of terrorism and the murders vere regarded in a similar lig h t.
▲t the b eglnning o f 1906 Dinusulu himself handed over Hpoqo mud 
Lokotvayo, for tr ia l for the murders of Tshigaaa and Haqandi.1 
These murders happened within his d istrict and the suspeots vere 
immediate members o f his entourage. Stainbank was murdered ii 
the Hahlabatini d istrlo t. Even I f he knew who the murderer waa? there 
vas no immediate reason fo r  him to act i f  he did not want to.
(Dinusulu may simply not have known vho the surderer waa -  and he 
vaa not going to try to find out either). The extraordinary 
d ifficu lty  the Grown had in acquiring evllenoe in this oase vaa 
accounted for by the Government at the time by the fact o f Dinu­
sulu ' b com plicity, although such an explanation is  not entirely 
necessary. For most o f the tribesmen in the area, Stainbank'a 
murder on the 6th Kay, 1906 probably came am a r e lie f. He waa 
extremely unpopular in the division , not only because of his slaughter
1C0 179/235/22649 (Cd 3027, p .65), O.I.A. to P.K. 29.5.06, no.164, 
minute on te l. from magi s . fiOngoma.
of Infooted cattle daring the outbreak o f East Coaat fever, 
bat also because he vas extremely highhanded md rude to the 
leading chiefs of the area.1 In April, 1906, the Commissioner
for  Hative A ffairs had actually recommended his transfer fo r  this
2reason* Hot only did the people of Hahlabatini not sent to 
become involved in the processes of an alien lav -  they also 
sympathised entirely vith vho ever it  vas vho k illed  the magistrate* 
Eventually, as has been mentioned) the murder vaa pinned on Vyataaa,
and onoe again the defenoe vaa that he had been ordered to ooaait
the crime by Dinusulu* This vas about the fourth or fifth  tria l 
fo r  this particular murder.
The other murder oases in Zululand in 1907 bars already 
bean dealt vith ; i t  seems unlikely that Dinusulu personally 
hatched the p lote, or vas party to them. There la really  l i t t le  
evidence to suggest that he vas -  the Natal government fo r  a ll 
their trying, vere simply unable to gather the evidence on this
score* It vas the allegation of the Hatal Government, the loyal
3
chiefs and both Stuart and Perrett, hovever, that through these 
sots Dinusulu vas trying to terrorise Africans Into his support*
At that game he mat have found it  h erd to compete vith XoKensie 
and the Hatal armed forces after the Battle o f Home Gorge* lo t
S^NA 1/4/20 0~^, Report C* G* Jackson on Stalnbaak Murder, 26*3*09*
2ZA.28, Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion, C.H.A. to Attorney 
General, 1*2*07*
S^tuart, Z.R.. p*484* Perrett, p.175#
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fo r  nothing vas MoKenzie called Shaka by the Africans} The vay
in vhich Africans feared making their support of Dinuzulu known
vas to some extent revealed by the large number of representatives
in the Northern d istricts vho alluded before the Natal Native
A ffairs Commission to their need for a representative aad spokesman*
On being asked who this spokesman vas, one Somcuba remarked:
"Ve are rather afraid of answering that question and 
saying mho i t  ia that I have in mind* To mention his 
name vould be to be arrested and be made a prisoner*
Z refer to the Governor, bat the Governor represents 
the Queen and the Queen reigns over a ll the white people 
as well as ourselves* The whole Zulu nation are un­
animous as to the need o f some person to voice their 
feelings<”2
Hiss Perrett Indeed sees these remarks, as v e il as Dinusulu's re­
marks to the Governor in May 1907, as evidence that hems trying 
to manoeuvre his vay back to a Paramount position , under the aegis 
o f the Imperial Government* Thus she el alma the known disagree­
ment betveen Natal end the Imperial Government vas a faotor In Dinu­
su lu 's handling of a ffa irs aad as support fo r  her thesis that Dinu­
sulu "used” the rebellion to this mud* He hoped to showr in 1907
*See above, Chapter T, p* 2-^ 7
^N.N.A.C• Evid. p .744. Por a ju stifica tion  of Somcuba's fears see Gov.'e 
interview vith  Hnyaisa, pp, 57-8, fool* In desp. 86, CC 179/241/23107, 
5*6*07 when the Oov. warned Hnyaisa that i f  he vere not himself leering 
Natal, he vould depose Mnyaisa and break up his people, putting someone 
in charge of the remnant''who did not recognise Dinusulu1 (my ita lics )*
P^errett, Introduction, pp* i-iii* Sim* Stuart, Z*R.* p.484.
that while the Natal Government were unahle to control the situation
in Zululand, he, Dinusulu could. He hoped the Imperial Government
would regain control of Zululand and that he would be returned to
« « * , . * .  f .th .r  tad t a - / « .  tadr ta ta,
though there ia something rather touching in the straightforward
way in which Dinusulu asked the Governor to grant the African people
a spokesman and representative.^ Moreover Dinusulu' a own papers
reveal very l i t t le  of this attempt to be restored as Paramount
Chief under the i^egis o f the Imperial Government. He had after a ll9
l i t t l e  reason to fee l that Imperial rule would have beenmuoh of an
improvement over that o f  Natal; his own experience o f  it  had been 
2far from happy. His concept o f himself as intermediary between 
the government and the Zulu people, while perhaps a tr if le  naive 
in the circumstances of Natal, was surely a considerable advance 
on the only schemes which the Natal goveruaent could propose on 
the recommendation of the Natal Native A ffairs Commission that 
Africans be given some way of voicing their grievances and that 
their government become more personal.^ Schreiner viewed Dinusulu1 a 
interview before the Governor in rather a different light to that
^See above, p. ^ -5 ^ - -440 
2See above, Chap te r n ,
^See below, Chapter , p. 5%%
adopted by Kiss Perrett.1 He maintained that here vas a man 
yearning to be taken into the confidence o f the Government, to be 
trusted and given greater scope for his energise. He fe lt  Dlm - 
zulu could hardly be blamed for hoping that he could be incor­
porated into the framework of African administration in a rather 
more constrictive way than hitherto, and fo r  hoping that tha re­
bellion  might have caused some change of heart amongst his white 
rulers.
Dinusulu vas not the stuff o f vhioh martyrs -  or heroes -
are made. He vas grossly overweight md physically i l l .  He
f rahk too much, nevertheless his remaining letters show a man
of considerable stature. His words to the Government at the
>Atsetof the disturbances after the murder of the two policemeni
"It vould be v e il for the Government to ca ll those 
subjects o f theirs vho hare k illed  the vhite man 
and not ca ll out an army, fo r  I say i t  is  just an
accident  Let thenaall those men peaoably end
try the case, because i f  the Government uses foroe 
and ca lls  an army, the country v i l l  be upset. •• 
startled, for I hear they are pained by Mils Poll 2 
Tax and even those vho pay i t ,  do not lik e i t . . . . N
vere sound -  as v e il as brave for a man in his position . His
vords to the Governor in Hay of 1907, hia le tter  to Harrietts
Colenso in June of that year, his sympathy and understanding for
Trial of Dinusulu... .  p .56.
2AGO l/7 /5 3 , Dinusulu to H. S. Colenso, End. copy 2.6.06.
the young Congress movement, do not entirely f i t  in vith the 
picture which the Natal governmentpainted o f hia in 1907-8* 
Nevertheless ultim ately, froa their point of view, the 
Natal government vas right* Within their oonoept o f a vhite Natal, 
narrow, closed, privileged, there vas no room for Dinusulu* They 
showed this long before the tria l vae over* Their refusal to 
pay hia salary vaa after a ll not dependent cn his gu ilt before 
a court of lav* As V* p. Schreiner pointed out, Dinusulu9* vas 
s great p o litica l tr ia l "to achieve in the long run a certain 
long desired result vhioh It has bean determined at «iy  coat 
and at any risk shall be achieved."1 The Natal Government end 
even Sir Charles Saunders had "always* known that tha return of 
Dinuaulu "oould never work". Saunders indeed confessed that ba 
had never understood Sir Marshal Clarke's "settlem ent".2 James 
Klrfcman, M.L*A., vho wrote to the Prime Minis ter at tha beginning 
of December 1907, suggesting that Dinusulu should he removed 
without tr ia l, fo r  the entire con flict betveen Dinuaulu and the 
government vas p o litica l,^  vas speaking more truly than he perhaps
l lhe Prial o f Dinugul^**** p.48* See also remarks of G* A* da S. 
abiotour to C*N*A*,11*2*07 in SNA 1/6/29* "There are people vho v i l l  
not be satisfied  until he ia turned out o f the country aad that must 
happen sooner or later* * * This ia purely a p o litica l matter end 
tha government have quits enough before them to aot*"
2See above, Chapter I I , p* 1^5.
realised. The long treason tr ia l in the osse of Dinusulu was 
evidence ultimately o f the weakness of Natal's whits population end 
especially o f its  government, which could not face the storm which 
would undoubtedly hare arisen both in South A frica and In Britain 
had Dinusulu simply beam deposed by administrative action, as h is 
uncle Sukana or his follow er Be j  ana had been. Perhaps too i t  
revealed the semi-mystloal b e lie f in the proeeases of the lav which 
white South Africans s t i l l  hare*1
Tst in the fin a l analysis i t  was really immaterial whether 
Dinusulu had handed Bambatha a gun; whether he had incited Xangati, 
Cakijana and the rest to revolt; whether he had been responsible 
fo r  the murders of three medieine men, tvo ohief a and a magistrate 
-  or not. A fter a ll Cakijana, who by hia own testimony carried 
out one of these murders and vas directly implicated in the planning 
o f a ll the others -  whether with or without Dinusulu's oonnivanoe -  
vas reprieved after but tvo years of his seven year sentence had 
elapsed,and granted a free pardon. Cakijana, the lieutenant of 
Bambatha vho had fought at Keats's D rift and Kpansa, Home Gorge 
and Cetshwayo's grave -  Cakijana eould be converted into a police 
spy. Whatever Dinusulu did -  whether he handed over rebels or 
paid the Poll Tax -   ^ was irrelevant, froa 1he
^See e .g . J. Levin, Poll ties and Law in 3, Africa (London ,1963) 
Chapter 4, Power, lav aad Race Halations.
point of view of the Hatal government as well as of the Zulu
people, he was the son of Cetshwsyo. He was the embodiment of
Zulu national pride and sentiment* Innumerable phrases used
before the Natal Native Affairs Commission and sisewhere come to
mind; he is our ’•husband" to whon we ire married; he is  the
"egg" whom Cetshvayo le ft  behind; he is' the "high tree on
2which a ll the birds feed and congregate". Vithout him, the Zulu
people would be like "coolies" as one spy report put it.^  And
from the point of view o f white Hatal, end especially that part
of i t  with Interests in the sugar plantations, wattle fie ld s , mining
concerns and expanding white population of the delimited areas,
Dinuzulu and his followers had to be destroyed.
Prom that point of view, even though the Hatal Minister of
Justice fe lt  that Sir William Smith's sentence erred grossly on
4the side of forgiveness and generosity, his sentence was a triumph 
fo r  the Natal government. Although he was found guilty only on the 
oounts o f harbouring Bembatha's family, sheltering Mangati and 
Bambatha during the disturbances and sheltering rebels afterwards,
1H.N.A.C., p. 746 et passim.
2C0 179/257/38009, <tar. to Sao. St. ZL.9.06, Bad. 1. C.H.A. to F .I ..
11.9.06, quoting a "Zulu of high standing" (Cd 3888, 2n d . 1, no. 1;*
S^MA 1/4/20 0 ^ | , fcrantskop no. 1, 14.11.08.
4Hathan MSS 570, p.133, Carter to Nathan, 4.3.09
he vas deposed from his position as Chief and sentenced to four 
years' imprisonment from the time of his arrest and a fine of 
£100 or 12 months. One of the f ir s t  acts of the Union government 
was to release Dinuzulu, although he was to he exiled for the 
rest of his l i f e  from Zululand and Natal* On his lonely farm 
near Middelburg in the Transvaal, with hut Mankulumana for com­
panionship and sixteen oxen, three milch ocws, a cart and a plough,* 
i t  availed him l i t t le  that his NfriendN Louis Botha,2 Prime 
Minister o f the newly formed Union government, saw f i t  to grant 
him his freedom and an allowance of £5^0 a year* He vaa indeed 
a man "of rank vithout followers"* But three years later, he 
died a comparatively young man, presumably of rheumatic gout and
3
Bright's disease -  though Mankulumana said it  vas of a broken heart*
*Col. Col* 140/Vol* I II , H. ft* Colenso to ¥• P* Cohreiner, 8.4.1911* 
2Col* Col* Corresp* 133* L* Botha to H, E* C* n*d* Telegram proposes 
an amnesty because he is  "a friend of Dinusulu"*
^Jeo Mankulumana' s oration at Dinuzalu's funeral, Tryheld 31.10*1913* 
Cutting (no heading) found Nathan MSS 182, p*48* D* Bel tat Mo 
fatspan (London, 1943), pp. 66-7.
Chapter VIII
"Discontent and rebellion are only the natural
consequences resulting from education aided by 
missionary influence. The education of the native 
cannot be retarded though i t  may to some extent 
be controlled and directed into the proper channels. 
Missionary influence tends to inculcate an equality 
between b).ack and White which is  a dangerous doc­
trine in Natal and must result in discontent In the 
subject race."
Assistant Commissioner Mardall 
of the Natal Polloe, N.N.A.C., 
p. 1023.
Despite the fact that by and large the 1906 disturbances 
vere led by chiefs and headmen and in so many oases the reasons 
for participation or non-participation can be traced to interi­
or intra- tribal disputes, i t  vas the participation of another 
section of the African population, the Christian Afrioans, or 
as they vere called in the colony, Amaicolva. which caused the 
greatest consternation in Natal. At the time i t  vas believed 
that the role o f the Amakol va in the disturbances vas "a large 
and prominent one".1 Sir Henry McCallum, the Governor o f Natal
from 1902-7, vas not alone in his be lie f that the "Kolwa as
2Kolwa" vas behind the rebellion. His vlevs vere dramatically 
repeated in John Buchan's Preater John vhioh vaa supposedly based 
on the 1906 rebellion but which curiously bore a closer resemblance 
to the Chilembwe uprising yet to occur vhen Buchan published 
his book inl910.1; Too much reliance need not perhaps be plaoed 
on the h istorica l accuracy of Sir Henry's vievs either -  four 
years earlier he had informed the trustees of the Amerloan Zulu 
Mission that ” . . .  He had a distinct distrust o f Christian natives,
*J. Stuart, Z .R .. p .420.
2GH 579 G, Conf. to Lord Salbome, High Commissioner, S.A ., 27.8.06.
A Oi'’
both in Natal and elsewhere. He said that he had given in­
structions to those concerned in India never to send him a 
Christian Indian for a servant,1 For KcCallum, the Supreme 
Chief, African evangelists, exhorting their congregations hot 
to extol their Chiefs or the Governor but their Saviour Jesu3 
Christ, vere "firebrands ••• preaching against constituted
authority” , examples of misdirected and dangerous missionary
2
activity which ought to be suppressed,H Nevertheless Captain 
James Stuart, in his History of the Zulu Rebellion, echoed 
these views in somewhat less forcib le terms and maintained that 
some 5°/o of the rebel prisoners being held in July, 19071 admitted 
to being Christians, a figure he dearly  regarded as excessive; 
amorgst these 214 Christians were seven preachers. Unfortunately, 
Stuart gives no indication as to what his criterion of Christianity 
vas, nor has i t  been possible to trace their various denominations. 
Host of them would appear to have belonged to independent sects,
1ABH IV /l/4 , Report o f Trustees of A.Z.H. reserves, Annual Hoeting
1902 by C. W. KdLlbon.
2SNA l/4 /9 I f ’* Gov. to P,H•, 13.9.01, There seems l i t t le  doubt 
that NoCallum actively encouraged the Natal government In its  
obstructive policy towards mission work (see below  ^ See
SNA Vi/3042156 Hinute KcCallum, 19,8.03 and SNA 1J1/35324II where 
it  is  the Gdfernor who opposed grants of land to Weeleyan06 Methodists 
and Church of the Province in Zululand, despite the support for 
mission requests from the C,N,A, and the Minister fo r  AgricuJure 
(Minute 2.11,06).
^Z.R.. pp. 420-1.
rather than to orthodox missionary organisations. On the other
hand, the present day traditional Zulu attitude appears to be
that the Amakolva were Aliambuka, traitors to their people,
"loya lists" who fought on the government side.*"
In a b itter struggle in whioh more than three thousand
Africans lost their lives and about thirty Europeans vere k illed ,
i t  is  perhaps not surprising that the Government should have
adopted the attitude that "those sho are not fo r  us, are against 
2 ’us"; nor is  i t  remarkable that amongst the African tribesmen, 
the spectacle of the small groups of Christian levies fighting 
on the government side should have lingered on as a stereotype 
of the entire African Christian community acting as "traitors".^  
Nevertheless an examination of ths situation in deta il, suggests 
that the Kolwa response to the events of 1906 was far more com­
plex than the views of either of the protagonists vould allow, and 
sheds interesting ligh t both on why people rebel and, equally 
important, why they do not.
In fa ct, rank and f i le  mission converts could be found 
fighting on both sides in 1906. While the vast majority of Christ­
ians remained unaffected by the disturbances, as indeed did the
^A, Vilahasi, Zulu Transformations. A .ctudy of tho dynamics of 
Soolal Change.( Natal 1962V p .143.
p
See below, p. 5 4  T
The total of native levies employed 26.5*06 vas 1800. Very few 
of these were In faot Christian. CO 179/235/226499 Annex A end B to Snel. 
in deep* 106.
vast majority of tribesmen, in the actual area of military 
operations there vere almost certainly rebels frcm every 
denomination. Of these, the members of the Independent seots, 
or so-called Ethiopians, vould appear to have been most pro­
minent, although at a time vhen Natal vas even more obsessed 
than the rest of South Afrioa vith the thought of the Ethiopian 
menace,* i t  vould be dangerous to accept vithout qualification 
vhite allegations as to the part played by "Ethiopians" in 
the disturbances. It is therefore necessary to look a l i t t le  
more closely at the meaning of the terms Kolva and "Ethiopian", 
as well as to examine the nature of the Natal African Christian 
community.
As Professor George shepperson has remarked, by the turn
of the century, "Ethiopians had become for the idiites of Southern
African a "31aok peril" ,  the equivalent of the 'Yellow peril'
2of the yellow press in Great Britain of that period". And 
nowhere vas this fear of "Ethiopianism" more marked than in Hatal. 
It vas Hr. Payne, M.L.A., the Hatal delegate to the Inter-Colonial 
Customs Conference at Bloemfontein in March 1903, vho proposed 
that concerted action be taken by a ll the ^outh African territories 
against Ethiopianism. He recommended that clergymen of African
*See below, p^s-siro.
2"Pan-Africanism and pan-Africanism, some h istorica l notes",
Unpubl. paper, I.C .S. April, 1961.
^Minutes o f Inter-Colonial Customs, Conf. p .9.
churches should not be licensed as marriage o fficers  or in any 
vay recognised, md that continued efforts be made to suppress 
the "propaganda of dangerous p o litica l and reasonable teaching 
vhich is  doubtless unsettling the native mind” . These proposals 
vere rejected as needlessly alarmist by the other ^outh African 
representatives.1 It vas the Natal members of the South African
Native A ffairs Commission vho fe lt  most anxious on the subject
2
of Independent African Churches. Natal too vas the only South
African territory to bar entry to members of the African hethodiat
Episcopal Church which Captain James Stuart was to regard as “the
harbinger of general revolution among the native population of
South A frica .•• /w ith/ its  supreme and persistent id e a l.••
nothing less than a reclamation and recovery not merely o f South
Africa but Afrxca".^
Although Natal government policy had never exactly encouraged 
4missionary endeavour, i t  vas in the immediate post-war period 
with a ll its  concommitant stresses and strains that anti-misel cziary 
feeling expressed its e lf  most strongly. The Rev. 7. Mason, a man
^Minutes of Inter-Colonial Customs Conf., p .9. These suggestions 
vere virtually identical to those made by U.S.N.A. S. 0. Samuelson, 
in 1908, as a basis of Union policy towards "Ethiopian!sm" and vhich
B.G.H. Sundkler suggests were the resu lt o f Natal's experiences in 
1906. In fact they predate the disturbances. See Bantu Prophets in 
S.A. (O.U.P., 1961), 2nd edition, pp. 69-70.
2See esp. questions asked by S. 0. San&elson of African witnesses, 
8.A.N.A.C. passim.
^Stuart Papers; Press copy o f a paper on "The Ethiopian Movement" 
compiled aad partly written by J. Stuart to S.I.A . Jhbg 22.6.04, p .30.
vho had f ir s t  come to Natal as a Wesleyan Missionary in the 
1830s, and had considerable experience and knowledge of native 
affairs,wrote in the Christian Express in July 1906 -  "the v i l i ­
fication of African Christians has been going an a long time, 
but of late there has been a kind of violence and volcanic out­
burst of anti-missionary hatred, without any reason or provocation 
whatever.
While the disturbance of that year contributed to the 
violence of anti-missionary feeling in 1906, there can be l i t t le  
doubt that the Nev. Mason’ s views were correct. Nor did this 
lu lling reflect i t s e l f  only in the calumny of the post Boer «ar 
period; it  was actively expressed in the legislation even before 
the war. The f ir s t  step in the process can perhaps be seen in 
Act No. 25 of 3395 -  an act to regulate the use of mission re­
serves. Under i t ,  the Governor and Governor-in-Council were given 
extensive powers over mission reserve land aid their inhabitants. 
According to the Natal Lands Commission of 1902, however, this Im  
remained a dead letter, largely owing to the opposition of the
American Zulu Mission, vhich had more land in its  possession than
2all the other mission bodies in Natal combined.
4
-ee above, Chapter 1, for example on Natal attitudes toeduoation*
C hristian bxpresa. 1.7.06 (Lovedale), "Native Christians and their 
Calumniators", Part I .
1904) pp. 69-70.
In September 1903 the Mission Reserves Act (Act 44 of 
1903) renewed this policy of government control over the 
mission lands; with the agreement of -the majority of the 
missionary bodies, the Natal Native Trust took over the admini­
stration of the mission reserves, and a tax of £3 was levied 
on their inhabitants. Although half of this tax was to be handed 
over to the missionaries for missionary and welfare purposes 
and half to the government, i t  vas fe lt  by most of tiie Africans 
on the mission reserves to be excessively high, and many of th# 
missionaries agreed vith them.* Again hovever i t  vas the American 
Zulu mission vhlch vas most outspoken in its  criticism . The tax 
created a certain amount of resentment in the mind of some of 
the converts vho fe lt  that the money vas going into the pockets
of the white missionaries and that the latter vere responsible 
2for the tax.
According to George Leuchars, the Minister of Hative Affairs
in 1903, the aim of the Act vas
"to cheok and i f  possible stop a movement in this 
oolony amongst the natives which was growing very
*ABM l l l / l /3 »  p.325, Rev. J. D. Taylor to Rev. Judson Smith (Boston) 
27.4.06.
2ABM H l / 1 / 3 , p .313. Rev. J. D. Taylor to M.N.A. n.d. (c March 1906) 
and see Ilanga lase Natal. 15.11.07, 207” .08.
quickly. •• o f throwing o ff white control and
achieving for its e lf  aad its supporters inde­
pendence and eel f-governnsn t presumably in tha
fir s t  instance In a matter of Church control 
hat no doaht ultimately also p o licy ."1
Farther efforts cn the part of the government te stamp eat
*Ethiopianlea" ware to cause area greater disquiet amongst
almost n il tha missionaries o f tha Colony* From 1892, even
prior to Responsible government, i t  hnn bean tha policy of
tha Natal Native Trust to in sist that aiadon work on lands
subject to its  Jurisdiction be la tha psxaonnl charge and
2undar the supervision of a resident European missionary. 
Nevertheless, i t  was really  only after 1902 that missionary 
complaints beoame really b itter on this score, perhaps because 
under the Mission Reserves Act lands which had previously been 
free of government restrictions vere now also under the control 
o f the Natal Native Trust. Possibly also in the post war years 
the restrictions vere applied more rigorously. In tha years 
Immediately prior to the disturbances, six  Af risen please of
worship vere pulled down by the Natal government for allegedly
%not being under the control o f a resident vhite missionary. 
According to the A.Z.M. at least two of thsse vere directly
l C0 179/241/19857, Bael. U .S.A . 16.6.04 quoted In oU>*U oa'« 
memorandum In above on American Zulu Mission, 10.5.07. Lee also 
Debates in N.L.A. Vol. 34, P*32 f f ,  sad 103 f f .
*C0 179/241/19587, Minute 0. O'Orady Gubbins to Gov. quoted in 
samuelson Memorandum, 10.3*07.
3Cd 3027, no.87, Oct. to 3#c. St. 14.6.06.
under their supervision whilst one was unde r the supervision
of Rev. Suter of the South African General Mission.* The American
missionaries whose preachers were not granted marriage licences
by the government on the grounds that the African Congregational
Church was an ’’Ethiopian" Church -  and not the o ffic ia l church
of the American Zulu Mission as was claimed by the white mission arimi
-  were not alone in protesting that although the policy of the
Government was due to exaggerated fears of Ethiopianism, the
practical effect " is  to s t ir  up the very sp irit which i t  is  sought 
2to suppress". The 1906-7 Natal Native Affairs Commission concurred 
3in wlis opinion.
Norwegian, Wesleyan and Anglican missionaries were as certain
that the conditions set out by the Secretary for Native Affairs
that there should be a resident European missionary in charge of
a ll statins was "impossible” . B. Markham of Ipolela complained
Gospel
to the Society fo r  Propagation o f the /  year a^ter year that he
could not get land for a church at St. Mark's, although he had 150 
converts there, because of the Interference of the Under-secretary 
for Native Affairs who apparently sided with the local Chief In his
* Natal Mercury t 23.1.07, Letter from Rev. J. D. Taylor. N.N.A.C. 1906-7# 
Evid. Rev. P. Suter, p. 190-2.
A^BM V /l/4 , Annual Rept. fo r  1905, S.H.C. Ransom.
3p.28.
opposition to mission work. Although the reason given was 
Ethiopianism he maintained that Mthere is  not a single Ethiopian 
here in the d istrict -  nor in the whole o f Xpolela that 1 have 
heard o f . . . ,,x
Several deputations of the Ratal Missionary Conference, a
2body founded in 1877 to express missionary views and to discuss 
common problems, and to which most of the larger missions with 
the exception o f the Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholics 
belonged, petitioned the government to reconsider its  policy 
towards the missionaries but to no avail. In a memorial forwarded 
by the Missionary Conference in 1905 they stated -
"tjiese repressive measures instead of securing ths
objects presumably sought by the government are ... 
actually operating to produce feelings of unrsst and 
dissatisfaction among the native Christians in the 
locations. •• The regulations now in force have the 
effect of preventing the spread of Christianity and 
education, and of keeping the people in their pre­
sent state of ignorance and heathenism."4
1S.P.6. Missionary Reports 42. See e.g . 3. Markham to Sec. 50.6.02.
Sim. vS.PiQ. Missionary Reports 1897, no. I l l  and 1896, no. 116.
^C. P. Grovaa, Planting of Christianity in -Africa, Vol. H I, p .179 
suggests it  vas founded in 1884; the f ir s t  meeting hovever vas 
held in April 1877 (See Report of Natal Missionary Conf. 1877, K.C.L.)
^Sss e.g. SNA 1 /1 /3 2 5 ^ ,  Report of meeting between M.n.A. end Natal
Miss. Conf. and Bp. of Natal, 22.12.04. SNA l / l / j2 0 ,  Lditer of Durban 
Church Council to Col. Sec. ( j .  MaydonJ 5«5*05, Petition of Durban 
and Pietermaritzburg Church Counoils, 22.8.05•
4SNA l /l /3 2 3-^fe, Hemorlel 19.7.05.Up
This vas neither the fir s t  nor the last of such pleas*1
The attitude of the government to the missionaries as a
whole was well summed up by S* 0* saauelson at the end of 1902
when he remarkedx
"Too mu oh of our ^ative Education is  in the hands 
of foreigners and the subjects o f other nations, 
who are loyal to their traditions and proud of their 
history and antecedents, and who cannot but exercise 
a seditious influence on the loyalty and affection  
of our natives*
Missionaries, mission agents and teachers are erer 
increasing in our midst and throughout South Africa*
I do not think that i t  is  their sole aim to hold up 
the prestige and interests of the British people and 
government among our natives* They may be passively, 
but not actively lo y a l."2
The worst suspicions of the Natalians shout the Ethiopians 
appeared to hare been Justified at the very outset of the disturb­
ances when i t  was revealed that the twenty-seven armed Africans 
who had resisted their ch ie f's  orders to pay the Poll Tax on the 
7th February and vho had been involved in the shooting of two 
police o fficers  the following day vere members of an independent
3church. Indeed the fact that these men, under the leadership
^Sim. vievs e .g . vere expressed by Rev. J. Astrup (Norwegian),
N.N.A.C. Evid., p .525, Rev. J . 0. Chater, Springvale Ib*^ . p .581.
It should hovever also be noted that in 1904 for example 25 Hermannsburg 
Missionaries appear to have requested the govt, to suppress Ethiopian­
ism because Mthey are a dangerous sect undermining the Christian 
Church and the State". Petition publ. in Cray town Casette. 9.7.04.
2SNA 1/4/10 o||, Minute, 23.10.02.
3See above, Chapter V, p. ~ ^
of Kakanda and Mjongo, two woodcutters from the Enon forests
near Richmond, were separatists tended to blur certain other
equally important features of the incident.
The group under Makanda and Mjongo were a ll members o f
the Presbyterian Church of A frica,1 which had been founded in 1898
by Pambani J. Hzimba, a Fingo who had broken away froa the United
2Free Church of Scotland Mission at Lovedale. His church had 
spread in Natal under the leadership of John Slbiya, who under the 
influence of Hzimba had also broken away in 1898 with 150 comaruni-
3cants from a Scottish Mission Station at Spandikron. lh.ile Sibiya
Awas regarded by the government as a "dangerous propagandist"
5and Hzimba as a virulently anti-white crusader, Hzimba himself 
claimed, perhaps somewhat ingenuously, that he had no connection 
with the "Ethiopian movement" and that his break with the mission­
aries at Love dale had been purely on account of ” religious d lf f i -  
6 **cu lties". These religious d ifficu lties" appear to hare arisen
^And not the African Congregational Church as stated by B. ftoux, f l u
Longer than Rope, p .89.
2Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, pp. 42-5*
3U.F.Ch. of Scotland records: U.F.C.S.-14-368, Meeting of Natal 
Mission Council, 10.4.01*
^Though a missionary o f the United ?ree Church described him as 
"beloved by his people, respected by the ->utch farmers", there 
was "never & word o f scandal about him" U.F.C.S.-14-258, Ur. Dalzell 
to Sec. 21.9.98.
Cd^Cov. to Sec. St* 14*6.06*
6S.A.I.A.C. 1903-5, Tol. H, p.793
largely over his handling of ths large sums of money handed
to him while representing his people at the Tree Church of
Scotland Jubilee celebrations in 1692. Whatever the rights md
wrongs of ths sp lit may have been, however, before the South
African Native Affairs Commission Ksiaba dissociated himself
from p o litica l matters1 and in 1908 ha wrote to the Prime
Minister o f Natal in order to establish ths rsspsotability o f
his church that although his aim vas to establish an independent
church he bore
"no opposition to ths white race as such. Our 
experience is  that th# missionaries o f the United 
Pree Church are at present unable to understand ths 
South Afrioan native or work vith him* In the 
meantime we are anxious to work fo r  the welfare o f 
our people* ••” 2
Defplte Ms lab s's  publicity hand-outs for government con­
sumption, end despite ths faot that no ohargs of sedition oould 
be proven against Sibiya, who was under polios surveillance both 
during ths Boer War md in 1906, when he was detained in the Central
3
gaol, Pietermaritaburg, i t  can be argued that this vas no guarantee 
that Makaada aad MJongo, vho used to preach to their followers
^S.A.H.A.C. n ,  1903-5, p. 793.
2SEA 1 /1 /3 9 9 ^ , 16.5.08.
3SKA 1 / 1 / 3 7 5 Hlaut* U.S.H.A. 10.8.07.
three times a week in S iblya's absence, vere not preaching in­
surrection. Precisely vhat they preached is  not d ea r. As 
the Rev. J. D. Taylor (A.Z.X*) pointed out "Sthiopians" vere 
hardly lik ely  to be oosBunioatiTe to hostile vhitee.^ According 
to Kakanda's sister at their Court Martial, both Kakanda and 
KJongo vere "good preachers", "they preached, but not about 
I  h m d  nothin* man* »ith  Z^h^l7pr.M hln«".2 
The eridenoe o f the Anglican vicar of Richmond, the Rev* Algernon 
J* Fryer, is  probably sore illuminating* He had v isited  the 
"victims o f the Court Xarttt" on several oooasions, in order as 
he put i t  to bring that to realise the error of their ways "by 
God* s help and ty • the assistance o f  my very able mad sympathetic 
interpreter".^ According to the statements they made to him
"They had been taught by native preachers and eran­
gel is ts  that the d id e  o f the Holy Scripture pointed 
to the fact that the curse on the blade race vhich 
vas to keep them under, vas nov to be removed and
^In a paper before the Batal Missionary Conference, reprinted in 
Christian JEtoress, Oct* 1903, Part I, p .150.
2The evidence in the Richmond Court Martials in end* in CO 179/ 
234/19935, Rvid. Yonkuba*
C^O 179/234/14956, find* 2 in dssp* 53 o f 5*4.06, A.J. Fryer to Oov. 
3*4*06* To this olalm Winston Churchjr'et that time TJhder-Seo. for 
Cola* retorted (2*5*06* Minute on above)s "The Rev* A, j*  Fryer 
haa evidently distinguished himsdf* I should think the exertions 
he made vith  the combined assistance of the Almighty and the 
interpreter to impress upon the prisoners the Justice o f their 
sentence and the abounding graoe o f the Churoh should be brought 
to the attention o f the co d cs ia s tio d  authorities in this country 
in order that some speeid  mark of favour he accorded him."
that i t  vas time that blacks should take the upper 
head aad reduce the whit es to a state of subordination*
The witness examined than ia their knowledge of 
soriptures at length aad he found that they vere « b~ 
oeptionally well aoqpalntad with the aain facts, more 
especially o f the Old Testament, but that they had 
ignorantly twisted* »• these facta into superstitious 
notions affecting their relations with Europeans*”^
Although this evidence would appear to be very similar to that
about m ilitant, millenmriaa -  type sects both In Africa md
elsewhere, i t  does not necessarily suggest that the men intended
resorting to force at the beginning of the lnoident on the 7th,
nor docs i t  imply, as was widely implied at the time, that theirs
vaa the beginning o f  a widespread plot aimed at the overthrow
2o f vhite authority* Indeed, as has been shown above, the fir s t  
armed resistance to the white forcea which war# ca ll ad out to 
deal vith  th is widespread plot oane almost two months later in a 
different part of the colony md mosgst rural tribesmen* Never­
theless, aa so often in h istory, what people believe to be true 
ia frequently more important in determining the subsequent oourse 
of events, than tha rea lity ; md the psychological reality of 
the "Ethiopian menace" a fter this incident played aa important 
part in the government1 a reaction to thS disturbances md led 
whltea to exaggerate the part played in the disturbances by
S .I .A .C . grid. p.349.
2Chapt*r T, p.iSa-t
"Ethiopian" preachers.1
Undeniably, Christian praaohara aoooapaniad the ratal foroes 
af tar Benbatha cana out into open raaiatanoa on the 4th April 
and lad tha diaturbanoaa into a new phase. Hla nan vara praaohad 
to by Xoaaa Hbhele who had hrokan awey from tha Dutch Raforaad 
Church vith  about a hundrad of hia follovara in tha 1890a aad 
had bssn ordain ad by H»iiba> although ha had fora ad hia ovn church, 
T w sx ia  i f  110, 1 . tn th . TJppwe U*roti d iria lon .2 Int*r**tin«ly 
enough, Baabatha had triad unsuccessfully bafora this to acquire 
a missionary froa tha Hermannabnrg Lutherans in hia neighbourhood. ^  
Hbhala had bean fo r  hla a second choice* ▲ Salvation Army teacher 
vith  Sigananda's people also joined Baabatha vith moat of hia 
followerst tha majority of than ware killed** Other ohiefe alsov 
notably Kesenl in tha Hapuaalo division in tha last phase of the 
disturbances, vara accompanied by the black-hatted, vhite-chokered 
figure vith a prayer book in hia hands which roused particularly
l &or lurid deaoriptlona o f tha a ctiv ities of Hthioplans, see the 
contemporary novels by Bertram K iffod, a popular author in Fatal 
at tha tumof the century -  eap. The *hite Hand md tha Hlaok.
P* 50 f f  (vritten  about tha 1906 diaturbenoas) (London, 1907).
Also Hack Odyaaay by J. Crad (pseud*) 1929* John feohan's 
Prester John ia tha beat known voxk o f this genre.
Report o f 2nd General Missionary Conf. 1906, "Ethloplanlam” by 
Rev. F. Suter, pp. 110-111.
3H*raann»hurg*r M l»»lon*blatt. Jaa.1909, p. 14.
*SHA l/l/4 6 0 ^ | ^  , ta g !.. I .  A. Jaakson, Hlcandla, 2.4*10 to Assistant 
Native Commissioner.
angry emotions In the breast® of shite observers.1 The sane 
ohiefe vere also invariably accompanied by a number of var-doctors 
and witchdoctors -  as a fora of double insurance. Their presence 
passed almost unremarked. Hor did 1he appearanoe of s  preacher 
vith Sibindi*s loyal forces vho offered up a abort prayer for 
their suooeaa every morning, surrounded by kolva on the inside 
end heathen on the outside, provoke similar h ostile  oomment.
The activ ities o f "preachers" apart, the participation 
o f the Aaakolva would appear to hare been most marked in the final 
phase o f the disturbances in the Lover-Tugela and Hapumulo divisions. 
In the la tter division there were, at 1he turn o f  the century, 
about 6,400 Africans living on Mission Reserves, not a ll o f than 
o f course converts. In this division, almost a ll the converts of 
the laaareth mission station -  a Hermannsburg German Lutheran
station under the Rev. Dedekind -  vere reported to have joined
x
the rebels. Aa early aa 3rd March, Dedekind vaa warned by Chief 
Hermann Hounu that he should leave the Station lest he be anrdered, 
fo r  "the people want war. They says in the South part of
1Cd 3247, S ad . 1 in no. 32, <tav. to Sec. S t., Col. Barker to M ilitia  
Dept., 17.7.06. One of theee vas Andrew Kbolangva, Minoti. Aoo. to 
the govt.j he vas o f the A.Z.X. vho hovever dieovned him and said 
he vas C. of £• As the Churoh of the Province also disowned him, 
he may originally  hare been a Coleaaite* (CO 179/24l/l9587 Samuel son 
Memo on A .Z.X.) See also SNA l/4 /l7  Orr, Statement ex-chief Meseni 
to magia. Lover Tugela, 20.3.07 . 00. 179/241/2138, Gov. to Sec. St.
25.5*07. CO 179/234/16341 Gov. to See. St. 20.4.06.
^1rrMrMv*him fr HAp^°nphl*t t i 1907, p .134. a ^ ort w .*.otor H u u .
?Ibld. .  pp. 137-40. SHA V l/3 4 6 ^ ^ , Q.A.Jackson, C .I.D ., H.7.T. 
to O.C. Helpmbcaac
there le  war, the Abelungu /w hites/ hare started i t ,  why should ws 
look on in actively ."1 A fa ir  number of Veslsyan Methodists -  or 
sx-Veslsyan Methodists -  would also appear to hare beam amongst 
ths participants, as at least two o f ths four preach ears said to 
have accompanied th# Mapumulo rebels vere originally o f this de- 
nomination* Soma Christiana from the Norwegian Mission Station 
at Ekhombe also joined the rebelsi some volunteered, but most 
fcj*5 been forced to jo in  on fear of death, ^  This vaa also true of 
a number of members o f the A.Z.M. and other denominations. Thus 
Rev. J. D. Taylor actually aaked the O ffiosr in Command at Hapumnlo 
fo r  protection fo r  loyal Africans and pastors on their Mission
Stations who had bean threatened with death unless they joined the
A *»rebels. George Champion, himself a member of A. Z. H«, writing
his autobiography years later, confines this situation remarking
that on two occasions he had been forced through fear o f rebels
K
to sleep in the veld* It la significant hovsver that tha rebels
1Heraannsbn.^rMlssionsblatt. May 1906, Report, Rev. Dedekind.
2SNA 1/ 4/17 C ^ 9 Svid. Meseni before Magis. Lover Tugeia, 20.5*07*
3
**sr 1907f. pp. 137-40 and Oct.,
1907, p*296.
4AHl 111/1/3, P.552.
5
p .9. Unpubl. MSS, Life o f  G* V. Champion recorded by S. Trapido 
who kindly showed i t  to me*
from the two - jnerican Zulu Kiss ion stations In the area appear 
to hare attracted the most attention.1 HoCallum2 vas convinced 
that the A.Z.H. converts joined "to a man" and this statement 
made In public led to a long and aorimonious correspondence betveen 
the Governor and the missionaries, some of vhioh found its  vay to 
the Colonial O ffice and some to the ®atAX' Press .**
Certainly their estimate of the number of their converts 
Involved made by the American missionaries in the heat o f battle 
differed considerably froa their later re-appraisal • Thus in 
July, 1906, the Hev. J . D. Taylor vrote to the Secretary o f the 
American Board in Boston that the most serious side of the re­
bellion  vas that most o f their people in Mapumulo had joined the 
rebellion , only a fev o f the most fa ith fu l standing by their 
African pastor.* He fe lt  that the "vhole church" at the two 
affected stations had "spiritually  at least been snuffed out by
1For a typical attack see SNA lA /M O ^ f^ , Capt. Kbe to Commandant 
o f M ilitia , Mapumulo, 14.4*06,2Cf the private vlevs o f HoCallum expressed in a long memorandum 
to Sir Matthew Nathan, his successors "Ton w ill have no peace until 
you make the position of tills Foreign Mission impossible and induoe 
them to hand over their own particular mission stations to the other 
Christian denominations who can exercise more effective  European
control£. Nathan MSS 401, p .227# ttoCallum to Nathan, Native A ffairs 
Confidential n.d* £ e Julyj.9037*
5 See the long memorandum by S* 0« Samuelson on the A.Z.H. 10.5.07 
Encl. in CO 179/241/19587 already o ited . See also Cd 3247» nos. 31 and 32.
* A » H l /1/3 Letter book p. 359 to Dr. Judaon Smith, 6.7.06. Even In 1905,
J . D. Taylor vas complaining that the Mission vaa understaffed and 
undersupervised. SEE ABM U l/l /5  to Rev. Judson Stadth 12.5.05, p. 158 f f  
Sim.5.4.05, p. 145 f f .
joining the rebellion ".1 On the other hand, at the beginning 
o f 1907, when faced by the accusations of ths government, Taylor 
and the other misaionariee o f the A.Z.H. staunchly maintained 
that relatively  few o f their actual converts had been Involved in  
the rebellion -  about thirty out o f their four thousand fu ll 
members -  md that many o f tha people on their mission reserves
whom the m ilitary accused o f rebellion were not Christians at
2a ll , although they might Year European-type clothing.
Am the oldest, largest md richest o f ths missionary bodies 
in Natal, one run on Congregationalist lines which i t  was believed 
was fundamentally Munsuited to the native mind" and by American 
pastors, vho, according to ths Governor, oould "not be expected to 
advocate the principle o f honouring the King as much as that o f 
fearing God", i t  vas perhaps natural that ths A.Z.K. should bear 
tha brunt o f the Government attack on mission work. Their American 
origin vaa an additional handicap in that i t  vaa feared that South 
African Africans vould be "contaminated" by Amerioan negro influences. 
There vere at this time apparently 150 South African Africans studying
1IW.d.. p. 373, 20.7.06.
2e.g . la  letter* to Natal Witness. 9.1.07, Natal MercurT. 23.1.07.
See also JJ9L Y I l/8 /l, Transcript o f notes taken at interview between 
M.N.A. md Rev. Goodenough and J. Dexter Taylor, 26.2.07. J . D. Taylor 
to H.I.A. Moor 18.6.07. ABM V /l/4  Report o f negotatlons vith the 
Govt. 1906-7 by J. D. Taylor. Cf. Hev. Briksen of the Norwegian 
Mission Society who also remarked that a mm sentmoed fo r  "rebellious 
talk" on being asked by the Judge whether he vas a Christian replied 
"I  wear Buropean clothes". Norakmisjonstid snds. June 1906, pp. 243-9. 
Briksen vas writing from Durban, 14*2.06.
O^H 579 8g| Conf. to Lord Solbome, 12.8.06.
in the States, 20 o f them from Natal, That their mission reserves 
vere on excellent sugar lands, looking up i t  vas alleged thousands 
o f acres o f valuable land and hundreds of valuable African labourers, 
vas an important factor in colonial dislike of the R.Z.H. Nor 
did the outspokenness of the American missionaries both on the 
general grievances o f the African population and an the atrocities 
committed by the troops hiring the 1906 disturbances particularly 
endear them to the government.^ Finally, by calling its  purely 
African ohnrch, the African Congregational Church the aiaaion 
had Incurred the suspicion o f the Native A ffairs Departments 
although this body vas under the control o f the vhite missionary 
society, the Government vere convinced that i t  vas an Ethiopian 
seot and had refused to grant marriage licences to its  preaohers 
or a llov them to preach in the locations from 1903 onwards.
There vas a more general reason for the government attack 
on the A.Z.X. The changed attitude amongst the Amakolva at the 
turn of the century vhich vas causing so much concern to vhite 
observers a ll over Southern Africa cud vhich manifested it s e lf  
both in the Independent church movement cad in the new, European- 
type p o litica l organisations vas, in Natal, mat closely  connected
XSm  e .g . AM H l/l/3 *  p .362* J.D. Taylor to T. P. Churchill, 13.7.06, 
p. 373 (loose in book), J. D. Taylor to X. Campbell 21.7*06, p. 394,
J. D. Taylor to Rev. J* Bruoe, Sec. Natal Missionary Conference, suggest­
ing that the Missionary Conf. take the in itia tiv e  in asking fo r  aa 
enquiry into alleged a trocities. See also AIM V /l/4 , Report of 
Negotiations vith govt., 1906-7. See also above, Chapter T, p.
ABM ? I l /8/ l ,  J . D. Taylor to Moor, 18.6.07.
2SNA I /1/ 3 1 Transcript of interview between M.M.A. and deputation 
from A.Z.X. io.2 .03«
with the converts o f the A. Z. M.; Wesleyan Methodists and the United 
Free Church of Scotland. But while the Wesleyan Methodists and to 
a lesser extent the U.F.C. had a strong European church within 
the colony and In Britain, this was not the case with the A.Z.H. 
whose converts vere its  church. I t  vas thus in a peouliarly vul­
nerable position.
It is  d ifficu lt  to assess how far the Natal Government's 
fears of Ethloplanism vere ju stified  and to what extent independent 
Church leaders were preaching rebellion in the years before the d is­
turbances. 'h ile  some Separatist church members undoubtedly parti­
cipated in the disturbances, it  is  at least as remarkable that 
many more did not.
Ihere was, moreover, a tendency in Natal to see every educated 
African as a dangerous Ethiopian, ready to drive the white man into 
the sea.1 As long as the Zulu accepted their in ferior position -  
as indeed the bulk of tribe amen in Natal, many of them refugees 
from Shaka's wars, had in itia lly  been prepared to do in return for 
the increased security the white settlers offered -  the whites 
fe lt  l i t t le  anxdsty about their position. But as soon aa anyone 
began to question the basis of the oaste system, he was fe lt  to be
‘See e .g . S.A.N.A.C. v o l. I l l ,  p.62B, Evid. Rev. V. H. Goodwin (Anglican 
missionary) on the subject.
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a throat far out of proportion to tho actual danger he represented*
As the Rot* John Dube1 succinctly remarked: "The reason that the 
Christian Native has a bed name, among the lover classes of 
European especially, is  that he does not submit to being treated 
as a dog"*
Perhaps because the educated African vas so tota lly  rejected 
by the lfcites of Natal, the need fo r  solidarity between the tribal 
and Christian African vas appreciated somewhat earlier there than 
in the older colony. It  may hare been this realisation that lay 
behind John Dube's reprimand to the Sdendale "loyal levies" fo r  
fighting their brethren, although at the same time he cautioned 
the tribesmen against the fo lly  o f taking up arms against the whites*^ 
Thus, whereas in the past the government had been able to count on 
the traditional hatreds between the Christian and non-Christian 
sections o f the African population, in 1906 the old division, while 
undoubtedly s t i l l  in sxistenoe, vaa no longer aa olear-cut aa i t  
had been at the time of the Zulu Var, when Christian Africans seem 
to have responded with considerable enthusiasm to the anti-Zulu cause**
^Por Dube, see below, p* S48
2Cit*d S. Shepperaon and Price, Independent African (Edinburgh,
1958), p.91.
3 OH 579 C C o n f^ , Oct. to Lord 3*1 bo m e, 6.8.06.
4   0See D. R. Morris, The /ashing of the Spears, pp. 506 , 527 * 451.
By the tarn of the century, hovever, even the epithet "Zulu"
had for some educated Africans pan-Natal and nationalist connotations.
Thus Hark Radeber , one-time Secretary of the Natal Native Congress
defined himself before the South African Native Affairs Commission
as a Zulu, though he agreed vith a questioner that he vas of "Sesutho t?
origin".*' Alfred Kargena, the first African advocate in South
Africa and one of the founders of the South African Native National
Congress in 1912, also called himself a "Zulu", though he vas
2probably not of true "Zulu" origin. Increasingly too a number
of educated Africans vould appear to have turned to Dinusulu ao
representative of the Zulu Royal House and therefore a symbol of
unity. Thus In 1902, Kagema X. Fuse, an African of Natal -  probably
of "Lala" origin -  vrote to Dinusulu i
"I therefore say to you Zulu, it is veil for you to 
be vise and to stand upon your rights md to remember 
that you are the only representative of the House of 
Tshaka,and that all the country Is in your hands.
You should fight for that vhich is yours by right as 
all people do •••• nov our only resource is to
fight in a lavful vay as do all vise nations under 
the sun. Indeed I say this to you because I fear 
that if  you are quiet and do nothing ve shall find out 
that you are left alone md all the Zulu nation scat­
tered from you by cunning md alienated from you so 
that you shall have no place of refuge md he in xrant 
of all things."3
^.A.H.A.C. in ,  p.531.
See belov, Chapter IX, pX for Han gene.
3AGO 1/7/93, Kagema X. Fuse transl by T. A. Jackson.
In this o u t , i t  oaa be argued that Magena vho had bssn Bishop 
Colenso* 0 interpreter aad printer, vas influenced by his association 
vith the Colenso fam ily.1 On the other hand, it  may v e il be that 
i t  vas the v iew  o f people lik e  Magena that enabled the Colensos
to see the Zulu Royal family in so different a light to that o f most
2of their contemporaries. As ve shall eee, hovever, Harriet te 
Colenso vas in oontaot vith the early nationalist leaders and un­
doubtedly through her there vas an interaction betveen the a ffairs 
o f the Zulu Royal family and Zulu nationalism on the one hand, and 
the relatively  later and broader nationalism o f the vestem type, 
educated Christian leadership at the turn of the century.
I f  Christian Africans vere claiming to speak on
behalf o f their pagan brethren and vere trying to create
%a Zulu nationalism, i t  is  also significant that while there vere 
undoubtedly many chiefs vho wanted to get rid  of the Christians in  
their tribes and \ho fe lt  that they and the traditional values of
S lim  In Zttlulwtd «ad B .tri,. p .498. Col. Col. 139
vol. I I , Correspondence M. Clarke to Ag&es Colenso (oopy) 28.3*96. 
fo r  a eulogy on Magena who vaa his ohief informant see Bryant, O.T.. 
p.498. Magana vaa also the author of s traditional history, Abentu 
Abaporama (Black People). In the 1890s hs had accompanied the Royal 
family to St. Helena and had taught Dinusulu to read and write.
The Governor hovever thought he might cause trouble end replaced 
him vith Daniels instead, fo r  Daniels see above, Chapter YU.
CO 27/10/4682, Harrietts Colenso to Sse. St. 11.3*90 and Mlnuts,
E. fa ir fie ld , 12.3*90.
^Belov, p. SS^-
5See e .g . the xensrk of V.H.A.C. that "the cleavage betveen the 
kraal k a ffir  and the Christian is  no longer as great as i t  used 
to be." pp. 8-9, Report.
their people vere being undermined by them,^  there vere others
vho vhilo not vantin  ^ themselves to become converted Christians
vere beginning to realise the value of vestem education. It
is significant that, as has already been mentioned, although there
vere a number of mission stations in the heart of the troubled
areas, none of them vere destroyed by the rebel impis, even though
they vere deserted by the vhite missionaries and their black oon-
2verts vere intimidated into joining the rebel forces.
While hovever it can be shovn that the bulk of Christian 
Africans did not join the uprieing, it is also clear that they 
did not join in the defence of the government as heartily as on 
pre;*i6tra ocoasionB. Amongst Sibindi's Boxavu people it is true it vas 
***• Kolya apparently vho first rallied to his call for aid. They 
vere adherent a of the Norvegian Mission Society. Some three hundred 
inhabitants of the Wesleyan Methodist settlement at Sdendale,
traditionally the most enthusiastic and effective of the govera-
3ment's allies, fought for it  again this time. Their constant
1Cf the complaint of Hnqamdi (Newcastle) before the N.N.A.C. 1906-7 that 
"most of the girls vho became pregnant amongst them vere those vho wore 
clothes. •• /vhich/ had been brought about by the introduction of 
Christianity.. This is one example amongst many.
2See above, Chapter V.
i* 9 *>
3Cd 3027, no. 49, Got. to S.0. St. 18.5.06.
loyalty had its  roots in origins of their settlement vhich had
been founded by Hey. Allison vith & band of Svazi refugees in 1347
On the other hand, the Driefontein tfesleyans who had broken away
from Oden dale and bought their own faiti in 1865 thou^i they had
2remained orthodox members of the church at the time, vere 
noticeably reluctant to take up arms for the Government in 1906.
There vore several reasons for this. In general there vould appear 
to have been sympathy vith the grievances of the rebels, although 
the Kolva realised the futility of violent methods as H. C. Hativane, 
Secretary of the Ratal Native Congress pointed out.^ There vere 
also more specific reasons for the lack of enthusiasm at Driefontein. 
Several men there complained that they had not been adequately 
revarded for their services during the Boer War, and tbfc they 
had not been trained aa a fighting corps, despite their requests 
for military training over the past tventy years. There vas also 
some opposition to R*C.A» Sanuelson's recruiting schemes from the 
local magistrate. Perhaps one of the most Important factors, 
hovever, vas the conversion of a large number of the men to the 
Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion, a distinctly pacifist body
*See Rev. J. Whiteside, A Historyof the Wesleyan Methodist Church 
of S.A.. London 1906, pp* 559-62.
2Ibid.. p.369.
^Cited in A Question of Colour by Anon (Miss E. M. Green), London,
1906, p.276.
^R.C.A.Samueleoa, Long. Iona ago, p .150 (Durban, 1929)* and 
SEA l /l /5 4 1 ^ .54.4. Report R.C.A.Samuelson.
none" of its oonverts had participatsd on either side.1 The son
of the chief at Driefontein, Johannes Kumalo, was, according to
Leaves of Healing the sect's newspaper, their leading advocate 
2there? to HoCallum, this was proof that the Driefontein men 
were "rebels at heart".^
Apart from their realisation hovever that there was little  
likelihood of success against the ifcite man's machine gyms, there 
vere other reasons for the neutrality of the Amakolwa aa a group. 
Fundamentally they still identified themselves vith the values 
of the tfliite man, and wished to be received by him as an equal.
Armed warfare could not achieve these rights -  as Dube pointed out
Aon several occasions in Ilanga lase Natal. -  what they needed 
vas education and political organisation.
The foxmatlon of the ^atal Native Congress in 1900 is an 
indication of the Amakolwa's awareness of the importance of political 
organisation. This developed out of a smallgroup of exempted Zulu
1SHA 1/1/364-^, Minute TJ.S.K.A.
*19.4 • 07, ^eport of a two weeks' conference held at Kalfcoenkronts.
A oopy of this paper was found in SNA 1/1/364^22 heavily scored 
in blue pencil by Samuelson and HoCallum who feit that "Zionism" and
pacifism were distinctly dangerous.
5SNA l/l/543^?g^> Minute Go t .  2.7.06.
- < o O O - k \ l
eg. 23.2.06 and 2.3*06. See also Chapter IX, p^for the increased 
awareness of this after the disturbances.
which claimed with pride at the end of the disturbances that
calling themselves the "Funemalumcelo" into & more representative 
body. It  v&s then called the Natal Native Congress,1 probably 
following the example of the Natal Farmers' Congress and the Indian 
Congress which had originally been founded by Gandhi in the Trans­
vaal, but had spread to Natal by 1894 as the Natal Indian Congress. 
Its f ir s t  meeting, held in July 1900, set the tone for subsequent 
assemblies. Thus after prayers and hymns, loyal resolutions vere 
passed and votes of thanks proposed to the Queen,the Prince of Wales, 
Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Milner, tiie Governor of Natal, Lord Roberfc, 
Sir Redvers Buller and a ll those who had fallen in the Boer War.
George Herbert Hulett, a so lic ito r  in Verulam and son of Sir James
oLiege Hulett, a former Secretary of Native Affairs, vas in the
It vas in Hulett's o ffice  that H, C. Mativane, the firs t  
Secretary of the Natal Congress, worked. It would appear that 
both G. H. Hulett and his father took a not unsympathetic interest 
in the Christian community at Groutville. Sir Liege, himself one 
of the most important sugar farmers in the colony, helped the Grout­
v ille  farmers market the sugar they had been growing since 1859,
4and had a fa irly  high opinion of the settlement. In his opening
^.H.A.C. Evid. H. Lublili, p .973.
^In the Btms Cabinet o f 1897-9.
"'Report in Katal Mercury. 8,6.1900.
4S.A.M.A.C. Tol. Ill, p. 166-7, Erid. J. L. Hulett. 110
address, Mark iladebe, another of the founders of the Congress, 
and twioe its  Secretary, welcomed George H ulett'e presence because 
he fe lt  "The natives must not rely on themselves too much, but 
endeavour to en list the sympathies of English gentleman''.1 Although 
H ulstt's presence at the meeting led the Undersecretary fo r  Retire
Affairs to refer to the "serious p o litica l significance of this
2movement, promoted and engineered . by Europeans”, H ulett's 
remarks at the Conference vere ch iefly  devoted to advising the 
Africans to advance slowly and to supporting the views of tiie meeting 
that sympathetic vhite members should represent them in Parliament. ^  
Prom his evidence to the 1905-5 -frioan Native A ffairs Commission, 
Hulett would appear to hare been a firm believer in cutting up 
Reserve land into individual allotments.^ Otherwise i t  is  d ifficu lt 
to see what he had in common vith the Congress, though his family
ware known for their Methodism vhich may have provided the link*
5He had also acted as adviser to the Svasi in 1894* He vas, hovever,
^For Radebe, see below.
2SNA l/4 /8  o||00, Minute 8.5.00.
^Katal Mercury. 8.6.1900.
*S.A.H.A.C. I l l ,  p .915.
5
See Rev. J. Whiteside, A History of the Wesleyan Kethodiot Church 
of S. A frica (1906), p.389. S.A.H.A.C. I l l ,  pp. 919 and 922-3.
one o f  the fo v  people in  Hatal vho eav the advantage o f  the
public holding o f  p o l i t io a l  meetings, and be lieved  in freedom
o f  speech as a sa fe ty  valve fo r  the more educated and prosperous
Africans* Even 0* H. Ib ile tt , hovever, f e l t  that formal permission
should be obtained from the Governor fo r  the holding of pu b lio
meetings by A frican s, that "under no con sid eration " shouldthe
African obtain the fran ch ise , and th a t, hovever h igh ly  educated,
he could never he "put on the same le v e l"  as the ifc ite  man.*
Within a couple o f  months o f  this meeting, Congress claimed
to have twenty three d iffe re n t  lo c a l committees scattered  throughout 
2
Natal. In August a l l  o f  these sent -their representatives to a 
meeting held under the Chairmanship o f  Chief Isaac KJdLze. I ts  
aim according to spokesmen l ik e  Stephen Mini, Mark Radebe, Martin 
Luthuli and John Dube, vas to  enable the n ative population  to 
express i t s  fe e lin g s  and bring i t s  grievances to the a ttention  
of the Government. Prominent amongst the re s o lu t io n s  of this 
time vere requests f o r  d ire c t  representation in  Parliament -  by 
fou r  e le c ted  European members -  and that Native and Mission Reserve
^•S.A.ir.A.C., I l l ,  p .923.
2Christian Express. 1 .10 .1900, p .147.
5IW ds.
lands be cut up into allotments vith fixed t it le . Throughout 
its  existence, individual land-tenure vas to be one of the most 
important issues to Natal Native Congress members. In 1901 there 
also va&k apparently, a proposal to send a deputation from the 
Natal Native Congress to England, in order to express Zulu view 
on the var settlement.1 Nothing came of it  hovever.
At the same time as the formation o f the Congress, the 
f ir s t  non-micsionary paper in Natal -  Ineoa lo  -  appeared,
apparently sponsored very largely by the same groupe o f people 
that founded the Congress. Thus the editor vaa Mark Radebe, perhaps 
a typical representative of the group. He vas born in Pieter­
maritzburg, o f Sotho origin and had been educated at hovedalef 
after working in & large departmental store in  Pietermaritsburg, 
he had acquired his own drapery store. In addition to his politioal 
interests, he vas a Methodist loca l Preacher, choir master and
2organist, and vas generally extremely active in Churoh matters.
By 1901, Ipepa had five-hundred and f if t y  subscribers and distributed 
f if t y  free copies. The publishers vere Chief Isaac Kkise and James 
Mjozl, both Wesleyan Methodists.^ The paper, hovever, did not last
1 In n ro .  1 0 . 6 . 0 1 .
^Mweli Skota, The African Yearly Register (JWb£ 1931), p#84.
The African Yearly Register is  an invaluable "black man's Who'e Who" 
-  unfortunately i t  only appeared onoei
33HA l/4 /9  Minute 15.1.07.
very long -  th* end of 1901, after a couple o f qppareatly
inflammatory le tters1 b*d appeared jh its  columns, Hkiae and
Hjosi vere summoned before the Under Secretary for  Native Affairs*
a result of his Mfriendly varaing", the chiefs "voluntarily"
refused to take out a licence for its  publication in the f o i l  ovine 
2year •
Host leaders of the Natal Native Congress vere to denoun oe 
the "Ethiopian Movement", at any rate in so far as i t  vas anti­
white, and to dissociate themselves froa it* Hkise and Mjosi 
maintained that i t  vas "the young people" vho vere responsible 
for the inflammatory tone of Ipepa. '  This may simply have been 
an attempt to overcome government hostility# but 1he entire policy 
of the Congress, its  tone of cautious accommodation and its  
appeal fo r  vhite support, vould seem to have arisen out of a 
response to the European settlers which vas different in kind
from that o f the Ethiopian Churches* Thus timidity and moderation
%
(to say nothing of suspicion of Booth)"* may ve il have lain behind
^See e.g. Ipepa 14*12.00. Translation in SNA 1/4/8 "The
Boers say that Africa is  theirs, but the English say i t  belongs 
to them, but ve the aborigines of the country what do ve say?
God ••• is  strong Africa belongs to the black man*** I f  you 
do not remember me I w ill send you a strange nation, i t  w ill be 
fierce  and devour a l l . " m This passage vhich combines both millensiL 
and po litica l beliefs is  one of the few using both approaches I 
hare found.
S^HA 1/4/9 Hinutes 15.1.01, 29.1.01 and 27.2.01.
o^HA 1/4/9 c|1, Minute 27.2.01.
A^BH 7 /l /2 , Annual Report 1897 by B.H, Bridgman H.D. vho suggests 
Africans mistrusted his motives.
the rejection of Joseph Booth's schemes by the intellectuals
he called together to discuss his proposals fo r  establishing
his African Christian Union in 1896*  ^ The reason given by
Shepperson and Price -  that after the death of Bishop Colenso
2the Zulu vere unable to trust any vhite man -  may perhaps here 
been the viev of a small number of the hundred and tventy men 
pibsont; on the other hand, a vhite man had been called on for 
assistance in the formation o f the Congress* In 1907 vhen the 
passions vhich had been kindled by the disturbances vere s t il l  
running high, Congress enlisted the aid of Ralph ?athorn, another 
advocate and member of parliament* Although at this point there 
vas controversy over vhether a vhite man should be invited to 
the meeting -  Mark R&debe being very strongly opposed to it  -  the
Amajority of those present considered that he vas necessary*
Almost a ll the leaders of the Natal Native Congress and of 
the Iliso  LeSisve Esimayaaa vhioh vaa founded af ter the 1906
disturbances to oppose Frederick Moor's proposed reform of native
5
leg isla tion , appear to have remained members of European controlled
^Cf the attitude of J* T. Jabavu in the editorial columns of Imvo 
vho regarded Booth "as a great enemy to our people" because he v i l l  
arouse enmity betveen vhite and black* (imvo. 12.1.96)
2G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African. p*76*
3See belov, Chapter IX, p* 60 ^
^Ilanfta lase Natal. 14*6*07 and 26*7.07*
5See belov, Chapter IX, ^p* 5 8 1 -  $87
missionary bodies. Most of them were drawn from the Wesleyan
Kethodist and United Free Church of Scotland missions and from
the stations of the American Zulu Mission -  men like Stephen Kini,
Saul Ksane and M&xk ^adebe from the f ir s t , B. Cele and S. Nyongwana
from the second, or Martin Luthuli, P. J. Gumede and John Dube
from the third. Many of them remained prominent in Church po litics .^
Thus Martin Luthuli and John Dube played a prominent part in
trying to get the group which broke away from the American Zulu
mission in 1896 under Simungu B&faaini Shibe to rejoin the parent
2body in 1901, but with only partied success. It  is  incidentally 
of interest to notice that at the meeting of reconciliation between 
representatives of the mission and some of the Separatists, by 
that time known as the Zulu Congregational Church, i t  was necessary
In 1909 fo r  example Maphtali Qule, Simeon Kaabula and the Rers.
A. Mtimkulu and Ngana were elected to the Wesleyan Methodist D istrict 
Committee1 the f ir s t  three were a ll aotire p o litica lly . J. M. Majozl,
I Kk±se, S. Katwane and Z. Mdmang were elected lay representatives 
to the Wesleyan Methodist Conferenoei the fira t  two were associated
with Ipeoa la  Hlanga and Congress, the tvo later share surnames with 
the Secretary o f Congress in 1906, H. C. Hativane, and with Selby and 
Richard Ksimang who vere later prominent in A.N.C. and even I.C.U. 
activ ities, f Methodist Churchman. 16.2.09^ Similarly “though there 
were signs of tension both between Bryant Cele (ia t Vice Pres, of 
N.N.C.) and the missionary Dr. Dewar, and Dube and the A.Z.K., neither 
seem to have le ft  their parent organisation, Dube remaining a pastor 
in the Church until 1908 (see p. 544 ) and Bryant Cele acting as 
Secretary of Natal Native Preachers Conference. (U.F.C. of Seotland 
5-14-161, Dewar-1 to Smith, 6.3.02).
Q f
ABM IV/1/ 4, Committee Reports, C. M.KSLbon, Report o f Native Annual
Meeting, 23.1.01.
^For the sp lit see "Christianity and the Natives of S. Africa" by A. Lea, 
pp. $7-8 in A Yearbook o f S. Afr. Missions, compiled and ed. J.D.Taylor 
(Lovedale, 1927)* Sundkler. Bantu Prophets, pp. 45-6 and ABM Y Il/5 /l 
Matters relating to Native Churches 1897-1904.
to find a name fo r  the African section o f the misaion. hot one 
vote vas cast for the Zulu Congregational ^hurch; "what seemed 
to carry the vote against i t  vas that i t  vas too tr ib a l, sectional, 
lim ited -  'A frican1 having wider meaning than '^alu '"#1 As 
early as 19 06 Dube advocated an African national Congress in South 
Africa.
The Rev. John Dube, in some ways the epitome o f the new in­
dependent Afrioan, was perhaps in a class o f his ovn in Hatal. the 
object o f much suspicion on the part of the Hatal government,he
2vas regarded as a '’pronounced Ethiopian1' vho ought to be v&tched.
He himself at a la ter date viewed his a ctiv ities as a struggle 
"to harmonise the best Hative aspirations vith the best European 
opinion", and complainsd o f being called an Ethiopian by those
3 .vho misunderstood his attitude. Although this remark vaa made 
in 1922, Dube's letters to Marshall Campbell aad 7. R. Moor in
41907-8 vould appear to conform vith this viev. Bom in 1871 
he vas the second son of James Dube, pastor o f the Inanda Churoh
A^lflt rv /l/4 , Committee Reports, Report of Annual Meeting, 23.1.01, op. 
2C0179/235/22645, Gov. to S*c. S t., 30.5.06.
'MJo B rit. Empire S 22 G 191 (i.F .S . tapers, Hhod.es House), J.L. Dube 
to C.Ae Wheelwright, Chief Hative Commissioner fo r  Hatsl, 14.6.22 
and H.N.A.C. Evid., p .962. ^ee also The Clash o f Colour, by J. L.
Dube and Archdeacon Lee, Durban 1926.
^Marshall Campbell papers, bantu Section, K.C.L. See also the attack
on Ubutopia ("Ethiopianism") in Ilanga. 2.3*06 •
of the v^Hierioan Aulu mission. His grandmother had been one of 
Daniel Lindley's earliest converts in Natal. In 1887» Dube 
went on his f ir s t  trip to the United States with the Rev. V. C.
Wilcox, his Journey being paid for, so the story goes, by thirty
igold sovereigns le ft  by his father for his education.
-according to Wilcox, i t  was on Itabe's second v is it  to the 
States that he met Booker Washington whose work at Tuskagee was 
to have a profound effect on him and led to the founding c f Dube* a 
own ^ulu Christian Industrial School. It was on this occasion 
too that he met both Joseph Booth and Chilembwe who were in the 
United States fo r  the purpose of raising funds fo r  missionary
3endeavours in Africa. During the course of his v is it  he also 
came Into oontaot with other negro independent Ohurch leaders 
in the States. Although Shepperson and Price state that he was 
assisted in his efforts to raise money for his school by the leaders 
of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, on his return to Natal 
he retained his links with the American 4xlu mission, uhoee pastor 
he was at Inanda until 1908, when he resigned from the pastorate,
^Por Dube* s early background see J. L. Dube, A Talk upon My Native Land. 
Rochester, 1892 (microfilm obtained froa N.Y. Pub lic  Library).
2W. C. Wilcox, "The Booker Washington of S.A.I The Story o f John Dube" in
the Congregational. 10.3.1927, found in K.C.L. A?-. * ... See also 
the -imerican _3ulu Mission Annual. 1902.
Shepperson and Price, Independent African, pp. 91-23
but not, i t  would appear, from the A.Z.M.*" There were, however,
signs o f tension in his relation ship with the vhite miaeionsriee
2after hia return from a fund raising tour o f the States in 1905*
According to Jordan Ngubaae, who knev him personally, he waa even on 
one occasion barred from holding a service in the church at Insnda
n
by the white missionary. Unfortunately, Mr. Ngubane does not 
state at what date this occurred.
On his return from his second v is it  to the States, Dubs was 
watched by special detectives. £e and his uncle, Chief Mqave, whose 
son was also studying In the States, vere said to be harbouring 
treasonable designs against the State as early as 1898.^ During 
the Soer War Dube was detained for some time for alleged treasonable
5statements, and in 1902 the fact that he was friendly vith  a couple 
o f American negroes in Natal vas noted somewhat ominously, and the 
teachers and pupils of his school blacklisted.^ Dube's "questioning"
*ABK V /l/4 , Annual Report, 1908.
2Articles in Ilanra lase Natal and Dube's extreme anger at the 
Mission Reserve Aot^at what he fe lt  was the collusion of missionaries
in i t  could partly explain friction  at this time. See e.g. Ilaru:a 
15.11.07 and 20.3.08.
5^An African Explains Apartheid. London, 1963, p.84.
4SNA 1/ 4/5 <M, I n t .l l . R«porta. Si*. SHA l /4 /l2  0 ~ , Reports on J. Dube's 
teachings. ^
S^NA 1/1/296 o™ , Minutes of interview between S.N.A. and A.Z.M. 
missionaries, 3.4.02.
S^KA 1/4/9 Detective (A fr.) Report on Dube. SKA l/4 /l2 0 r . Reports 
o f deteotlves on sehool, friends end pupils.
attitude, hia b e lie f that" ju stice  vould be done only vhen the
African ruled the country", perhaps not surprisingly, led whites 
to regard him as an agitator.* Tho fact that his speeches vere, 
on the whole, reported back in rather dramatic terms by the native
2constable appointed to follow his movements did not improve matters.
In 1903 Dube started his paper Ilan~a lase Hatal in Zulu
and English, a paper which is  s t i l l  in existence today. Dube was
to use its  columns to express tho grievances he fe lt  the Africans
o f Hatal, both tribal and Christian, were suffering under. On
several occasions the Minister for Native Affairs, between 1904 and
1906, H. 3 . Winter, was sorely tempted to suppress this ’’mischievous"
paper, but was apparently restrained by the advice of the Attorney 
*
General. Dube, being exempted from N a t i v e  Law, could not be dealt
vith as summarily as both the Minister and the Governor might hare
wished. During the disturbances, however, especial exception was
taken to an article  he wrote i nllanga on the 4th May entitled 
4SgkssL Bantu. In this burden of his message was that while the
*J. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid, p .71.
2S.e reports In f ile s  SNA 1/ 4/9 0 ^ , SNA l /4 /l2  <j|^
5SNA l/l/34Q S|p-, Minutes Gov. and M.N.A. 21.8.06, 20.9.06.
^Translated in SNA l/l/3 4 0 * jffi, but acc. to the missionaries of 
the A.Z.H. not very accurately. Vukani Bantu, meaning "Arise, 0 people" 
vas interpreted as an invitation to rebellion.
Indians and Coloureds raised funds in order to bring their 
grievances before the Imperial Government, and vere aided in this 
by their friends in Britain, amongst the Africans there vas only 
indifference.
Dube therefore called upon the Zulu people to raise money 
and send delegates to England to try to remedy such grievances as 
the high rents imposed on Mission Reserves, the compulsory labour 
system, the 1 ass lavs as veil aa various other lavs considered 
oppressive by both Christian and tribal Africans. As a result of 
this a rtic le , Dube vas brought before the Governor and forced 
to make a public renunciation and apology, both in hia own paper 
and in the other Natal newspapers. 1 In the view of the American 
missionary, John Dexter Taylor, Dube's wridngs vere not intended to 
s t ir  up seditious feelings amongst the African populace -  indeed 
in February and March 1906 Dube warned the tribesmen that an appeal
to arms vould never help the black man and that even i f  some of the
olaws vere not approved, the Zulu vere obliged to obey them. The 
American missionary was sure, after translating the article himself
1C0 179/235/22645, Oov. to 3*c . St.k 30.5.06.
2llanga lase Natal. 23.2.06 and 3.3.06. Cf alao.l-laa^a lace .total. 
10.11.05 (transl. H. C. lugg in SNA l/l/3 2 9  " . . .  It tti. Ilanga
does find fault with this /VollJ Tax . i t  nan to fbd b o x. fau lt with 
the remarks made by those natives in jurban, vho said they vould not 
pay the money. Such ecu temptuous speech to tho Government is  not right. 
It is  ve il that the natives ehould leam  to be more respectfu l."
:* 1 *f
and catting aa indapandaai Zulu translation o f i t ,  that 3. 0.
Scmuelson, the Under Secretary for Ttetive A ffairs, misinterpreted
Dube in several instances and read into the Zulu words more than
was actually there•
The crux of the matter , however, was probably expressed by
the Governor, Sir Henry KcCallum when he declared in his interview
with Dube -  which was already been partly quoted, "You w ill find
from our newspapers that even the white people, who are the ruling
race -  and I presume you will acknowledge that we are the ruling
race -  have determined that there shall he no discussion in native
affairs while the rebellion exists. In the same way we expect
you to lend us your influence , , ,  by advising the chiefs and
■embers of the tribes rightly. Tou must understand that those
wwho are not for us, are against us."
Dube's rather humble reply, that he was a young man, rather 
easily swayed by his feelings and not guilty of any Intentional 
disloyalty towards the government, and his promise to fu lly  retract 
his words in the next issue 6f Ilaaga to some extent apparently
l l l / l / ,  p .347, Letterbook: J. D. Taylor to F. F. Churchill, K.L.A.
2See above, p. ooo
3Co 179/235/22646, O o t . to Sec. S t., deep. 103, 30.5.06. Snol. 
interview with J, L. Dube,
assuaged the government; a few months later HoCallum vaa able 
to write o f the admirable way in which Dube was aiding the 
government in preventing the spread of a rebellion .* There oan 
be l i t t le  doubt that even before hie meeting with the Supreme 
Chief, Dube was fu lly  aware of the im possibility of fighting 
the white men's bullets with assegais cad the incantations of 
witch doctors* It vas apparently his influence idiich kept the 
Chief Hqave and the bulk o f his people, the Qadi, from joining 
the resistance despite the fact that many o f them were right 
in the heart o f the troubled area (Hapumulo) and were d ea rly  
restless over the Poll Tax. Pour hundred Qadi aided Col* MoKensie 
in the Hapumulo district*'*
I t  is  not surprising that the emergence of the "new movement" 
in both religion  and p o lities  vas noted especially amongst the 
members o f the American Zulu Mission and of the Wesleyan Methodist 
Missions.* The Wesley ana end the American Board were the earliest 
entrants in the Hatal Mission Field, md oould count among their
*Cd 3247# Gov. to S#o* S t., no* 27, 4.8*06.
2See c.g* Hanes lass Hatal, Feb. md Haroh 1906.
^Cd 3247, Gov* to Sec* St*, no* 27, 4.8*06*
*To some extent what follows applies in lesser degree to the United 
Free Churoh o f Sootlmd vhioh also was producing p o lit ica lly  
oonsoious md articulate converts like S* Hyongwana md Bryant Cels 
at this time*
follow ers second and even third generation Christians.1 Outstanding 
nen o f both Missions had had the opportunity o f studying outside 
Xatal y whether in the Cape Province at Eealdtown or Lovedale as 
was the oase vith nost o f the ^esleyan converts lik e  Saul Xsane 
or J. T. Oumede, or in the States lik e Dube or Pixley ka Isaka Seme, 
both of the American mission.
The Missionaries o f both these bodies had had great faith  
in the educative value of individual land tenure and had encouraged 
their converts to acquire their own land and settle  down as Christian 
communities. The Wesleyan Methodist settlements at Sdendale and 
Driefontein, fo r  example, vere on land bought by the Africans
themselves and vere governed by twelve officers eleoted by the
2shareholders, important training in self-government• Other 
syndicates had been formed on similar lines and fa ir ly  extensive 
farms amounting in a ll to 37,000 acres had been bought, especially 
in  the Klip-River and Dundee magisterial divisions, where there were 
no government reserves. I t  vas largely due to ths endeavours of 
Aldvin Croat o f ths American Zulu Mission that large Mission Re­
serves had been eet aside by the Government o f Xatal in 1856, an 
important factor in giving th# Christian Communities cohesion and
^Sss above, Chapter I , p. 74-7#
^R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Tenses, p. 91 f .  S.A.X.A.C. I l l ,  Bvid. 
R. Plant, p .248. R. Plant was Inspector of African Schools in Xatal.
stability*1 There had also bean an experiment in individual 
land-tenure at tha Groutville Mission Station (A.Z.M.) . Although 
this had not bssn entirely auooeaaful, largely i t  would appear 
baeansa of tha failnra o f tha sugaivnill sat up by tha government 
at tha Station,2 i t  had what tad tha sppatita o f tha imerloaa Board's 
converts for tha furthar cutting up of tha Mission Reserves in to 
individual allotments*^ This i t  vas fa it  would prorida inoentive 
fo r  tha improvement of lo ts , «id  would give a aaa tha naeassary 
saourity and status in tha ooaaunity* It would also fraa tha 
Christians froa baing undsr tha jurisdiotion of a Chiaf, who vas
4.
not naeassarily sympathetic to thair beliefa* Theee oonrarts laid
graat emphasis on tha Inportaaos of private proparty and fa it  that
■an o f proparty should bara tha wots in ordar to protaot thair
5interests. I t  is  also olaar that nan who had a fa ir  sanunt of 
proparty* aa vaa tha oasa fo r  instanoa vith Staphsn Mini or Martin 
lu th u li, would n ot eaxa to Jeopardies i t  by rash actions*
It ia  notioaahla also that both tha Vsslayan Methodists and 
1ha Aaarioan Zulu Mission had prowl dad seops for tha awangalloal saal
13undkl*r, Bantu Prophatn.p.26.
V a .I .A .C ., Vol. I l l ,  I r l i .  i .  L. Hul*tt, p .167.
S^XA l/l/2 9 5  Q2^ . Thi* saams to hanr* bean * oonatant preoccupation of the 
Aaarioan missionaries sad thair converts* In 1902 Martin luthuli organised 
a petition  amongst Aaarioan Zulu Mission oonrarts vhich vas slgnsd by 
767 residents in far our of individual tenure. When a b il l  for 
establishing soaa form of individual leasehold tenure for Africans 
fa l l  through in 1906-9 i t  vaa decided to put thia into operation in 
tha Ebnrotl Mission Reserve* (Sea belov, p* )
4S*« * . , .  S.A.H.A.C. I l l ,  B rid ., Martin Luthuli, pp. 868-9.
^Ihld. Erld. Ouaede and Kaabule, p .<59.
o f their convert*. Among the Wesley ana, the Usondela movement 
vas founded in 1874 largely ** a result o f Will ism Tsylor and 
Charles Psnla's revivalist meetings held in la ta l in  1866*
This vaa o ffic ia lly  reoognised and designated the Weelevan Hative 
Hone Hlcaion in 1878 md in itia lly  vas run by four missionaries 
md eight African evangelists.* The W.M.H.M. vas paralleled 
in tile American Zulu Mission by tha Isitupa or committee of elx 
Zulu members founded in 1885 entrusted vith the indigenous mission­
ary movement. Similarly within tha indigenous African Congregational 
Church, which vaa regarded aa the fru it o f American Board1 a mission­
ary endeavours, eaoh individual church or congregation had th* 
right to decide fo r  I tse lf a ll matters o f a purely loca l nature) 
eaeh congregation could choose md call its  own minister subject 
to the approval o f the American missionaries though the ministers 
were s t i l l  trained by the Mission at schools lik e  AnansimtotL under 
European supervision. All the congregations o f the Afrlean Con­
gregational ohuzdh met annually to consider general matters md the
rulings o f tills oonferenoe vere accepted by a ll constituent churches 
2as binding. This taken together vith the le tte r  from the American
1SundkJ.«r,B«ntu Prooh.ta. p .26. L. H m oi, An Introduction to 
South African H«thodints. Qnhaastovn, 1950, pp. 79-7.
2Sundklar, Bantu Proph.t.. pp. 26-70, AM T H /8A  J.D.Taylor to T.H.Hoor,
18.6.07.
Board to a ll Its  foreign missions in February 1895 strongly ad­
vocating a self-supporting, self-propagating dhnroh -  again a 
feature vhioh can be parallelled Igr' John K ilner's v is it  to South 
Afrioa in  1882 and hia very sim ilar suggestions -  was yet a further 
factor in  the Government's h ostility  to ths American Zulu Mission.1
Their congregation si structure may v e il have predisposed 
the American Zulu Mission to sohism, md i t  has been frequently 
noted that protectant md especially congregational missionary 
organisations seem to su ffer far more from sohlsmatlo movements 
then the more heirarohioal and structured Roman Catholic md An^Licen 
ohurohee. In part this may perhaps be attributed to the greater 
moouragment o f independence and enquiry given by the oongregation- 
a lla t missionaries as va il as to their dsoentralised organisation. 
While the sohlams vara extremely upsetting to the missionaries, 
the kind of education provided md the values inculcated do seen to 
have fostered ths growth o f  a considerable oadre o f p o litica l 
leadership from amongst both the Wesleyan Methodists md ths A.Z.m., 
end to some extent from the United Free Church o f Sgotland.
The a ctiv itie s  o f the Colenso family, independent Church o f 
Ehglend missionaries in Vatal were probably also among the important 
formative factors in tho crystallisation  o f A frioanpolitioal
1Sundkl«r, Bttttt Prophof. p .30.
r : *
opinion and techniques. And perhaps also In creating the ataosphere 
o f separatism I After e l l , Bishop Colenso was the fir s t  leader 
o f an Independent Church in Hatalv after his exoonm ication hy 
the Bishop o f Cape Town in 1863 on oharges o f heresy.1 Part of this 
heresy was that polygamiets should he admitted to Baptism. The 
Colenso contribution was perhaps rather different to that o f the 
other mission bodies mentioned. The actual mission work of ths 
Colenso Church would appear to hare been negligible af ter the ex- 
communication o f the Bishop, and certainly after his death. Their 
convert© did not become leaders o f eithsr separatist sects or 
p o lltloa l organisations. Instead there seems some evidence that a 
couple o f separatist church preachers at the TJsuthu actually joined 
the Church o f England ( i .e .  the Coleaslte body) in the years before 
Dinusulu1 s arrest. On the other hand, as has already been pointed 
out, members of ths Colenso family, but especially the Bishop and 
his daughter Harrietts, themselves became spokeamoi o f the Zulu.
On the whole Harriett# wss more concerned with the situation in 
Zululand, sad ths plight o f the Zulu Royal family, after ths 1879 
war, although she also took a keen interest in the affairs o f Hatal.
^For the merit recent book on the religious aspects o f Biahop Colenso's 
I l f .  ••• P. Jofaa WUXlm Colwuo. Bjahop o f H.ttf. (London,
1964). DvP. Morris, Th. Wwhing of th. Sp.ara. Brook.» and Wbb, A 
History of Natal and V. Rees, Letters from Hatal are reocit works vhioh 
deal b rie fly  vith his osspaigas on behalf o f Africans.
^Report o f Hatal Lands Commission, 1902, p .26.
jj  Vhile the part aha played aa adviser to Dinusulu haa bean discusaed 
in greater detail above, the type of agitation she in itiated  -  
pamphleteering, petitioning, organising pressure groups -  vaa to 
oonstltute aa important lesson in "Claphaa sect” methodology fo r  
the Africans o f fa ta l,1 Her activ ities oould not fa il to hare 
their Impact on the in telligentaia  of fa ta l, fo r  there mas in ter­
action between the a ffa irs o f Zululand and the a ffa irs o f fatal# 
fa r  tin  Luthuli fo r  exaaple vaa Dinusulu's secretary during the 
1880a, and auat then hare beoome avare of the p o litioa l forces at 
play in Zululand, while Dinusulu*a secretary, Leonard foapaai, in 
1907-8 vas also a member o f the Groutville community. Presumably 
i t  vaa through their jo in t e fforts on Dinusulu1 s behalf that Martin 
luthuli and Harrietts Colenso f ir s t  met.2 In 1899 he, Saul Ksane
and Josiah Qu&ede met her to discuss the formation o f the fata l
3 1Katire Congress. She maintained her sympathy and contact vith 
the educated mid p o litica lly  conscious Afrloans fo r  the rest o f 
her U fa.*
1See S. X. Horwae, M&fa, ^  ' CVc^ pl^ cvn v^ C-tVvocioV^ ^
2Col. Col. 189, betters from Martin Luthuli to H.E.Colenso date 
from 1885 onwards.
Col. Col. 120. H.B.Colenso diary, 21.12.00.
*See my'Harrietts Colenso and the Zulus, 1870-1915!! J.A.H.. IH , 1963*
There vaa at the turn of the century an evident "ferment"
amongst the educated Africans in South Africa aa a Whole which
vas commented on by several authorities. To the A.Z.K. missionary
Rev. Bridgsnaa this vas a not unwelcome signs "Although raising
d ifficu lt  problems /I t7  was . . .  an encouraging indication .• • an
awakening froa the sleep o f agee and a villingneaa to aseuae
respon sib ility".1 Other observers vere less sympathetic. Many
labelled the entire phenomenon "Bthiopiaaian", a movement which had
as its  aim "Africa fo r  tha Africans". Tet in Ratal, this "Ethiopian-
isa" can be seen to be composed o f many strands. At one level i t
was expressed in m illenisl fantasies and dreams, lik e  those of
the lunatic vho
"got up In Durban outside the gardens, sprang up on 
the palllsade there and cried that hems the Lord 
Jesus Christ and that ha came there to lead the 
natives into their ova kingdom, end to take possession 
o f the land which vaa a black man's land."2
On another, i t  vas represented by the African who informed a member
o f the Ratal Legislative Assembly that in two years time he vould
ovn a store on the main street in Durban aad "that a vhite man vould
work fo r  him".^ Kjongo and Hakanda and the separatist seots vere
^Rov. B. R. Bridgaman, K.D. ABK V /l/2 , Annual Report o f A.Z*X. 1897.
^ .L .a . Debates, Vol. 34§ Debate on Mission Reserves B ill, 21.7*03, 
Speech KoLatty, R.L.A.
?XMd.
evidence of i t , 1 as vers Dube and Radebe and Stephan Mini, and 
ths Ratal Native Congress. It vas the product o f many and varied 
factors, although nervous whites wore of course correct in attributing 
i t  predominantly to the work of the Mission arise. P olitica l epi­
sodes gift* i t  substance: the defeat and subjection of Zululand
on the one hand and the Anglo-Boer war on ths other were obviously
shaping events* To a ll these faotozv oust be added the e ffect of
2the whirlwind v is it  in 1896 o f Joseph Booth, that turbulent sp irit 
in African missions and p o lit ic s . Although his scheme for setting 
up en African Christian Union to regain "A frica fo r  the Africans" 
was rejected at the tine, the readiness with which ths Africans 
attended his meetings, and their "unmietskeable general approval 
of his utteranoes and plana" not only "illustrated the sp irit 
and danger o f the times", and increased vhite suspicions of 
African intentions: they undoubtedly contributed to the "strange
leaven working amongst the educated K affirs throughout the country".* 
While a ll the p o lit ica lly  conscious Kolva;however moderate ? vere 
indiscriminately lumped together by most whites with the leaders of
^ e e  above, p*Si7’ « d  Chapter ▼, p. ^ o \ -
^For Booth in *atal see C. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent 
JQttMftt. P* 74 f f .
**AUI V /l/2 , Annual Report 1897 by B.y.Brldgeman, M.D.
*Y.R.Harkham, The lew Era In S.A .. London,1904, p*177.
a ll the independent sects ae "seditious Ethiopians" f "busy bodies, 
in existence more for the harm of the native than otherw ise",1 
their approach would appear to here differed considerably from
that o f the seot leaders, and they vere at great pains to deny
2their "Fthiopianian" • I t  ia true that both the no resents -  tha 
religious and the p o litioa l -  arose to some extent out o f the sane 
general background facto rat the imposition and extension of whits 
rule, the resentment caused fcy the oolour bar, the struggle over 
land and labour.? they also both drew their leadership from the 
ranks o f the Christian converts o f Southern A frica. Nevertheless 
the relationship of the tec vas not the "directional one" argued
Aby many authorities. Chronologically the independent churoh 
movement preceded the more conventional p o litica l a ctiv ities ; but 
their relationship ean best be expressed as that between different 
sides o f the same coin.
^S.A.N.A.O., I l l ,  p.98« Brid. O.A.R.Lsbibtour, Attorney General 
Natal.
2Aoo. to A. Vilakaxi "the Separatist Churches... ere regarded as 
catering to the uneducated people and ae being led by illite ra te  men." 
But this attitude j*ay be a later development. Zulu Transformations.
p .101.
^B,O.M.Sundvlo r„  bantu Prophets, pp. 32-3*
For an extreme statement of this viewpoint see fo r  example 
P. Worsley,"Millenarian Movements in Melanesia' in Shodee-Liringstone 
Journal, no. 2, p. 18 f f .
It vould be wrong to label a ll the independent sects nanti- 
white" -  indeed not a ll o f thsm even participated in the 1906 
disturbanoeat aad I have been able to find no references to the 
largest o f the A.Z.M. splinter groups, S. B. Shibe's Zulu Congre­
gational Church as actually taking part in the fighting1 -  none­
theless there vould appear to have been a considerable difference 
betveen their act o f breaking away from a European dominated church 
and the aspirations o f the majority of the p o lit ica lly  conscious 
Anakolwa. vho sought acceptance by white society and integration 
within i t .  This difference probably explains in large measure the 
difference in their degree of participation in the disturbances.
Thus it  can be seen that the Kolwa o f Natal took up no 
single stand on ths 1906 disturbances! they wars as divided as their 
fellow  tribesmen. Vhile about three hundred Christian levies fought 
on ths government side, an equal number joined the rebel a, vhile 
the majority even in the areas o f m ilitary operations, tried to re­
tain a precarious neutrality* It ia o f oourse d ifficu lt  to estimate 
the influence of those vho joined the rebels, but i t  vould not 
appear to have been profound. As we have seen, the rebellion , in so 
far as there waa a real rebellion , vas predominantly a tribal one,"
1?or Shibe see Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p.45. SNA lA /592^?2, 
Minutes on Shibe, attempting -  unsuccessfully -  to find him g&ilty 
o f seditious preaching during tdm Boer War.
2See Chapters T and TI.
van ao t* r  as poM lU i on traditional linos* THo popalar A t t f  
W llo f tU t tho Ethiopian* hod fdowtod tho dtoturtamooo would 
oppoar to oolaaldo with tho thooiy fh d lU r  in  South Afrio«a  
and iaAood oolon lol hiotory of "agitator* caaood roW lliooa* Aa 
tho tor* H« D • Ctafdonoagh w o to ia  hlo Annual depart to tho 
Aaorloan Board o f Xiooloao ia l$Cds
*U for tii* Hkimitt attrrln* *  N M U m ,
1 fuiiv OaLiowo thoar are oaeahlo of our ooooot of 
■ U tiiin u  it i  N titU «t talk, M  that th*y km  
Mffioioat i^TFuirrt^  with tho hoothon people to ho 
iU * to attr u» n n m I hr|* trihos to oyoa r*- 
*oLiiua aoooo to oo ia tho a mi mn i o t  poviliVO pwooi* 
f aooofliviot"^
—  ■ - * ■■■ 1 ■■■ -  "  ■ ■ ■ ■ ■    ■     ..
XAB» f /1 /4 .  31a. tr l« . I.I.A .C ., y.72. r*
SbaSat-Ji
■I thank Baabata* I thank Baabata vary 
nioh. tfoold thia sp irit night oontimiai 
I do not m u  tha Baabata of tha hith sho 
pari shad at Bkandhla, hat 1 naan this nav 
sp ir it shiah va hara Just haard explained."
Christian Afrloaa at a aaa tin t hsld 
hr John Saba in  Balulsnd to atplain 
tha nav South African Satire Bational 
Congraaa and sppaal fo r  Afrloan unity*
K.C.L. Marshall Caspball Papara 
Bantu Seotion, Lattar froa D istrict 
Coaaisaioner, Zululand. B 156/1912/32.
The !fatal disturbances ware over? in a ll , betveen three 
and four thousand Africans had been killed and about thirty
vh ites.1 The rebellion and the expedition to arrest Dinuzulu
   2cost the colony over £B80,000. The trials before the Special 
Court cost the Hatal per eminent £15,500 and the defence £11,044, 
of vhich the Imperial government paid 2,000 guineas.^ Dinuzulu*a 
tr ia l ate up Harrietts Colenso*s private resources,4 even though 
V. P. Schreiner vent without his fee so that the private members
5o f the defence team could be paid. Even they vere never paid in
a m .6
For the African population, the cost vas far greater, fhat- 
•ver the long-term results of the rebellion vere, its  immediate
S tu art, u.d.* pp. 540-1.
2ib id . .  p. 550.
5C0 179/253/24398, Ooy. to d*«. S t., 26.7.09.
^Se« The i’la .a  (London), 8.3.09 , 00 179/251/34522, T .lu  
to Seo. S t., 12.9.08. In the *90*s she spent £5,000, 1907-09 £1,600 
in defence of Dinusulu. In 1910 under the Church Properties Act the 
remaining mission lands of the Church of England vere incorporated 
vith those of the Church of the Province and in recompense the 
Colenso sisters vere granted an annuity of £1501 In addition Lady 
Schwann organised a fund in Britain to help in their support. See 
Col. Col. 121, Diary H.E.C. Batal witness 18.9.10, Letters froa C. 
de B. Peruse.
*See tf. P. Schreiner, A South African, E. A. tfalker, pp. 296-7 and 502.
6C0 179/255/2221, C. Xaaasl to K. c. Lehaana, B.P., n .d . 1909. Col.Col. 
14C>, T o l .n i , B. X. Col ABO to V.P^chr.liiBX’ 8 .4 .U .
results vere to exacerbate the poverty and distress of the African
population, especially those living in the disturbed areas. Coning
on top of the plagues and pestilences of the last ten years,1 fo r
many Africans the rebellion oust have been the last straw. In
Kapuaulo, for example, half the breadwinners had been k illed  or
imprisoned. ?or a on the afterwards no-one could be found tobury
2the dead bodies in the area. In Mapumulo, Hdvedwe and Lower 
Tugela, 6,700 huts had been destroyed end well over 30,000 people
3rendered homeless.'' In June 1907 , 25 ringleaders including 
wore deported to St. Helena and there were over 4,000 p o litica l 
prisoners in ffatal gaols; at the beginning o f 1908 this figure 
had been reduced by half and sore of these were released by the 
end o f March 1908.^ Hr moving looted stock which was infected 
with £ast Coast fever and Tick fever froa one part of the colony 
to another, the troops had introduced cattle disease into areas 
hitherto unaffected, and in 1907 there vas unrest, especially 
amongst Silvane's Cunu people over the further quarantining
1See above, Chapter III .
2Letter, Rev. H. D. Goodenough to Hat s i Mercury. 28.11.06.
3 :HA 1/1/352 3322. Mlnut. Hagls. Marvell to 0.S.M.A., 12.10.06
06
4C0 I79/ 240/ 52B7 , Oot. to i>eo. St. Conf. 19.1.07 and Cd 3998, no. 61. 
Gov. to Sec. S t ., 27.3.08.
measures and the k illin g  of stock that vere considered necessary 
by the Department of agriculture.1 according to a missionary
report in Zululand in 1907 "famine and starvation have been keenly
2fe lt  . . .  and oattle have died in their thousands"." Under the 
circumstances, i t  is  not surprising that the rumours of unrest 
and the dreams of a messianic saviour continued unabated.
At the same time, Africans vere taking more practical steps 
to alleviate their distress. Thus the numbers of Africans seeking 
work in the European areas immediately a fter the disturbances 
suddenly leapt forward. In Zululand, according t o one estimate 
in 1909 80 Vo or the adult males vere away at work.4 In the pro­
claimed labour area© of the Transvaal, the figure of labourers
froa Natal-Zululand in 1909 shows a 59°/° increase over that in
5
1906. The presence o f Chinese indentured labour on the gold 
mines until 1910, and in the Natal towns and co llie r ie s  o f 'rebel* 
prisoners vho vere hired out at a nominal fee to any "municipality, 
township, company public body or individual"6 enabled employers
l C0 179/242/533, Oor. to S«e. S t ., 15.12.07.
2iululand Mission Report, 1908 (ifssleyan Math.)
3bee above, Chapter 4.
4Zululand Mission Report, . » 1909. (Wesleyan Meth.)
5SHA 1 /1 /460^ 4- , S.K.A. Prstoria to 3.N.A. Pl.twnM rlt.bnrg, 30.3.10. 
loo. to Axelson.Taxation in Hatal. th . nunbsr of -.frioana fr o . Natal 
employed in Transvaal increased from 17,900 in 1906, to 22,600 in 
1907, 25,000 in 1906, 26,500 in 1909 and 54,200 in 1910.
6SMA 1/6/26, Govt. Votloe Mo. 497, 1906. Regulations framed under 
Govt. Lam o f 1887 and Act Mo. 52, 1906 fo r  employment o f convicts.
to keep down wages. At tha aaaa time, tha numerous petitions from
farmers to the Department of Native Affairs fo r  the women aad
children o f rebels as apprentices and domestio servants show how
their labour problems were being tackled. In August, 1908 the
Minister of Railways and harbours in Ratal could report with
satisfaction  that the wages of Africans on the railways had been
reduced from 30s. to 22s. 6d. and 25s.1
The disturbances also gave rise to changes in the p o litica l
configuration o f Hatal-Zululaad. First and foremost of these waa,
o f oourse, the removal of Dinusulu, and his permanent exile froa
the territory. In Zululand it s e lf , his kraal was ploughed down
and destroyed to prove to h is s t il l  hopeful followers that he
would never return. Needleas to say the Kandlakasi under the
appointed chief Kcitaki were 'very pleased9 to hear that Dinusulu
2had been deposed and exiled. In 1910 the Usuthu were divided 
between Hcitaki of the Kandlakasi, Kpikanina, Dinusulu'e cousin sad 
son of Siwedu, and a newly appointed ch ief, Koya. The King's people 
vent under Chief Nkandumba ka ftnyamana <f the Buthelesi end brother 
o f Tshanibeswe who died in the middle of 1906. At the seme time
^imes of Natalt 24.9.08, Rept. M.L.A. Debate.
2oNA 1/4/22 C~lL , Minut. Magi.. Ndvandve C. 0. Jaoiceon, 16.4.10 
to D istrict Native Commissioner Rahova.
3C0 179/256/6718, Kethuen to Sm. St. S.orat 9.2.10. Eaol. 2.
Megis. ftdvandwe to I0.I.C. 21.1.10. Bzysnt, 0. T. ,  p. 73 wad p. 133*
•vary of fo rt vaa aada to destroy the moat prominent pro-Usuthn 
members of tha Zulu Royal family* Dinusulu'a uncle, Tahingaaa
aad Me family vara exiled froa Zululand, largely i t  vould aaaa
because of tha d ifficu lty  any other chief would have in controlling
thesu ' Ha auat have been about seventy years old at Me time.'
Hakoboko, Chief o f the Tshangesa people, Dinusulu1 a brother-in- 
law and one of hia prominent followers from tha eighties onward, 
vaa arrested end flogged by HaeKenaie when Me Field Forces vere 
in Zululand end the Northern irovinoes on suspicion that he Md 
sent aid to Dinusulu at the time o f his arrest and Md been re- 
sponsible fo r  hiding his fir e  arms. He vas deposed from Me 
position, ee vae Chief Tahlbela, head o f Me Kafu people in the 
Vryheid division , vho vaa said to have sent armed aid in Dinusulu's 
support at the md of 1907*' Mabekeahlya, the most influential 
man amongst Ms gulusi, vaa removed for Me aaae reason* In 
Tahibela's place ruled Kaindo, vho had been the one to give e r i-
Adance of their planning to eld Dinusulu in 1907* Ironically enough —
1?or Tshingana's part in events o f Me '909e, see above, Chapter 
p* Col. Col. 140, Vol. I l l ,  H. t*. Colenso to W* P. Schreiner,
8.4.11.
2Sd 5999. no. 24, Got. to 3*s. St. i* o r .t  25.1.08 (CO 179/244/5605).
3SHA lA /4 6 0 ^ p , Klnut. D.H.C. C. 2 m .tt, 1 .4.10.
4Xbld.
but not perhaps surprisingly -  onoe Dinuaulu himself had boss 
deposed and sailed, o ffic ia l fears began to osntrs round hia 
brother Haasolvandle, whose claims to the chieftainship they 
had formerly sponsored. Thus in 1909, the Hdwaadwe magistrate 
wrote to the District Commissioner in Zululand about the i l l i c i t  
liquor tra ffic  which he accused Mansolwandle of indulging in , 
remarking}
"you w il l . . .  agree with me that now that Dinusulu 
is  no longer the tangible pivot of disaffection in 
Zululand i t  ia to be expected that Monsolvandhle 
w ill become the centre round which the reverence for 
the Royal House w ill gravitate and that however 
loyal his present intentions may be, the pernicious 
effect of an unlimited supply of liquor together 
vith the insidious influences which will probably 
be exercised upon hia by malcontents may be a fru it­
ful source of trouble in the future.
was le ft  to the Union Government to appoint a regent for Dinu­
sulu *s young son, Solomon, on his death in 1913, and to the present 
Rationalist government to support the paraiaountcy of his grandson, 
Cyprian Bafchesulu to the h iltJ2
So much for the Usuthu. At a local level the disturbances 
also made considerable changes in the p o litica l landscape. During 
the disturbances fourteen chiefs had been killed or deposed. In
Z^HA iA /2 2  Or? , Hagis. C. J* Jackson to Hatal D istrict Commissioner 
5.10.09. See' also CO 179/245/ 25140, find. 5 in desp. Secret
20.6.08, Xntell. Report Jan.-Mar. *08, Major R. H. Wilson to 
Commandant M ilitia, Pretoria, 11.5.08.
Andapparently fo r  Cyprian to support the Territorial Tribal Authorities 
o f the Rationalist Government equally strongly, see C. B ill, Bttawtanr. 
P« 96.
2
their piece, aad that of the ten chiefs vho had died during the 
course of 1906, thirty-two new ohiefe and actings chief s wore 
appointed* lioven chiefdoms vere cut up In Betel and two coa- 
pleteiy new units were formed in dululend*^ In Natal the siain 
people to he divided up were Tilonko's bo, lis ik o fo li's  ?2uze 
and Ngobiaeabe* 0 uilu who had been divided into three in the 
early days of the disturbances* Is 1910 ^ilwane’ s Cunu, one 
of the largest groups in the oolony were divided into four 
sections, after Jilwane himself had been deposed, ostensibly 
fo r  insolent behaviour to the magistrate, while under the in­
fluence o f alcohol* bilwane had had over 1C,500 men o f fighting
age under his sole control, and was rumoured to have been in
• 2sympathy with hinuaulu*
Froa the inception o f self-government in Natal, an attempt 
had been made to give chiefs a purely territoria l jurisd iction , 
and to institute a 'ward-sy stem* whereby the people ii a particular
division of territory or ward, would a ll be subject to the same
3chief*" The upheaval oauaed by the disturbances enabled the 
government to take this a stage further than hitherto and to break
* Annual ftept. on Native A ffa irs,1906, Pietermaritzburg, 19C7, p. 40, and
Appendix 5, p.39.
23NA 1/1/436 2296. SKA 1/1/457 Minut** S.K.A. md
Magis. Nav Hmnorar, Waenen aad Astoourt, aae also SHA l/4 /4 3 5 ^ q " 
md 195S. CO 179/253/26470, dor. to S*c. S t., 15.7.09. ^
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-'See above. Chapters I and VI*
up tho larger •tribes1. According to E. D. ./inter, Minister of 
Native Affairs in 1906 -  never a particularly perceptive vitneaa 
-  " the natives took ^ h is  procece/ in good part".* Thus in the 
Lower Tugela division, the disturbances afforded a useful pretext 
fo r  an a ll round adjustment of the boundaries in a division 
vhich vac "almost a byword for confusion and unwieldiness".
In that area, during the disturbances, the number of chiefs vas 
reduced from nineteen to nine, and the magistrate of the division 
tried to reduce thia number even further by finding chiefs Msolwa, 
Kakewu, Cakijana and Tshinguausi guilty o f rebellion, although
2they had none of them played any overt part in the disturbances.
By the beginning o f 1908, Moor, by then Minister of Native Affair* 
and Prime Minister, decided against so drastic and logical a 
form of the ward system, and decided against taking action against 
any of them except Tshingumusi, whose tribe vas simply merged with 
those of other chiefs under the ward system.^
In the Kkandla division too, despite the in it ia l desire of 
the Commissioner for Native Affairs to completely smash Slgananda's 
Cube people, by 1906 wiser counsels had prevailed, and the people
1K .».l.C . 1906-7, p .218.
2S*A 1/1/374— 2-, Hlnut. S. 0. Samwlaon, 7.1.07, aa<L2. E. Addison,
F. P. Shuter fad F. E. Koor, I.2.O .8. SEA l/l/TIO -“ S S  3»port
iiagiB. 7.8.07, Kinut. Koor, 8.7.08. l.H.A.C. p.497, Esld. R ad .. F. 
Shuter, Lover Tugela.
53EA l /V 3 » * § § * . Koor to U. S.N.A., 9.1.08.
Ytrt allowed to reconstitute themselves under a son o f Sigananda* at
approved o f toy tha government.1 Daaplta considerable pros sura la
tha Hatal Legislative Asssmfcly froa tha members o f 2ululand, Tonga
aad Brunner, their lands vere not opened to European settlement,
although i t  vma decided not to allow any Africans to settle  in
the old haunts of the Cube people, which had proved of such strate-
2gic value to Bwbatha and his follow ers. Vhile the disturbances 
provided an opportunity for the redrawing o f in ter- and in tre- 
tribal boundaries, many o f then for genuine administrative con­
venience, there is  no evidence that they provided any additional 
land for European settlement. On ths other hand, the removal o f 
Dinuaulu froa Zululand and the crushing o f the Usuthu cause, 
must in no snail measure have facilita ted  the occupation by Euro­
peans o f those lands Vhich had been set aside fo r  white settlement 
by the 1902-04 Delimitation Commission. When Margery Perhan 
v isited  South Africa in 1931 she was immediately struck by the con­
trast presented vith native administration in Tanganyika! in 
South Africa, she remarked
" . . .  tho strong tribal feeling of the Zulus, defeated, 
restrained and neglected, made me think o f some large
SNA 1/1/354 Hinut. C.N.A. to K.N.A., 2S.10.07, aad
Moor, 1.2.08, Cofenbraader, 24.2.08.
2SNA 1/1/34^252-, Hi nut a 3.0. F.K., 10.8.06. Thia on x«Ooaaand.tl on
of Col. Byu-39 Wold, 17.6.06.
power machine pushed on its  aide, s t i l l  working, 
i  ts energy running to waste, a sad, I f  not dangerous
sight**1
Those then were the immediate and negative results of the rebellion* 
I t  has, however, been argued recently that in colonial afrioa even 
resistors achieve some, i f  not a ll , of their aims* A rebellion 
heightens awareness of African grievances, and, €nran i f  i t  involves 
considerable suffering, i t  can produoe a change in administrative 
practice and even politica l structure, i f  only because the pre­
dominant aim of almost every colonial administration ia to keep 
the peace* ./bile i t  is necossaxy to bear in mind that Hatal, be­
cause of its  large white settler community ? ia not entirely typical 
o f the colonial situation in tropical Africa; i t  is useful to ex­
amine this hypothesis ±1 the context of the aftermath of tho disturb­
ance u what was the lesson learnt by Natal from the rebellion?
In looking for these changes one oust not expect any radical
departures. Hatal was not a Company-governed possession over
2which the Colonial Office could reassert oontrol* At & time 
vhen the Imperial government vas looking forward to a unification 
of Southern Afrioa and vas pre-occupied vith granting self-governing
Cited B.G.N* Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in S»A** p.100, from K*
Perhan*o "The System of Native Admin in 'Tanganyika*, Afrioa* 1931 •
2i*e* unlike the situation in dhodesia after the Katabele-Shona
rebellions*
institutions to the defeated Boer Republics, i t  vodd have bssn 
virtually impossible for Liberal stats— a to bars contemplated 
returning to "quasi Crown Colony Government" In Ratal, as bad 
happened fo r  f ir s  years in 1875 in part as a result of Ratal1*
Mishandling of ths Langallbalele diaturbanos o f 1875.1 It eas 
probably squally unrealiatio to aapsot ths 1906-11 Liberal gorern- 
aaat to have aoeeptsd ths suggestion that Zululand rsvsrt to 
d irest Imperial ru le ,2 aa Basutoland bad dons in 1684 a ftsr the 
1880/1881 Cun Var.'* That had been at the direst request o f ths 
Cape ministry oonosmsd. m Ratal, ministers vere far too wsak
4
p o litioa lly  to have contemplated doing this. Indeed aoet of 
them found that the beet sey o f raising their p o litioa l stock
5vas by raising the matl-Imperial interferense ory. Though many 
South Afrioan atateamen vere extremely oritioa l o f R atal's handling 
o f her a ffa irs , a good deal o f thair orltlelam  vaa spurred on by 
tha fear that rite would foxes the Imperial government to intervene
X f
In this oase hovever the incident provided Canupron vith a useful lever 
in further hie confederation schemes fo r  South Africa. Sac C. If. de 
Kiewsfc, gjs^liipsrial Paotor ia  South A frica, pp. 56-46.
*This p ossib ility  i t  — ears vaa discussed by the Aborigines Protection 
Society! CO 179/243/45081 to Elgin, 9*12.07. The Rev Reform Club 
P olitioa l Committee, ”a l i t t le  body of Radical R.P.a and others" 
to 1906 fe lt  Zululand should betaken — y from the special control o f 
Ratal and put under 'federal control' presumably o f tha forthcoming 
union. See J . A. Hobson to J . C. smuts, 14.6.08. Por the response of 
South Afrieane outside of Ratal see Starti*. reply to Hobson, r .
13.7.06. Saute Papers, ad. v .d . Poel and H— ook, Tol. n ,  no. 355^3^.
^The Cape decision to ask the Imperial govt, to taka over Basutoland vas
k j  a
through ihnr alauaagiMnt. To mb who bad liwad through tho 
JaBOOon Bold md tho Boor War, this appsarod both dangerous md 
aril. Tho Liberal goromaant were felly aaare of thlo -  indeed 
they refrained froa interfering la Intel's logiolotlTo plana 
la 1909/10 preeiaely bananas thay feared it would iapodo tho 
fortheoalng union -  and dooplto tho foot that tho proposed legio- 
latlon waa dlaorialaatoxy md thoroforo olearly within tho oate- 
gory of logialatloa whioh oould bo disallowed.^ *
Thao tho ehangaa whioh mo la looking far aa a xoault of 
tho diatarbanooa aro a noro aubtla affair, ahifta la anpbaaio, 
aoao ohango ia attitude, reform iatrodaood by a body of xulora 
md adalBiatratora rolatlwoly unaltorod froa thoaa who had boon 
ia powor through all tho yaara of aolf-goTamamt# That tho 
rabollloa did jolt aoao whito latalima mt of tholr ooaplaomoy 
ia perfcapa to bo aom la tho roplaeoamt of Viator by Moor aa 
Kiniator of Matiwa Affaira at tho aad of 1906. Moor waa atill
a product of tho chaotic conditions after tho war md tho oolooy9a 
falling nram . Snn E. A. Walter, A JUtaHT of So.th.rn Afrlan.
PP. 590-4.
4Soo o.g. T. Hymlop to J. 0. ^Wta, 22.11.09, Santa Papora. Tol. n , 
ao. 449 and Xathm MSS 368, p.98«Nto Haly-flutohinaoa, 10.3.08.
5SOO o.g. Moor'a apooch on the aubjeet, Tiaoo of latal. 23.5.08. 
aoo bolow, p.
Soo o .g . Co 179/236/8664 Miauto Lmbert, 24.3.10 oa Bagulatiaa an dor 
Aot no. 1, 1909, rs &ntlro Aaaoablioa aad Co 179/236/3726, Bala 
to Soo. St. 14.1.10 on Aot no. 1, 1910, A leh  exoladod non-whitoa fron 
provision node fo r  gort. aorrmta at tine o f union. 00 179/236/3960 
Hathuea to See. St. 2.2.10. B ill to prorlda fo r  teachers ia Oort .-aided 
schools, whioh excluded non-white toaohora froa ita  bm afita.
widely considered the most sympathetic o f the possible Hatal
ministers to the Africans. Extraordinary as this may sees to
anyone who has reed h is evidence before the South African Katies
A ffairs Cosnlsslon or at the Ketlonal ConTentlon o f 3906, he
indubitably represented a change for the better by comparison
with Leuchars and * in tar. any other than Hatal standards,
he sas a short-sighted and illib e ra l maat1 to aspect Test changes
In the philosophy and practice o f native policy froa him was
clearly unwarranted by anything in his previous record. That he
would prove ammahle to a policy of removing unnecessary friction
however wae lik e ly , md vaa shown in a sense In theestion decided
upon ty the government ee a rem it o f the reeomendations o f the
Katal Hative Affairs Commission.//is Important as the replacement
o f Vinter by Koor, was ths replacement of Sir Henry HoCellum by
Sir Matthew Hathan in the middle o f 1907. Sir Henry, le ft  me
colony fu lly  satisfied  that he bed le ft  native affairs "fa irly
flattened out” ! a phrase which led Vina ton Churchill to minute
" 'fa ir ly  flattened out* is  a good expression md 
does ju stice  to me wisdom md tenant ty that have 
Inspired, no lees mm to the beneficent results 
that hare attended the native policy  o f the In tel 
government end Sir Henry KeeCallum (s ic )"2
Sec introductory quotation to €• I . Moor thought the ideas of 
"equality md brotherhood" between bleak and white "preposterous" • 
Hathan MSS 372, p. 226 f f .  Henderson to Kethaa. See shove, p. ios-tx
A l\i
*00 179/241/^9725. Klaut. on Oor. to Sm. St.* 1.4.07.
This vac probably an over omisti© Judgment. There ie  erldenoe
that after the disturbances, Sir Henry took a keen Interest In
the recommendations o f the Ratal Hat lye Affairs Commission vhlah
ha mas responsible for ^pointing at tha gad o f 1906, mod that
he urged oa ministers the wisdom of releasing tha rank and f l la
o f p o litioa l prisoners at the rate o f 600 a month.1 Bren before
the Ratal Ratlve Affaire Commission had reported he urged on
ministers that rate o f vagea paid to labourers under the Ialbalo
2system be brought nearer the minimum market rate. Before he 
le ft  Pietermarii.shurg he decided to hold a meeting of the prisaipal 
ch iefs, by vhlah both they and ha mere suitably impressed.^ 
In itia lly  oalled ae aa to avoid giving Dinusulu any reason fo r  
thinking that he wsunique in haring n nesting vith the Governor,* 
HoCallum vac to auggeat to Sir Matthew Xathsn that thia meatiTig 
become aa azsmal function, yundamemtnlly however he vac n man of 
autocratic temperament vho would kook no interference, reseated 
end suspected the educated Afrioan, and Uho proved very adaptable
S e e  Rathan KSs 401, no. 226, taport on Rative A ffairs Confidential 
n .d. unsigned hat la  KtiCallun's handwriting and probably written 
before bis departure to bis successo r .
577 C o n f^  U n to  Oot. to F.M., 20.3.05. 3HA 1/1/357 
H a it i fro* f t * . Sw. o f Oot. to X .I.A ., 11.12.06. *
5S*. I .ttmb 9a,«ra, IBS 401, no. SB, op .o lt.
400 179/241/23101, to o l. la  d«*p. 86 ef 5.6.07, Zatwrrlm with 
Chiefs, p .33*
to Hatal mores* Indeed the Hatal ministry o f 1906 more than onoe 
begged Lord Elgin that KoCallua be allowed to prolong hia governor­
ship o f Hatal* so well did he understand their problms*^
Sir Matthew Hathan* described by lrmt> as the "host able
and b rillia n t ••• enlightened aad benefic ent" Governor o f Hatal*
2had a very different teoperaaent. Chosen sp ecifica lly  fo r  the 
position by Lord Elgin, ho vaa awn of vide experience and 
ryapatbies* Ce arrival in fatal* ha rapidly informed hinaelf 
on every aspect o f native policy* Vi thin the fir s t  fee months 
a fter hia arrival ha had v isited  moat parts of the oolony and 
had intervleved a large number of ohief s . He .even visited  Zulu­
land under martial bnr despite the open opposition o f ministers 
aad of the formidable Sir Dunoon HcKeaaie vith vhoee views he 
vaa to hare the profouadest md moat fundamental disagreemente.5 
Throughout hia period at governorship he oanduoted a paaaionate 
crusade against the practice o f flogging in  Hatal aa v e il as the 
inordinate mount o f state-made crime In the ooloay.* He took
XSHA 1/4/16 < $&  lim it* « .* .A . 9 .7.06. CO 179/240/7991. fe e l, 
in tea*, eonf. 9 .2 .07. fe* *l*o 00 179/245/18622, Oor. to 3*«. St. 
29*4*08 and C*0* minutes*
2Inwo* 17*11*08* See also private le tter  from J* T* Jabcvu preying 
that Hathan ba aada fir s t  Governor of tfoited 3*1* and praising hia 
"vara sympathy" fo r  a ll tho people o f South Afrioa* Hathan HSS 575 
p .151# 8*9*09*
^See sap* CO 179/244/5029* Intel* 2a in deep. Secret 4*1*06* F*H* 
O ffice to dov* 51*12*07 and 26* Gov* to Col* See* (Hatal)* 1*1*08*
*3ee above* Chapter T* p.-Hl-fl
up tha reoomandationa af tha Hatal native Affaire vith seal md 
lo st no opportunity o f  p raaalng tha naoaaaity fo r  thalr ffelfiX - 
aant on alniatara*1 Hia nynpathy ulth tha Chrstlm ^frioaaa aaa 
vary oonaidarabla, md tha Har. M dgm aa af tha Aaarlam 4ilu 
Hisaion, had had auoh a tnaala vith Sir Henry HoCallua# aaaa
avay fm a a aaa ting vith Hathan "very favourably lapreaaed vith 
hia gaaulna Intaraat ia ha valfhra md program o f tha native 
togathar vith hia apiftpathr fo r  alm lon work". Hathm arm aoa- 
aeated to opm a nav aohool building araatad by John Saba at
Ghlanga. Hat auxprlalngly# Brldgoam found hia "a  mfmahiag
2
oontraat to hia pradaaaaaor# *
I t  la trua that tha rooa miah Hathm had fo r  amoaarre 
vaa aavaraly 1 initad. Ha oould try to bring ninlatera round to 
vhat ha ooaaidavad right# hut ha ad nalthar tha naahlnmy nor 
tha flnmaa to forea hia vlava upon thaau In tha fin a l aaalyala 
ha had to aoaapt thalr daolaioaa m  raapoaaihla alnlatara la a a e lf- 
gavamlng colony, bovavar moh ha disngraad vith thalr pollalaa*
It vaa olanrly ivpoaaibla fa r hia to ohanga tha m darlyiag a true turn 
o f Hhtal aoalaty# its  raolal attltndaa or arm neat o f lta  ad- 
alnlatrative pm ctioaa. lavarthalaao tha inportmoa o f a Governor* a
18ath«n hss 568, Hathan te Haljr Hatehinaon, 2.1.09. Battaa to 
Salbo traa, 11.12.08.
2A *  lU /l /3 ,  p .583, ftrldceaea to J . L. Barben, 10.10.07. fo r  
tha contrast vith HoCallun# aaa above* Chap tar f i l l ,  p.
ability  to lnflnenoe in a oolony tha else of Ratal through the 
weight of hie prestige and experience mat net he completely dis­
counted. that the Colonial Offioe were mooiaafUl  for example 
ia 1908 in bringing Ratal to its  view, waa ia part the result of 
haring Sir Ratthaw aa thair Intermediary. While ha waa not able 
to anooeed over major lames each aa tha declaration cf Martial 
law ia dolulaadL, on leas vital issues § ha m , at times, able to 
prevail. In general, he was aora successful when hia views co­
incided with those of some of hia ministers, and at tinea ha fe lt  
frustrated at not being able to influence ministers "nore to tha 
hone Idea of what ia right".1 Nevertheless, tfter he had recovered 
from the in itia l "repugnance" which Ratal's native p o lls / nanairt "to 
a am of former training", he handled the situation with
tact and understanding.
Aa haa already been mentioned, immediately after tha dlstnrb- 
aaees, Sir Henry RoCallum appointed a Commiseion to enquire into 
native tffa lrs in Ratal. The Coanlaeionere were a ll dhoaen from 
amongst the Ratal colonists, though in genaral they oould ha described
^Nathan KS 368, p.60, Nathan to Ilgin , 19.1.08.
2Ibid .. Nathan to Ooold-Adana, 14.9.07.
^Perhaps aa a result of hia afforta, by ths middle of 906 Sir Matthew 
oould note that "public opinion in thia oolony la certainly more motive 
themit haa bean before to the necessity of dealing gcnarously vith 
the Motives." Nathan MSS 368, p. 105, to Elgin, 23.5.06.
. •:
kJ a (. )
as fa llin g  vithln tha Hatal benevolent paternalist tradition, 
aad represented tha noderate viewpoint oa 'native policy* • Thus 
they included auoh mm aa H.3. Brans, a man <t wide synpathiee 
aad intaraata, a aonbar of tha Legislative Assembly fo r  Dor ban, 
who had already wrlttan a p«Bphl«t oa tha BatlTo P roblm 1 aad 
waa latar to publish a book oa *«tal -  Black md Ihlta In Sonth- 
Baat Afrloat2 1h a te r . Janes Soott, Brea Church o f Sootland 
missionary! Col. H. 1. Rsweon who had represented tha Imperial 
gonraaant on tha Zululand Dalinitation Oonaission, Jaaae Liege 
Bulatt, ncaher o f tha Legislative Asssably of Hatal, a rary pro- 
ainant sugar farmer aad ona tins Secretary o f Xatira A ffairs.
Tha two remaining aaabars wars C. J . Bircksnstook aid T. K. Hurray 
whilst H. C. Canpball, Jfcdge of tha *ative High Court, aotad as 
Chairman. I t  gatharad tha arldanoa o f thraa hundred aid ana 
Europeans and alaa hnadrad and six Africans"* -  in it s e lf  a renark- 
able step forward* -  ewer a wary wide rang# of topics -  admini­
stration, land, labour, customary law, DLgmor, education, tha problems
1*hbg, 1906.
"London, 1916.
"*N.I.A.C., Report p.7*
*Though nany o f tha Afrloaa witnaaeas expressed fear at what tha 
eoneefuanoce o f openly stating their grievances would h . saa
asp. H.H.A.C. Brid. pp. 80+-5.
of representation. Some 5,000 Africans sat la an its hearings
in thirty-four centres of tha oolony. V md larga tha philosophy
vhioh lay behind tha report vaa vary similar to that of Sir
Theophllue Shepatone, though llmaa 1aaa latal valoonad it m "tha
most honaat md comprehensive reports war praam tad to a government"
md atrpraaaad its approoiation for "tha ayapathatio spirit it
contains".* At tha aaaa tlaa thay vara alao strongly iaflmmaad
by tha Social Darwinist thinking of thalr day md gmted vith
approval tha votds of a "reoent writer" that equality batvaan blaok
md iddta vaa lapoaaibla because
"It baa bam danonatratad that tha blaok md bhite 
raom ara opposites In amy ordinal points. Tha ana 
baa a larga frontal region of tha brain, tha othsr 
a larga posterior afloat tha ana a great seaaonar, 
the other caineatly motional, tha one dost nearing 
bat haring great self-control, the ether seek aad 
subadesive, bat violent md lacking In salf  acdtrol 
vhm the paaalaaa are spanned."*
Tha ComdLssloa aav m its ideal a policy vhioh vould vary 
gradually vem the *fr± om any froa tribalism# and vould progress 
tovarda the "higher aad flmar grounds" of "individualim" • ^  la 
the nemtlae# the "native vaa a miner vho had to ba aafqpmded 
again at things vhioh he otherwise sight think right."* Its
r.Vfflfift 23.8.07. Cf. th. verdict of 3. 0. SMMUoa
la th. NataJL Ooww m t  O es.it. that th . Import “would do w n  bars 
thM good, Im um  I t . wctiwregant l.n g y ... i .  s lw lit r t  to MMttor 
both M otion, o f th. rm— inity, Mklag infTnptnli. worm pppiMtlTi 
m i on w11« i n.grophllmi Md phUMthzoplate Md netiT. Mloontenta 
nor. Insistent Md I jg wu lw ." Government Notice no. 33, 18.1.08.
^3•Vi'.c.f p.15.
fundamental tenet was s t ill that "ths natives are a people accustomed 
. . .  to the patriarchal system, ths leading feature of which is a 
paternal despotism" that therejfUrtlhe administration of native 
affaire "snst be based on the sntooratlo principle of control".
To this they added the proviso that ths government should be "a 
benevolent and sympathetic father" -  as in the "good old dsye" of 
Shape tone and his personal control of native a ffa ire.1 To this 
end they recommended that the powers o f the Supreme Chief be aora 
ol early defined, and that he should be free of hterferenoe froa tha 
courts md to make the position of the Secretary for Native Affairs 
a permanent one. Their reform of the administration also included 
foursnr d istrict ooaalssioaers who would sot In a general super­
visory capacity over the magistrates, would he in more direct 
end personal contact with ths Afrioan population and, by encouraging 
then to look over the heads of their chiefs, to break down tribalism. 
On the ether hand, aad in oontrsdiotory vain, ths powers of chiefs 
were to he increased in crder to prevent the disintegration of family 
life , for the ehief as haad ef a patrilineal elan vas recognised,
3H.port I J .i .0 . ,  p. 14.
4Col. tanwn to B. 2. Co1«mo, B.I.A.O. Erid., p.121.
V l.A .C ., p .13.
though It was hoped that Increasingly ths powers of the ohiefs 
could he made territorial through application of ths ward ays tea, 
rather than personal. A Council an Native Affaire wee also re* 
ooanended to advise the government on proposed native regulation, 
consisting of fbnr officia l and four non-offieial msmhara with 
tho S.N.A. aa Chairman.1
thsso reooemeadations of the Commission were aihodied 
la the Aet Vo. 1 o f 1909 *to provide for the Better Admialatretlon 
o f Xative A ffaire". The Aet hovever vent rather further than tha 
Cn—lesion had ouggeatad in extending the povera of tho Supreme 
Chief, further defined and now unassailable, to a ll ths deputies 
of the supreme Chief, down to the magisterial level, ashing these 
officers answerable in turn only to their superior of flours.
Ths set vas apparently designed as early as 1905, ty S. 0. Samuel* 
eon2 who in 1906 eapraaasd his regret that the o ffice  sad powers 
of the ftiprams Chief and his mbordlnate officers had been "so 
mash restricted and pored down through the instrumentality of 
those who did net understand the nature, value sod requirements 
of native life ".'*  On a previous ooeaalon he bed expressed his 
convletlou that
1>.I.A.O. pp. 14-17.
StttM  MSS 368, p.189, latfcn to Luca, 27.10.08.
30oTnrnMat lo tio . bo. 39, 18,1.06.
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" everything which leads the native0 to believe that 
the powers poaaasead tor those la aatherity are in­
competent or restricted as compared with ths power 
of /lhose7 . . .  they hate been asenstomsd to ass 
possessed sad exercised by thair native rulers sad 
that thair rulers are liable to errors of Judgment 
aad undeoided in sotioa only tends to bring the .
authority of thair rulers into ooataspt Md disrepute.*
Sir hatthew lathaa,vho supported no at of the 1909 Act, eonf eased
that he disliked Fart III2 vhioh "opens the door to arbitrary
action by subordinate o fficia ls  and this part of the MU
received ooasl&erable opposition not only from pelitieally
eonseious ^frleaae but deo from the newly formed Hative Affairs
Reform Committee, a committee o f about a hundred pubilo spirited
residents of Durban vho had fornsd tbsmsslvss into e body after
the dieturbeneee.* Reverthelece this Act vas ths only one of throe
major legislative enactments to pass through a ll ita stages in
ths Satal Legislative Assembly, though it  did not last long
being abolished by Union Act 1 of 1912*
Aa awinapsnyiag measure, the b ill to inerease the membership
of ths Ratal Legislative Council from thirteen to seventeen members,
by ths addition of four members chosen by the Oowcrnoyd^ Coanoll for
^Cited in Samuelson*e Kenorandom, printed Govt. Rotloe no. 59, Jon. 1906.
^Part I I I , § 27 of ths b ill road 1 HHo Interdict or other prooess of 
a court of law shall issue for ths stay of m  administrative set or order 
of ths Supreme Chiefs or of any other such officer aforesaid, or for 
requiring say such officer to answer any suit or proceeding in respect 
thereof, unless ths court shall first be satisfied that nrimjaa fade 
such sot or order is  without say lawful authority."
5HatLan B3S 360, p .189, Hathm to Luoaa, 27.10.08.
4C0 179/248/43579, Petition froa H.A.K.C. « d .  In dicp* Got« to Sao* St., 
6.11.08.
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th e ir  eepeelel knowledge md regard fo r  the A frican  population  
did not become lav, * md the link rcooaasndsd by both Sir Katthev 
Hathm md the Hatal Hat ire Affairs Comal salon betvesa the Hatire 
Affairs Counoll md ths Hatal legislature thus idled to m aterialise.'
While the Aot for the Better Adniaistratioaof Satire Affaire 
is  described by **tuart as part of the special md successful effort 
made by the Xoor government "to improve the relatione betveen the 
tvo moes"^ in Hatal, Sir Hatthew Hathm pate Ids finger on Its 
key weakness vhan he pointed out that area the D istrict Comaleeionere 
vere s t ill Chosen from the general run cf Hatal nagi at rates -  
md vhat he sear of thgr work did aot inpress hia vith their oalibre.* 
The firs t four Coaadsaioaers ineluded 1. H* Addison, vho had played 
so proalneat a part in the disturbances in Zululand la ths eighties 
md vho had been described by Fairfield at the Colonial Offioe as 
s "nost injudicious young am"» "on# of the most potent osasee" of 
the 2068 rebellion. ^  Its second amber , J. L. Knight, had been 
closely associated vith Mdiaon md the disastrous boundary Const anion
* Brin ted ia Hatal, Govt. Ornette, 21.4*06, p .298.
^Nathan KSS, p.145. *nthm to Lucas, 6.9.08.
^Stuart, p . 526.
*Nathan l£S 568, to Gov. Haly-Hutchinsor, (Cape), 28.10.07*
^Minute on CO 427/20/2261, deep* 11.1.95, Oov. to Seo. 3t.
of 1887 which tried to settle the boundaries between the Usuthu 
end the Mandlakasl, a settlement which caused grave dissatlsfaction  
to the TJauthu*1 The third asnber wee R. I .  Beachoroft, vho had 
been in the Ratal service slnoe 1883, while the fourth Cnmml seioner
was Cheers Emmett, a Vryheid farmer, one of the Boers who had aided
2Dinusulu against Aibhebhu in 1884. Be seamed to ove hie appoint­
ment to no better reason than that he was Botha's brottaer-in-1 m 
end i t  wuid please the Boere.^ At the seme time there was a 
general shuffle in the Department ef Native A ffa irs. With the 
eppoiatmamt e f the four D istrict Commissioners, Sir Charles Saunders 
gave up hie position as Coauieeioner fo r  Bative A ffairs in Zululand*
Ae thenew end permanent heed of the *ative A ffaire Departuent yet 
another Shepetone vaa ohosen, this tine Arthur J . Shop stone,* the 
eon of S ir Theophllus Shops tone, ae I t  was fe lt  that there should 
be "a new nan fo r  new measures". Aa Brookes and Vebb point out, 
there is  something "almost endearing" in the faith  Ratal had that
XC0 427/2/14989, Minute ^airfield 26.7.88 on deep. Oot. to See. St., 
(Havelock to Kmuteford) 22*6.88.
^H. Spender, Oeaexul Botha (London 1919) (2nd ed«), p .37.
^Nathan XSS 368, p .300, Nathan to Carter, 19.6.09.
*C.R.C., J.P. Bo a  in 1852, Pleteruarltsburgi eduoated in Ratal.
Trooper in Natal Carbines a  during Langalebalele 'rebellion* 1873* 
1887 N.H. A d Aset. Conalasloner in Zalulaad where he "took a  active
part in quelling the Dinusulu rebellion* o f 1888. He held various 
magisterial poets ia Ratal 1899-1907.
N^athan Ktf> 368, p.306. Nathan to S. 0. Lasuelson, 29*6.09.
y«t another Shepstone vould help then solve thair "native problems*.1 
Hia Assistant aa ttoder-Secretary of Native Affaire vaa Captaia 
James Stuart,
Tha Secretary of Hative Affaire vaa also aada head of tha 
Hative Affaire Council undar tha 1909 Act. Sir Hat thav Hathan took 
exception to this step a lso, aa ha fa it this vent against tha 
1906-7 Commission by exalting tha pexmanent o ffic ia l at tha ex­
pense of tha four d istrict Commissioners vho* tha Coaaiaaion had
hoped vould ba tha principal executive offloere in  tha aahaaa of
2native administration. I t  ia  doubtful however whether this vaa 
a natter o f such sonant considering the background of tha Com- 
ni salon era which vas virtually tha sane aa that o f A, J , Shepaton# 
in the magisterial service of the oolony, *hat lay behind Hathan* s 
objection vaa apparently hia feelin g  that vhat Natal needed vas 
"four S ir Charles Saunders* not one magnified Sagnelaonf,^
One o f the ways in vhioh the Commission saw Africans could 
be Weaned* away from tribalism md also could ba given soma form 
o f loca l self-government vaa tharough a form of leasehold individual 
tenure and loca l council system similar to that adopted under the
V  229. 
230 1 7 9 /2 4 3 A 8 6 2 9 , 4««p. 69 o f  3 0 .4 .0 6 . M ln u t ,  Gov. to  P,H,
%Hathan Papers 562, p .15. Report o f interview vith Ramsay Collins, 
10,5.08.
Glen Grey i j> t u  in the T m ik tl. Li 1908, the native A ffairs 
Department actually sponsored a n a i l  deputation consisting 
o f tha 1.2.M* missionary, Dr. V* B. Brldgeman aad two Africans, 
Martin Luthuli aad P. J . Gunada to study tha Gian Gray eyatan 
and report hack oa its  applicability to Vatal conditions.*
Tha deputation oana back duly impressed, that Rhodes’2 "B ill fo r  
Africa1' could ba applied la Vatal, and tha Vatal adalnlstration 
framed a M l 3? fo r  tha creation aad administration of Native Land 
Settlement, designed to "promote sa incept ire  foam o f s e lf-  
government",4 aad which included loca l taxation aad the issue 
of conditional t it le s  to secure fix ity  o f tenure. I t  was widely
believed that individual tenure vould lap rove Afrioan agriculture
aad thus enable the reserve lands to hold an even greater number 
o f Africans. Tory similar in some ways to the Glen Grey system, 
there were minor differences. Thus whereas under the Glen Garay 
Act, the loca l d istrict councils md general councils in which
there vas a large popular element had considerable say over the
5disposal o f loca lly  raised funds, In Vstal, these 9 member
"Their import vss published in  Govt. Gssetts, July, 1306, Govt. 
Ifotlce no. 420.
^Though Rhodes introduced ths measure ss P.M. In ths Cape Legie. 
Assembly in 1694, J . M. Grp an claimed to be its  true father (Vathan
MSS 376, p .73, Orpen to Vathan 25.5.08). In fact the idea of in­
dividual leasehold tenure for Africans had s  long history in ths 
Ceps colony. It vss the provision fo r  loca l s e lf government (with 
certain lim itations) vhioh vss novel.
3For this BUI see Natal Govt. Gssetts, 210 .06, p. 302 f f .
4C 4194, mo. 6, Gov . to See. St. 1.5.08.
village oou id la  vara to ba appointed by tha D istrict Cosnlssloaers 
ia  aonaultatlon vith tha loaal inhabitants, aid to hold offlaa  
fo r  oaa year "during pleasure” o f tha Government! tha deelslone 
over tha disposal o f funds vara to lia  aatiraly vith thaaa Com- 
niseioners. Thara vaa to ba no general counoil though loaal eeunslls 
oould join  up to font divisional councils. On tha sthsr hand, 
tha propoasd grant o f 10 aora allotaanta vaa aora generous than 
tha Tranahai 4 aora plota and tha provision nada fo r  paying survey 
faaa would probably hava baaa nora auooaaaful. Ivan thia aodsrats 
maaaura o f raforn hovavar fa ll  through1 aa a raault o f tha oppo­
sition  both of tha sduoatad Afrioana vho fa it  it  did not go far
anough and o f tha Hatal Legislative Assembly vhich praauaahly fa it
2i t  vant too far.
 ' ..............................
5
Tha Dlatrlst Counalla undar tha Glen Oray Act sonalstsd o f 4 
aaabara noninatad by iaadovuara and 2 nominated by tha govamnant 
in  surveyed areas. In unsurvey ad areas 4 numbers vara noninatad 
by haadaan froa among thair number. Resident Magistrates vara 
ax o ffia io  aaabara of tha Connells aad acted as thair
chairmen. Provision vas also aads for a General Council (vhioh 
bsaane known as ths Aoraga) to ba beaded by tha Chief Magistrate o f 
tha TTanshalt to lnolude Resident Magistrates and 3 Af risen re­
presentatives from each d is tr ict, 2 noninatad by tha Dlatriat 
Counoil and one by tha Govt. In a ll thaaa oounoils the magistrate 
had tha fin a l say -  a natter o f eoneldsrable complaint later oa.
Sm Buell, Tho I S U l  M S l  «*• Vol. I 1938),
pp. 88-93. ________
was hovavar decided to implement parts o f ths raforn on tha 
Umvnti Mission Reserve.
^Sftthan MSS 368, p. 145, H.than to Iimm 6 .9 .06| O c t . to Sm. S t., 
30.10.08, 00 179/347/43738.
One o f tho major complain ta o f Africans before ths Xatal 
Xatlve A ffairs Commission vss that thay lacked any assas or kind 
or representative to voice their demands mod make thalr grievances 
known* While on the whole the Commission construed this an the 
need for a primitive race fo r  a father figure,* i t  oan be argaed 
that tha actions and attltudas o f sueosaaive Secretaries o f
Vatlve A ffairs, but especially Leuohsrs and H. Winter, gmve
2very real meaning to these oomplsints. On ths score o f reprc -  
mentation the Commissioners vere very oautious, though they sug­
gested various ways in vhieh African grievances could be made 
known to the "ruling race"* Thus the four additional members to
be appointed by the Governor to s it  is  ths fata l Legislative
3Council and 1he members of the Native Affairs Council ware con­
sidered to be su fficient representation fo r  the tribal African*
For ths 'exempted' African tvo different proposals vere made*
A minority o f the Coemiesion argued that exempted Africans be 
allowed to elect one n on -officia l member of the  ^stive i f f  airs 
Counoil, while the majority favoured a separate electoral r o ll fo r
*H«X«A.C* pp
^s** above Chapter XI, p*
3This fa iled  to materialise In any case, see above, p. $ 8 l  * 3
'exempted' and qualified1 Africans vho vould return up to a
maximum o f throe member* fo r  the vholo colony vho would re -
present African interests. These members vould be seleeted
by ballot from oaadldates nominated by ballot by the Gowernor-
in-Counoil. Behind their reocsmendatl one lay the firm conviction
stated by the Commission at the beginning of its  report that
"the natives must be elearly aade to understand..* 
that the presenee and prsdoainaaos of the vhite 
raee w ill be preserved at a ll haaards and ••• a ll 
atteapts to destroy ita  hegemony. •• w ill be promptly 
punished. ”3
The franchise vas seem as an outlet fo r  grievances, not a p o litica l 
weapon. It  should be added that their views on ths french lee vere 
shared by many an 'authority1 on the 'native' at the turn e f the 
century and beer a dose  reeenblanoe to the reeomaeadatieas o f  the
S.A.H.A.C. Even Sir Matthew Hathan expressed Mtaself as opposed to 
the grant of ths franchise to Africans, though he based his appo­
sition  on somewhat novel groundst he fe lt  that any attempt to 
great the franchise vith a property and educational qualification 
vould lead the settlers community In Hatal to withhold bath property 
and education from the African in an a tte s t  to keep him baek
^They vould need educational and property or income qualification* 
(unspecified).
2H.I.A.C.» p.10 20.
p o litica lly .*  Nevertheless i t  is  significant that anongst tha
loudest Toioee against tha Cape franchise at the National Convention
o f 1906 vere those o f Hyslop, Moor and S. M. Greene, the la ta l
representatives, vhile i t  vas Greene who noved the ssendaeat to
exclude non-Nuropeans froa aewherehip of both Houses o f  P eril*-
2■eat in the fortheoaing Union.
Oa education, ths Cosnission vere equally cautious* While
recognising the growing desire fo r  education on the p rt o f ths
Africans, the Craniacion suggested that enough education should
be provided "as vould enable the GcTeranent to keep the control
o f it"|^ It  should be "up to but sot beyond their own growing
(l*c* the Africans9) needs"*4 As Sir Matthew Nathan pointed out,
they did not recognise
"the principle followed in the Crown Colonies that 
i t  is  the duty of the Gcvemaent to give as many 
astivss as possible as good an education as they
le  interesting to note that the curious scheme vhich oaaa 
before the National Convention suggesting that suitably ^ is lifisd  
Africans be granted the franchise at 31, their sons, i f  s t i l l  
qualified, at 30 and so on until in ths 10th generation froa the 
present a 9c iv ilise d 9 African vould get the franchise at 21 
appears to have originated vith Sir Matthew Nathan*
2U  tU rhoapeon, ^ # 9 4 . i>* 218 t t .  KonY«aaie
Dagboek van ... F. S. Mai an 1908-9, ad. J . F. Prsller (transl* A* J . 
d . m i l r n )  (O .p. Towi 1951). pp. 47. 145.
3,fb l. ooaMBt 1 . la  CO 179/244/5756.
B.H.A.C., Kpport, p. 19.
are capable o f assinilsting and to do a ll in its  
power to raise then to the moral aad intellectual 
plane o f Buropsen civ ilisa tion ."1
Here the recommendation o f  the Coaaiaslon vas ths sstaKLisb— it 
o f a separate Board o f Education fo r  African*, on vhich a ll ths 
different missionary denominations would be represented as ve il 
as the Government Inspectors o f Afrioan schools. Despite the 
opposition o f the Hatal Department of Education, thia Board vaa 
o f fic ia lly  constituted in 1909* largely as a result of the press 
are o f ths Superintendent of Education, ths Hatlve A ffairs 
Council ead the Inspiration o f S ir Matthew Kethsa shoes own in­
terest; in educational work vas profound.^ Ths Commissioner^ 
recommendation that small industrial schools be establlfeed aad 
greater attention be given to agricultural training in fee edu­
cational system, also seem to hmrs boms fru ltf*  by ths 1920a 
ths ffcelpa-Stokas Commission on "Education in  hast A frica” commented 
enthusiastically that Ratal had the aoet successful educational 
system in A frica, one which vac superior to the Cape system "ia
1C0 179/ 244/ 7756, Oot. to Sm. S t ., 6.1.08 JSaol. PxopoMl. ty 
Sir Matthew Nathan on Native A ffaire, Ho. 2.
H.N.A.C. Report, p .26.
330 179/254/992, Baal. 1 ia  4m p . 272, 9.12.09, Aaa. I , to ft , by 
Council o f M.A. on Native Education Advisory Board. CO 179/244/3756, 
o p .c it .. ABM V /l/4  Annual Report o f A.Z.M. 1909 by Margaret McCord.
^V.H.A.C. Report, p .28.
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general organisation, effectivenose and adaptation to tha real 
needs o f tha Hative people".1 At laaat ia  tha matter o f 
eduoatlon, thara does seam to have bean a change fo r  tha better*, 
though the enthusiasm o f the Phslps-Stoksa Commission, so domln- 
atad by tha Booker T. Washington philosophy o f education does 
hare to ha treated with a l i t t le  oautiozu nevertheless, area 
the amount spent by tha government on Afrloen education trebled 
in the period between 1906 end 1915,5 though i t  waa s t i l l  bslow 
hat oontributad by tha Capa government to ita  prograsaa of 
Afrlean education.*
Tha other raaoaaandationa o f the Coaaiaaion am ba dealt 
with aore suaaarily. Aa a result o f thair reeonmendatioas, 
legislation  vas prepared on tha aubjeot o f tha indebtedness ef 
tha African population, though Sir Matthew hathan pointed out
Xe .* . * . J. Jones (N .I., 1925). p. 194 t t .
‘ The change vas certainly not In tha pre-Onlon periodt Indaafl 
in 1907 tha Sdandale grant was s t i l l  £60 p .a ., and tha situation 
was the sane in 1909, despite an extra £225 on tha eetinates 
whioh waa not paid* Waaleyen Methodist Churoh o f S« A# leports 
o f Missionary Society. Hdendmle Report, p .54 and 27th Rpport# 1909.
3^Brookes and Webb, A History o f Natal. p .254.
*Under tha Act o f Union, a ll education other than higher aduaation 
remained undar the oontrol o f the prowlneial administration* By 
the Financial Regulations Aot o f 1922 the Union government took 
power to provide funds fo r  native education# while tha Provinces 
"ware held to a certain minimum o f obligations"* At that time ia  
tha Cape 20°/o  o f government appropriations vara paid oa non-white 
education, in Ratal 17°/o, in tha Transvaal 5°/o and ths 0*F.S. 
1 % *  Malherbe# A history ox eduoatlon ia ^ r io a . p .4241 
Phelps Stokes Os—lesion , p .191.
that tha measure fa il ad to tackla tha Boat common forma o f aon^r 
landing -  loans to secure labour and store debts, which tha Com- 
alaaion had suggested should not ba recoverable against kraalr* 
heads (as vas stipulated by the 1891 Coda) uni aaa ha bad incurred 
tha debt personally.* A nav liquor lav vaa drafted which re­
gulated tha sale o f utahvala in Tillages, and opened tha way
fo r  aunioipalities to establish monopolies over tha aale o f  this
2brew, using tha funds fo r  African Welfare purposes. Thia 
leg isla tion  seems to  bars prepared tha way fo r  tha aactiona oa 
beer-brewing in tha Urban Areas Act paaaad by the Union govern­
ment in  1923* fin a lly , action vaa taken on the suggestion that 
the position of children bora after their parents had bean ex­
empted from the provisions o f native lav be themselves exempted.
On thia question o f exemption, the Africans found a champion in 
Sir Matthew Kathaa, lfco took a vary different stand on tha sub­
je c t  to that o f hia predecessor; though ha agreed the lav aa 
i t  stood was unsatisfactory, Sir Matthew maintained that the way 
to deal vith tha problem waa to xnform applicants - of its  lim ita­
tions, and a llov them to make thair own daoiaion aa to whathar
1C0 179/245/22270, Oot. to Sm. S t., 27.5.08.
l SH C<2. 4523, Oot. to S*c. S t., tesp. 175, 18.8.08 (CO 179/846/
35500;.
they wanted to eantlaue In their request. By January, 1900,
Nathan had granted ten petitions end refused three, and there­
after i t  would appear that petitions were granted no re freely 
than before.1
Reoossendations of the Coanlsslon which were not anted 
upon were basically those whioh aost affected ldiite settlers 
on the score o f labour and land, aad those granting my fora of 
direet representation to Afrioans.2 Thus the proposal that 
further alieaatlen o f lend In Zululand be stopped was mt as- 
eepted by sinister©," not was isibalo ended.* the Pass laws,
eontraets between natlwe tenants and landlords end Cattle Steal­
ing lo ts , reaained unchanged* The oolony found i t  impossible 
to ehange its  Methods o f selecting Magistrates, though various 
oiroulars were seat to the m isting magistrates on the question 
o f  the proper treatment o f natives at pubiie o ffic e s . In 1909, 
the Natives Courts Aot o f 1896 was mended, md tria l by Jury 
which had been proven m abyssmal failure aad resulted la "notorious 
Miscarriages of ju stloe" in Hatal was abolished as unsuitable Ia
S^HA l /l /3 7 5 ^ P . so* N p. Kimites HOthan to U.K.A. 22.10.07, 8.11.07 
and 3.1.08. S .. alao CO 179/344/9756. Oov. to boa. S t., 6.1.06,
find. Proposals on Native A ffairs, no. 1, Sxenptlon.
22d 4194, -inol. 1 In daajp. I l l ,  Oov. to 3ao. S t., 24.6.08, Stekaaont
by W. A. Dept. showing actions taken on recommendations o f I.V.A.C.
? tf r, ■» r\ r*7 r »* 4-r 1 ; 719 J ♦ - • | O  ^ | 1. % >7 v- a*. • SV S f *
^Snole. in 00 179/245/26093, Oov. to P.H. 18.10.07 and P.M. to Oov. 
22.10.07.
*Llko tho riT loolnn. lothan oppoaod ioibolo. Soo S*A l/l/d lT "® ^  Bothon
to K.9.A., 15.12.08 and 29.12.08. 08
African-Suropean o ttw .1 I t  vas s t i l l  found impracticable to 
inform Africans o f contemplated legislation  la  advance md l c n  vere 
not translated into Zulu* Tho Government remained as foarful aa 
over over poaaihla "combinations"! indeed the adminietratlom vaa 
horrified vhen i t  heard o f proposals lnl909 to hold meetings o f
Africans over tho forthooning unification  o f ^outh Afrioa* Tha
2nestings vere promptly banned*
This then vas the attempt aade lay the Moor ministry to 
refom  native affaire on the basis of the recoanendatioaa o f the 
1906-7 Native Affaire Coaniaeina* On the African population 
it s e lf  the disturbances had a profound md positive impact in 
other ways* Thus soon a fter the disturbances, Missionaries o f a 
number of different dmoaJLmtlons noted an upsurge of interact 
amongst Afrioana in Christianity* Ia some plaoes this mounted 
to "a great revival"; the oonversion o f rebel prleonere at 
Behove gaol vaa deaoribad by the Vealeyaa Methodist evangelist 
there es “an extraordinary work o f g r a c e " A f t e r  the arrest o f
^This comment is  T* F. Carter's, Min* o f Justice and attorney General, 
mol* in CO 179/256/5965* For a scandalous example of this aaa
CO 179/241/20385, desp. 72, Go? . to Sec. St. 15*5*07.
2-** e .g . SNA 1 /1 /3 3 1 ^ ^  , le tter ^ I*b *  10.5.09. Haply U.S.*.A. 
Samuelson, 22*5*09 and* 3IA l/l/42722£ Minute Saaualaon -  Maroh, 
1909. Sw also SNA l/l/3432Z gl 09 Cleric M.il.Truat to tJ.S.N.A.
18*8.06 and Minute U.S.H.A. t8 *^ ec. lav  ^B m t., 29*6.08 on regulations 
designed "to oheok the Influx of irreapJT"native preachera* and fo r ­
bidding assemblies of natives except at an authorised mission centre.
H^ermannsburger M ieeicasblatt, May 1909, n.5# p*134* Wesleyan
Methodist Report, 1908, Hatal Circuit md Zululand Miaaion.
AThe Methodist Churohnan, p .7, 8.9.08.
Dinusulu there was wen a 'rw ival* amongst a saotion of tha Zulu 
at longona.* Daapita Dinusulu vs own bittwr remark at hia tria l 
oa bslag aaked whether ha vaa a Christian *1 '..do not kttov who ia 
a Christian In this country* It waa only Christ who waa a Christian, 
even tvo o f the Chief's vivas beams oonrarts in 1906.
Together with tha spread of tha white dominated Christian 
ebareh, there also asms te have been a spread of separatism
at thia time • both af those independent ohurehee already in  ex-
3istanoe, and of a eouple of nav ones* In tha Qraytovn and Lady­
smith areas, the missionaries ooaplain of the activities of tha 
'Z ion ist' churches, whilst ia tha Ixopo region John aibiya vm 
extending tha fm e of tha Afrioan Presbyterian Charsh, whose fira t 
martyrs had bean provided by Hakaada and XJsngo*4 It la significant 
that tha aoat prominent meabera of Isaiah Shambe's Haaarite qhnroh 
are Heeenl'a Qvabe people* Though thia vas a slightly later want,
It ia olaar that tha wants af 1906 played a major part in tha 
Wholehearted support of tha aim  for a prophet who a) aimed, to 
"revive the bones of Hessen and of the people Who were
killed in lanbata's rebellion".^
*Weslsyan Methodist Churoh o f S,A*t Report o f ZululanA Miaaicn. 1908 
by Bar. I* Rndavsni.
^Hatal Witness. 2B.1.09. Dimsulu vm apparently oonverted just 
before ha died in 1913*
tothoaut Ch. Of 3 . 1 .1  UaorXm of Hl.oloawnr 3ool.tar 1900, 
The Ratal Circuit, p .20.
4au  1/ 4/19 o32&, aopt. h u i ,  r.x.roxoa, 14 .1 1 . 07.
53un4ka«r, frmtu Proohoto. ,.5 1 3 .
Hot surprisingly, In the light o f  their experience end 
philosophy, the Hatel government took l i t t le  heed of the judgment 
o f the Hatal Hative Affaire Commission that 1heir aot Ians in 
dismantling unauthorised plaoes of worship on Trust land mss 
"needlessly" alarm ist.1 Indeed a fresh regulation Issued in 
A pril, ©07 stipulated that no African evangelist be allowed to 
preach in gaols except in the presence of a European Zulu- 
speaking missionary* Numerous deputations, reinforced by ths 
support o f Sir Matthew Nathan end tha Offioar Administering tha
Government in 1909* Sir Henry Bala, failed  to  away tha government
2on this issue. Nor was Sir Matthew able to gat the Natal govern­
ment to rescind its ban on tha African Methodist Episcopal Church, 
despite its  renewed application tobe allowed to work In Hatal 
aad spread the gospel of "moral excellence, Uiaineas integrity, 
obedience to government and religious intelligence".^  By the 
end of hie stay, however, together with Koo^Bathaa seams to 
have been able to persuade the remaining ministers to take a 
more enlightened view towards the ^frioan agents o f ths American
p .  28.
2C0 179/254/31870, B a l. to  S «e . S t . Conf. 4 .9 .0 9 .  CO 1 7 9 /2 5 J /»5 B 6 , 
Oov. to ^eo. St. Conf. 2 5 .5 .0 9 , deports o f various deputations cm
the e u b je c t .
3 SNA l/l /3 8 8 ^ 2 i. $>. Dorriok, A«R*E.C» to Nathan n.d. 't(Dsc. 1907) 
and Minute, Nathan 2 0 .1 2 .0 7 .
r ' '  ^ •
S. ; „ ... • > .
r -  i •
Zulu Mission.1 A decade later it  1* interesting to note that 
the Fhelps-Stoke Commission remark^on the anooth relations 
between the Natal provincial administration and the missionary' 
organisations in the territory hut i t  would appear that i t  vas
the result o f soae intervention by the Union Native A ffairs
* 3Department.
Apart froa the purely religious aspect o f this revival, 
one which oan be explained in terms of the solace religion  can 
afford in times o f distress and despair, the disturbances also 
brought about an increased awareness of the value o f the edu­
cation provided by the Missionaries* Onoe and for a ll, armed 
rebellion had been proven fu tile . The Kolwa who bad advised 
against i t  had been shown correct in their analysis. Education 
was the new weapon, and even 'reb e l9 chiefs lik e  Ndlovu ka TjUmnl
gvere heard advising their eons and people "to learn” . Chief 
Gayede, who was said to have been disaffected (hiring the disturb­
an ces but restrained froa overt action by the advloe of the African 
Lutheran teacher amongst hia people, also "begged” hia children and
1AM lU /l /3 ,  p .956, to Barton, 11.12.09.
2Education in East Africa, p.195.
l/l/3 9 6 f c . H. Maxwell, A.Z.K. to Lt. Col. Lugg, R.M. 12.5.12, Aare h
states that there las been a change in govt, policy  to mission work in
locations vhich be gathers ’’ from recent correspondence aid interviews
with Burton and others” •
See also V.N.A.C. Bvid. passim, but sap. Chief Skabana Newcastle 
p. 802*5, J . L. Dube, p .960 (though in h is oase thia docs not repre­
sent a new stand).
4
paopl* to M*k oduoation in 1907.1 Chief Sibindi, vho booatw 
convinced during his fighting on the government side that God 
wae vith him, allowed aohools to be tu llt in his tribal area 
for the f ir s t  time after the rebellion, and a large number o f
hie Bosvu people ease to the missionaries fo r  instruction in
2Christianity.
At the ease time as the tribal Africans vere turning to 
education and Christianity, the Christian Africans seem to bars 
been drawn closer to their non-Christian fellows by the disturb­
ances and to have their feeling o f common race aroused. This pro­
cess had indeed already started before 1906^. Nevertheless in 
the dramatic events o f 1906 there must have been suoh heart- 
searching about vhioh side ttie Kolwa really vas on. Immediately 
a fter the disturbances fo r  example vhen an A.Z.H. missionary 
gave a sermon based on vhat he had seen during the disturbances 
it caused an uproar in hla congregation and a very bitter editorial
Aand correspondence in Ilan/ra l a c e  ?&tal. After a discussion 
with Martin Luthuli on the cause of the incident, the Her. J. D.
Taylor concluded that the missionary had
1Hemannsburger Missionsblatt, Jan. 1909, p .13.
^Heraaansbur^er Missionsblatt, Hay 1907, p. 134, Sept. Director Hands.
3S.C rtov . Chapter m i .
‘ ttiptSS 'Triff; I1<BU!*  **»• ***** aBd lts  •d ltor John * •  *hoT*>
"fa iled  to correctly estimate the depth o f feelin g  
on the pert o f the people, who, though not in 
sympathy with the rebels, oould not bear a recita l 
o f its  events froa ths lips of a white man without 
feeling that he was gloating over the success o f 
his own r a c e ..."1
The disturbances also provided a potent spur to p o litica l set ion.
Vith the announcement of the formation of the Hatal Native A ffairs
Commission, the Hatal Native Congress set in order to ehoose
the witnesses who sk would best represent its  views before the
2Commission. Even before the report of the Commission, Dabs wee
urging from th . oolumun o f I l i a .  Uee M.U15 th*t wfc*t th.
Africans needed was representation in the Hatal parliament, by
two or three European members chosen axpresaly fo r  this purpose.
It was probably a mark of the p o litica l realism of Hatal Africans
at this time that none o f them requested representation in the
4Legislative Assembly by any other than a white candidate. P..Be, .. 
advocated a separate voters r o ll comprising two classes of Africa* 
voter) the f ir s t , exempted mid litera te  Christians with property 
to the value o f £25 and secondly, Chiefs end headmen. As early as
1ASH H l/l /3 , p.409, J. D. faylor to J. I.  Dube, 14.9.06.
Ilan/ta laae Hatal. 12.10.06.
3See rap. hie ‘'Address to the Zulu Pooplej 2.11.06. Heo TlfUff- 
31.8.06.
. Report,
R . U . N . A . C . , p . 2 1 .
September, 1906 Dabe was calling fo r  a meeting of the T n & sm l,
Cape and Hatal Congresses and welcoming "eigne that tribal
antagonisms are dying down aa indications o f progress*.*
2The election of Ralph Tatham to the Natal Legislative 
Assembly aa member fo r  Durbm City in September 1906 brought a 
man of socia list leanings fo r  ths fir s t time into Natal politics* 
and also seams to hare lain behind a revival o f a scheme which 
boars SOM nM BU taot to Joseph Booth's African C h r is ta  Union 
of the 1890*a amongst the Africans of Natal* The main point# of 
this scheme* which he called a "Native Centralisation Scheme", were 
to "provide means o f cooperation where by Hative ownership o f land 
may ba i sreased so aa to oovar a ll branches of agriculture***", 
to provide means whereby Africans oould get trade "now carried on 
by Indiana" into their own hands, "by establishing businesses 
from the central organisation under native manggonent” , to provide 
a centralised legal organisation, and savings bank, to provide fo r
the p o litica l representation of African grievances and to eliminate
.
the ill-fe e lin g  betveen black and white In Natal by co-operating
*3with the Croveraasnt to improve race relations. Tatham had visited
*11 an^a la-'o ^atal. 14.9*06*
H B ora in Natal in 1867, he was one o f tho four labour members to be 
elected to H.U.A. in Sept.1906* (Natal Who*a alho* 1906, p .195)
He was ths brother o f P. S. Tatham, a prominent opponent o f Union 
in 1910* In view of the attitude taken by white labour leaders 
on the Rand to Africans at this time, as well as the later d o se  
links between fcreaiftvay members of the Labour Barty (lik e  S* P.
n . j ?
V_-
Dinusulu at ths sad o f 1906, and It  is  in terestlng that aa 
unsigned and undated typescript found amongst Dinusulu papers 
vas found headed "A -ohame for Arranging Native A ffa irs", vhich, 
making allowances for the vagaries of different translators, was 
the same as the scheme sent by Latham to Harrietts Coleaso ia  
Hay, 1907.1 Behind the scheme may veil have lain  considerable 
consultation vith the p o litica lly  conscious Africans of the dayt
3* Myongvana, at that time Chairman of Congress, worked in Tatham*a
o ffic e , whilst Tatham vas also c lo s e ly ^  touch vith John Dube,
Joslah Gumede and Saul M e a n s S a u l  Ksane, originally  bora la 
Natal aad educated at Kdendalu, had by 1907 spent some dosea years 
aa compound manager on the gold-mines, where in 1904 he vas a 
member of what was called the So tho committee, a&d on whose behalf 
he had v isited  Britain as a member of the 1904 delegation* In 
1907 he v isited  Natal where he waa occupied vith launching this 
tfative Centralisation scheme or fund, vhich vaa given the Zulu 
t it le  Isivivane. and i t  ia interesting to note that he had been a
Bunting and Ivor Jones) with African p o litica l movements, It is  
interesting to note this early connection in Natal both hi the
oase of Tatham and apparently Nelson Palmer (see below, p. )
with educated Afrioan opinion*
•kCol. Col. 206, Copy attached to le tter &• Tatham to H. S* Colenso,
3.5.07.  
\lt>0 1/7/53 transi. T. A. Jackson.
2Cf also address to 2*. H. Moor from Members of 3.N.C. forwarded by
H. Tatham, 2C.6.07 in SNA 1/1/369A5& . SNA \/l/yi\±2£&. , 1 . Tatham to • 
«j * Gum de, 9*S«07 and Col. Col. 2u0, d. Xetlism to H.is.0. 3 .p .07.
3S.A.H.A.C., Vol. IV, p.853, Bmll 3kot*. p.TX
a supporter of Booth* a Afrioan Christ!on Uhion,1 Joalah Qunsda2 
had boon a nmbar of a delegation to MLtaia» at 1he oad of 1906 
over tha land lava of tha Osaaca free stata. la  thla ba aotad 
aa tha agmt o f a troop of So tho aha had bought load la tha Orange 
free Stata aoao jaara baokv bat vara aaabla to taka ooatrol of 
i t  undar tha lam  of tha In a  Stata* for leaving Batal without a 
paaa (far vhioh ba had applied but/had aot baoa granted) ha waa 
arraatad md flood £10 or thxaa aontha oa hia raturns apparently 
at tha au«aatian of KoOallua tho fa it that hia going waa "a 
pi aaa o f InaubordlAatlaa” that ought to ba punished*'* Panada 
who partlaipatad la tha founding of tha Batal Coagraaa la 1900 
aad waa far amoral yaara Ita gaaaral seeretary# latar baaam tha 
Praaldaat of tha Afriaaa Vatlonal Coagraaa* Oaa woadarw whathar
f f  15.1.04.
Hsana'a father, Kathav)*
1Saa lattar froa tha Johannesburg C'ttaa af tha A*0*U# to tha 
Watchman reprinted ia MTO. 12*1*96*
2J* T* ftamde waa aduoatad at Qsahmstewn aad taaght for aoaa tlaa 
at ^oaamat Baat ia  tha Cape Colony bafosa going to Batal wham
ha baaam advisor to Xatal aad 0.F.S* ahiafa* Ha waa a founder 
nmbar of tha S,A,H*1*C« aad latar baaam ita Preaiimt* H» waa 
also Praaldaat of tha Taagpa of Afyieaa Bights sad dalsgats to 
tha Pirat Xmtssmatloaal Confaraaoa against Xgpertalian ia Bslgina 
(1926)* Ha sppasrs ia  Boxy Benson*# The African Patriots md la 
Bdward Bouz*a Tina Longer than Rope as Jams T. Ounede*Xvall 
SkohSf f*150f Hour, p .211 ff*
5SJU MinutM Mad*. to rg r ill* , 3B.ia.06 aad O ot. to
n u  15.1.07 UA5.3.07.
his ls ts r  left-w ing views1 w n  ia  aqr effected s i this time 
by his eoataot with Tatham. Paey ita ths attempts o f Tatham to 
launch this sohsss through Congress, i t  vas abandoned a few aoxiths
later according to Xathaa beoauao ”neither the zatlves nor tha
2Europeans are ready fo r  it"*  The fact that by the middle o f 
1907 IV: than had gone bankrupt and vas being sued in the oourts
by fyongwana for his backpay may hare had something to do vith
3hia disillusionment vith *vfrican politicians* As a result o f 
h is insolvency, T a than vas forced to reai&i froa the Hatal 
Legislative Assembly and the hopes cf Congress that he might 
represent their views there fe ll  to the -round* Froa the outset 
there had been those members lik e Mark RMebe vho vere strongly 
opposed to Tatham'c presence at Congress meetings -  on the 
ground that no whit# man should be allowed to their meetings* 
Although at the time Eadebe vas overridden by other members o f 
Congress vho fe lt  that Tatham vasracessary and useful, *vadebe'a 
heightened race consciousness may veil hare been in part due 
to the 1906 disturbances.^
*See A. Eoux, Time Longer than Epps. p. 211 ff*
2Col* Col. 206 to H. E. Colenso, 13*5.07.
^Natal Hercury. 6.7.07 and 8.7.07.
^For H&debe seosbove Chap tar TUJtpp.i'jS^HO
The azTMt and tria l o f Dinusulu m at also hmre been a 
factor at this time la  heightening African p o litica l coned ouanass.
The Attorney General and Minister of Justice, T. P. Carter,
constantly feared the p o litioa l use to vhich the tr ia l would be
put by the defenoe, specially by Harriett® Colenso, and the action
taken by the government In suppressing any meetings and preventing
funds froa being raised fur Dinuzulu• e defence in Natal and Zululand
prevented any overt signs of this being shown at the time. Although
Dube himself advised Dinusulu that his only course vas to surrender,^
Ilanga lase Natal reported the very deep sorrow end bitterness
occasioned by his arrest2 and in April 1908 Dube wrote to Harrietts
Colenso after a v is it  to Cape Colony that “a ll the natives there
3admire your pluck and purpose in the defence o f Dinuzulu. “ In 
1912 Dinusulu vas invited to become Honorary Tice President c f 
the newly formed South African Native national Congress, c f  which 
John Dube had become President, and it  vas probable that the crests 
o f 1906-8 vere very ouch in African minds at the time.
A^GO 1/7/53, Dube to Dinuzulu, n.d. ? Deo. 1907.
2See e.g . Haasa. 20.12.07, 27.12.C7 and 1 2 . 3 . 0 9 , appealing for mercy 
in his sentence. On 27th Deo. 1907 lianas commented on reports 
that Africans vere pleased at the arrest of Dinuzulu 1 " . . .  Tou should
come into contact with the real 2ulu in Durban and you would there 
see the bitterness, I saw aa eduoatsd native boy buying a paper contain­
ing a picture of him being marched by the soldiers which the boy was 
shoving the natives. A young fluluwan looked at the picture again 
and again and then the tears streamed; he beat his breast and walked
Tha opposition of tha Christian Africans to Boor's proposal 
reform of native administration vaa far aora opaiu Perhaps i t  
vaa fa it  that Boor vaa in sons ways responsive to Afriaaa poli­
t ica l pressure on this score, md i t  la also poaalhla that tha 
presence o f Sir Matthew Bathm encouraged the educated Africans 
to aaka thalr wlawa fa it  fhr aora vigorously than they had dared 
In tha tlaa o f 3Lr Henry MoOaUua. Thus P o rtly  aftar tha publl- 
cation cf tha thaaa nrtn h illa  la  April, 1906,1 a deputation of 
seventy-four Chriatlm Afrlosas aat Boor to protest aapaeially 
about tha b il l  fo r  tha "Batter Administration of Satire A ffa irs". 
Thalr m eting waa adjourned until tha 10th md U th A aa, whan 
tha mabar o f tha Afrlom  deputation had swelled to a hundred 
md flftj^ a lz*  Bow opposition was expressed g a in st a ll thraa 
h illa . Tha M & utlcna against tha M ila  ware signed lay Simeon 
Xanbnla m (Thai man md John Dube as Secretary, laadara apparmtly 
o f a apaoial fifteen  am ooaaittee appointed ty tha Batal Batlwa 
Congress formed sp ecifica lly  to handle tha opposition to tha pro­
posed leg isla tion . Oh tha 13th July Dnbe aad sight others pre­
sented a petition through Hr. Saloon Palmar, X.L.A. fo r  Plater- 
asritsbuxg, another o f tha four labour ambers to have bam elected 
in  1906. m  September there ware further deputations md a petition
*3ee hbora, p.
vith  over two hundred naoes appended to i t .  In a ll these petitions 
sad delegations the fan? lia r  asses appear sad rasppasr • S. Xlnl,
Mark Eadebe, J , T. Ounede, P. Ounede, S. lab*, Xark Sivetye amongst 
others*1
The soat b itterly  opposed o f the three major h ills  introduced 
by Xoor vas the measure entitled "To provide fo r  the le tter Ad- 
miniatrationof Hative A ffa irs". Africans pointed oat that Parts 
III  and I f  opened the vay to arbitrary aotion hy a host o f o ffle la ls  
and closed a il doers to redress through the eourts. They also 
objected to the establishment o f the fbur D istrict Commissioners 
who, they fe lt*  vould block their seeess to the Secretary o f Istive 
A ffairs, and asked instead for D istrict and General Councils am 
In the Tfcaaafeal.2 Ths Lands Settlement measure they maintained 
did not satisfy  their aspirations either to loca l self-government 
nor to Individual freehold tenure, and they fe lt  that Africans 
should be consulted ever the four sash ere vho vere to represent 
their Alternate in the Hatal Legislative Council. In addition they 
thought there ahould be Afrloan consultation in ths Lover House 
which controlled finance. Above a ll they expressed their dissatisfaction 
that no provision had been made fo r  an Afyiosn franchise*'* In a
XSee also CO 179/248/43579, Kasls. ia desp. Gov. to Sac. St. 6 .U .08 , 
oontains a ll ths information an vhioh ths shove pmregrsph is  based*
See also CO 179/247/41751, Qov. to Sac. St. 19.10.08.
2Ibid and letter J. T. Ounede, ls ts l Witness , 3*10.08, and SHA 
l/l/3 9 7 3 ffi, P. Oumsde in seating vith Hoor,U.6.08«
■^ See SHA l/l/3 8 7 ^ p ^  Heating betveen P. I* Koor and Christian Africans
le tte r  to the lational Convention sitting In Durbar at the 
end o f 1908 the I.G .C. sim ilarly asked fo r  "some decree o f re­
presentation" in the legislation  of the weaning Union,1
In theee protests aeahere o f Congress vere Joined by the 
naebers o f a nav organisation ehloh had been formsd in itia lly  
in 1907 in ths Duadae aid Xevoastle arsaf end ooneistlng pre­
dominantly o f Vesleyan hethodiat converts aid ch iefs. It  seeae 
to have been called Ilieo  la  *»■* originally , though later
ttto zxtam « u  ohaa«*d to T iT lm  ^rillBTmt » »  «■ »*
nesting I  hare found reoord of vas sailed to proteat at the
regulation hindering Africans froa  purchasing Qrovn lands, aid
vas held under the Chairmanship of Chief Xaphtali gale*2 In
1906 a constitution van dram up and signed by Z. X. a—
ead J . T. Oumede, in vhioh the dec lared alas vere to unite the
people o f Xatal end Zulul and into a contented and prosperous
end united people to bring About harmony aad . . . .  aatual oo-operatian.5
11.6.06, eep. lev* V* 0* Kfcenfcu# Xathan MSS 368, Xathan to Luoae,
6.9.08. ________
1a u  1/1/415 iP 2  Lottor M. S. HM .b., 5 .U .08 to ta k e s .
Onion Convenxidn.
2 SNA 1/4/18 o^S- , ftaport Chlrf 1 . Oulo, 50.9 .01, 3  1/4/30 (M  ,
Report o f a n n i i  o f t h « .  i* .^ . 25rd July,1908 (apporantly 
by a spy). Also Letter f r .  Z. X. Kag.nku to U .S .I.A ., 13.7.08.
Preamble end Constitution o f X.L.S. me found in SKA 1/4/20
together vith a l is t  o f dalegatea expeoted at the anneal meeting.
There imbb to hare boon soae atteapt to dra* tribal African* 
and especially ohiafa into their dalibaimtioaa aad plan* vara 
aada for tha rap ra* notation of tribal unit* in ita  foruna.l
I f tha dlatarba&aaa heightened politica l oeneolouaaees in 
Xatal, thay also appear to hara inareaeed p olitioa l activity 
outaida tha boundaries o f tha eolony* ftna ona of tha aoat active
opponents o f tha Xatal varaion of tha 'raballion* aaa Alfred
2 -  Kangana, author of aonraral patitiona to Hia Majesty's Ckrra xnaent
against tha XAofcaoad Coarta Martial. Aeoording to Matal Xhtelligenee
Raporta ahiah aara widely publicised la tha British praaa by tha
Xatal agaat ia London, Col. XUliaa Arbuekle, Xengena, eboa ha
aoonaad of being a tool ia tha handa of tha "anti-Matal sedition
aoagara”  ^ aaa not a Xatal Zulu at a ll, bat a Jingo froa Ctrl foal aad
Vast. Kangana M assif aalatainad ha aaa a Zial froa tha X&teourt
division la Xatal,* ha had however baan ia  the Capa Colony at
tha torn o f tha eaatnry, where ha had been proainent in oalleoting
aoaay for tha dafanaa of certain Afrioana arraetad for obstructing
1Ibia. S#a alao SHA 1/1/410 2 ^  , Z. Maauku ta O.S.B.A., 12.9.06, 
and Minutes of Matting held by i.L.iU (Xaport C. Kaoane).
h o r  Kangana1* haairgitnind aaa 4*6*08, Latter froa P ixie/ ka
Xaaka San* aad Itaall SBcofa, Afirloaa Taarlr Raaiatar. p.43.
C^d 4409* p.15. Pap«va ralatlag to th* aaa* ot Mr. Alfrad lan««a 
(London, 1908).
4Cd 4403, p.5.
th® laploaentation o f tho anti-Bubonio Plague ooamtzoo In Cape 
Toon in 1901| according to tho Bor* S. Hdoloaba earring at that 
tin® vith tho loyal Hatal Hative Horoe, oad whoso Woolcyan con­
gregation Hangona had lo ft  to jo in  tho Chttroh o f feglaad* Hangana
ahooondod vith tho aoney ho had raised to Sngland to further hia
1 „  own studios* Against thoao allegations, Kengena subosqpisatly
von four lib o l actions so too such roliaaoo nood not bo plaood 
on their Tsraoity* Oa tho othor hand* Hangona vas aaaooiatod 
in Cap® Town* whothor only so interpreter as ho aalntal nod* or 
nor® intimately* vith tvo aan* Wilkinson oad Kuril vho varo en­
gaged in tho dofonoo of ^frioans in Capo Town and idio may vail 
hare boon implicated in thoorlgtnal opposition to Cape Tovn 
aunioipality 'o attoapto to aore Afrieeas to a looation furthsr 
froa tho towzu* During tho disturbanoos Mangcna pro son tod tvo 
potitions against tho Hatal goTensaont aotions at Rlohaond and vaa 
also rosponsiblo fo r  laying a ohargo at Bov Strost against tho 
OoTomor of la to l fo r  tho illog a l dooloration o f Xartlal la v .5 
Along vith Maageaa* tho naao o f aao ikllagpa Osabraupa Sawyer 
appsars in tho instructions to K, 0. Jollieoo of tho Middle Toaplo 
to petition tha Judicial Coaaittoo o f Hatal against tho Hiohaoad
1C0 179/235/21724. Oor. to 0*0. S t ., 17.6.06.
2Cd 4403, pp. 30-32. So* olao MSS B rit. asp. S 22. 0 198 (A.P.S.
Papers, Hhodoo House)* Hooolntiono o f a Mooting hold under tho aaepioe® 
o f the Satire Vigilant Association of Vdabsni Looation* 27th Sept.
1906.
u  JL*!
5Cd. 2927* Petition to H.M. In Counoil by A. Mangona.
sentences.1 Another Vest Afvioea to here taken an intereot in
the Betel situation was Princo Ononoyi Bendele of Ife  tiio pub-
A  Defence of Ethiopianism. in Edi^>urgh, which seems to have had 
liah^i a fp«n^Afrle«n perepeotive*. Haagena himself returned
to South Africa to become the fir s t  African Barrister at lav 
and vas one of the founder mashers o f the South Afrioan Vatlre 
lational doagrees. Hangena's motions vara also approved tor * 
resolution o f a body calling I ts e lf the South African Satire 
Congress in Capa Town/5
Tha diaturbancaa were time one o f the factors leading 
p o lit ica lly  oonselous sad articulate Africans to thiak in terms 
o f a wider p o litica l organisation vhieh would embrace Africans 
a ll over Southern Africa. An equally potent factor wsa tire growing 
movement towards the unification of a il the South Afrioan terri­
tories, amongst white South Africans. Whilst the unification 
o f South Africa vas the product o f many factors which i t  is  un­
necessary to examine here, the rebellion la Betel end the Hatal 
government *s handling both o f the 1906 uprising and tha arrest 
and tr ia l o f Dlnmsulu seemed to many South Africans is  well as
Xc* 2905, P* 33, 43.
2Cf. 1 . Sh«pp*zvon, "BxtMMl fM tom  to th* B w il ryMnt af
African Bhtianallaa>, i Phylon. Atlanta, N U  XXII, no, % mid 
"Historians in Tropical A frica", Proceedings o f Lererhnlme Conf. 
held at University College of Bhodeaia and Byasaland (Salisbury, 
-1962), p. 3*9.
M  Skot^ Afrlow T w lr awtlgtwr. p.43.
it s  a n t . s 22 e 19a .o p .o it .
to tho Iaperlal goweraaaat to illu strate tho dangers o f
"loovlac large faootlm o effecting tho fUtltTO of a ll Sooth Africa
to ho doolt with toy o  eooXl oolony liko Botol9 whose thoro ia
neither tho largeness of vision nor tho wucleeoas cheek o f a
strong opposition m< influantlal leaders.1
Throughout tho distarbsaoss of 1906-6 ^outh African stats*-
M i lik o  M m rlM i Shuts, Botha and Stays aora extrsaely
o r ltle a l o f bar handling of a ffa irs*2 It is  not surprising
that la  1906, stung toy Batal*a attaek on tho Capo franchise
aad toy tho aoaowhat snug attitudo of tho oolony to Its  oan aatlTo
policy# M m Usa should toare written to a ir Matthau Xathaat
"The Xatal oontlngont always talk as i f  thalr aystou 
of gowexuueat had hoon a oosploto and aogslfleant 
anasooo. It le jseeleely  hooousa It has orootod a
sort o f plague spot and pnhllo danger that wo are 
anxious fo r  felon  whioh any pat aa and to ulsgover*- 
aaat. *aturally wo are too polite  to to ll than tho 
truth la  the Oeawantioa. "3
I t  la  a sobering thought that fo r  tho Afrlooao o f Xatal 
at least In ita  early years and prohahly until 1946 tho ad- 
▼antogoo o f felon  outweighed tho disadvantages.
M orrison Papers 93, Shuts to Xerrlasn, 3.4.06, pnhl. Shuts Papers, 
od. Boaoookan v.d?eLxp. 253# ao. 294. Of. aloe 00 179/255/24799
C.O. mantes on Oct. to See. St. 2.7.09# an raport on allegations of 
flogging toy Xatal. "too ooanot take away Xatal's ooatrol hofors Onion 
and ao hope that aftar feloa a hotter aad wiser administration w ill 
take tho plaoe o f tho proooat Oovemnsnt.* See alao JMroekss oad Vobh#p229
2r>e e .g . Xerrlasn Papers 123 oad 160# 147# Suits to Morrlasn n.d. 
1907# M. T. Stoyn to Msnrlasa# 7*5.06# Botha to Msrrlaaa 15.12*07# 
Marshall Ooapholl Papers, Bantu Section, Ida. Hosken to X* Ceaqpbell, 
29.2.08# no. 26. Xeorrlaaa to X. Gaqpball# 30.11.07* Santa Papers od. 
Hancock .anct’vvd^ Pool, Vol. 1 . nos. 269# 293-o# 303# 3o5-6 (mainly 
Santa aad Xerrlaan's slows).
Nathan MSS 375# p. 149* Merriasn to Xathan# 1.12.08.
This Bibliography has bean divided intot
Unpublished Souroea
A. O fficial
1, British
2, Ratal
B. Ron-Official
1. Mission records
2, Private Collections and Unpublished Typescripts
f l l S i S  Coctwpormry Souro—
A« O fficial Records
1. British
2. Ratal 
3* Other
B« Newspapers and Periodicals 
1. Natal 
2m Mission papers 
3* Cape
Cm Conteaqporary Books end Panphlets
D. Doounents subsequently published
S^etxUry Spuro«»
A# Select Books end Artlelee
B. Unpublished Theses
SKLECT MttlOGR. PHT
z unpubiighftd P riyn r Sastm
A. Off i cia l
1. Public Rooorda O fflot
CO 179/177 -  25* Despatches, Oot. Ratal to  3*0. St. 1890-1910.
CO 181/62 (17)1 Iridanoo Ratal Nat ire  A ffairs Ccaaisslon. 1906-1907.
CO W7/1-28 Despatches, Oot. Zululand to Soo. St. 1807-1897.
CO 879/30 Confidential Prints Afrioan (South).
2. Rrttl A r^ v tt , fietyrffaritsburg,
' : ( i )  v Attowaar Ooneral^ Offloo : , i  .-'f ^
AtfO 1/7/51 -  1 /7 /81. Prooeedln£s of tho Spooial Court 1908-1909.
Bvidenoa and briafa in tha criminal :
:/■ V ' ly/vA,;.;- ,^>;#-:-^pro089dingflr Rax v, Mjonbalwana
I. ;:4  ■ }'*$% • ;-'r ? . ' /  Cakijana'
Dinusulu
Mayatana and V Jljl 
Nsolo and Mkipani
AGO 1/7/53 Contains Dinusulu9■ papara found at tha Usuthu
v in December 1907 (inol* oapias and translations).
(11) Pofonoo Aooorda
S /l-3 . f Corraspondanoo 1891*1906• Raoords in thia Department
acre extremely meagre aad af l i t t la  valua. I t  la
i i. posslbla that tha bulk o f tha notarial la elaewhare, *• 
perhaps transferred te  tha Union Dafenae Department.
(H i)
Oi 798*805 Correspondence re IVatlva Rebellion 1906*1909.
GH 569*582 Confidential Correspondence (General) 1900-1910,
01 583*586 Secret Correspondence 1900-1910,
(iv ) Native A ffaire Department
SNA lA /V »lA /2 2  Papers, Confidential 1890-1510.
SNA 1/6/25 Papara related to tha wploynant o f armed
/ v Zulu in looting tha Boar population
1901*2 by Col, Bottonlay,
SNA 1/6/26-31 Ratio. Rebellion 1906. Court Martial
Proceedings. \* v  V \
SNA 1/V289-1/1A80 Minute Papers 1900-1910.
SNA 1 /9 /6 -1 /9 /7  Brief sketch e f Zulu History for
e&oh tribe for vhieh the 
B eliaitstion fn— isslon vas 
required to delimit Reserves.
(t) Erja. W lo .
n  57-74 H aul. Papers 1906-1909
PMC 98-108 H au l. Papers, Confidential, 1905-1910.
PMC 124 Letter book, Confidential, 1901-1910.
(v l) » W l  1MHF**
Proceedings (transcript) in Special Court (for eases, see
2 (1) shove)*
SC i n / y l ,  SC 113/3/6-10, SC III/3 /19-21 .
(vU ) lululand ‘j-chirea
ZA 22, 23 Miscellaneous Correspondence 1991*1909*
ZA 29-39 Confidential Correspondence 1990*1908.
ZA 28-29 contain nest ef the material on the
disturbances.
B. Pnwbll»*»d Hep-Offl«lal Souroea
d )  n e s m  > ***«»
Aaerloaa Boerd Rlaalon Collectioc (Ratal Arohiraa)
AIM VtI/2-4 Annual Raporta 1897-1915.
ABM IT/l/J CoBBittee Report* 1898-1903.
ABM VI1/4/1 Draft plan for a net ire agency.
AW m / 7 / 1  Matters relating to  Retire Churches 1897-1904*
end letters from Commissioners of Foreign 
Mission Boards 1895-190b.
ABM 1/V 7-1/V 8 Minutes, 1900-190?.
ABM 1A/V3 Letters fren Mission Secretary te ABM
headquarters ead others 19GA-1910.
ABM 14/3/4 Letters to See* AZM end between missionaries,
1902-1907.
These were by fur the meet important of the nieeien re**rds
consulted.
( i i )  I « c  9 f Iftw tl (LoodOB)
Mlealenaiy Keporta and Corraapondenoe fr a . Ratal, 1896-1909
i l l )  Cburoh o f Spotland (National Library, Edinburgh)
United Free Churoh o f Sootland, Natal Correspondence 1892-1910.
It) W l l l p w  H .t h o d l.t  H ln iO M IT  s o o l . t r
Z waa unfortunately unable to tea the unpublished reoorda o f
the Veal ay an Methodist Churoh in  South A frica, at Rhodes 
University, Grahaaatown.
The reoorda o f the V.M.M.S. in London -  outgoing Lattera to 
the South Afriean Confsrtnee 1883-1907 -  vere not waxy useful.
Private Colleetlona and Unpublished Typoaorlpta
Anti-Slavery Papers (Rhodes House, Oxford)
MSS. B rit. Sep. 8 18 
C 154/1-11 Booth Papers
C 150/177-183 f . I .  Colenso to H. R. Pox Bourne 1889-1906
C 150/184-222 H. S. Coleneo te H. R. Pox Bourne
C 130/90 Dinuaulu to H. R. Pox Bourne
C 167/62-75 Elgin to Travers Buxton
C 161-166 O fficia l letters arranged ohronologieally •
Campbell Papers (Bantu Section, K illia  Campbell Library, 
i)
0. V. Champion» Unpubl. Autobiography (in  possession o f
Mr. 8. Trap1do, Durham Univ.)
J, 3, Colanbrandert "The Bambata Rebellion", MSS., n.d. (K.C.L.)
H. I .  Colenso Collection (Natal Archives)
Bexea 85- 206
Boxes 85-87 contain MSS e f miscellaneous statements,
treatises aad articles by a variety o f authors,
la d . H. I .  Colenso and Alice Werner.
Boxes 98-113 Zulu trials,mainly material on Dinusulu*a tria l
and reoorda o f the Defence Counsel*. . .
Box.* 120-121 B la r l.. -  «r« in00"?1*'** oy^lgnea M. Colenso.
The remaining boxes contain oerreapondenoe arranged 
alphabetically •
Bex 170 oontaina Dinusulu9!  eorreapondenee (5 v o le .)
Box 181 " a number o f letters from 8 . T. Plaatje
Box 199 includea the C.E. Renaud Papers.
P. E. Colenso Papers (kindly shown as by Mr. Crovo, 'Siangan!9, 
Amerahan) -  some correspondence, mainly between fraaeis 
Ernest and Harristte Colenso. The bulk o f f.E .C*9s papers are 
in  the H.B.C. C ollection.
Marshall
Durba
* • * 8 ! S 1 S & . ) .1
Unpublished Autobiography (kindly ahown ae by
a* MoKenslti "Reninlsoenoes o f  Sir Dunoon Molensie” and aa a rticle
on hia by M3* (K.C.L.)
P» MoKensjfi *Thc Bpi© o f  Transport Riding* (by a borthar o f 
Sir D.M*) (K*C.L.)
J* I# Hsrrlaaa Pnpora (ia  South African Public Library)
H O  » » »  *ottho»)
Nathan MSS 369-405 (Rhodaa Houaa)
Nathan MSS 42-5 (diariea, 1906-9 -  not vary uaaful) )ln  tha Bo&olon 
116-120 (lattara to hla aothor, 1906-1909))libr *17 , Oxford.
C. I .  Ronoudt Soaa poporo, in e l. a tjrpoooript "Tho arroat o f 
Dinuaulu la  1907*• (K.C.L.)
J , Sohortold Collootlon
• neither w ry  useful
w .  P .  r7 «^ T T T  H n  <*■ S o u t h  P M h l l o  Uhrary)
J . Stuart Pnoorn aainly drofto o f  hla published work, bat
including e typescript a rticle  oa "Ethiopianisa” aad traaeeripte 
e f  laforaeate* eridenoe on the 1906 rebellion  (in  "Hative 
Habits aad Cue tons ia  tine e f War") not Included in  InRn
far the aeat useful o f  the shore were the Colenso Collection aad 
the Hathaa Papers*
XX P u b l l ^  Soy Off
a.  a a e a
m m
( l )  Parllaaontary Debate* 1906-1910.
(U ) Parllanontonr Sbpora
1882-1890 C 5182, C 3247, C 3270, C 5293, C 5466, C 5616,
C 3705, C 5864, C 4037, C 4191. C 4214, C 4274,
C 4567, C 4645, 6 4915, C 4980, C 5143, C 5432,
0 5890, C 5893, C 6070.
Correspondence re Hatal aad Sululaad*
1893-1894 C 7013* Correspondence re eetabliabsent o f
Responsible Government ia  Ratal*
1898 C 8782* Correspondsaoe re Zululand 1893-1898*
1903 Cd 1640, Minutes e f Prooss dings e f S»A« Customs
Union Conforenoo hold «t FI osmfantela, Barak 1903*
190b Cd 1894-6-7. Beporte of Transvaal Labour
Commission end evidence.
1906*1906 Cd 2905# 2927# 3247# 3688# 4001# U94# 4199#
4328, 4404.
Correspondence re Native disturbances in Natal.
1907 Cd 3563* Correapendaaoe re removal e f native
prisoners free Natal.
1908 Cd 4403* Papers re ease ef Kr. Alfred Kangana.
1909 Cd 4585* further oorrespondenoe re the tria l of
Dinusulu and other natives In Natal*
Tha P.P. ears read in conjunction vith tha records in CO 179 
and CO 427# nates generally being referenced te unpublished 
m sfrl al which often oontalned significant additional material.
(***> s m i  .M t U ii . . » « s a i n -
Prdela o f infonwtion ro Zululand 1879, 1864, 1895, 190#.
2 . Natal
BtwrtwtnW
A. Colin Wdbh has pointed out in h i. guMf 1° tfr  °i:fA<»4AJ«OTdi 
Of tho Colomr o f Notol (Natal, 1965) , thaaa appear in o hsffling 
variety of forma. At times# they ears published in a ecmpeslte 
•Blue Book9# el ether times aa separata publications o f the 
particular department in tha Natal CTovsmmant Casetts or aa 
Saaalonal Papers.
(1) Agriculture
Blue Books 1896-6 
Sessional Papara 1899*1900
Separata Publications 1902-8 (under a variety af t it le s ).
(u )  Pofonoo ond P olio.
Blue Books 1890-1900
Separate Publications 1902-1904# 1908-1909*
Government Gasetts 1.10.07.
Monthly Polloe Statistics for 1905*1907
C.G.
Annual Polloe statistics 1900*1909 Blue Books 
Reports of tommlsslcnar of Polios 1902*1909
( i l l )  B&uoatlon
Reports of Znapoator af Native Schools ead o f Superintendent
Inspector of Schools (who Included report# on Govt.
. recognised Afrioan schools free 1894*5)*
HLue Books 1890-1900
Separate publications 1902-1909*
Bduoational statletios were ineluded in Blue Bocks 1900-1909 and 
in Natal Govemnent Gassttos (which even listed  African teachers).
(I t )  N atlv  AffOr*
KLua Books 1890-1 to 1893-4
Department of N.A.t Blue Bock on Native Affairs/Annual 
Reports (sop. pub.) 1894*1909#
These Included reports froa magistrates*
(v) Zululandt Blue Bocks 1889*1897 (include a ll the departmental
reports).
itBBrti j f  cmksakw.. fsfrJralM
Native Affairs Commission Beport and Prooeedings 1852-3 
Native Affairs Commission Report end Prooeedings 1881-2 
Report by Col. 0 . A. m ile , C.B., on the censes which led to the 
ill-fe e lin g  between the Boers sad the Zulus oulninatlng in ths 
attack on the Boers by ths Zulus under Chief Slkobobo at 
Key 6, 1902. (Sep. pub* 1902)
Lend Commission Report end Appendices 1902 
Native Suiter# Commission (G.G. 10.3*03)
Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission 1902-4 * Report by joint 
Imperial mad Colonial Commissions (itobg. 1905/
Report of Industries and Tariff Revision Commission (G.G* 6.2.06) 
Prison Reform Commission (B.C. 18.9*06)
Report o f Mr. Justloe Beaumont on Alleged Shooting of Native 
prisoners by members of Royston'a Horse (G.V. 18.9*06)
Agricultural Lands and Land Settlement e f Natal -  Deportment e f 
Agrleulture (Fmbg. 1907) British
Native Affairs Commission Report (also published aa/P.P. Cd 3889) 
and Bvidenoe (Ptabg. 1907-1908) -  Report by tJSNA on tho Report 
o f NKAC (G.G* 21.1.08).
Report of deputation commissioned by D.N.A. te observe the operation 
of ths dsn  Gray Aot (G.G. 21.7*08) •
Ths Trial o f Dinusulu on charges of High Treason at Greytown, Natal, 
1908-9 (**bg. 1910).
Report of Natal Native Affairs Counoil, 1909.
Rxtant Circulars issued to Magistrates by Dept, o f N*A« 1880-1905.
A.M.MJTI B«fe»tos 1893*1909. S.s»1om1 P»pw» 1893*1909. 
Votes and Prooaadings 1895-1909*
Covwrmi*  G ssstt- 1909-1906
a tstls tlo s l Twrtxxto 1905-1909. ItaUl C«ft»ug KtWrt 190*.
( f t * *  m u .
Civil 3w rl— .Usk 1699-1910. (N bg.)
C«p« R»tiw  1m s  and Customs Commission, 1883 (Caps Tm »  188V).
South Afrloon Nation Affairs f — loo lorn 1903*5* Roport and 
Srldonoo (5 n l i«  Capa Town 1905)*
Natlrao hand fnmnloslon Riptrl DC 19, 1918* laid* DC 22, 1916.
Vlnuto by W. H. Beamout, DC 25, 1916,
Natives Land Aat 1913* X-ocal Committee Natal Report, DC 3V, 
1918*
Fourth Roport af tha Saiaot Comalttoo on Natlvo Affairs 
Administration, SC da, 1917.
Impart o f Native Churoh Commission (Capa Toan 1925).
B. HtfiWBWn I d  PerjoAlaslS
[Rm n  only m  or too artlolM  h m  boon leoksd up la a 
particular journal, this w ill ha oltad halow undar oootoaperovy 
artlalaSuJ
Natal
Tha Natal Advartloor 1902-10 
Tha Natal Noreuty " 0
Tha Natal Tltnass • •
Tha ttnoo a t Natal " •
Tha Graytown Gasatta 1904 1^906
Xlanga laaa Natal 1903*10 (Zul\*-fcigliah weakly; hay artelas wara
conveniently found translatad in 
fllaa  of S*n.a.)
Ipapa la  Usage (translations found in fllaa  o f 3 J f #A » )  1901-1903. 
Indian Opinion 1903*10
Mission Papers
Kernaimsburg Mlaslonsblatt 1900-1910 (Caxnany)
Norsk Misjonstidencle 1902-1910 (Stawangsr)
Tha Christian Express (Lovedale) 1891-Dao. 1909.
The Methodist Churchman.
£lBft
Bsro Zabstsundu 1895-1910 (English only).
African Monthly 1907-1910 (Crahanatown).
fliM pqgLfijrt&ffig
V Book, o f prooo out ting* collected by H. s . Colons. (K.C.L.)
4 Books of press outtinga on tbo native question, oollootod by
Alloo Warnsr (1888-190?) (Royal Commonwealth Sooioty Library)*
C. Contonporagr Book* and Porohloto
J* Boynoo, C i .1
Annual 1900-1901, 1901-1902 (Durban, n .d .)
(London, 1904) 
t la  mtJfcPIWRSy
v rnT Tjrn
z h e e e i
Capt. Y. Bosnant
H* R* Fox Bournei 
J* B«yoot 
J* Nuehant 
Slr.Y . Butlers
A* Campbells
Y* Y* Campbells 
•Caveat Natalia9!
Christian Cathollo Apostol
vith an introduction by
(London# n.d*) 
>. 1899)
  S** Vineyard (London 1907). (A oorioo o f
articles on South Africa ni— 1 aaioned by Tribune
flL ^ E S  R b e lli b r i f R  i  I i t r t s l
survey
M  thy Xnkandhl^  (D u te«,1 8 8 j) 
(Purb«n, n .d . 171907J)
\ t lio Churoht Loaves o f Hoalinx (Jhbg* 1
Franses B* Colonsot 
Franois K* Colonsot
. 9.4.07). 
; only one issue found 
in Natal archives, heavily soared 
in blue penoil by 8* 0 . Senuelson 
end Sir Henry MeCallue.
Tftg *MK,of (London, 1884-5), ^ t e l..
"The Natives of Natal in relation to  Martial Lex" 
(n .p .j n .d .)
"That a Liberal govern—nt  oan tolerate" • Diary 
e f T il coke fs 9 t r ia l9 by Court Martial, compiled 
by hie attorney under Poser (narked 9not for 
general publleation, F.B.C.9 and found in Public 
Reeords O ffioe). (n .p .f n .d .)
"The tr ia l and oonvietion by Court Martial o f a 
Natal Chief for 9sedition and puhlle violonoo9” 
(sln« marked to above, vlthout signature).
(n .p .f n .d .)
a m m  fia1* * 0 im, p*k
"The Reign ®f Unlaw in Natal" (22*10*08. n*p*)
(Londan. »•*•. «.1908) __
Plnmulu Sw clal Court (London, Oot. 1908)Zte nsnE ^LH ats^A  } ou
to  Jm tloo and poaoo In
,1t*ho» ^ p o t lt lo p o o *  
te r  »»« ( ?Pmbo». T1906) 
Tha Principle* o f Natira 
(address bafora Pnbg. Da! 
14*4*03j 26 .8 .06)
n »  a a a a t  i p i  (L< 
fat. 2^ a t.flp > 3 fla .*n £ °*Talk, About Mr M »tln Lot
Saa alao 'Cabuaa9 balov.
Harrlatta 5. Colanooi 
H. X# Colanao aad H. X. fox  Bournai
H. X. Colanaos "Zululand, Past and
Konoheator G o«. Soo
(London, 1890)
sent
fo r  tho futu.ro (London. 1893) 
.o o h a o n to f B^tjoh O fflola lo t o l l
cndon
s H H i
(London ,1890 ) 
Jn lo  of
BMLtBMMLJC M U f t i l
^vyo yjroomvm« oo
iL S g ^ a r
o opd tho Colonial Off loo 
ofo t i l l  la
i (^ London, 1895)
Raoes in
H. X. Colanao aad
H. X. Colanaos
I, July 1897* 
Robinson:
Afrloo", AoUtlo Quortorlr
l i t  ..,<frmamfrpcn|S££SS£
S£±Jj1fton
80
iTa oouncto  th t* lo k o fH f
A. X. Cal<juhoun: 
A. Darias 
J . L. Dubatm m
tho ftodtow of tho
CoTamnant in Natal*
ebating Sooiaty, Natal Wltnaaa
1906)
(London, 190J)
K.T., 1892)
_ _ _ a a a J M ia i
2LU'*,?£EM, **••*»
Lt. Col. Xladalat "The Problen af tha Baoaa In Afrloa" Aalatie
Jun*.H. X. Baeonba and F. C. Duraat r XlBftnatrwunai Trrfala  o f thy
V. S. Evanatw « probli
X. F inari
f t p a m jir  ta n !
produoSi ^ a b . ' s s r 1,05)
(London, 1916) 
and ppoaant ralationa af tha 
European and Bantu raoea in N atal*..", 3.A. Jnl. o f 
Sol. * Vol. XIII, 1916, 117 fr .
"Tha Natives af Natal in Halation * to  tha Land",
S.A. Jnl. of 3ci. 1918, pp. 235**46 
'’Separate Churchaa in South A frloa", Baat and West. 
▼al. 15, 1917, pp. 135-42.
-  1 0  -
lav. W. Flint and J . D. F. Gilohrlets g ^ a gff ,gp .t e it t ju a ° a . ...*caPr
'Gabuaa' ( » .  £ . Colanao] i Ths Peril In Natal (London, 1906) 
General Missionary Conference of South Africa:
(I. I .  GM«ai of Colour (London
C. W. F. Harrisons
D. Kidds
« m
G. Lagdens
Unrest in South AfrioaH, Nineteenth 
Hot.  1899. • ,
j a S  .of general information (London, 1903)
A. I . KRoys
V. I . Markhams
I .  A. Karwioks
Rot. T* Masons
B. Mitfords
Th. t e g B t t  r> flr  (London, 190b)
"l£e NatiW Question in South Afrioa" in Tha Shnira 
and Century (London, 1905)
"The Educated Native", Paper read before 2nd S.A. 
Mlaalonair Confer too.  (1906)
*  * a . Bra In South Af rlaTTLoptton. 190b)
iatlraaR aballai", Rapd Dally Mall. 19.9.06 
and 21.9*06. 
Pollqr la Ratal. Paat and Putura (Durban,
(London, 1905)$ 
the Slack (London, 1907), 
(London, 1908) -  M lf i l  about 
Natal, the last two about the events o f 1906s Tesy 
fie tltiou a .
A. N. Montgomerys 
Natal Missionary Con
Natal
Prince
1895-6, 1898-9, 1900, 1905, 1907,1937 
(found K.C.L., rest missing)
MiO’ f  p>0 (Durban, 1906)
1 Ban dale Oaonoyi: A Dafanea o f tha Ethiopian Moraaiant
S T U B Ii
R. Plants 
W. J . Powells
Sir J . Robinsons 
Russell s
Kclabours (London, 190J 
1. C. A. Samuelson:
T*06*8 **S R^,b** 1905^
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